Thursday, August 23, 2007

I Had No Idea: The Hitters (Pt. 4)

A few quick notes before we start:

  • The Astros recently fired manager Phil Garner and GM Tim Purpura both on the same day. I was going to devote an entire entry to this, but Jayson Stark's excellent article makes most the same points I would have made. Although I wasn't particularly a fan of Garner or Purpura, the problem here (as Stark points out) goes much deeper than the manager and GM, and the new hires will face most of the same problems as before. And a lot of the blame goes to owner Drayton McLane.
  • As to the Rangers' 30-3 victory over the Orioles: according to espn.com, the NFL's Baltimore Ravens haven't allowed 30 points in a game since 2005.
Reggie Smith (1966-1982)
(Career 287/366/489; 2,020 H; 314 HR; 1 Gold Glove; 7 All-Star teams)
This would be the second-most famous Reggie of his era, and unfortunately, that's about all he's remembered for. Reggie was a good all-around player for a number of winning teams, but he doesn't have one memorable moment or any flashy counting stats. What he was was a darn good player for quite some time, and that's well worth remembering.


Reggie's the first player on our list who entered baseball before the adoption of the amateur draft. Reggie was a multi-spot star coming out of high school and was a 5-tool baseball player playing shortstop. The Twins signed him to a contract but left him unprotected, so the Red Sox drafted him away.
Reggie would come up through the Boston system as one of the first African-Americans to star with the Red Sox. The Sox were the last MLB team to integrate in 1959, a full 12 years after Jackie Robinson's first game. They had an abysmal record on integration and had been run by overt racists in the years leading up to Pumpsie Green's debut in 1959. Boston's reputation as a racist baseball town would last for years, but the front office at least was getting with the program, and the results showed as Smith neared the majors.
We don't have any record of walks for Smith's time in the minors. But he advanced quickly for a player right out of high school. After a promising season with Low Class-A Pittsfield in 1965, Smith got promoted all the way to Triple-A to begin 1966. Amazingly, at age 21, He thoroughly bashed the International League. He hit .320 with 18 HR and 30 doubles in 143 games. It earned him a September call-up to the big leagues. The Sox had moved Smith to center field in the minors, and he filled a hole with the big club. The Sox had the veteran Carl Yastrzemski in left and another hot prospect, Tony Conigliaro, in right. But the team had struggled for a solution in center, filling the position with stop-gaps such as Don Demeter and Jose Tartabull (to be fair, Demeter could still hit).
Smith played in 6 games in '66 and hit poorly (154/154/192). The Sox finished 9th in the AL that year, at 72-90. But -- for the first time in a couple decades -- there was hope.
The Sox in '66 were an amazingly young team. Their lineup was the youngest in the league, while their pitching was in the middle of the pack. This may not seem surprising, but for most of the 50's and early 60's, the Sox had consisted of Ted Williams and his band of mediocrities. The mediocrities were either veterans past their prime or guys who never even had a prime. So '66 was a promising year for the organization; not because they had a lot of young players, but that they had a lot of good young players coming from their own system.
Only three players over 30 got more than 100 at bats for the '66 Sox. The one with the most at bats was Don Demeter (age 31), who was effectively replaced by Smith. 34-year-old Eddie Kasko backed up second base (and didn't hit) and 33-year-old Lenny Green backed up the outfield (and didn't hit either). That was the extent of the over-30 hitters who played for the Red Sox in '66.
As for the young guns, they were a pretty impressive lot. 22-year-old first baseman George Scott hit 245/324/433 and would star in the majors for 13 more seasons. 23-year-old third baseman Joe Foy showed a lot of promise and had some good seasons, but ended up going to the Royals in the expansion draft, and his career never really took off. 23-year-old shortstop Rico Petrocelli would spend his entire career with the Sox, an impressive 13-year run of good baseball. The aforementioned Conigliaro looked like a budding superstar hitter (he debuted with the Sox at age 19 and hit 290/354/530 in 111 games), but an errant beanball to the head would compromise his eyesight and end what should have been a Hall-of-Fame career much too early. I haven't even mentioned Carl Yastrzemski (who was a veteran at 26), who would go on to a sure-fire Hall-of-Fame career. Or pitcher Jim Lonborg, then just 24. Then there's Smith, and of course all the other fine players the Red Sox would produce in the late 60's and early 70's. After the stagnation of the 50's and the handicap of maintaining an all-white team, the Red Sox were actually putting together a winning team by themselves.
I say this to illustrate what a great turning point this was for the Sox. They were about to enter their longest period of sustained success since they sold away the Babe, and Reggie Smith was right in the center of everything.


The year 1967 will forever live in Red Sox history as the year of the "Impossible Dream." Indeed, that 72-90 record gave the Sox quite a hill to climb. Sure, maybe they had the talent to move into the first division (the top 5 of the then-1o team league). But could they move past the defending champion Baltimore Orioles, who had both fine young hitting and superb pitching? Could they get past the previous year's pennant-winners, the Minnesota Twins, with an All-Star roster of Killebrew, Carew, Oliva, Kaat, Bob Allison, Dean Chance, Mudcat Grant, and Jim Perry? Along with the Tigers (McLain, Lolich, Kalin, Horton, Freehan, Cash, etc.), these three teams were the best bets to win the AL pennant in 1967. And the White Sox and Indians weren't too bad either.
However, the 1967 American League provided one of the greatest pennant races ever. The Orioles faltered and were never really a factor, but the White Sox, Twins, Tigers, and Red Sox were evenly matched at the top of the standings. The White Sox led the division for most of the summer and actually spent more days in first (92) than any other team. Even in an era that favored pitchers, the Sox hitters weren't too good, but they were led by an excellent pitching staff anchored by Gary Peters, Tommy John, and Joe Horlen.
As late as July 15, the Red Sox were in 5th place, behind all the contenders plus the Angels. The offense was doing well, but the Sox had a heck of a time filling out the back of their starting rotation. The Sox were also getting terrible production from catcher Mike Ryan. (It wouldn't be until 1972 that the Sox filled their catcher hole -- and how -- with Carlton Fisk). The Sox played well to finish out July, and on the first of August had moved up to 2nd place, 2.5 games behind the White Sox. But at this point, there were still 5 teams within 6 games of first.
When the White Sox gave up 1st place, it wasn't to Boston -- it was to the Twins. The Twins were led by an MVP-caliber season from Killebrew, plus a pitching staff with four well-above average pitchers (Chance, Kaat, Dave Boswell, and Jim Merritt). This was on August 13. At this point, the Sox were still 2.5 games out of first, but now they were in 5th place. As the season entered its final six weeks, it looked like we might be seeing the first-ever 5-team pennant race.
The first team to drop out was the Angels. They went 5-10 over their next 15 games to fade out of contention. Just 7 seasons old, the Angels had become competitive much quicker than any of the other 1961-62 expansion teams. They had some legitimate stars in '67, such as Jim Fregosi and Don Mincher, but they were still a thin team that hadn't yet filled out its roster.
The Red Sox claimed their share of first place for the first time with a win on August 25, as they leap-frogged the Twins and White Sox (who both lost), to take a 1/2 game lead over Minnesota in 1st place. All four teams, Boston, Minnesota, Chicago, and Detroit, were within a game of first. About four weeks later, on September 19, little had changed. The Sox and Twins were tied for 1st (86-66), with Chicago 1/2 game back and Detroit one game back.
It looked like the Sox might blow it, and considering their history, few Fenway faithful would have been surprised. The race stayed tight, as all the teams kept winning, but with a loss to Cleveland on September 26, the Red Sox fell a full game out of first, tied with Chicago in 2nd behind the Twins. The Sox had one more game against the Tribe at home, before the Twins came to Fenway for the last two games of the season. Even with ace Lonborg on the mound, the Sox lost to Cleveland, 6-0. Luckily for them, the Twins lost too, falling to the Angels 5-1 at home. The White Sox lost, too, but the Tigers won. Detroit was a game back, but they were even with the Twins in the loss column, as they had played two fewer games. So while the Twins were going to Fenway to play two against the Sox, the Tigers would be at home for a four-game set against the Angels. The White Sox, even though they were 1.5 back, had the easiest schedule, with three games at home against the Senators. So on September 27, this is how the standings looked:
1. Minnesota (91-69)
2. Detroit (89-69) 1 GB
3. Boston (90-70) 1 GB
4. Chicago (89-70) 1.5 GB


