1998 Expansion

Arizona Diamondbacks
The Diamondbacks broke every record for expansion franchises when they won the World Series in 2001, just their 4th season of existence. They did it almost exclusively through free agent signings, as owner Jerry Colangelo spared no expense to bring a World Series winner to Arizona. The weight of the free agent money and the lack of a strong farm system eventually brought down the former World Champions, but new ownership and a sharp young GM have restored hope to the franchise.
The Arizona franchise was awarded to Jerry Colangelo, who also owned the NBA's Phoenix Suns. Even before the 1998 season started, Colangelo worked feverishly to put together his franchise, spending as much money as necessary. The first move was an agreement on a publicly-financed stadium to be built in Phoenix in time for the Diamondbacks' debut. The Bank One Ballpark (or the "BOB") was a natural-grass stadium with a retractable-roof. It was more than just a baseball stadium, as evidenced by the swimming pool in right-center field, a conversation-starter in baseball circles if ever there was one.
Colangelo also signed former Yankees manager Buck Showalter to a massive contract three years before the team ever took the field. Showalter served in an advisory capacity, consulting on team-wide issues such as the ballpark and the uniforms. Joe Garagiola, Jr. was signed as the team's General Manager.
Before the expansion draft even started, Colangelo made waves by signing middle infielder Jay Bell to a 4-year, $32 million contract. Bell was a truly underrated performer and many other teams saw the move as wild spending that served to drive up contracts around baseball (which was partially true).
The expansion draft itself was fairly fruitful for the Diamondbacks, certainly when compared to their expansion-mates in Tampa Bay. Arizona's first two picks in the draft were Brian Anderson (Cleveland) and Jeff Suppan (Boston), neither of them aces, but both valuable arms. Suppan would be sold to Kansas City mid-season, but Anderson stuck around, providing good depth to what would soon become a historically good starting rotation.
Arizona's third pick, Gabe Alvarez (San Diego), was a third base prospect that never developed into anything at all. But the day of the expansion draft, the D-Backs packaged Alvarez with another pick, Pittsburgh 3B Joe Randa, as part of a trade with Detroit to get 3B Travis Fryman. But two weeks after getting the underrated Fryman, the Indians made another, more momentous trade. This one sent Fryman and relief pitcher Tom Martin to the Cleveland Indians for 3B star Matt Williams. The move really helped legitimize the Diamondbacks, giving them an established star right from the beginning. Williams was never really great in Arizona, but he was certainly very good, and he (along with Bell) gave the D-Backs a strong infield foundation from the very beginning. The D-Backs were also able to take advantage of the Florida fire sale by trading for CF Devon White.
Other useful players taken in the draft included: catcher Jorge Fabregas (Chicago-A), Karim Garcia (Dodgers), Cory Lidle (Mets), Tony Batista (Oakland), Omar Daal (Toronto), David Dellucci (Baltimore) and Russ Springer (Houston). Buried at the bottom of the draft was young Minnesota catcher Damian Miller (47th overall pick), who would serve as the young team's catcher for its first 5 seasons.
But Colangelo & Co. weren't done on the free agent market. The team nabbed Cardinal ace Andy Benes to a 2-year deal worth $12.5 million. It wasn't a very fruitful deal for the team, as Benes followed up a decent 1998 with a dismal 1999 before returning to St. Louis via free agency.
The most unlikely successful signing would be that of reliever Gregg Olson. Olson had attained stardom as a rookie phenom with the Orioles in the late 80's and early 90's, but the mid-90's saw him bouncing from team to team as a spare arm. His glory days seemingly over, the D-Backs signed him to a 2-year deal with barely more then $1 million. Olson was the comeback story of the year in 1998, when he saved 30 games as closer for the team, posting a 3.01 ERA (143 ERA+). He had a decent year as closer in 1999 (3.71 ERA; 119 ERA+), then left as a free agent.
But even with all these promising developments, the biggest "star" of the 1998 team was super-prospect Travis Lee. After being drafted by the Twins in 1996, Lee was (with the help of "advisor" Scott Boras) declared a free agent on a technicality. The loophole made the hot prospect a real-life free agent. The Diamondbacks signed him, with lots of high hopes for the future star. What followed was a fairly familiar story in modern baseball; after playing hard to get as an amateur free agent, Lee never developed into anything like people had expected. He had a decent rookie campaign in 1998 (269/346/429), but considering the context of the 1998 National League and his hitter-friendly home ballpark, that hitting line isn't too impressive for a first baseman, even a good-fielding one. After nearly two seasons of Lee getting even worse, the D-Backs traded him to Philadelphia as part of the blockbuster trade for Curt Schilling in 2000.