On September 29, the Sox were shocked with a 1-0 loss to the lowly Senators. As unlikely as it may seem, Tommy John was outduelled by Phil Ortega. Now the Sox were 2 games back with three teams in front of them, and those odds were just too much. The Senators completed the three-game sweep of the Sox at Comiskey, and the Sox finished the season in 4th place.
At Fenway, Twins starter Jim Kaat was lifted after 2.1 innings, and the Sox hammered his relievers. Jose Santiago pitched seven strong innings as the Sox won, 6-4. They were now tied for first place with one game left.
The Tigers won the first game of their double-header as Mickey Lolich shutout the Angels. For a while, at least, the Tigers were in first place by percentage points (their 90-69 record better than the 91-70 mark of Boston and Minnesota). They had a chance to move into first place by themselves in Game 2 of the twin bill, but the Angels hung 6 runs on the Tiger bullpen in the 8th inning to complete an 8-6 comeback. The Tigers were 1/2 game out, with another double-header the next day. They would have to win both games just to foce a playoff game with the winner of the Twins-Red Sox game.
Hopes were high after the Tigers won Game 1, 6-4. Joe Sparma pitched well for Detroit while the Tiger offense clobbered Clyde Wright. For the moment, there was a three-team tie for first place. All three teams were 91-70. A three-way tie was impossible, since two of the teams were facing each other. But things were getting very interesting none the less.
Alas for Detroit fans, it was not to be. Future star Denny McLain was knocked out in the third, and the Tigers sent out 7 relief pitchers to try and save the game (it was closed out by Lolich, pitching on zero days' rest). The final score was 8-5 Angels, and the Tigers fell to 91-71, guaranteed 2nd place.
At Fenway it was aces high, as the Red Sox sent out Lonborg to face Minnesota's Dean Chance. The Twins scored two early runs off of Lonborg, and Chance shut out the Red Sox through 5 innings. But in the bottom of the 6th, Boston struck.
Three singles loaded the bases, and then Carl Yastrzemski came through with another single to tie the game. Ken Harrelson hit an RBI groundout to give the Sox the lead. At this point, Chance was relieved by veteran reliever Al Worthington. It was just 3-2; the game was still in reach for Minnesota. So Worthington threw a wild pitch (the runners advanced). Then he threw another (Yaz scored to make it 4-2). After a strikeout and a walk, the fifth run of the inning scored on an error by erstwhile MVP Killebrew.
The damage was done. Lonborg went the distance, allowing just one more run in the 8th. The Red Sox won, taking home their first pennant since 1946.
It was the "Impossible Dream" season, where a young Boston team passed four competitors that were far more experienced and (on paper) much better. But the Sox stuck around and won the pennant. They took a tough loss in the World Series, a 7-game affair against the Cardinals, who finished 101-60, 10.5 games ahead of the 2nd-place Giants.