But we're getting ahead of ourselves. The 1998 Arizona Diamondbacks went 65-97, finishing last in the NL West. It wasn't much of a surprise for an expansion franchise to finish last, but it was still a bit disappointing for Arizona fans considering the money Colangelo spent on the team (the D-Backs' payroll was over $32 million, compared to about $27 million for Tampa Bay).
Team highlights were provided by the free agents -- Bell and Williams (20 HR each), Devon White (22 HR), and young Travis Lee (a career-high 22 HR). The pitching staff wasn't dreadful; in fact it was better than the ballpark made it look. Benes pitched fairly well, as did draft picks Anderson (4.33 ERA) and Omar Daal (2.88 ERA). Olson shined as closer, although the team sported a weak bullpen behind him.
It wasn't an awful first season, but (as I said) it must have been disappointing for Colangelo, Garagiola and Showalter, who had spent a lot of time, energy, and cash to field something better than your average expansion team.
So Colangelo went into the offseason ready to spend more money. The early returns were fairly promising; in November and early December, the team signed Greg Swindell, Greg Colbrunn, Armando Reynoso, and Todd Stottlemyre to significant free agent deals. Each player contributed to the team's 1999 leap forward; the only real "busts" would be Reynoso, who never pitched nearly that well again, and Stottlemyre, whose career was basically ended by injuries in 2000; but he still collected $8 million a year through the 2002 season.
But the deal that really put the team over the top occurred on December 10, when the team signed Randy Johnson as a free agent. Johnson signed a four-year contract and went on to win the Cy Young Award in all 4 years, a truly amazing feat. Johnson was a star and had been a star for years in Seattle, but he ascended to the elite when he went to Arizona, an unlikely accomplishment at age 35.
Colangelo followed that up by plunking down big money to center fielder Steve Finley. While not nearly as lucrative as the Johnson deal, Finley was a key part of the team's later success, giving them an all-around gem of a ballplayer for just a little more than $5 million per year.
Two other deals that offseason that went (nearly) unnoticed at the time were the acquisition of Erubiel Durazo and Luis Gonzalez. Durazo was a raw talent from the Mexican leagues, whereas Gonzalez was a 9-year veteran who was an underrated hitter, but otherwise not much of a star. Arizona took Gonzalez in a trade with Detroit that sent off Karim Garcia. The gross inequality of the deal would soon become apparent.
This time, all the money spent paid off. The Arizona payroll skyrocketed up to $68.7 million in 1999, making them 3rd in the NL behind only Atlanta and Los Angeles. But it worked and thensome; the 3 million+ who came to the BOB in 1999 saw history in the making as the Diamondbacks went 100-62 and cruised to the NL West title; they saw an expansion franchise making the postseason in its 2nd year of existence, a new record.
The team sported all-around talent and a balanced attack. Their 5.60 runs per game was 1st in the NL, better even than the Rockies. And despite their ballpark, Arizona's pitching and defense limited the opposition to 4.17 runs per game, tied for 2nd in the NL. Only the Braves were better.
While Travis Lee and free agent Finley slumped (his 34 HR were offset by a .336 OBP), veterans Bell and Williams picked up the slack; Bell with 38 HR and Williams with 35. Right fielder Tony Womack made a lot of headlines with his 72 stolen bases, but this just exposes the baseball media's bizarre fascination with stolen bases. While Womack's 72-for-85 stolen base performance was amazing, stealing bases was the only thing that Womack could do on a baseball field. Womack was similar to Vince Coleman in that his skills at stealing bases made him a star in spite of the fact that he couldn't hit water if he fell out of a boat. Womack hit a truly dismal 277/332/370 in 1999 and currently sports an awful 273/316/356 career batting line. His defense in right field wasn't good (and it's even worse at second base), but Womack still gets work in the majors; after getting kicked out of New York and Cincinnati, Womack is currently wasting at-bats with the Cubs, thanks most likely to Dusty Baker, a manager who has shown a remarkable ignorance of how runs are actually scored.
But I digress. The real superstar fueling the '99 Diamondbacks was Randy Johnson. In the midst of a hitting renaissance, Johnson posted a 2.48 ERA in 271.2 IP, walking 70 batters and racking up an ungodly 364 strikeouts, good for 3rd on the all-time list behind Nolan Ryan and Sandy Koufax.
As a side note, it must be said that it took Ryan and Koufax 326 and 335.2 innings, respectively, to set their strikeout records. And the truly all-time strikeout kings come from the 19th century, when people were still throwing 500 innings in a year. A better measure of strikeout effectiveness (which also adjusts for a pitcher's era) is strikeouts per 9 innings. The top 10 single seasons of strikeouts per 9 innings are listed on www.baseball-reference.com. Randy Johnson holds first place, with 13.41 K/9 in 2001. He also holds 4th place, and 5th place . . . and 6th place, and 7th place . . . In fact, Johnson holds 7 of the top 10 positions on the single-season list. Only Pedro Martinez (1999 and 2000) and Kerry Wood (1998) share the space with him. This gives us an idea of just how historically amazing Randy Johnson truly is.
The Diamondbacks didn't have much behind Johnson in the starting rotation, but they did have a strong bullpen. Matt Mantei, obtained from Florida, took over as closer and managed 22 saves with a 2.79 ERA. The bullpen was rounded out by veterans Swindell (2.51 ERA), Olson (3.71), Darren Holmes (3.70) and Dan Plesac (3.32).
The D-Backs went into he 1999 postseason as history-makers and left as disappointments. Ace Johnson only got one start in the 4-game NLDS loss to the Mets, a Game 1 loss that saw him allow 7 ER in 8.1 IP. The D-Backs made it close in Game 4 at Shea Stadium, but the Mets sent the game into extra innings and won it in the 10th inning on a walk-off, series-ending homer by backup catcher Todd Pratt.
The '99 postseason was a setback, but it looked like the Diamondbacks had arrived as true contenders in the NL. It was thus a big disappointment when the 2000 club struggled to an 85-77 finish. Despite the presence of a juggernaut outfield of Gonzalez, Finley and the unlikely Danny Bautista (317/366/511), the D-Backs were short on offensive depth, with veterans Bell and Williams starting to show their age. And despite another historic Cy Young season from Randy Johnson (2.64 ERA, 177 ERA+, 248.2 IP, 347 K), the team was still struggling to fill out the starting rotation behind him. Brian Anderson was a reliable arm (4.05 ERA), but not the kind of guy you want as your #2 starter behind a Cy Young winner. With Reynoso and Daal tanking and Stottlemyre's career essentially over, Colangelo decided the time had come to take on more money. This time it was via trade, a trade that sent Curt Schilling from Philadelphia in a cost-cutting move that netted the Phillies disappointments Daal and Travis Lee, as well as young pitchers Nelson Figueroa and Vicente Padilla. The team soon signed Schilling to a contract extension that would pay him $20 million for his last two years in Arizona. While Schilling pitched well for the team down the stretch in 2000 (3.69 ERA in 13 starts), it wasn't soon enough to turn around the season. But the Schilling deal would pay big dividends in the coming years.
Considering that the 2000 club's payroll had risen again, this time to over $81 million (3rd in NL), there would be some accountability for the 2000 disappointment. Despite his energetic role as team-builder, manager Showalter got the axe in October, with the chief complaint being that he kept the team too tense (a similar story heard during his days as captain of the Yankees). The job went to the chief complainer, broadcaster Bob Brenly, who would take the helm in time for the 2001 season.
It was more free agent fun during the 2000-2001 offseason. The biggest names coming in were first baseman Mark Grace and right fielder Reggie Sanders. Grace was a veteran team leader with the Cubs for years who left when the team preferred to give his job to a cheap 1B prospect. Sanders was a nomadic hitter-for-hire who was never great, but was good enough to keep getting jobs as a starting outfielder. There were worries that the team had come to rely too much on free agency, making the team not only too expensive but too old. These fears seemed justified when hitters like Bell and Williams made an immediate impact, then started to deteriorate with age. Indeed, the average hitter on the 2001 team was 31.9 years old, the oldest in the league. Their pitchers were 30.9 years old, 3rd-oldest in the league. The franchise was still waiting to produce a useful player from its farm system. Was this team really fundamentally sound in the long run?
2001 gave a striking answer to that question: the team was very sound, although the long run was still yet to come. But the short run showed a 92-70 record that was good enough for the NL West crown -- a bare 2 games ahead of San Francisco. The lineup was generally strong, with their 5.05 runs per game 3rd in the league. Free agent Grace proved that he had at least one year of stardom left (298/386/466), but the mega-star was left fielder Gonzalez. Gonzalez had already experienced a career renaissance in Arizona, hitting like an All-Star for the first time ever. But in 2001, he ascended to the next level. He hit for a 325/429/688 line, amazing under any circumstances. But the number that caught everyone's eye was his 57 home runs. Gonzalez was part of the year-long chase to break Mark McGwire's record, and thus became a true superstar (while Karim Garcia dwelt in mediocrity). The only downside was that despite his 57 dingers, Gonzalez finished 3rd in the home run race -- behind Sammy Sosa's 64 and Barry Bonds' record-breaking 73.
If it was possible, though, the performance of Randy Johnson and Curt Schilling dwarfed even that of "Gonzo." Schilling went 22-6, posting a 2.98 ERA in 256.2 IP with 293 K against just 39 walks. But Johnson was even better -- 21-6, 2.49 ERA, 249.2 IP, and 372 K (just one short of the record) against just 71 walks. They finished 1-2 in the Cy Young race, with Johnson winning his third straight. Their brilliant performance drew comparisons to Koufax/Drysdale as one of the dominant pitching duos of all time, a comparison that has a strong basis in fact.
The dominance continued into the postseason, as the team beat the Cardinals in a tense, 5-game NLDS. Curt Schilling pitched a complete game in the finale, allowing just one run, but he was matched by St. Louis' Matt Morris, and the game was tied going into the bottom of the 9th. After a failed suicide squeeze saw the potential winning run out at home, Tony Womack saved the day with an RBI single that won the series for Arizona.
The NLCS against Atlanta was a relative cakewalk; Johnson and Schilling made 3 starts between them and won all 3, allowing just 3 ER in 25 IP and striking out 31. The true test would come in the World Series, one for the ages, against the vaunted New York Yankees. The Yankees had won the past 3 World Series and were considered by many to be the favorites, despite the possibility of Arizona getting 5 starts from the Schilling-Johnson duo.
It got off to a great start for Arizona; they took Game 1 9-1 behind Curt Schilling and then won Game 2 thanks to a Randy Johnson shutout. But things changed when the Series went back to New York. Starter Brian Anderson held his own against Roger Clemens, but the Yanks squeaked out a 2-1 victory.
Things brightened up in Game 4 when the D-Backs got a great start from Schilling and took a 3-1 lead into the 9th. The Diamondbacks had Byung-Hyun Kim was on the mound. Kim was signed out of South Korea in 1999 and had quickly established himself as a premiere relief pitcher with his unorthodox sidearm motion. He had been brilliant as the Arizona closer during the regular season, but it wasn't his day. Tino Martinez tied the game with a home run in the 9th inning, sending the game into extras. Despite the fact that he had already pitched two innings, Brenly sent Kim out to the mound in the 10th (one of many questionable moves the Arizona skipper made during the Series). Derek Jeter added more to his "clutch" aura when he hit a walk-off home run to tie the Series 2-2.
Game 5 was hideous deja vu for Arizona. They got a great start once again, this time from Miguel Batista, who shut out the Yanks for 7.2 innings. With the team leading 2-0, Brenly sent Kim to close out the 9th. And after giving up a leadoff double, Kim gave up a home run to Scott Brosius, which tied the game. It was a horrible two days for Kim, who was otherwise brilliant in 2001. Brenly took a lot of second-guessing for his decision to send Kim out again after allowing the Game 4 homer, but this is the worst kind of second-guessing. Kim was his closer and had done the job brilliantly throughout the regular season. Every closer has an off day, and you don't give up on them afterward, even if it happens in October. On this point (at least), I'll stick up for Brenly. Game 5 went into extra innings, but the Yankees won in 12, taking a 3-2 Series lead.
The more romantically-inclined baseball writers (read: all of them), took this as a sign of fate; September 11 was barely 6 weeks past, and it seemed like the perfect story for the Yankees to win the World Series. The unlikely comebacks in Game 4 and 5 (not to mention the eerie similarities) seemed to prove it: the Yankees were fated to win the World Series. Not just for New York . . . but for America.
But this is baseball; it's a sport, not a Greek tragedy. And when the Series returned to Arizona for Game 6 it left the world of media fancy and returned to the world of realism.
This was dramatically displayed by a 15-2 thumping of the Yankees in Game 6 that evened the Series 3-3. But although it was a great victory, there were still mistakes being made. Despite the fact that the D-Backs got out to a huge lead, manager Brenly left starter Randy Johnson in the game. It became clear, when Arizona led 15-0 in the 4th, that the game was a foregone conclusion. It seemed prudent for Brenly to take out Johnson early in order to save him for a possible relief appearance in the crucial Game 7. But despite the fact that even Rick Vaughn could protect a 15-0 lead, Brenly left Johnson in all the way through the 7th inning before taking him out. It's a point energetically pointed out by Rob Neyer, and although the move didn't end up costing the Diamondbacks, it very well could have.
It was winner-take-all in Game 7 with Roger Clemens facing Curt Schilling. This was turning into a World Series for the ages, and it seemed as though America was watching. It was a true pitcher's duel, but Clemens was just a bit better. A solo homer by Alfonso Soriano gave the Yankees a 2-1 lead in the 8th, forcing Schilling out of the game. Brenly brought in Randy Johnson to close out the 8th (with the seemingly-mutant Johnson pitching on 0 days rest). But Joe Torre brought in ace closer Mariano Rivera in the 8th inning, which certainly seemed to be the end of it for Arizona. Not only was Rivera an ace, but he seemed to save his best pitching for October. Rivera had already thrown 5 shutout innings in the Series, and he put on a display in the 8th inning, striking out the side. Johnson retired the Yankees in the 9th, but the Diamondbacks were down to their last 3 outs against Rivera in the 9th.
It started out innocently. Mark Grace led off the inning with a single. The next batter, catcher Damian Miller, bunted Grace to second, but was safe at first when Rivera made a throwing error. Jay Bell came up next as a pinch-hitter and tried to sacrifice the runners over, but Rivera was able to throw out the runner at third. With runners on first and second and one out, it was again Tony Womack who played the hero, doubling to right and tying the game, with Bell stopping at third base. Rivera again seemed to feel the pressure when he hit Craig Counsell with a pitch, loading the bases. After that, Luis Gonzalez came up. With one out, the infielders came in to keep the Series-winning run from scoring. Rivera threw a pitch that jammed Gonzalez; it was a blooper into center field, but it was enough to get past the drawn-in infield. Bell scored from third, and the Arizona Diamondbacks had won one of the most exciting World Series ever played. To honor their pitching co-dominance, Schilling and Johnson were named co-MVPs of the Series.
It seemed impossible to follow up such an amazing season, but the D-Backs came close in 2002, going 98-64 and winning the NL West. Johnson and Schilling were as sharp as ever, with the Big Unit taking home a record-tying 4th consecutive Cy Young Award. Johnson also earned the "Pitcher's Triple Crown" by leading the league in wins, ERA, and strikeouts. It was much the same team that returned to October, again facing the Cardinals in the NLDS.
What followed was a complete upset. Johnson got blown out in Game 1, and the Cardinals won 12-2. Schilling pitched well in Game 2, but was matched by Chuck Finley, and the bullpen allowed the go-ahead run in the 9th, as St. Louis won 2-1. Having defeated both Johnson and Schilling, it was thus anti-climactic when the Cardinals defeated Miguel Batista 6-3 in Game 3, completing perhaps the most unlikely sweep in the short history of the NLDS.
Arizona fans didn't know it at the time, but 2002 was the last hurrah for the teams that had been so strong since 1999. Injuries hampered first both Johnson and Schilling in 2003 and although Johnson bounced back with a 2004 that almost (ahem, should have) won the NL Cy Young, Schilling was already gone; traded to Boston in a salary dump. Johnson would follow in the 2004-5 offseason, going to New York.
There was some hope for the 2003 team, even as their Dynamic Duo struggled with injuries. With veterans Bell, Williams, and Grace long gone, a group of young players -- dubbed the "Baby-Backs" -- came on the scene, helping the team to a respectable 84-78 finish. The most prominent of these were first baseman Lyle Overbay (276/365/402), second baseman Junior Spivey (255/326/433), shortstop Alex Cintron (317/359/489), and relievers such as Oscar Villarreal (2.57 ERA, 80 K in 98 IP) and Jose Valverde (2.15 ERA, 71 K in 50.1 IP).
But the best Baby-Back of them all was also the first real star to come out of the franchise's farm system. Starting pitcher Brandon Webb brought his sinker and his penchant for LOTS of ground balls to the majors in 2003. The Kentucky native's 10-9 record was belied by a 2.84 ERA and a fabulous 68:172 BB:K ratio in 180.2 IP. Webb finished 3rd in the Rookie of the Year voting, behind flashier (though not necessarily better) players Dontrelle Willis and Scott Podsednik. Webb regressed in 2004, allowing a league-high 119 walks against 164 K in 208 IP. But he managed a good ERA (3.59), and his 7-16 record was more a product of the team he was playing for (we'll get to them in a minute). Webb bounced back with a fine 2005 that saw him establish himself as one of the best young pitchers in the game. Again, his W-L record was deceiving (14-12), but Webb posted a 3.54 ERA (124 ERA+) and put his 2004 wildness behind him, walking only 59 against 172 K in 229 IP. 2006 has thus far been very kind to the 27-year-old, who is currently making a bid for the Cy Young Award with an 8-0 record and a 2.01 ERA.
So while 2003 was a setback, the presence of a strong group of young players meant that there was no reason to panic in Arizona. Sure, the team was trading away its more expensive players (Steve Finley, Curt Schilling), but how bad could that be?
As it turned out, very bad. Very, very bad. Very, very, very, oh-my-God-so-TERRIBLY bad.
A sign of things to come was a move by GM Garagiola that soon become known in infamy as the "Sexson trade." Garagiola, seeking an impact hitter, traded for Milwaukee first baseman Richie Sexson, despite the fact that 2004 was Sexson's last season before reaching free agency. So unless he could negotiate a contract extension, Arizona would only be "renting" Sexson for one season (which is exactly what happened). But that wasn't the worst thing. The worst thing was how much Garagiola gave up to get Sexson. I can't imagine WHAT Brewers GM Doug Melvin slipped into Garagiola's drink to convince him to line up the Arizona players and let Melvin take his pick, buffet-style, but here's a list of the players Arizona gave up in exchange for Sexson (see also previous entry on the Brewers):
Junior Spivey, Craig Counsell, Lyle Overbay, Chad Moeller, Chris Capuano, Jorge de la Rosa
So most of what kept the Diamondbacks competitive in 2003 (84-78) was gone to the Brewers for Sexson -- who only appeared in 23 games before suffering a season-ending injury.
So not only were the Diamondbacks without the players listed above, they were also without the impact bat that was supposed to replace them (although how a good first baseman can replace a good shortstop, good first baseman, decent second baseman, and good pitching prospect all by himself is beyond me). How did they fare?
They went 51-111.
To put that into context that is -- you read it right -- one hundred and eleven losses. That's not just a bad year, that's a 2003 Tigers/1962 Mets type of bad year. That's the kind of bad year that stains a franchise for years to come. The last NL team to lose more than 111 games was the 1965 New York Mets, who went 50-112. So the 2004 Diamondbacks were the worst National League team since the worst years of early Met history. That's the kind of fact that makes you shudder.
The Diamondbacks were bad in a diverse way; they had bad hitting, bad pitching, and bad defense. Their 3.80 runs scored per game was the worst in the league, even worse than the lame-duck Montreal Expos. Their 5.55 runs allowed per game was 14th-worst in the league. Only the Reds and Rockies were worse, and the Rockies at least have their ballpark as an excuse. Arizona's ERA+ in 2004 was 89, an awful number that ranked them 15th in the league. They were simply lucky that the Reds chose that moment to field the worst pitching staff in franchise history (Cincinnati's ERA+ was 77). And yes, the D-Backs also led the league in errors with 139 for the league's worst fielding percentage (.977). The more accurate metric of Defensive Efficiency ranks them as 15th in the NL -- slightly better than the Rockies, which is about as dubious a compliment as there is.
Upper management's response to the fiasco was about what you'd expect -- absolute panic. Brenly didn't survive the season, getting replaced by interim skipper Al Pedrique. After the season, it was owner Colangelo who got the ouster by the team's board of directors. He was replaced by Jeff Moorad, a former superstar player agent. It was an odd arrangement that saw an agent switch sides to management -- something akin to an Israeli partisan hanging a picture of Yasser Arafat in his den. When asked about a possible conflict of interest -- Moorad had represented players such as Arizona star Luis Gonzalez -- the commissioner's office saw no problem. In other news, the Institution for Wolves saw no misconduct by the Big Bad Wolf in the Little Red Riding Hood affair.
Ownership, along with GM Garagiola, decided that the best way to put 2004 behind them was on the free agent market. So despite trading away Randy Johnson to lower payroll, they turned around and raised payroll with the signing of questionable free agents Troy Glaus and Russ Ortiz to big-money contracts. Glaus was a great hitter when healthy, but his playing time had been limited while with the Angels. That and his poor defense at third was enough to make him a poor choice for a big-money investment.
Ortiz, on the other hand, just wasn't that good under any circumstances. Ortiz is the textbook example of a pitcher whose circumstances made him look good, while he himself wasn't. Ortiz had amassed a lot of wins in his career, yes; but Ortiz had spent his career with the Giants and Braves, two perennial NL powerhouses of the era. In fact, let's take this opportunity to compare Ortiz's W-L record to that of his team:

1998: S. F. Giants (89-74); Ortiz (4-4)
1999: S.F. Giants (86-76); Ortiz (18-9)
2000: S. F. Giants (97-65); Ortiz (14-12)
2001: S.F. Giants (90-72); Ortiz (17-9)
2002: S.F. Giants (95-66); Ortiz (14-10)
2003: Atlanta Braves (101-61); Ortiz (21-7)
2004: Atlanta Braves (96-66); Ortiz (15-9)
2005: Arizona D'Backs (77-85); Ortiz (5-11)

Some coincidence: Ortiz's first losing season as a pitcher comes during his season with a losing team. Now not all of Ortiz's value is tied up in his team; he is a generally good pitcher. But he fooled most of the baseball world -- who are still too easily fooled by these things -- that he was a great pitcher, based mostly on his W-L record. Not only that, but it must be said that the Braves and Giants generally had a strong defense behind Ortiz; he wouldn't be so lucky in Arizona.
As if all that weren't enough, the D'Backs should have been troubled by Ortiz's last season in Atlanta. Yes, he went 15-9, but see above: his team went 96-66 and the 2004 Braves had a good defense. But Ortiz turned 30 that year, and his skills were starting to deteriorate. He allowed 112 walks against just 143 strikeouts; the worst BB:K ratio of his career. And a pitcher's walk rate and strikeout rate are much more closely tied to his actual level of talent than wins, losses, and even ERA (Ortiz's 2004 ERA was a decent 4.13). A clever eye would notice that Ortiz's "peripherals" (stats such as walk rate and strikeout rate) showed a pitcher on the decline. But either the Diamondbacks did not see these things or they chose not to see them. They paid the price not only in dollars -- $7.4 million, about twice as much as a league-average pitcher is worth, let alone one whose stats show a steep drop ahead -- but on the field. Ortiz's 2005 was cut short by injuries to just 22 starts and 115 innings pitched. That was merciful -- because he posted a 6.89 ERA and walked more batters (65) than he struck out (46). While injuries go away, bad pitching does not -- especially if you're 32 years old; and now the D-Backs are stuck with the rest of Russ's contract.
But even considering all of that, anything would be better than 51-111. And the D-Backs were a lot better than that; they went 77-85 and finished 2nd in the awful NL West. It wasn't without some pre-season controversy, though. The team signed Wally Backman as their new manager, but apparently didn't do much of a background check on the candidate. It was up to local media to point out that Backman had been convicted of physical harassment and drunk driving in his days as a minor league manager. This was a huge management gaffe, which left the team no choice but to cut ties with Backman and choose Bob Melvin to run the team. It was perhaps a fitting footnote to such a season that was embarassing on-the-field to see the front office made to look like fools and incompetents.
But the 2005 team wasn't as good as it looked. This was partially due to the weak competition in their division, but is also suggested by the team's Pythagorean W-L record. Judged by runs scored and allowed, the 2005 D-Backs should have gone 66-96. Instead, they went 77-85, outperforming their Pythagorean projection by a historic 11 wins. This could be due to great on-the-field management and "clutch" hitting, or it could be a sign that it's very, very hard to revamp a 111-loss team in just one season.
Team highlights included the development of talented corner infielder Chad Tracy (308/359/553), the good health of Glaus (258/363/522), and the unlikely renaissance of platoon first baseman Tony Clark (304/366/636 with 30 HR). Pitcher Javier Vazquez, obtained from New York in the Johnson trade, was a bit more disappointing, posting a 4.42 ERA despite 192 K in 215.2 IP. The culprit was likely his 35 HR allowed. The pitching slack was picked up by Webb and closer Jose Valverde. Free agents Ortiz and Shawn Estes weighed down the rotation, and what had looked like a great young bullpen had by and large fizzled out.
More change was in order for the 2006 season. GM Garagiola was out, replaced by Boston Assistant GM Josh Byrnes, a widely-respected young executive with a fine reputation. Byrnes' focus thus far has been to prepare for the arrival of the fruits of their stacked farm system. Expensive third baseman Troy Glaus was traded to Toronto for second base glove whiz Orlando Hudson and former D-Back Miguel Batista. To replace Glaus, Byrnes shifted 1B Chad Tracy to third, making room for vaunted first base prospect Conor Jackson. To fill the gaping hole at catcher, Byrnes traded away two relief arms for Atlanta backstop Johnny Estrada. He also brought in Eric Byrnes and Jeff DaVanon as temporary fixes in the outfield. Byrnes traded the disappointing Vazquez to the White Sox for starter Orlando Hernandez (whom he recently sent to the Mets for reliever Jorge Julio). So while there are still expensive former stars such as Luis Gonzalez and Shawn Green still on the payroll, Byrnes has managed to assemble a competent, competitive team without making any expensive, long-term commitments (with the exception of the untradable Russ Ortiz). They've paved the way for the arrival of young players like Jackson while keeping the pitching staff strong with the likes of Webb and Batista. The NL West is an up-for-grabs division right now, and Arizona's deep farm system and keen GM make them favorites for a return to glory sometime in the near future.

Sources:
Total Ballclubs by Donald Dewey & Nicholas Acocella
Total Baseball Encyclopedia 2004 Ed.
Rob Neyer's Big Book of Baseball Lineups by Rob Neyer
www.retrosheet.org
&
www.baseball-reference.com

1998 Expansion (preview)

Interlude

Realignment

"Interim" commissioner Bud Selig did not take long after coming into power to implement some radical ideas. Well, they weren't that radical, but in the most tradition-minded sport of them all, they did seem radical. But Selig, unlike many other wild dreamers of the past, was able to see his ideas to fruition. This illustrates not just Selig's position as one of the more powerful owners (and a man working among friends), but someone who can effectively put through his ideas. And to Selig's credit (much though I mock him elsewhere), many of his ideas have been good ones.
After the 1992 expansion, it became even more clear that baseball was facing the same problem it faced in the late 1960's: too many teams out of contention. In the late 60's, 20 teams competed for 2 postseason berths (10% of teams reached postseason). This was fixed when baseball expanded to two divisions in 1969, making it 4 postseason berths for 24 teams (17%). This was done in part to make the postseason more exciting, but mainly to provide room for other teams, especially underdog teams, to make the playoffs and make the pennant race much more accessible.
The MLB faced a similar problem in 1993. Things hadn't changed much since the first divisional split; now 28 teams competed for the 4 berths (14%). But baseball was facing growing competition from the other major sports. The NBA and NHL playoffs are admittedly a joke; when more than 50% of teams make the postseason, the first few rounds are pretty dull. But the great benefit of this was giving more teams a shot at the postseason; therefore more teams would be considered competitive and able to draw fans, and fewer teams would have to live through utterly meaningless Septembers.
Baseball decided to take a limited solution to this problem; they looked to the example of the NFL. The NFL had expanded to 4 divisions, with the addition of one or two "Wild Cards," where the team with the best record (after the division leaders) took a spot in the postseason as well. This was essentially what Selig had in mind.
Selig envisioned breaking baseball into 3 divisions; 2 divisions of 5 teams each and one division of 4 teams to make up both 14-team leagues. Here's what he had in mind:

AMERICAN LEAGUE

AL EAST

Baltimore Orioles

Boston Red Sox

Detroit Tigers

New York Yankees

Toronto Blue Jays

AL CENTRAL

Chicago White Sox

Cleveland Indians

Kansas City Royals

Milwaukee Brewers

Minnesota Twins

AL WEST

California Angels

Oakland Athletics

Seattle Mariners

Texas Rangers

NATIONAL LEAGUE

NL EAST

Atlanta Braves

Florida Marlins

Montreal Expos

New York Mets

Philadelphia Phillies

NL CENTRAL

Chicago Cubs

Cincinnati Reds

Houston Astros

Pittsburgh Pirates

St. Louis Cardinals

NL WEST

Colorado Rockies

Los Angeles Dodgers

San Diego Padres

San Francisco Giants

One added benefit of the new divisional system was that it was geographically correct -- teams were located in divisions in keeping with their physical location -- so no more Atlanta Braves in the Western division.

The three division winners would each receive a postseason berth, and the 2nd-place team with the best record would get a Wild Card berth. While the MLB didn't go to "seeding" teams in the postseason like the NBA, they did set up advantages and disadvantages. The Wild Card would have to face the team with the best record in the league in the first round of playoffs (unless they both came from the same division; in which case they would face the team with the 2nd-best record). The team with the best record in the league would also be guaranteed home-field advantage in the ALDS and ALCS.

This meant, of course, a new round of playoffs, termed the Division Series. The Division Series would be a best-of-5 affair, with the two winners then advancing to the ALCS. It meant more postseason games ($$$), more teams in contention deeper into the season ($$$), and a move toward becoming more competitive with the other major sports.

Traditionalists were outraged. The idea of a 2nd-place team making it into October baseball was considered akin to sacrilege. It meant that a lesser team stood a greater chance of making it to the World Series and winning it (which was precisely the idea, although they prefer to call themselves "underdogs"). It also meant that two divisions in baseball would consist of only 4 teams. So you only had to beat 3 other teams to make it to the postseason. And with a 6- or 7-team division, there was always a measure of competitive balance. But with a 4-team division, you're going to have years where all 4 teams are good and some years when they're all bad.