Okay, that only tangentially relates to Reggie Smith, but I very enjoy talking about the '67 pennant race. Special thanks to: baseball-reference.com, The Baseball Cube, Baseballraces.com, Retrosheet.org, and the new BP book It Ain't Over 'Til It's Over.
And now, back to our story. Reggie Smith wasn't a star on the '67 Red Sox, but he did fill a key hole and play good defense. He hit 246/315/389, which looks awful today, but was actually pretty decent in 1967. Smith finished a distant 2nd in the Rookie of the Year voting to Minnesota's Rod Carew.
It was 1968, though, when Reggie broke out. He hit 265/342/430, pretty darn impressive for the Year of the Pitcher, when the entire AL hit 230/297/339. Unfortunately for Reggie, the Sox did not match his improvement. They fell to 4th place, finishing at 86-76, 17 games back of the Tigers. The Sox offense was good; they had most of the same players back again, and only the Tigers (who led the league in runs) outscored them. The problem was that the Tigers also led the league in fewest runs allowed, whereas the Sox weren't even close. As it turned out, the Sox weren't as successful in bringing along young pitching. They had decent seasons from several guys, but Lonborg struggled (4.29 ERA in just 17 starts), and the Sox had trouble assembling a group of replacements. Another problem was that the Sox used Lee Stange (3.93 ERA in 103 IP)as their ace reliever out of the bullpen, when young Sparky Lyle (2.74 ERA) had already established himself as a capable fireman.
In 1969, baseball took several measures to tilt the game back in favor of the hitters. Everyone benefited, but even in context, Smith took another step forward to hit 309/368/527. He hit 25 HR, drew 54 walks, and made his first All-Star team. Reggie had already established himself as the best-hitting center fielder in the league. Baltimore's Paul Blair was a wizard with the glove, but Fenway alone didn't account for Smith's hitting prowess. But again, Reggie's success was not reflected in the team's record. The split into two divisions meant little to the Red Sox; they finished 22 games back of the Orioles in the AL East.
That would be the story for Smith in the coming years; consistently excellent production as a center fielder with no postseason appearances to show for it. But the Sox came awfully close in 1972, finishing 1/2 game behind the Tigers in the AL East.
You're probably thinking, "How, in modern baseball, can a team lose a division title because they happened to play one less game than another?" The answer is that 1972 was a strike year, with the season starting late due to the showdown. The Lords of baseball could have determined a way to make up all the games, but instead they decided to just join the season in progress, knowing full well that that meant not all teams would play the same number of games. And so the Red Sox finished 85-70 and missed the playoffs because the Tigers finished 86-70.
For shaaaaaame.
Reggie responded in '73 with one of his best seasons yet. He hit 303/398/515 despite playing in just 131 games. Reggie had shifted to right field in '71 to make room for Tommy Harper. But in '73, the only better right fielders in the league were the other Reggie, and Jeff Burroughs, who was just having a career year, anyway.
With Reggie missing some time in '73, the Sox called up a youngster named Dwight Evans to play in right (he would stay through 1990). Harper was in left, with Yastrzemski moving to first to compensate. This put young Rick Miller, another product of Boston's minor league system, in center. Miller was a good defender and could take a walk, but he had no power and hit .261 in '73. While that's a useful player, it's not the guy to install as your center fielder of the future, especially at age 25 (Miller was eventually displaced by Fred Lynn and never did learn to hit).
And so the Sox had a full outfield, not to mention a farm system with even more prospects on the way (notably the aforementioned Lynn). And so the odd man out was Smith. In October, the team traded him (and Ken Tatum) to the Cardinals for Rick Wise and Bernie Carbo.
Tatum had two great seasons with the Angels as a reliever, but his three seasons in Boston had been thoroughly disappointing; the Cards probably took him just to see if he had anything left (he didn't). This trade didn't turn out as much of a winner for Boston, but knowing what they knew at the time, it wasn't bad. Wise was just 27, and had been pitching good baseball for a while. And he did give the Sox what they wanted: another reliable starter. Granted, injuries limited him to 9 starts in 1974, but he came back with a really good year in '75 when the Sox won the pennant. And by then, the Sox had an outfield of Rice-Lynn-Evans, with Yaz at first and Cecil Cooper DHing, so there was no room for Smith and noplace he would represent a clear upgrade.
As for Carbo, he was a professional hitter with a strong resume but with a reputation for being somewhat difficult. He too starred with the '75 team as a jack of all trades, hitting 257/409/483. He would bounce around for a few more years of solid hitting.
So while Smith is a tough player to lose, the deal ended up working out fine for Boston. What about St. Louis? The Cardinals were famous for their pitching, and for good reason; their offense had been near the bottom of the league the past couple seasons. The ultimate frustration was their 81-81 finish in 1973, which was never the less just 1.5 games behind the Mets.
The '73 Cardinals had gotten poor production from their outfield, and they saw Smith as a good solution to that problem. Lou Brock would be 35 in 1974, and the previous year the Cards had gotten poor production from Jose Cruz and Luis Melendez in center and right. Smith took over the starting right field job in '74, and Cruz got played out of a job by rookie Bake McBride. The Cards sold Cruz to the Astros after '74 and lived to regret it; McBride flamed out quickly whereas Cruz proved to be a late bloomer and did all of that blooming in Houston.
With Reggie in the fold, the '74 Cards improved their offense and their record, finishing 86-75. But again they were 1.5 games out, this time behind Pittsburgh. Smith was the team's MVP, though, hitting 309/389/528 with 23 HR and a career-high 100 RBI. Reggie finished 11th in the NL MVP voting, which is about right. One year in the league, and he had already taken his spot next to Rusty Staub and Ken Singleton as one of the best right fielders in the NL.
Reggie had another fine year in '75 (the Cards finished 3rd), but he started off 1976 in a pretty big slump. Smith was having injury trouble, and hit 218/281/412 in 47 games with the Cardinals. This made him available when the Dodgers came calling. L.A. was desperate for some offense to help them pass the Big Red Machine, and Smith helped them complete a formidable outfield, with Bill Buckner in left and Dusty Baker in right. The Dodgers ended up finishing a distant 2nd to the Reds, but Reggie hit more like his old self in L.A., going 280/335/484 in 65 games.
Despite playing in an NL pitcher's park, Reggie put up an MVP-caliber season in 1977, hitting 307/427/576 and finishing 4th in the NL MVP voting as the Dodgers won the division. Reggie struggled as the Dodgers beat the Phillies in the NLCS, but his bat awoke in the World Series, as he hit 273/385/727 with 3 HR in the 6-game loss to the Yankees.
Reggie wasn't quite as good in '78 (295/382/559), but he still managed to hit 29 HR in just 128 games and again finished 4th in the NL MVP voting. But a mini-controversy broke out during the season between Don Sutton and Steve Garvey, with Smith in the middle. Garvey had matinee-idol looks, was a star on and off the diamond, and was considered to be the team MVP. But Sutton told a reporter during the season that Smith -- not the overhyped Garvey -- was the real team MVP. Garvey confronted Sutton about his comments, and it resulted in a clubhouse brawl. If it's any consolation, Sutton was right; Garvey was good, but he was like the failed attempt to clone Pete Rose. He wasn't that good, but his style of play made people think he was an MVP (and a Hall-of-Famer). In '78, Garvey hit 316/353/499 as a defensively limited first baseman. And that was actually a better-than-average year for Garvey, who hit 294/329/446 for his career. But he wasn't even among the top 5 first basemen of his era.
The '78 Dodgers repeated the previous year's postseason exactly: 4-game NLCS win over the Phillies, 6-games World Series loss against the Yankees. Smith struggled throughout, managing just 8 hits and one homer for the whole postseason.
Unfortunately, 1978 would be Reggie Smith's last full season in the big leagues. He managed 92 games and a 322/392/508 batting line in 1980, but in 1981 two serious injuries, one to his shoulder, prematurely ended his season. He was around for pinch-hitting duty in the postseason, though, as the Dodgers avenged themselves against the Yankees with a 6-game victory. It was Smith's only World Series ring.
Smith was a free agent after the '81 season. His shoulder injury had forced him to first base, and it looked for a while like he might play in Japan. But he couldn't come to terms and instead signed with the Giants. The '82 squad was actually much better than the other Giant teams of the period; they finished 87-75, in 3rd place. Smith hit well (284/364/470), sharing first base duties with Dave Bergman and Darrell Evans. It was actually a fine lineup, with a 38-year-old Joe Morgan as well as promising youngsters Jack Clark, Jeff Leonard, and Chili Davis. But it wasn't that great, and neither was their pitching; the only starter with an ERA better than the adjusted league-average was Bill Laskey, who went 13-12 in 189.1 IP. The key to their success was likely an improbably strong bullpen, with closer Greg Minton having the best year of his career, and relief aces Gary Lavelle, Al Holland, and Jim Barr also on the staff.