The reality, though, was that it didn't make that much of a difference. It was probably a necessity to include more teams in the postseason, especially since the owners kept adding more franchises all the time. In 2006, 30 teams are competing for 8 postseason berths (27%). It's a lot more than it used to be, but it's nowhere near the NBA or the NHL.

Bud Selig announced that 1994 would be the first season played under this new format. And it started off well . . . at least, until the player's strike hit. One of the forgotten casualties of the '94 strike is Bud Selig's 3-division system. What was supposed to breathe more life into baseball soon became old news compared to the more monumental events in the game.

For those who are curious, here's what the postseason would have looked like when the strike hit:

ALDS

New York Yankees (70-43; AL East Champs) .vs. Cleveland Indians (66-47; Wild Card)

Chicago White Sox (67-46; AL Central Champs) .vs. Texas Rangers (52-62; AL West Champs)

NLDS

Montreal Expos (74-40; NL East Champs) .vs. L. A. Dodgers (58-56; NL West Champs)

Cincinnati Reds (66-48; NL Central Champs) .vs. Atlanta Braves (68-46; NL Wild Card)

I've mentioned before that the '94 players' strike crushed the hopes of the Expos, who would never be that good again. It wasn't so bad for the other NL teams; the other three would return to the postseason in 1995.

Over in the AL, the New York Yankee renaissance had to wait another year before making the postseason. And a very good Chicago White Sox team missed a chance at postseason glory. Both Cleveland and Texas would be back in '95. The '95 Rangers are a great footnote to baseball history; they're the only team to win a division with a losing record. True, it wasn't a full season, and true, there was no postseason, so it wasn't a real division title. But it's still a pretty sorry distinction, and one of the real dangers of the 4-team division.

When baseball came back in 1995, so did Selig's format. It saw the Braves beat the Rockies in the NLDS and then sweep the Reds in the NLCS (Cincinnati having defeated L.A. in the NLDS). In the AL, the Indians beat the Red Sox in the ALDS and then toppled the Mariners in 6 games in the ALCS (Seattle having defeated New York in the ALDS). The Braves then took the World Series in 6 over the Cleveland Indians. There was really no scandal involved; both pennant winners sported the best record in their league and were certainly worthy competitors in what was a memorable World Series.

Everyone knew it would happen eventually, and it did in 1997, when the Florida Marlins became the first-ever Wild Card World Champions. It was certainly an exciting journey, culminating in a 7-game World Series that made the Marlins look like the underdogs, but realists pointed out that the Marlins certainly weren't the best team in baseball in 1997. But with the addition of a 3rd round of playoffs, the odds are that much greater that the best man will lose. The Marlins repeated the trick as Wild Card World Champions in 2003. No franchise has ever won a World Series without finishing in first place at some point in its history. Except the Marlins -- they've done it twice. And they're still waiting on their first-ever 1st-place finish.

Selig the Mad Scientist went into 1998 with even more crazy ideas. It was termed "Radical Realignment," and this time it proved too radical for even the most ardent of his supporters. Specific plans were never publicized, but Selig reportedly wanted multiple teams changing leagues, let alone divisions.

This was all to accommodate the 1998 addition of two new franchises. They couldn't just put one in each league, because that would make it an uneven 15 teams per league, with one team in each league idle at all times. No one was ready to go for constant, year-round interleague play, so Selig stepped in with his plan.

Luckily, cooler heads prevailed, and a plan was put in place whereby one team would be added to each league, but with one AL franchise switching to the NL to make it a more practical 16/14 split. As I've mentioned before, Kansas City was the first choice to move, but local fans rejected the idea. The Milwaukee Brewers were open to the possibility of the move (which would hopefully make their owner, Bud Selig, more money), and so it was decided. After a couple division-switches and just a little realignment, baseball agreed upon the divisional format that still exists today:

AL EAST

Baltiimore Orioles

Boston Red Sox

New York Yankees

Tampa Bay Devil Rays*

Toronto Blue Jays

AL CENTRAL

Chicago White Sox

Cleveland Indians

Detroit Tigers (moved from AL East to accommodate Brewers' switch to NL)

Kansas City Royals

Minnesota Twins

AL WEST

Anaheim Angels (later Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim)

Oakland Athletics

Seattle Mariners

Texas Rangers

NL EAST
Atlanta Braves

Florida Marlins

Montreal Expos (later Washington Nationals)

New York Mets

Philadelphia Phillies

NL CENTRAL

Chicago Cubs

Cincinnati Reds

Houston Astros

Milwaukee Brewers

Pittsburgh Pirates

St. Louis Cardinals

NL WEST

Arizona Diamondbacks*

Colorado Rockies

Los Angeles Dodgers

San Diego Padres

San Francisco Giants

* -- denotes 1998 expansion team

This had the added benefit of removing at least one of the 4-team divisions and adding a super-competitive 6-team NL Central.

Stay tuned, as I'll wrap up this entire series by discussing the two 1998 expansion teams: the Arizona Diamondbacks and . . . uh . . . what do you call them . . . uh . . . the . . . starts with an "S"? . . . No, no, a "D" . . . Are we, um, are we sure that there's another "major league" team to discuss? Are we? Really?

1993 Expansion Pt. 2

Florida Marlins
No franchise has so shamefully exposed the heartless, profit-seeking nature of modern baseball more than the Florida Marlins. While many thought that syndicate baseball had been left behind somewhere in the early 20th century, the Marlins have proven that theory wrong. Now the Marlins are in the truly Machiavellian process of blackmailing the state of Florida for more money, threatening to pull up stakes and leave if they don't get it. Rumors that the team has been taken over by Major League owner Rachel Phelps are thus far unsubstantiated.
But the Marlins began, as the Rockies did, with a general sense of optimism. Major league baseball had never come to Florida, although many teams had threatened to for a number of years. The nominal destination for discontented teams was the Tampa-St. Petersburg area, a market that had come within inches of getting both the Giants and White Sox and had gotten serious nibbles from other franchises.
It was thus a bit of a shock when the MLB's first Florida franchise was located in Miami. Not only was the Miami weather much more unpredictable, but the Tampa-St. Pete citizens had been given vague promises of a baseball team for years. What tilted the balance toward Miami was Wayne Huizenga. Huizenga was the owner of the Blockbuster Video company and a part-owner of the NFL Dolphins. What Huizenga had that others did not was money. Huizenga bought a half-share of the Dolphins' Joe Robbie Stadium and began an intense P.R. campaign to bring baseball to south Florida. It didn't hurt that Huizenga offered to pay his $95 million league entry fee in cash. The final blow to the Tampa Bay area fans was the choice to call the new team the Florida Marlins, implying that the team represented the entire Florida market.
There was a bit of a murmur surrounding Huizenga's selection of team executives. Carl Barger was named team president and drew criticism when he continued to hold down his job as president of the Pirates. Even worse was the hiring of Dave Dombrowski as General Manager. To take over the position, Dombrowski left the General Manager's job in Montreal and, in the process, poached almost all of the Montreal front office, bringing them to Florida with him. The raids on Montreal executives didn't stop until NL President Bill White intervened.
Compared to their expansion-mates in Colorado, the Marlins had a very poor showing in the expansion draft. Their first pick (2nd overall) was Nigel Wilson, an outfielder in the Toronto system who turned out to be a major-league bust. Their 2nd pick was a Mets pitching prospect named Jose Martinez. Martinez never pitched a game for Florida, but he was a part of the trade that brought Gary Sheffield to Florida in July of 1993.
Their 3rd pick, Bret Barberie, was a Montreal second baseman who never lived up to the hype. They finally scored a winner with their 4th pick, taking reliever Trevor Hoffman from Cincinnati. But unfortunately, Hoffman only pitched 28 games as a Marlin before going to San Diego as part of the Sheffield deal.
With their 5th pick, they finally took a player who would be at least semi-useful to the team for a good length of time. It was starting pitcher Pat Rapp, taken from the Giants. Rapp spent 4+ years in Florida, usually pitching well and offering strength to what was rarely a respectable starting rotation.
The early draft picks the Marlins made look pretty disastrous in retrospect. They got speedy outfielder Chuck Carr, but quickly found out that speed was the only thing worthwhile about him. It looked like a steal when they nabbed Angels closer Bryan Harvey, but unfortunately Harvey only had one good season left before injuries prematurely ended his career.
It's actually in the middle rounds of the draft that the Marlins got their go-to players. The Marlins and Rockies took 21 other players before Florida finally selected Jeff Conine, an oversight that's tough to fathom even without hindsight, as Conine would become a stable producer for the team for years. The Marlins' 13th pick was a young Yankee hitter named Carl Everett. But after a couple disappointing years in Florida, the Marlins traded him to the Mets for Quilvio Veras.
Other name players taken in the draft include: reliable relief arm David Weathers (Toronto), useful starters Cris Carpenter (St. Louis) and Jack Armstrong (Cleveland). The Marlins took the veteran Danny Jackson (Pittsburgh) very late in the draft, then turned right around and traded him to the Phillies for two no-names. (Jackson would serve an important role as a starter on the 1993 NL Champion Philadelphia team.)
A much more useful trade the Marlins completed was with the Oakland A's, getting Walt Weiss in exchange for Eric Helfand and Scott Baker (?). Weiss would prove one of the more reliable Marlins in their early years, whereas the other two players only managed 54 career games in the majors.
Not really satisfied with their take in the amateur draft (especially compared with the success of the Rockies), the Marlins decided to budget some money for free agents. The most famous of these was 44-year-old Charlie Hough, who was still able to serve as a league-average innings-eater for two years in Florida before retiring. The same day, the Marlins signed corner infielder Dave Magadan. Although he only played 140 games in Florida, Magadan hit while during his stint there and proved one of the few potent bats the team could muster. The Fish also managed to take star catcher Benito Santiago as a free agent. But Santiago's two seasons in Florida were disappointing, and he left the team after the 1994 season.
Some signings were less fruitful. The Fish signed Geronimo Berroa to a 1-year deal, with Berroa hitting a dreadful 118/167/147 in 14 games. He went to the A's as a free agent in 1994 whereupon he blossomed into a quality hitter. The club also managed to nab Orestes Destrade, a slugger who had spent the last 4 seasons in Japan. While Destrade hit fairly well with the Marlins (255/324/406 in '93), it wasn't quite good enough, and he returned to Japan in 1994.
Sporting this admittedly bare roster, it was thus no surprise when the Marlins finished their inaugural season 64-98. The only consolation was that they (with a $19 million payroll) had finished in 6th place in the NL East, 5 games ahead of the New York Mets (with a $39 million payroll).
Time marched on, with the Marlins improving their record slightly each subsequent year. Under manager Rene Lachemann, the 1994 squad went 51-64, but improved their winning percentage from .395 in their 1993 debut season to a more respectable .443. In 1995, the team went 67-76, again raising their winning percentage, to 469. The 1996 team jumped all the way up to 80-82, a 3rd-place finish in the NL East. It was a sign of things to come, because the 1997 Florida Marlins went 92-70 and nabbed the NL Wild Card, finishing just 2 games ahead of the Mets and Dodgers.
How did the Florida Marlins, who started from such humble beginnings, make it to the postseason in just their 5th year of existence? The answer is simple: they spent a lot of money on free agents and made trades for big-time players.
Only three members of the 1997 starting lineup were home-grown Marlins. Only two pitchers in the starting rotations came out of the Florida farm system, and just two of the six core bullpen players. This was a bit unusual at the time, but isn't really that uncommon in the age of free agency. The difference here is that while the home-grown players on the roster were mostly secondary role-players, the key contributors were almost all free agents, and expensive ones at that.
It was simply a case of having the means and the motive to buy a World Series. There were some errors on the way; not all the players the Marlins signed up turned into gold. 3B Terry Pendleton proved to be well past his prime during his short stay in Florida, as did aging outfielder Andre Dawson. The club gave good money to John Burkett in 1995, only to find out that his 22-7 record in 1993 was indeed a fluke. All these moves came before the 1995 season, and could be seen as the failed first attempt to assemble a free-agent winner.
But the real spree began way back in June of 1993, their inaugural season, when the Marlins sent two (basically) useless players and relief prospect Trevor Hoffman to the Padres in exchange for expensive problem child Gary Sheffield and reliever Rich Rodriguez. Sheffield was a man among boys on the 1993 squad, with only Conine, Magadan and Walt Weiss holding their own in the lineup. But help was on its way.
Less than a month after the Sheffield deal, the Marlins sent starter Cris Carpenter (who would never develop into much) to the Rangers in exchange for two relievers; one was Kurt Miller, and was essentially forgettable. The other was Robb Nen. Nen, unlike the other '97 Marlins, wasn't really a high-priced free agent, but a prospect the Marlins had nabbed in time to see him develop into a star closer. With Bryan Harvey's career basically over in 1994, Nen took over as Marlins closer and never lost the job. He stayed through the team through 1997 and was perhaps the league's best closer over that period.
In spite of their other 1995 free agent misadventures, the club did manage to get good value when they signed center fielder Devon White in November. But they really plunked down big money on two free agent pitchers: Al Leiter and Kevin Brown.
Leiter had come up through the Yankee system, but had never really been given a shot to succeed or fail either way. After being traded to Toronto, Leiter excelled as a starter, culminating in an excellent 1995 that saw him post a 3.64 ERA with 153 K in 183 IP. It was his free agent walk year, and the Marlins signed him up.
An even better move was the December inking of Kevin Brown to a big-money deal. Brown had succeeded as a starter in Texas for years, but as he played on forgettable teams, he wasn't much of a star. Then the Rangers traded him to Baltimore for his free agent walk year in 1995, whereupon Brown posted a 3.60 ERA in 172.1 innings of work. The Marlins got him under contract just in time to enjoy his coming-out party.
And 1996 was a coming-out party for the Florida Marlins. It started off quietly in January, when the team signed a Cuban defector named Livan Hernandez as an amateur free agent. The team got off to a slow start (costing Lachemann his job), but replacement John Boles kept the team strong the rest of the year, and while an 80-82, 3rd-place finish isn't much, it represented great news for the Marlins in their quest to build a winner.
There were many star performances on the 1996 team that seemed to indicate better years to come. Right fielder Sheffield had a monster year (314/465/624) that would have merited strong MVP consideration were it not for his surly attitude and prickly relationship with the media (he finished 6th). The club also got strong hitting from stalwart Conine (293/360/484) and young shortstop Edgar Renteria (309/358/399). But several hitters performed well below their usual standards, including CF Devon White and C Charles Johnson. This was good news for a possible rebound for the lineup in 1997.
Kevin Brown was the best pitcher in the National League in 1996. John Smoltz may have won the Cy Young (as the Braves went on to win the pennant), but Brown was just plain better. Here's a comparison:

1996 Cy Young Race:
Kevin Brown: (17-11, 1.89 ERA, 33 BB : 159 K, 233 IP, 8 HR allowed, 214 ERA+)
John Smoltz: (24-8, 2.94 ERA, 55 BB : 276 K, 253.2 IP, 19 HR allowed, 149 ERA+)

Of course, anyone who goes 24-8 is going to win the Cy Young, regardless of the underlying reality. And while Smoltz's huge edge in strikeouts is a legitimate argument in his favor, I simply don't believe it makes up the gulf of difference in ERA. Brown was simply the best pitcher in the NL at preventing runs, which is a pitcher's primary job.
Brown was supported by a strong season from Al Leiter (2.93 ERA, 200 K in 215.1 IP), but the rest of the rotation was a chaotic mess. John Burkett, not the San Francisco savior the team thought he was, posted a decent 4.32 ERA, but only threw 154 innings. The only other starter to top 100 innings was Pat Rapp, whose durability was countered by a 5.10 ERA. At least four other pitchers made at least 4 starts, as the team tried to find some way to support the Brown/Leiter tandem in the rotation. Solving that problem in time for 1997 would be a top priority.
While Nen was brilliant as closer (35 SV with a 1.95 ERA), the rest of the bullpen was rubbish, with the next-best ERA Jay Powell's 4.54 in 71.1 IP. Just as with the bullpen, the Marlins cycled through a number of arms in 1996, looking for a solution. This would be Priority #2 going into 1997.
Dombrowski and the Marlins were energetic re-builders in the 1996-97 offseason. Their first move was to replace ancient third baseman Terry Pendleton with free agent Bobby Bonilla. Then they strengthened the outfield depth by signing John Cangelosi and Jim Eisenreich.
The team finished off its December to Remember with two big-name signings. The first was starting pitcher Alex Fernandez. Fernandez had come up with the Chicago White Sox and was a big part of the dynamic rotation that drove the Pale Hose to the 1993 AL West title. Fernandez was coming off a strong 1996, where he posted a 3.45 ERA (136 ERA+) in 258 IP to go with an impressive 72:200 BB:K ratio.
The other big signing was outfielder Moises Alou. Alou had gained stardom as part of the strong Montreal outfields of the early 90's. But Alou's hitting numbers had dipped in 1995 and 1996, and thus it was a bit of a risk for the Marlins to sign the 30-year-old to such a big-money deal. But if the Marlins had a mantra going into 1997, it was "Money is no object (at least, not yet . . .)"
Under new manager Jim Leyland, the 1997 squad finished 92-70, earning a postseason berth as the NL Wild Card. What was responsible for the team's turnaround? It was, of course, mostly the free agents. 3B Bonilla had a fine year (297/378/468), LF Alou returned to his former glory (292/373/493), and Jim Eisenreich hit fairly well off the bench (280/345/372). The team also made a canny mid-season trade in acquiring veteran catcher Darren Daulton from the Phillies. Daulton hit 262/371/429 down the stretch and helped provide an extra boost to the offense.
On the pitching side of the equation, the team was able to offset slight slumps by Brown and Leiter by putting together a deep, solid rotation. Free agent Fernandez pitched very well (3.59 ERA, 113 ERA+), Pat Rapp bounced back to post a much more respectable 4.47 ERA, and the team got a strong contribution down the stretch from homegrown talent Tony Saunders.
But the biggest story was Cuban emigre Livan Hernandez. Pitching in Miami amongst many other Cuban exiles, the 22-year-old Hernandez became a big star when he joined the stretch drive with a 3.18 ERA in 17 starts, striking out 72 in 96.1 IP.
It must also be noted that the bullpen, behind a less-impressive Robb Nen (3.89 ERA), was much more stable. Workhorse Jay Powell lowered his ERA to 3.28 while still managing 79.2 IP. Unsung free agent Dennis Cook provided a reliable lefty arm, and farm system products such as Felix Heredia and Robby Stanifer contributed as well.
What you had in the 1997 Marlins was a good team that had struggled its way into the postseason. No one really expected them to go far in the postseason, and so it was a great surprise when the Marlins swept the Giants 3-0 in the NLDS. But the Giants had an even worse W-L record (90-72) than the Fish, and with Marlin pitching holding Barry Bonds to a 250/231/417 hitting line, it wasn't such a surprise after all. But surely the Marlins would get theirs in the NLCS against the Braves, fielding what Bill James has called the best starting rotation of all time.
But observers might have taken a hint from the fact that the Marlins won 8 of 12 games against the Braves in the regular season. The Braves posted a 2.60 ERA and outscored the Marlins 21-20, but the Fish hammered both Tom Glavine and John Smoltz and managed to take the NLCS in six, winning the pennant.
The 1997 World Series against Cleveland was . . . well, it was COLD. One of the realities of a third round of playoffs meant that the postseason would last all the way to the end of October. And late October in Cleveland can be devastating (wind chills reached as low as 15 degrees).
The two teams split the first two games at Florida, and then the Marlins won a slugfest for the ages in Game 3. The game was tied 7-7 going into the 9th, and the Marlins exploded for 7 runs to take a 14-7 lead. Despite the fact that Cleveland came back for 4 in the bottom of the inning, the Marlins were able to hold onto a 14-11 victory.
The Indians tied the Series with a Game 4 victory, and then Florida took a 3-2 lead with a Game 5 win, which came despite another late-inning rally by Cleveland that cut the final score from 8-4 to 8-7 before the Marlins sealed the deal. Cleveland won Game 6 behind a fine start from Chad Ogea, and the stage was set for Game 7.
Game 7 was one for the ages. The Indians led 2-1 going into the bottom of the 9th, but closer Jose Mesa blew the save, the and game went into extra innings. It was in the 11th, with Game 3 starter Charles Nagy on the hill, that Edgar Renteria hit an RBI single that won the game and the Series for Florida. South Florida went into a frenzy, but it was a frenzy that was ruthlessly cut short.
The specifics of the Fire Sale of the 1997 Marlins have been dealt with in many sources (as well as my own blog), so I won't go into the full rant. I'll reserve the vitriol and first present a balance sheet of the ins and outs of the 1997 bloodbath, which started a bare two weeks after Game 7 of the World Series:

LOST: Mike Piazza, Gary Sheffield, Kevin Brown, Moises Alou, Bobby Bonilla, Al Leiter, Robb Nen, Edgar Renteria, Todd Zeile, Craig Counsell, Jeff Conine, Livan Hernandez, Devon White, Charles Johnson, Matt Mantei, Felix Heredia, Jim Eisenreich, Jay Powell, Dennis Cook, Manuel Barrios, and others

GAINED: Derrek Lee, A.J. Burnett, Brad Penny, Preston Wilson, Braden Looper, Justin Speier, Jesus Sanchez, Ramon Castro, Vladimir Nunez, Abraham Nunez, Nate Bump, Pablo Ozuna, Oscar Henriquez, Kevin Orie, Armando Almanza, Ed Yarnall, Joe Fontenot, Jesus Martinez, Blaine Mull, and other warm bodies

So there you have it, all done in just a year and a half. Not only did the Marlins trade away their entire 1997 Championship team (at least everyone making anything more than the league minimum), but they got almost nothing in return. You'd think that a team trading away two or three potential Hall-of-Famers and a dozen All-Stars would get a gold mine in return. But they just got four good prospects (Lee, Burnett, Penny, Wilson) and a couple of useful guys like Looper, Castro, and Speier. Few events in all of baseball have been so obviously inspired by money matters, and fewer still have damaged the sport's well-cultivated image of community. Bud Selig likes to pretend that there is a sense of community between a baseball team and its city, because that kind of thing makes people happy and makes you look like a good corporate citizen. But it's a lie. The simple truth is that the Marlins spent a sh*tload of money on a lot players in order to win over the course of one year. Then having won, they traded all the players away and let other teams deal with the long-term consequences of the contracts the Marlins signed.
Is it possible that the Marlins simply had to trade away those players to deal with the fiscal realities of baseball? Huizenga claimed the club lost money during its championship year, and he had no choice but to sell. But if history is any guide, every baseball owner who claims poverty is lying. The '97 Marlins drew 2.3 million fans to the newly-dubbed Pro Player Stadium. This was, admittedly, only good enough for 6th among 14 NL teams. But for an expansion franchise in a new major league market in only its 5th year of existence to draw 2.3 million is an unqualified success. Suspicions later rose that Huizenga hid the team's profits by transferring them to stadium profits (he also co-owned the stadium), a move right out of the Enron playbook. So can we really believe that Huizenga was an innocent victim of the perils of capitalism?
I give Wayne Huizenga and his cronies respect as people who know good business. And no good businessman would recklessly spend that much money and then actually be surprised, a year later, at how much money he had spent. Only a fool would have such a complete lack of foresight as to sign all of those contracts without considering the consequences, and I doubt very much that the Marlins were run by fools. On the contrary, I think they were run by cunning, Machivellian businessmen.
My opinions do skew to the cynical, but I think Huizenga approached his team like this: we can spend a lot of money for just one year, reap the consequences of a winning team, and then sell off the team for parts before the costs become prohibitive. It's similar to the big-time Wall Street trader who talks up a company's stock until the price rises to its peak, then sells out before it crashes back to reality. Unfortunately, stocks don't capture the hearts and minds of millions of people. Baseball teams do.
The eviscerated 1998 Marlins went 54-108, the worst-ever drop for a defending World Champion. Leyland, disgusted with his surroundings, left, being replaced by front-office man John Boles. The skinflint Marlins returned with a 64-98 finish in 1999. Attendance was down by a million, to 1.3 million in '99 (15th of 16 NL teams). The only good players really worth seeing on the team were: second baseman Luis Castillo, a top-of-the-order speedster, slap hitter, and perennial .300 threat; Mike Lowell, the steady-fielding third baseman with a very good bat; Preston Wilson, the center fielder who had power, strikeouts, and a .280 average; Alex Fernandez (3.38 ERA), the veteran of the '97 team trying to come back from very serious injuries; and closer Antonio Alfonseca, the pear-shaped and mercurial hurler (21 SV).
In 2000, the Marlins returned to respectability, posting a 79-82 record. It was mainly the decent crew mentioned above, but also the arrival of first base prospect Derrek Lee (281/368/507), the eternally injured Cliff Floyd (300/378/529) and a young hurler out of the farm system named Ryan Dempster, who posted a 3.66 ERA with 209 K in 226.1 IP. The Marlins did have other pitching prospects breaking into the majors, such as Brad Penny and A.J. Burnett, but they didn't fare quite as well.
Any momentum from 2000 failed to translate to 2001, as the Marlins drifted back to a 76-86 finish. The year saw Boles out as manager, replaced by Tony Perez, who also failed to energize a club that apparently saw little reason in bothering at all.
It was after the 2001 season that baseball pulled off its greatest syndication scam in over a century. John Henry, having purchased the franchise from Huizenga in the midst of the post-'97 bloodbath, was looking to get out. Baseball also wanted to extricate art dealer/owner Jeffrey Loria from his spot as owner of the Expos. And so, tossing the free market and the passions of the fanbase to the four winds, Selig arranged a big-time switcheroo: Henry sold the Marlins to Loria and took over the Red Sox, with Loria selling the Expos to Major League Baseball. Not only did Loria take over as owner, but he (like Dombrowski before him) took most of the Montreal front office with him (manager Jeff Torborg, GM Larry Beinfest, president David Samson). See my entry on the Expos for more detail, but in short, the idea that one baseball team could be efficiently run by its 29 competitors was laughable, and it made a mockery of all the legitimacy and integrity that Selig supposedly stands for.
The 2002 Marlins were more of the same, finishing in 4th place with a 79-83 record. But along with the same solid lineup, there were signs that the young pitching prospects (Burnett, Penny, Dempster, and Josh Beckett) were finally starting to come along. But the problem that would plague the team for years was keeping all of them healthy at the same time.
The 2003 Marlins combined a strong amount of talent and an obscene amount of luck to win the World Series. It has been argued that the 2003 Marlins are the worst team to win the World Series. I don't know if I'd go that far, but they're certainly close.
They had a fine lineup. The infield of Lee-Castillo-Gonzalez-Lowell was intact, productive, and defensively sound. The outfield was shaky, with Todd Hollandsworth and Juan Encarnacion getting far too much playing time, but that problem was helped by the mid-season acquisition of Jeff Conine and the late-season callup of prospect Miguel Cabrera. The Marlins also managed a trade with the Rockies that sent off the expensive Preston Wilson and Charles Johnson in exchange for the cheaper (though less productive) Juan Pierre. Replacing Johnson behind the plate was 1-year free agent Ivan Rodriguez (297/369/474) who gave the club a much-needed source of extra offense.
But what really drove the pitching staff was a starting rotation of great strength and depth. The stars were Beckett, who was limited to just 142 IP but still managed 152 K and a 3.04 ERA, and a rookie named Dontrelle Willis. Willis captivated baseball with his big smile and quirky delivery. He also managed a 3.30 ERA in 160.2 IP. The club got surprisingly good production from trade acquisitions Mark Redman and Carl Pavano and got solid work from homegrown prospect Penny.
The late-season acquisition of closer Ugueth Urbina helped spur the Marlins to the Wild Card, finishing 4 games ahead of the Astros. In the first round, they took on the 100-win Giants and, after a Game 1 shutout at the hands of Jason Schmidt, won the next three games to advance to the NLCS. There they faced the Cubs in what was a star-crossed series for the Chicagoans and a great stroke of luck for Floridians.
The Marlins won a close Game 1 in extra innings, but then the Cubs blew out Brad Penny in Game 2 12-3 to even the Series 1-1. The Cubs won the next two games, taking a (seemingly) commanding 3-1 lead in the Series. The Marlins managed a Game 5 win thanks to a Josh Beckett shutout, but the Cubs still had a 3-2 lead with the series heading back to Wrigley.
In Game 5, the Cubs had a 3-0 lead going into the 8th inning and were 6 outs from the World Series. But a fan reached out and caught a foul ball that LF Moises Alou *might* have otherwise caught, and the Marlins exploded for an 8-run inning. Post-game second-guessers vilified the fan for catching the ball. But unless I'm mistaken, Steve Bartman wasn't the son of a bitch standing on the mound allowing 8 runs to score. Those particular S.O.B.s were Mark Prior, Kyle Farnsworth, and Mike Remlinger.
In Game 7, the Marlins scored 3 runs in the first, but then Kerry Wood homered to give the Cubs a 5-3 lead. They went on to squander it, losing the game 9-6. The Marlins had won their second pennant in just their 11th year of existence.
The Marlins were heavy underdogs going into the World Series against the Yankees. But it was another one of those bizarre series where one team gets outscored and still ends up winning. The Yankees scored 21 runs to the Marlins' 17 and posted a 2.13 ERA, whereas the Marlins team mark was 3.21. But the Marlins won because they scored their runs at the right time. That's partially good situational hitting but mostly luck, and I stand by my theory that the 2003 Marlins were extraordinarily lucky in winning the World Series.
Just to give you some data (apart from my own opinions) to support that: the Marlins' W-L record in 2003 was a mere 91-71. Their Pythagorean W-L record (a better indicator of talent) was 87-75, the worst for any World Champion since the 2000 Yankees. The Marlins finished 8th (of 16) in the NL in runs/game and 7th (of 16) in runs allowed/game, both obviously average marks. I will admit that these measures are for the whole season, and that Marlins in October had players like Urbina and Cabrera, whom they didn't have all year. But I'm standing by what I said.
To follow up their World Championship, the 2004 Marlins went 83-79, finishing 3rd. It was sort of a milestone, anyway; the Marlins had only finished above .500 twice before, and in both those years they won the World Series.
The 2005 team saw management spend a little money to try and goose the team up the standings. Having traded for catcher Paul Lo Duca in mid-2004, the Fish followed it up by signing pitcher Al Leiter and first baseman Carlos Delgado as free agents. The result wasn't quite a success. Delgado was brilliant (301/399/582), one of the ten best players in the NL. But Leiter was not, posting a 6.64 ERA before drawing his release. The team finished once again at 83-79.
Management faced a bit of a crossroads going into 2006. They were dealing with more free agent money commitments and were dealing with growing arbitration salaries for the likes of Josh Beckett, as well as the impending free agency of A.J. Burnett. So what did management do? You all know the words, sing along . . .
Fire Sale, Part 2:
Refusing to call the moves a "fire sale," but rather a "market correction," the team traded away 3/4 of its starting infield, its starting catcher, one of its outfielders, one starting pitcher, and a setup man. They also lost the other infielder, another outfielder, a starting pitcher, and their closer to free agency. They made no moves to replace them from the free agent market.
Here's how the ledger stood for this one:
Paul Lo Duca & Carlos Delgado to the Mets; Josh Beckett, Mike Lowell & Guillermo Mota to the Red Sox; Luis Castillo to the Twins; and Juan Pierre to the Cubs.
In return, the club actually got a much better haul of prospects than in the 1997-99 fire sale, leaving some hope that the team will be competitive sometime in he next, say, 2 or 3 years. Until then, though, the Marlins are being demoted to minor league status.
The reasons for this fire sale were pretty direct. The team, tired of sharing Pro Player Stadium with the Dolphins, wanted a state-funded baseball-only stadium to be built. The state of Florida, however, was more interested at the time in putting money toward Hurricane Katrina relief rather than a new toy/ATM for Jeffrey Loria. The MLB, accustomed to having its way in stadium negotiations, decided to use the team to blackmail the state of Florida. I can picture it thus:

(Interior of a delicatessan. Early morning. The deli owner -- hereafter referred to as FLORIDA -- is sweeping the floor in preparation for a day's business. Enter JEFFREY LORIA and wise-cracking sidekick BUD SELIG.)
LORIA: Mornin' there, Florida.
FLORIDA: Why, Jeffrey Loria! What are you doing here?
LORIA: I was just checkin' on business. Seein' how things was doin'.
FLORIDA: Well, it's been tough lately. We've had a horrible hurricane season, but the state has come together, and I think we'll be able to get through this thing.
SELIG: (with a frumpy scowl) Don't talk about hurricanes, it annoys da Boss.
LORIA: Shaddup, Bud. (slaps him)
SELIG: Sorry, Boss.
LORIA: That's a nice baseball team ya got there, Florida.
FLORIDA: You think so? I used to like them, but then that old owner sold them all off after we won the World Series in '97. Since then, it's just hard to get really invested in them.
LORIA: But you wouldn't want to see them go, would yer?
FLORIDA: Why, no. I still like to go to a game once in a while -- I love that Dontrelle Willis -- and they're great for business.
LORIA: Because accidents happen, you know.
SELIG: Yeah, they do. Accidents happen. They happen.
FLORIDA: Accidents? What do you mean accidents?
LORIA: Supposin' you were to wake up tomorrow morning and that team weren't there no more?
FLORIDA: What do you mean? Why wouldn't it be there?
LORIA: Oh, I could think of a lot of places it could go. San Antonio, Portland . . .
SELIG: Washington, D.C.
LORIA: We already made that visit, Bud. (slaps him)
SELIG: Sorry, Boss.
FLORIDA: But I do like the team.
LORIA: Well, if business don't get better for them, we may have to see them go.
FLORIDA: What do you mean about business getting better?
SELIG: (Speaking as if from a script -- even moreso than usual) The Florida Marlins cannot compete in their current ballpark. Without a publicly financed baseball-only stadium --
FLORIDA: Can't compete in that park? What are you talking about? The Marlins are the only team to win more than one World Series over the past 10 years except for the Yankees! That team was born in 1993 and it's won two more World Championships in 14 years than the Cubs have won in 98!
SELIG: (Pause. Repeats previous line robotically) The Florida Marlins cannot compete in their current ballpark --
LORIA: But ya see, Florida, it's not a problem. I can make sure that team will be there tomorrow and for years to come. All I need is something from you.
FLORIDA: What's that?
LORIA: Money.
SELIG: Specifically, some $400 million in taxpayer money to put towards building a baseball-only stadium, not to mention the usual tax breaks on property taxes, etc.
FLORIDA: You want $400 million from me?
LORIA: Hey, you're pretty smart! Didn't I tell yer he was smart, Bud?
FLORIDA: But you don't understand. We just got hit by the worst hurricane season in recent memory. There's people who don't have food, or - or a place to live.
SELIG: (Moving his fingers) That's me playing the world's smallest violin. (Pause) I can't get enough of that joke.
FLORIDA: Besides, there have been reports by respected economists that taxpayer-funded stadiums don't really put that much money back into the community. There's no way the community will recoup that $400 million. All the profits made by the team go into a vacuum straight to you and your stockholders and don't get reinvested in the community. Why, Andrew Zimbalist says --
LORIA: Do you mean Andrew "The Liar" Zimbalist?
FLORIDA: I've never heard him called that.
LORIA: You did just now.
FLORIDA: And anyways, Forbes magazine says that around 24 of 30 ballclubs are actually making profits. The MLB in 2005 once again broke the record for seasonal attendance. You guys are making more money now than you ever have.
LORIA: Do you believe everything you read?
FLORIDA: Well, if it's a choice between believing Forbes magazine and Bud Selig, I think --
(Loria's phone rings)
LORIA: Shaddup for a minute. (Answers phone) Hello, Barry, what's goin' on? . . . uh huh . . . uh huh . . you don't gotta worry about a thing. (hangs up) I'll have to talk to you later Florida. I gotta go have a talk with two reporters in San Francisco.
FLORIDA: You mean the guys who wrote the Barry Bonds book?
SELIG: . . . book of LIES, you mean! Ha! . . . well, yeah, most of it's true.
LORIA: (Exiting) I'll see you later. Think about what I said. Be smart. You don't wanna end up like Luca Brazi.
FLORIDA: What happened to Luca Brazi?
SELIG: He's sleeping with the Marlins.