After '82, Smith did go to Japan. But it didn't really work out for anyone involved. Now 38, Smith wasn't the all-around athlete he once was, and his injuries caused many fans to consider him a "million-dollar bench-warmer." Smith also feuded with the coaching staff and the umpires, insisting that there was a double-standard for gaijin, or Americans. For their part, the team and the media felt that Smith was disrespectful of the way the game was played in Japan. After one more season, Smith left Japanese ball and was vocal in his criticisms.
Since then, Smith has worked as a coach with the Dodgers and also served as the hitting coach for the USA's entry in the World Baseball Classic.

Looking back over Reggie's career, it's clear that he maintained a high standard of play in an era that was notoriously tough on hitters. Consistently overshadowed, either by Reggie Jackson or Steve Garvey, Smith was never really considered one of the greatest right fielders of his era. Even with his truncated career, here's how Reggie's career ranks among other right fielders (* indicates stats are through 2006 season; DT indicates Clay Davenport's translations):
Win Shares:
...
19. Willie Keeler (333)
20. Sam Rice & Dave Parker (327)
22. Reggie Smith (325)
23. Enos Slaughter (323)
24. Harry Hooper (321)
WS/162 G*:
15. Paul Waner (26.88)
16. Harry Heilmann (26.84)
16. Reggie Smith (26.49)
17. Bobby Bonds (26.45)

EQA: .301 (Not among top 20 RF)

WARP3: 89.5 (Not among top 20 RF)

dt Batting Line: 286/367/548 (None rank among top 20 RF)

I'm not trying to build a Hall-of-Fame case here, obviously. Reggie was quite good at his peak (note the EQA), but FRAA takes a dim view of his fielding, ranking him as poor in center field if competent in right. And more importantly, he wasn't around long enough to pad out his counting stats, like hits, homers, or Win Shares.
I wouldn't vote to put Reggie Smith in the Hall-of-Fame. But if there were a Hall-of-Fame B-team for right fielders, he'd be on it, along with Jack Clark, Rusty Staub, Dwight Evans, Andre Dawson, Dave Parker, Larry Walker, Ken Singleton, and Bobby Bonds. And their team captain would be King Kelly.

Bobby Murcer (1965-1983)
(Career 277/357/445; 1,862 H; 252 HR; 1 Gold Glove; 5-Time All Star)
There are a number of cases in baseball of a player who has to follow the act of a legendary player. Lou Gehrig was replaced by Babe Dahlgren wasn't much of a ballplayer. There have been hundreds like him who have been forgotten. But because he took over first base on the Yankees from Lou Gehrig, he'll forever be remembered as coming up short. When the Cardinals traded for Royce Clayton to take over shortstop from Ozzie Smith, Clayton was booed around the league. My guess is that the story will be the same for the next left fielder on the Giants.
The problem is that the fans get mad at someone for not being the person they replaced. It's stupid and illogical, of course, and we're usually aware of the stupidity, but we do it anyways because we don't like to think when we can boo. And it's not George Weiss or Walt Jocketty that runs out on the field everyday; we much prefer booing whoever happens to be nearby.
Bobby Murcer got a double dose of all of that. Because not only did he take over center field from Mickey Mantle, he was part of the post-dynastic Yankees who are always remembered with distaste. Otherwise great players like Murcer were looked upon at the time (and to a lesser extent, even today) as disappointing not because of their baseball talent, but because of the downfall of the team surrounding him. These players toil in obscurity, and it's no coincidence that I've chosen two of them for this list (the next one is Murcer's teammate, Roy White).
Sometimes there will be a backlash to underrating someone. It's happened for Murcer somewhat, but not because of an honest reassessment, it's just that his visibility as a Yankees announcer has kept him in people's minds more than White. And there actually is a campaign to get Mel Stottlemyre into the Hall, which is a violent overreaction to someone being underrated, if you ask me. No one's pushing Fritz Peterson's Cooperstown case, but then Fritz Peterson was never the pitching coach for a 114-win team.
So it's up to the rest of us to try and take an accurate look at Murcer. And when we do, we see a genuinely great player who still hasn't gotten the respect he deserves.

Just like Mantle, Murcer was from Oklahoma. He also started out as a shortstop, just like Mantle. He grew up as a big Yankee fan, and even though he was offered a football scholarship to play for the Sooners, Murcer signed with the Yankees.
Murcer's time in the minor leagues was incidental. At age 18, he killed the Appy League in 32 games of rookie ball (.365 average) before a knee injury ended his season. The next season he moved up to the high-Class A Carolina League and sustained his production over a full season (.322 AVG, 16 HR, 30 doubles). It was good enough to earn him a September call-up to the big club. Just 19, Murcer struggled against big-league pitching in 11 games (243/333/378), but was promising enough that he made the team in Spring Training in '66. Incumbent shortstop Tony Kubek retired after the '65 season, and Murcer looked like the heir apparent to replace him. Murcer struggled right off and was sent down to Triple-A Toledo. Murcer hit well in Triple-A (.266 with 15 HR), but not as well as he'd done in the low minors. He came back to the bigs in September and did somewhat better, but his final batting line (174/217/219) was still disappointing and seemed to indicate another year at Triple-A.
Murcer was headed for Spring Training 1967 confident that he could win the starting shortstop's job when he was drafted into the military. He was out of organized baseball for all of 1967 and 1968.

When Murcer came back, it was to a very different Yankee team. Mantle, his idol, had retired after the 1968 season, and the team had degenerated into a group of also-rans for the first time in half a century. Although Murcer's bat was ready for the majors, his defense at shortstop had been so erratic that he started out 1969 as the Yankees' third baseman. With 14 errors in 31 games, it was clear his future lay elsewhere, and so he shifted to center field, the position manned by Mantle for so many years.
Murcer hit well in '69, finishing with 26 HR and 50 walks on the season, for a 259/319/454 batting line. Center field suited him much better, and at 23, he still looked like a good bet for the future.
Murcer had an even better year in 1970, hitting 251/348/420 with a team-leading 23 HR (and 100 strikeouts). He helped drive the team back to respectability, as they went 93-69 and finished 2nd in the AL East. Granted, it was a distant 15 games behind the 108-win Orioles, but it was still a very good sign. Along with Murcer, the offense was driven by Roy White, a veteran of the poor late 60's squad, and a young catcher named Thurman Munson. The team also had a fine starting rotation led by Fritz Peterson and Mel Stottlemyre, and got an excellent season from relief ace Lindy McDaniel.
The Yankees fell to 82-80 in 1971, but Murcer broke through for an MVP-caliber season (331/427/543). He made his first AL All-Star team and finished 7th in MVP voting. I would argue that Murcer was the most valuable player in 1971. His only strong competition is from pitchers, and to be fair, both Vida Blue (who won the award) and Wilbur Wood were probably better, both of them having fantastic seasons.
Murcer wasn't quite as good in '72, but he did hit 292/361/537 and set a career high with 33 homers. He was still among the league's elite; only Gaylord Perry and Dick Allen were better, in my opinion. And once again, the Yankees were a part of the postseason race. As late as September 1st, they were just 1.5 games out. But they went 12-17 the rest of the way to finish 79-76, 6 games out of first place.
Murcer had another good year in '73, but struggled in '74. A lot of things changed in '74. Murcer got a raise to $120,000, making him the highest-paid Yankee in history. Ralph Houk, a player's manager, resigned and was replaced by Bill Virdon, who showed an unusual fascination with calisthenics. '74 also marked the first year (along with '75) where the Yankees played their home games at Shea Stadium, due to extensive renovations at Yankee Stadium. As if all that weren't enough, new manager Virdon decided to install Elliott Maddox in center field and shift Murcer to right.
It's hard to say which of these changes affected him most, but something was wrong, as Murcer finished the season hitting 274/332/378 with just 10 HR, awful by his standards. In spite of his struggles, the Yankees stayed in the pennant race all season long, finishing a bare 2 games behind the first-place Orioles. It was a sign of things to come for the franchise.

Unfortunately, Bobby wouldn't be around to see them. The Yankees had just been bought by George Steinbrenner, and one of the first moves made by Steinbrenner was to trade Murcer straight-up to the Giants for Bobby Bonds.
By all accounts, Murcer was devastated by the trade. The Yankees had been a part of his life since he was a child. Worse, he had to go to the National League to player for an awful team in a wind tunnel of a stadium. Murcer hit well his two years with the Giants ('75 and '76), but he was never really happy there and must have felt terrible as the Yankees won three straights pennants (1976-78) soon after he left.
Murcer had led the '76 Giants in homers (23), walks (84), and OBP (.362). But despite the presence of good talents like Darrell Evans and Gary Matthews, the Giants finished 74-88. The Giants apparently didn't think so highly of his efforts, even though he was just 30 years old and a good right fielder. They also were determined to get two-time batting champion Bill Madlock from the Cubs. So the Giants traded Murcer, Steve Ontiveros, and a minor leaguer to Chicago for Madlock and Rob Sperring.
Did the trade work out for the Giants? Well, they never got close enough to first place for the trade to matter much either way. Madlock did hit quite well for them, although he was (as was well known) a defensive challenge. The Giants actually moved him to second base in his second year there, a move which can best be described as puzzling, although to be fair, he wasn't nearly as bad as he had been at third. The Giants eventually sent him to the Pirates in a pretty dismal trade that brought back Ed Whitson and Al Holland for Madlock, Dave Roberts, and Len Randle.
Murcer spent two and a half seasons with the Cubs and continued to hit well. Wrigley Field was a much friendlier hitting environment, to be sure, and his 1977 season was vintage Bobby (265/355/455). His power dropped off dramatically in '78, although he kept up the rest of his game (281/376/403). His odd power outage continued to start out 1979 (258/374/400), but on June 26 Bobby got what must have been fantastic news: he was going back to the Yankees. The Yankees were fighting to stay in the pennant race, as the Orioles had once again risen to the top of the AL East. Bobby didn't hit too well, and the Yankees finished in 4th place.
Murcer was limited to part-time duty in 1980 (269/339/438). Spending most of the season as a left fielder/DH, Murcer apparently felt that he would be better suited as a full-time starter. But the Yankees were flush with outfielders and first basemen in 1980, with old standards Reggie Jackson and Lou Pineilla joined by youngsters Bobby Brown and Ruppert Jones, not to mention veterans Eric Soderholm (who was the primary DH and hit 287/353/462), Oscar Gamble, and even former Oriole Paul Blair, who ended his career with 12 games in pinstripes. At first was Bob Watson (307/368/456), and the Yanks also had a 32-year-old Jim Spencer (236/313/421). And so it was difficult to find a place to get Murcer regular playing time. As it was, the team won 103 games and finished 2nd in the AL in runs scored, but got swept out of the ALCS by the Royals in an interesting reversal of fortune.
In 1981, Murcer only played in 50 games but still hit well (265/331/470). The signing of Dave Winfield to a big contract meant playing time was going to be even harder to come by. But with Murcer in the fold, the Yankees won a spot in the playoffs by winning the AL East in the first "half" of the strike-abbreviated season. They won a close division series against Milwaukee (3-2) before sweeping the A's in the ALCS to win their fourth pennant in six years. Their World Series opponents were the Dodgers, who avenged the '77 and '78 losses with a 6-game defeat of the Bombers.
The Yankees brought Murcer back as a free agent in 1982, and he played 65 games as a pinch-hitter and DH. Murcer's age really started to show itself, though, and he hit just 227/288/418. The Yankees finished 5th. He came back in '83 but only got in 9 games and didn't hit well at all. After the season he was offered a job with the Yankees broadcast team, a job he has held through thick and thin to this day. A malignant brain tumor forced him from the job late last year, but his recovery has gone well, and he's received a great deal of respect and support from Yankee fans and baseball fans.
If Bobby Murcer had been able to hit as well in the second half of his career as he did in the first half, he would probably be worthy of induction into the Hall of Fame. And to be fair, it wasn't until his mid-30's that his hitting declined from All-Star levels to just pretty good. Either way, though, Murcer was one of the great Yankees and a fine ballplayer. From 1971-1973, there wasn't anybody better, and even if Murcer wasn't the next Mickey Mantle, he did pretty good for himself anyhow.
Roy White (1965-1979)
(Career 271/360/404; 1,803 H; 934 BB; 2 All-Star teams)
Like Bobby Murcer, a great deal of Roy White's fine career was lost in the disappointment of the late-60's Yankees. But unlike Murcer, White hasn't been able to reconnect to the fans via broadcasting. But it must be said that White was excellent, and while he may not have been as good as Murcer at his peak, he was still a fine player for a number of years.
A Los Angeles native, White was signed by the Yankees out of Centennial High School in Compton. After a slow start in 1962 at age 18, White had a good year in '63 with Greensboro of the Carolina League, hitting .309 with 9 HR and 10 triples. Again, we don't have any data on walks for White, so we're left to just assume that the plate discipline he showed in the majors was also there in the minors.