END

It's closer to the truth than you may imagine.

Sources:
Total Ballclubs by Donald Dewey & Nicholas Acocella
Total Baseball Encyclopedia 2004 Ed.
&
www.baseball-reference.com

1993 Expansion

A search through all my sources (limited though they are) was unable to come up for a reason that baseball expanded in 1993. I can find all of the specifics and details, but none of the backroom realities that made the NL (and MLB) decide to expand. I tried googling several different variations of "baseball expansion," but the only interesting thing that came up was my own blog(!). I clicked on the link and was taken to a "file not found" page. Such is my life.
With admittedly nothing but supposition to back this up, I'll put forth these educated guesses as to why baseball voted to expand the NL to 14 teams in 1993:

• Equilibrium. The AL already had 14 teams, and it would just match. This may seem too simple or straightforward, but it makes sense to me, especially since interleague play was being tossed around as a future possibility, thus an equal number of teams would be advantageous.
• Expanding markets. Despite worries that baseball was expanding faster than it could be pratically supported, the MLB saw the opportunities created by the growing Latin American market. Whether they took the Asia-Pacific market into consideration is unknown, but this would certainly be a source of new talent in the years to come.
• Geographical realignment. The original 16 MLB teams were in the northeast and midwest. Baseball has ever since taken gradual steps toward realigning major league franchises with the shifting population of the country, both through relocation and expansion. The Denver market had been attractive for many years, tempting other teams to relocate there. An added benefit would be that a Denver team wouldn't just appeal to the municipal or statewide market, but could represent the entire Rocky Mountain region (as the NFL Broncos illustrate). The same was true in Florida, a state with a whole lot of people served by no major league teams. There was great disagreement over where in Florida to place a team, but it was clear that the Sunshine State would sport a major league team soon, either through expansion or relocation.
• More money. This one rather explains itself.

Whenever baseball explores expansion (or relocation), a number of groups are formed in suitor cities to lure a franchise. The most recent example would be the relocation of the Expos, which saw baseball wooed not just by Washington, D.C., but by Portland, Charlotte, northern Virginia, and Monterrey, Mexico.
Oilman Marvin Davis had campaigned for a Denver baseball team for years with nothing to show for it. His cause was taken up by the money of Peter Coors and finally managed to get a franchise from the MLB. In Florida, it was Wayne Huizenga, part-owner of the Dolphins and Blockbuster Video mogul, who was able to attract the MLB to the Miami area. The two teams would start play in the 1993 season, bringing the NL to 14 teams, equal to the AL for the first time since 1976. This is what the new alignment would be:

NL EAST:
Chicago Cubs
Florida Marlins
Montreal Expos
New York Mets
Philadelphia Phillies
Pittsburgh Pirates
St. Louis Cardinals

NL WEST:
Atlanta Braves
Cincinnati Reds
Colorado Rockies
Houston Astros
Los Angeles Dodgers
San Diego Padres
San Francisco Giants

Colorado Rockies
As I mentioned before, oilman Marvin Davis had attempted to secure a major league franchise in Denver for years, unsuccessfully. In 1992, though, Colorado fans could rejoice when the MLB announced that one of the new NL franchises would be in Colorado (later named the Rockies). The ownership group was an unstable mix of money coming and going, guided only by the steady money of Peter Coors. Coors ended up with controlling interest in the club, supporting club president Jerry McMorris. Already plans were set in motion for a baseball-only stadium to be built in Denver. Until its completion, the Rockies would share Mile High Stadium with the Broncos.
The club named Bob Gebhard GM and Don Baylor manager heading into the expansion draft. Before the draft even began, ownership decided to make a splash by signing free agent first baseman Andres Galarraga. Galarraga would provide a steady power presence that would become emblematic of the entire team. They also signed a young amateur named Neifi Perez out of the Dominican. Neifi's defensive brilliance was overshadowed by his inability to hit his weight even in the most hitter-friendly environment this side of the moon. Another shrewd move involved trading the disappointing Kevin Reimer to Milwaukee in exchange for Dante Bichette, who would join Galarraga in the hitting heroics to come.
In the first pick of the amateur draft, the Rockies took prized Atlanta pitching prospect David Nied, a hopeful sign that the organization was looking toward the future. Their second choice was third baseman Charlie Hayes (N.Y. Yankees), a valuable hand and one of the better players ever left unprotected in an expansion draft. Their third pick was relief pitcher Darren Holmes (Milwaukee), who would help form what was, for a short while, a surprisingly good bullpen in Denver.
The rest of the draft was unspectacular, but indeed productive. There were no All-Stars, but it's amazing how many useful and productive players the Rockies took, including 2B Eric Young, C Joe Girardi, starting pitchers Willie Blair and Armando Reynoso, relief pitcher Lance Painter, and a young third baseman out of the Atlanta system named Vinny Castilla. With Castilla, Bichette, and Galarraga, the Rockies already had the heart of what would be a powerhouse offense.
Mile High Stadium's footbal dimensions helped the Rockies set a new major league attendance record in their inaugural 1993, when 4,483,350 tickets were sold, an astonishing 55,350 per game. As mentioned before, the Rockies had assembled a potent offense, but weren't able to get quality starts from anyone but Reynoso. (Nied spent parts of 4 seasons in Colorado before his rising star finally snuffed out). In fact, while the Rockies were among the league leaders in runs scored, they were dead last in runs allowed. Not only dead last, but dead last by a mile. Viz:

1993 NL Runs Allowed/Game
1. Atlanta (3.45)
2. Houston (3.89)
...
12. Cincinnati (4.85)
13. Pittsburgh (4.98)
14. Colorado (5.97)

Not only were the Rockies last, they were off-the-charts last. It was like someone had put a Triple-A pitching staff in the major leagues. The numbers were so awful they couldn't be real. And, of course, they weren't . . .

Every major league park favors, to a certain degree, either hitters or pitchers. Rarely is a park perfectly neutral, even for just one year. There is a statistic used to indicate how friendly a park is to hitters (or pitchers). It's called Park Factor. A Park Factor of 100 indicates a neutral park. A park factor over 100 indicates a park that favors offense; a park factor under 100 favors pitching/defense. A baseball field's Park Factor varies slightly from year to year (for a variety of reasons), but rarely moves sharply in one direction without a reason (a team bringing the fences in or out, for example).
Park Factor is measured by determining how many runs are scored at that park compared to other parks in the league. Specifically, you would take the stats of Rockies hitters and their opponents at Coors Field and then compare them to their performance at other parks. It's important to take into account both home and visiting teams. Because if you just measure the home team, then you're not measuring the park; you're measuring the team. People have said that the Great American Ballpark is a great hitter's park because so many home runs are hit there. That's true to some extent. But a lot of homers are hit at the G.A.B. because the Reds have a great offense and a terrible pitching staff. They both hit and give up a lot of homers. What we really want to know is how the Reds (and their opponents) hit at the G.A.B. compared to the rest of the league.
So that's a Park Factor. Most Park Factors from season to season fall between 105-95, within 5% of normal. Every once in a while a park will come along that consistently plays as a hitter's park (or pitcher's park), going even 5% above or below average. Here are some examples from the history of Dodger Stadium, a great pitcher's park:

Dodger Stadium Park Factors:
1963 -- 93
1967 -- 92
1975 -- 95
1986 -- 93
1992 -- 98
1995 -- 91
2005 -- 95
So we see that while the degree changes from year to year, Dodger Stadium is a pitcher's park, sometimes an extreme pitcher's park (more than 5% below average). Let's look at a famous hitter's park: Fenway Park.

Fenway Park Park Factors:
1945 -- 102
1955 -- 109
1965 -- 107
1975 -- 108
1985 -- 103
1995 -- 102
2005 -- 101
Again, the degree changes from year to year, but Fenway Park is a true hitter's park, sometimes to a great degree. It should be said that for a park like Fenway or Dodger Stadium to post factors this significant for such a long period of time makes them stand out; most parks really are fairly close to neutral, and many of the more extreme parks (Philadelphia's Baker Bowl) usually don't last very long. Either that or the team takes steps to correct the disparity.

All of this has been to give you an idea of context in which to place the Ballpark Factor stat. As one last setup, let's take a look at all of the ballparks in, say, the 1985 National League (random choice).

1985 NL Park Factors:
111 -- Wrigley Field (Chicago)
107 -- Atlanta Fulton County Stadium
105 -- Riverfront Stadium (Cincinnati)
103 -- Veterans Stadium (Philadelphia)
100 -- Three Rivers Stadium (Pittsburgh)
99 -- Busch Stadium (St. Louis)
99 -- Jack Murphy Stadium (San Diego)
97 -- Shea Stadium (New York)
97 -- Dodger Stadium (Los Angeles)
97 -- AstroDome (Houston)
96 -- Candlestick Park (San Francisco)
94 -- Olympic Stadium (Montreal)

All of this is fairly normal. Wrigley Field has been, at times, an extreme hitter's park (anything 10% in either direction is very uncommon). But its Park Factor has fluctuated throughout history for a variety of reasons too numerous to mention here. Everything else basically holds true. They didn't call Fulton County Stadium "The Launching Pad" for nothing. Riverfront was generally hitter-friendly. And Dodger Stadium, Shea Stadium, and the AstroDome were all generally pitcher-friendly.

Now that I've gone this far just as a set up, let me reveal to you the park factors for the Colorado Rockies in their first years of existence:

Colorado Rockies Park Factors:
1993 -- 121
1994 -- 117
1995 -- 128
1996 -- 129
1997 -- 123
1998 -- 120
1999 -- 128
2000 -- 130
2001 -- 121
2002 -- 120
2003 -- 112
2004 -- 118
2005 -- 112

This is what we call "eye-popping." Mile High Stadium (and later Coors Field) were the Barry Bonds of ballparks. At their peak, they increased offense by 30% -- 30%! That means that a weak-hitting team that scored 3.5 runs per game would now be a fine-hitting team scoring 4.55 runs per game. An offense would get an additional run per game based 0n the ballpark alone. ACCH!
We often talk about statistics being placed in context. Nowhere is that more true than at Coors Field. You just can't take anything at Coors Field at face value. For the rest of this entry, always remember the factors listed above whenever I quote the gaudy offensive stats that the Rockies piled up over the years.
What's really even more amazing is how even today people are fooled by Coors Field. Everyone knows that Coors Field increases offense, but it still doesn't stop some harebrained commentator from thinking that Vinny Castilla is going through a hitting "renaissance" in 2004 -- a renaissance that just happens to coincide with his return to the Rockies.
It's simply the thin air at the high altitudes of the Rocky Mountains that enables balls to soar and offers less air resistance to make those breaking balls break. It was no baseball secret -- the Dodgers' farm system at Colorado Springs had forever produced great-looking hitters who became surprisingly normal at lower elevation (Greg Brock, anyone?).
If you take nothing else away from this entry, it is to distrust any hitting stats compiled at Coors Field -- and by the same token, give those poor pitchers a break.

With the realignment of the NL into 3 divisions in 1994, the sophomore Rockies were lucky to end up in the 4-team NL West. They improved to a respectable 53-64 record (3rd place), but it was mostly irrelevant with the strike ending the season.
Then the 1995 Rockies shocked everyone by taking the first-ever NL Wild Card in 1995. In the strike-shortened season, The Rockies' 77-67 record may not have been great, but it was just good enough to edge Houston by 1 game and make the playoffs. The Rockies were the quickest expansion team to make the playoffs by far -- doing it in just their 3rd season of existence.
How did the Rockies make it? Everyone pointed to their powerhouse offense. But you, of course, have learned to be skeptical of Colorado offense. The 1995 Rockies scored an absurd 6.74 runs per game at home -- that's not absurd, that's just sick. On the road, though, the Rockies scored 4.17 runs per game -- tied for 11th in the league (of 14 teams). Now every team performs better at home than on the road, so we can give the Rockies a bit of a break. But the home/road splits go to show you just how much of the '95 Rockies' offense was an illusion.
The other side of the coin? Colorado pitchers (and defenders) allowed 6.81 runs per game at home, which is somewhat akin to having me and my friends as your pitching staff. On the road, though, Colorado pitchers allowed a bare 4.07 runs per game -- second only to Atlanta in the entire NL. So welcome to Bizarro World: everyone sees a team driven by a great offense and hampered by a bad pitching staff. The reality is a very strong pitching staff and a decent offense. The rest is just context -- statistical "noise," as it were.
On its face, though, the '95 Colorado offense was impressive. GM Gebhard had taken fine players in the expansion draft (Galarraga, Joe Girardi, and Vinny Castilla) and managed to trade for Dante Bichette. He found the last piece of the puzzle in free agent right fielder Larry Walker. Walker was a great hitter in Montreal, so when he moved to Colorado he became a monster. Bichette led the team with 40 HR, Walker swatted 36 and both Castilla and Galarraga topped 30. Although he didn't play the whole season, outfielder Ellis Burks still managed to hit 14 HR and would add another piece to the powerhouse lineup in the future. Don't misunderstand me; I'm not saying that this was a bad lineup that just looked great. It was a decent and sometimes genuinely good lineup, but none of the players were as good as their Colorado stats indicated.
But who were these good pitchers laboring in obscurity to put the Rockies into October? The staff ace was Kevin Ritz, obtained in the expansion draft. Ritz posted a 4.21 ERA, excellent in Denver, with 120 K in 173,1 IP. After Ritz, the Rockies had a terrible time getting a group of 5 starters together. Either because they couldn't pitch or because their ERAs made it look like they couldn't pitch, no one stayed in the rotation for long. Only Ritz and veteran Bill Swift (4.94 ERA in 105.2 IP) threw more than 100 IP on the whole team. So if that was the starting rotation, who was out there keeping this team in contention.
Say hello to the brilliant Colorado bullpen, the unsung heroes of 1995. Closer Darren Holmes (expansion draft, remember) notched just 14 saves but managed a brilliant 3.24 ERA in 66.2 IP. Setup man Curt Leskanic managed a 3.40 ERA and fought his way through 76 games and 98 IP, a necessity considering the starting rotation. The best of them all may have been Steve Reed, who posted a 2.14 ERA at Coors Field (?!) in 84 innings of work. Add in Bruce Ruffin (2.12 ERA), and you've got the perfect corps of firemen and ace closers to keep a rickety rotation stabilized.
All in all, GM Gebhard had done a wonderful job of building a good team quickly. It's hard to imagine given the subsequent downfall of the franchise, but the Rockies did almost everything right in building their 1995 team. They got a great haul of regulars and role players in the expansion draft and made some key trades to fill some holes. This meant that they didn't have to go often to the free agent market and when they did, they could afford an elite talent like Walker as well as some valuable parts such as Burks and Ruffin.
It was the high point for the franchise, without question. They went into the NLDS against the Braves and lost in 4 games. Unfortunately, it was a sign of things to come.
The team fell back only slightly in 1996 and 1997, finishing both years a respectable 83-79. 3rd place in the 4-team NL West. But in 1998, the team finished 4th in what was now a 5-team division (ahead of only the expansion Diamondbacks), a finish that cost Don Baylor his job. In 1999, even the Diamondbacks passed them, and the Rockies finished last, with a 72-90 record. Veteran Jim Leyland had left Florida to take over the 1999 squad, and it became clear that managing a losing team with a pretty hopeless future wasn't high on his list of priorities. He was gone after just one season.
So what happened to the 1995 team? The simple answer is that management failed to see through the illusion of Coors Field. They thought the hitters who put up great stats really were great. They failed to see through the high ERAs to find the quality pitchers they had and ended up cycling through pitchers like crazy, looking for a solution.
To be fair, Coors Field offered a challenge to a baseball organization like no other ballpark. What sort of pitchers would perform best in a homer-happy ballpark that takes the edge off of your breaking balls? What pitcher wouldn't completely lose confidence after a couple 8-run outings in Denver? So it's certainly understandable that Rockies management has faced unique challenges. But it becomes less and less of an excuse as time goes on; they've had 13 years now to try and figure out something, and you get the sense that they're no closer to "solving" Coors Field than they were when they first moved in.
Hitters like Galarraga, Burks, Bichette, and Castilla stayed and racked up mind-blowing numbers. But as our home/road comparison showed us, their contribution was not nearly as big as their raw numbers would indicate. Without a solid pitching staff (like the one they had in 1995), they couldn't contend. Which is of course, exactly what happened.
Not that they didn't try. We must be fair to the Rockies' upper management, becuase they did get pitchers -- good pitchers -- to come to Denver. But when the likes of Darryl Kile and Pedro Astacio, both formerly strong pitchers, got tagged with a 5.00+ ERA, it became more and more difficult to get free agent pitchers to come to Denver and risk their livelihood.
After Baylor's firing in 1998, GM Gebhard got the axe following a disappointing last-place 1999. Despite a promising start in 1993, Gebhard went to the panic button too soon and too often, making regrettable deals such as one for the non-productive Mike Lansing. And despite the signing of free agent Kile, the '99 team allowed an ungodly total of 1028 runs. The last team to allow so many runs were the 1930 Philadelphia Phillies, a terrible team in the other lively-ball era. Incidentally, the Phillies at that time were playing in the Baker Bowl, one of the few permanent major league stadiums to rival Coors Field in terms of offense. The 1930 Bowl's Park Factor was 109, although it usually stayed above 110.
The only good news to come out of Colorado in the late 90's was first baseman Todd Helton. Despite the fact that his arrival meant the departure of fan favorite Galarraga, Helton soon became a franchise player, and is the undisputed best Rockie ever. Helton debuted in 1997 and won the everyday first baseman's job in 1998. Since then, he's posted a career hitting line of 337/433/607 with 271 career HR and 3 Gold Gloves. While that may make him look like the second coming of Willie McCovey, the truth is much more modest. However, even judging by park-adjusted metrics such as Win Shares, Helton has put together one heck of a career that may merit Cooperstown induction, Coors Field or not.
In 2000, managerial reins were handed over to Buddy Bell. The team finished 82-80 and bounced back to respectability. Manager Bell was in favor of a trade that would have sent Helton to Detroit in exchange for Tigers 1B Tony Clark, one of Bell's favorites from his days as Detroit skipper. The trade never happened, which is a shame, because I'm sure Rob Neyer could use the material for another book of blunders.
The 2000 season was an improvement, yes, but not a significant one. Along with the offense, Bell got good starting pitching from the likes of Astacio and Brian Bohanon and was served by yet another surprisingly good bullpen, anchored by Jose Jimenez, Mike Myers, Mike DeJean and Gabe White.
But the Colorado management made a classic mistake. Fans and sportswriters were optimistic about the finish and convinced themselves that the Rockies could be contenders in 2001. The mistake management made was to believe it, too, thinking they were much closer to contending than they actually were. You may not have heard of most of the people mentioned in the last paragraph, because their major league success was temporary. The 2000 Rockies' success was temporary, too, but the front office had neither the insight to see it nor the willpower to believe it.
So the Rockies went on an orgy of spending in 2001, deciding that they could buy the pitchers to get them to October. They started with Mike Hampton. Hampton had achieved stardom with the Houston Astros, and then in one memorable season with the Mets. As a free agent, Hampton's services were in high demand. Hampton succeeded despite a rather low strikeout total and a high number of walks allowed. This would be a red flag for any GM about to sign him to a blockbuster deal, but especially for someone about to throw down as much money as new GM Dan O'Dowd was.
O'Dowd signed Hampton to an 8-year contract for $121 million dollars with many perks and deferred payments and that would keep Hampton on the payroll for many years to come. The deal was looked down upon; it looked like the Rockies were willing to pay any exorbitant amount to entice a pitcher to Denver, and it looked like Hampton would go anywhere for the right price. Hampton didn't help matters when he claimed that he chose the Rockies because he liked the Denver school system for his children.
But O'Dowd didn't stop there. Having apparently invested in a grove of money trees, O'Dowd pursued free agent Denny Neagle. Neagle took home about $8 million per year over his 4 seasons in Colorado. His best year was a 5.26 ERA in 164.1 IP in 2002. His worst year was 2004 -- when he made $9 million and never threw a pitch in the majors. And whereas Hampton was still fairly young (28) at the time of his deal, Neagle was already 32 and well past his prime years when the Rockies locked him up. The money tied down to these two would severely hamper every move the Rockies made for years to come. But the move that tied up the most money was made in 2003, when the team signed Helton to a lucrative long-term extension. The idea was that they would keep the franchise player in Colorado for all of his productive years. But the reality was that although Helton played well, he is now eating up %25 of the team's payroll all by himself. In hindsight, the team would rather spend that Helton money elsewhere. But you can't un-sign a contract (the Players' Union gets pretty uptight about that).
The first year under Neagle and Hampton resulted in a last-place finish in the NL West at 73-89. The club posted the same record in 2002, but managed to finish 4th thanks to the strugglging Padres. Apart from Helton and the aging Walker, there was very little reason to get excited about the Rockies. The crowds of 80,000 at Mile High Stadium soon have become a distant memory as Coors Field continues to grow emptier and emptier.
Ever since then, the story of the Rockies has been an attempt to get out from under the contracts of Hampton, Neagle, Helton and other ill-fated signings such as Preston Wilson. Although Helton's still there, they were able to trade away Hampton and Wilson's contracts. The Rockies had a stroke of luck (so to speal) when Denny Neagle's arrest for solicitation gave them an excuse to void his contract.
The Rockies of today are committed to building from within with a strong group of young players. While they do have a lot of young players, it must (unfortunately) be pointed out that none of them are great and only a few of them are good. There's still a chance that promising young pitcher Jeff Francis will figure out Coors Field, although 2002 Rookie of the Year winner Jason Jennings still hasn't. Left fielder Matt Holliday appears to be a fine hitter at Coors and away, although the same can't be said for infielders Clint Barmes and Garret Atkins.
The Rockies have more help on the way, and at least they aren't tossing away money on free agents anymore. They should be able to field an adequate team of rookies in the future; they might even make it to .500 for the first time since 2000. But if the Rockies actually want to win, they're going to have to get good pitching and good hitting (away-from-Coors good hitting). And to do that, they'll have to figure out exactly what it takes to win at Coors Field. And, not to sound too pessimistic, but I don't think they're much closer to figuring that out than they were in 1993.

Sources:
Total Ballclubs by Donald Dewey & Nicholas Acocella
Total Baseball Encyclopedia 2004 Ed.
&
www.baseball-reference.com