White had a rough year with Double-A Columbus in 1964 (at age 20), but he did much better when he repeated the level in '65, hitting .300 wit 19 HR and 14 triples in 139 games. White's great season with Columbus got him a September call-up with the big club in '65, and he hit well in 14 games (333/404/381).
White spent 1966 splitting time in left field with Tom Tresh. Tresh hit well (233/341/421), whereas White really struggled (225/308/345), posting a batting line that was poor even in 1966.
Perhaps because of this, White started out 1967 with Triple-A Spokane, hitting .343, but with little power in games. Still, the Yankees called him up in July to stay. Mickey Mantle had moved to first base, and the New York outfield was being manned by Tresh (219/301/377), Joe Pepitone (251/301/377), and Steve Whitaker (243/283/358). Tresh and Pepitone were both essentially done by '67, and Whitaker was never much good to begin with. All of a sudden, there was plenty of room for Roy White. Unfortunately, he wasn't much of an upgrade, hitting 224/287/290 in 70 games. After finishing dead last in '66, the '67 Yankees managed to move all the way up to 9th (of 10 AL teams).
In 1968, though, White finally broke through at age 24, hitting 267/350/414 with 17 HR and 73 BB. The Yankees finally got back to the first division, ending up in 5th place at 83-79. Part of their problem was still power; White's 17 HR were second only to Mantle, who hit 18. 1968 or not, that's disappointing.
The league-wide adjustments to favor the hitters helped White post even better number in '69, as he hit 290/392/426 with 81 walks. The Yankees again finished fifth, as Mantle's retirement left a big hole in the team's offense. White was the best-hitting Yankee in '69, although a young Bobby Murcer and Thurman Munson gave the team some future stars.
The 1970 Yankees shot all the way up to 2nd place at 93-69. Unfortunately, they were 15 games back of the dynastic Orioles in the AL East, but it was still a big year for the franchise. White had one of his best years (296/387/473, 22 HR, 96 BB), and he got strong support from Munson and Murcer, as well as hurlers Fritz Peterson, Mel Stottlemyre and Lindy McDaniel. White was just as good in '71 (292/388/469), but the Yanks fell back to 4th place.
White suffered a power outage in '72, hitting just 270/384/376, with 10 HR. The Yankees were stifled, too, finishing 4th in the AL East again. The problem was that apart from Munson, White, and Murcer, the Yanks hadn't found (or kept) any consistently productive hitters in the last 10 years. Their pitching staff was strong, but as it turned out, hurlers like Stottlemyre and Peterson didn't have a long shelf life, and they would be gone by the time the Bombers returned to the World Series. One guy who was still around was ace reliever Sparky Lyle, obtained in a lopsided deal from Boston.
White's power returned in '73 (18 HR), but his batting average fell to .246, giving him a dismal .329 OBP even with his 78 walks. The Yankees finished 4th again and it was starting to look pretty hopeless for the Yankees to get a winner out of their current roster.
All that changed in 1974. The Yankees returned to the top of the league as contenders, and would stay there for nearly ten years. The Yankees kept up in an exciting three-team race for the AL East. New York was there to the end, getting eliminated on the next-to-last day of the season. They ended up just 2 games back of the Orioles.
There were a lot of new Yankees in '74 that contributed to the resurgence. Former bench player Ron Blomberg now had a regular spot as the team's DH (311/375/481). Lou Pineilla was acquired from the Royals (305/341/407) to complete an outfield that also included White, Bobby Murcer, and Elliott Maddox (303/395/386), all of whom switched out and managed to get in at least 130 games.
Graig Nettles had come to the Yankees the previous season, but he would prove a fixture at the hot corner for the next decade. The Yanks had a strong bullpen anchored by Lyle and a transitional rotation with some old faces (Stottlemyre, Sam McDowell, Pat Dobson) and some new ones (Doc Medich, Dick Tidrow, Rudy May).
White had his best season in a while in 1975 (290/372/430), but the Yanks stumbled and finished 3rd.
In 1976, however, the same core group went 97-62 and won the AL East. The Yankees were back in the postseason for the first time since 1964.
New players that pushed the Yanks to the pennant (they beat the Royals in the ALCS) were young second baseman Willie Randolph, free agent pitcher Catfish Hunter, trade acquisitions Ed Figueroa and Dock Ellis, and a deep outfield consisting of White, Mickey Rivers, Oscar Gamble, Carlos May, and Pineilla. Unfortunately for the Yankees, their return to the World Series would end in humiliation: a sweep at the hands of the Big Red Machine.
But the Yankees of 1977 and 1978 went on a rampage that resulted in back-to-back World Championships. The word "rampage" describes not only their dominance, but the amazing behind-the-scenes turmoil that came to be known as the "Bronx Zoo." At the center of it were owner George Steinbrenner, sometimes-manager Billy Martin, and new free agent Reggie Jackson.
Roy White was not a headline-grabber like Jackson or a controversial player at all, really. He just held down the left field job. However, as he entered his mid-30's, it became clear that his skills were starting to slip. In '77 things were all right, as White hit 268/358/405. But in '78, he slipped to 269/349/393 in 103 games. As the Yankee outfield grew more crowded, White was forced to share time in left with Pineilla.

In 1979, the 35-year-old White played in just 81 games and hit 215/290/288, the worst baseball he'd played in a decade. On a roster that was still overstocked with outfield/DH types, White was finding it more and more difficult to get playing time.
Despite his fading status, White probably could have found work in the big leagues in 1980. But he signed with the Yomiuri Giants in Japan and ended his active career there.

White's career numbers aren't overwhelming. He got a relatively late start and made an early exit, so his counting stats aren't very impressive. But for about a decade in the late 60's and early 70's, White was one of the most consistently productive left fielders in the game. He's not a Hall-of-Famer; he just chose the wrong time to be a Yankee. He was overshadowed first by the team's mediocrity and then by the controversy that always centered on players other than himself.
So let's give some "props" to Roy White, as the kids would say. He was a heck of a ballplayer.

Jim Fregosi (1961-1978)
(Career 265/338/398; 1,726 H; 151 HR; 1 Gold Glove; 6-time All-Star)
Jim Fregosi was the Derek Jeter of the 1960's. As outrageous as that statement sounds, I intend to prove it by the end of this entry.
Now, Fregosi didn't have Jeter's October heroics to his credit, but due to his teammates more than anything. Fregosi never made it to the postseason in an 18-year career. He did play for the 1973 Mets (who won the pennant), but he was sold to the Rangers in July and thus missed all of the excitement.
But Fregosi was, in fact, Derek Jeter; he was the best-hitting shortstop of his time, and while his defense wasn't much, it was good enough for him to hold down the position. And any shortstop who hits like Jim Fregosi is headed to the Hall of Fame. And if it weren't for injuries, that's exactly where Fregosi would be.
A San Francisco native, Fregosi was signed by the Red Sox out of high school in late 1959. Fregosi, just 18, spent the 1960 season playing for the Alpine (?) team. He hit 267/384/389, showing very good patience if little power. That December, the American League conducted the first-ever expansion draft. The Red Sox left Fregosi unprotected, and he was drafted by the new Los Angeles Angels. The Angels actually got a pretty good haul out of the draft, taking Fregosi, Dean Chance, Ted Kluszewski, Albie Pearson, Ken McBride, Eddie Yost, Earl Averill, Bob Cerv, and Ken Hunt. Not a team of All-Stars, but it's one of the best any team's managed in an expansion draft.
Incidentally, while Fregosi was starring with the Angels, the Red Sox filled the shortstop hole with a washed-up Luis Aparicio and Mario Guerrero before finally settling on Rick Burleson in 1975.
Still just 19, Fregosi started 1961 with the Angels' Triple-A affilliate in Dallas. He still showed good plate discipline (50 walks against just 70 K's), but he hit just .254 with very little power. He still got a September call-up with the big club, where he played 11 forgettable games at shortstop (222/250/222).
Fregosi went back to Dallas to start 1962, and this time his offense got better. He hit 238/378/365 in 64 games before getting called up to the majors. The Angels had 31-year-old Joe Koppe playing shortstop, so they had very little to lose by going with young Fregosi. Fregosi played in just 58 games in 1962, but established himself as a major-leaguer by hitting 291/356/406. In just their second season of existence, the Angels went 86-76 and finished in 3rd place, a huge surprise to everyone. Unfortunately, their early success began a cycle where the team looked for instant gratification and neglected the farm system.
None the less, Fregosi was already looking like one of the best young shortstops in the game. His defense was adequate, and he was a good hitter for the position. He hit 287/325/422 in 1963, at age 21. Taking into account the era he was playing in and the ballpark (Dodger Stadium; the Angels didn't get their own stadium until 1966). But the Angels' success in '62 did prove to be temporary, as they fell to 9th place in '63.
In 1964, however, the team finished a respectable 82-80, in 5th place. The team MVPs were Fregosi, who broke out with a 277/369/463 season, and Cy Young Award-winner Dean Chance (1.65 ERA in 278.1 IP). Unfortunately, the only support these two stars had were some over-the-hill veterans and raw rookies. The best hitters in the lineup after Fregosi were Joe Adcock (36 years old) and Jimmy Piersall (34). They did get some good work from outfielders Willie Smith (25) and Lou Clinton(26), but they would be traded away within a few years.
On the pitching staff, Chance got good support from 22-year-old Fred Newman (2.75 ERA in 190 IP), but after an even better 1965, the overworked Newman flamed out and was out of the majors by 1968. Bo Belinsky actually pitched well, but '64 was his last year with the team, as his party-all-night lifestyle was considered a bad influence. Ace closer Bob Lee had an excellent year, but after a couple more good years in the bullpen, his career was basically over in 1967.
This typified the Angels teams of the era; they might have had a couple good players either on their way up or on their way out, but they rarely developed (and held on to) the sort of player you could build a winning team around. And for the first 10-15 years of their existence, the only player like that they managed to keep was Fregosi.
If there was any optimism surrounding the team's 5th-place finish in '64, it disappeared when they fell to 7th in 1965. Fregosi's production dropped (277/337/407), but he was still the team MVP, although the Halos got some good work from their starters (Newman, Chance, George Brunet, and Marcelino Lopez). 1966 was more of the same, as Fregosi's numbers fell to 252/325/391 (granted, batting numbers were falling all over baseball).
The Angels had probably their best season yet in 1967. See the above entry on Reggie Smith for more information about the '67 AL pennant race, but in short, the Angels stayed in a close 5-team race and finished 84-77. Stars included Fregosi (290/349/395), first baseman Don Mincher (273/367/487) and an outfield of Rick Reichardt, Jimmie Hall, and Jose Cardenal. The Angels got good work from several different starters, but once again, none of them would win long enough to become household names.
The Angels' tenuous relationship with winning baseball was proven in 1968, when they went 67-95 and finished 8th. Fregosi's numbers weren't nearly as bad as they appear (244/315/365) considering the context, but the rest of the team really was that bad. This was the Angels in a nutshell: Jim Fregosi surrounded by players that were either a) past their prime (Don Mincher, Woodie Held, Minnie Rojas, Larry Sherry), b) mediocre at best (Bobby Knoop, Rick Reichardt, Jim McGothlin) or c) players who would go on to star with other teams (Aurelio Rodriguez, Jim Spencer, Marty Pattin, Andy Messersmith). The names would change, but the basic makeup of the team wouldn't change until the onset of free agency. The front office didn't have the patience to invest in a farm system and they (apparently) didn't have the know-how to assemble a winner by themselves.
The story was the same in 1969 (3rd in the new AL West), but in 1970, at least, the team moved to 86-76, a much stronger 3rd place. This was thanks mainly to Fregosi, Alex Johnson, Roger Repoz, Clyde Wright, and Messersmith. Unfortunately, these players would all be gone within a couple years: Messersmith was traded to the Dodgers after the '72 season for a 37-year-old Frank Robinson; Clyde Wright was traded to Milwaukee for Ellie Rodriguez and friends (his career was nearly over, anyway); Alex Johnson went to the Indians after the '71 season for an aging Vada Pinson; closer Ken Tatum was part of a post-1970 trade with Boston that got the Angels semi-blind Tony Conigliaro; reliver Dave LaRoche was traded to the Twins straight-up for Leo Cardenas after '71; Roger Repoz stayed with the team but was done by age 31; 3B Ken McMullen went to the Dodgers with Messersmith; 1B Jim Spencer was traded to Texas in mid-'73 for Mike Epstein; Aurelio Rodriguez (and Rick Reichardt) went to the Senators in the deal that got McMullen in the first place; future star Rudy May was simply sold to the Yankees in June of '74; young Mickey Rivers at least stuck around through 1975 before going to the Yankees with Ed Figueroa in a trade for Bobby Bonds.
So imagine all of those trades that involve sending away useful talent in exchange for (mostly) junk, and then consider that their farm system was mostly fallow, and you can understand why club owner Gene Autry was so eager to jump into the free agent market in the future.
But what happened to Jim Fregosi, the face of the franchise? Unfortunately, that story is even sadder than the desolate state of the Angels . . .
The '71 Angels slipped back into mediocrity (76-86), and one of the main reasons was an injury to Fregosi that limited him to 107 games and a 233/317/326 batting line. According to Total Ballclubs, the front office (specifically GM Dick Walsh) were unsympathetic in their reaction to Fregosi's injury; they refused to give him clearance to leave the team, despite the fact that the injury (a foot tumor) would only get worse if he kept playing, and it was severely limited his on-field performance, as well. Finally, Fregosi went against the front office's wishes and checked himself into a hospital for operation on his ailing foot.
The following December, the Angels traded Fregosi to the Mets. Fregosi's declining play and "insubordination" likely made him a target for Walsh's fury, but it should be said that the Angels' front office had already made a name for itself over the years for its horrific record on player relations. The only exception was Autry himself, who had grown close to Fregosi in the ten years he'd spent with the franchise. It was that parting, apparently, that was most painful for both men. Walsh justified the move by pointing to the players the Angels got in return: outfielder Leroy Stanton and a young fireballer named . . . Nolan Ryan.
In retrospect, the trade that became infamous as "Ryan-for-Fregosi" was a blunder by the Mets. Unfortunately, Fregosi never did regain his former level of play with the Mets, and all Ryan did in California was throw some no-hitters and set a new single-season record for strikeouts.
But how much of a blunder was it at the time? Fregosi hadn't even turned 30 when the trade was made. His 1971 struggles aside, there was no reason to believe that he wouldn't continue on as one of the game's best shortstop for some years yet.
And keep in mind that the New York Mets version of Nolan Ryan isn't the same as the strikeout king he would become in California. Ryan was just 25 at the time of the trade, but in that time, he'd allowed 344 walks in 510 IP, a historically high rate of wildness. Granted, he did strike out 493 batters in the same time frame, but put the two together, and Ryan just wasn't nearly as good as he would become with the Angels. His best single-season ERA mark in New York was 3.42 (117 ERA+), which is good, but is a far cry from Cy Young contention. It should also be said that in that season, Ryan threw just 131.2 innings, and his career-high at the time of the trade was 152.
The other point is that the Mets had a lot of good young pitchers, and Ryan was considered -- by many observers -- not one of the best. In 1971, the year before the trade, Ryan was the fifth-best starting pitcher on the team. The Mets had one of the best pitchers of all time (Tom Seaver, age 26), an incredible #2 (Jerry Koosman, 28), not to mention Gary Gentry (a 24-year-old whose career unfortunately peaked with his 3.23 ERA in '71) and a promising young pitcher named Jon Matlack (21 years old). Even without Ryan, the Mets would have a starting staff of Tom Seaver, Jerry Koosman, Jon Matlack, and either Gary Gentry and Ray Sadecki (who was 30 years old in '71 and still better than Ryan).
What the Mets didn't have was an All-Star caliber hitter at a key defensive position. They did have solid glove man Bud Harrelson at shortstop (and a 20-year-old Tim Foli), but Fregosi could have shifted to third base (replacing 33-year-old stopgap Bob Aspromonte).
So should we really be surprised that the Mets traded away a historically wild young pitcher who was, by most accounts, no better than the third of fourth best pitcher on the staff?
Of course, what did happen is that Ryan learned to succeed in spite of his wildness, while Fregosi struggled in New York. The Mets really should have paid more attention to Ryan's strikeouts, but really, how many pitchers just like Nolan Ryan don't learn to succeed with his style? How many pitchers in history have been able to compete for Cy Young Awards despite regularly walking more than 100 (and sometimes 200) batters per season? Ryan, Bob Feller, and Randy Johnson come to mind, though Johnson's control improved significantly when he reached his 30s. And for those three, there are thousands of talented-but-wild pitchers throughout major league history who don't succeed. Yes, the Mets should have looked a little closer at Ryan before they traded him. But this move was not the blunder that it's come to be viewed as in hindsight. Because who would have predicted what happened to Ryan in California?
And for that matter, who would have predicted what happened to Fregosi in New York . . .
Fregosi still wasn't entirely healthy in 1972, his first season with the Mets (232/311/344). It's hard for me to pin down how much of this is due to the lingering effects of his foot problems and how much of it is additional injuries. Either way, he only played in 101 games. Over in California, Nolan Ryan went 19-16, threw 9 shutouts, and struck out 329 batters (against "just" 157 walks) in 284 innings, sporting a 2.28 ERA (128 ERA+).
And oh yeah -- Met fans noticed.
Things improved for New York as they won the pennant in 1973, but Fregosi wasn't around to see it. In his first 45 games, he hit 234/340/282, and in July the Texas Rangers purchased his contract. While the Mets won the pennant and went to Game 7 in the Series before losing, the Rangers finished 57-105. The only good news was that Fregosi hit much better with his new team, 268/318/446 in 45 games.
Fregosi hit well again in 1974 (261/324/439), but injuries limited him to just 78 games. The Angels were the first team to try him at third as his defense deteriorated from adequate to poor. He'd been a third baseman primarily while with the Mets, and the Rangers used him there as well, splitting time at first base. Fregosi's greatest strength -- offensive production from a key defensive position -- was gone, as was his ability to stay healthy. He played 77 games in 1975 (262/329/398) and never played more than that in a season again.
After an equally dismal 1976, the Rangers traded Fregosi to the Pirates in mid-1977 for corner infielder Ed Kirkpatrick, in the last year of his career. The Pirates used Fregosi almost exclusively as a backup first baseman, and he hit well in his 36 games with them (286/408/500).
But any hopes that the 35-year-old Fregosi had some good baseball left in him dimmed in 1978, when Fregosi started out hitting 200/385/350 with the Pirates in 20 games. Pittsburgh released him on June 1. Unable to catch on with another team, Fregosi's playing career was over.
However, the clever Fregosi started his managerial career right away, coming home to a much-improved Angels team in 1978. The team won the AL West for the first time under Fregosi in 1979, but after dismal play in 1980 and 1981, Fregosi was let go. After three forgettable seasons with the White Sox in the mid-80's, Fregosi caught on with the Phillies in 1991. He inherited a promising but problematic team that fell to last place in 1992. Amazingly, though, the Phillies roared back to win the pennant 1993, with Fregosi at the helm of a true ship of fools, a ragtag bunch of rough blue-collar types that somehow managed to upset the Braves in the NLCS and take the favored Blue Jays to 6 games in the World Series before falling.
1993 would prove to be the highlight of Fregosi's managerial career. He stayed with the team through 1996, but they didn't manage any more miracles like in '93. After that, Fregosi managed the Blue Jays to back-to-back 3rd-place finishes in 1999 and 2000, and hasn't worked as a major-league manager since. But although he hasn't run a big-league club in 7 years, his name does sometimes come up as a candidate for a team looking to hire someone other than the usual suspects. And at age 65, Fregosi is still relatively young.
Many players who suffered traumatic injuries look back at their careers and wonder what they would have done if they'd stayed healthy? What about Fregosi? Would he have made the Hall of Fame if he had played as well after 30 as he did before?
I think so. To quote Rob Neyer's Big Book of Baseball Lineups:
Jim Fregosi and Derek Jeter both became everyday shortstops in the majors when they were twenty-one. In Fregosi's first eight seasons, he earned 207 Win Shares. In Jeter's first eight seasons, he totaled 192 Win Shares. This is not a knock on Jeter. Cal Ripken also was twenty-one when he won a regular job; in his first eight seasons, he earned 219 Win Shares. The point is that Fregosi obviously had Hall of Fame talent and, for eight seasons, he also had Hall of Fame performance. Fregosi was a good hitter and -- because he played a decent shortstop -- a great player.

So this is our verdict on Jim Fregosi: yet another in a long list of "almosts." But for a while, he was great.

Special thanks to Baseball-Reference.com, Retrosheet, The Baseball Cube, Baseball Prospectus DT Cards, Baseball Race, Rob Neyer, Total Ballclubs and especially to the SABR Bio Project for info on Bobby Murcer.

NEXT UP: Bill Freehan, Vada Pinson, Frank Howard, Johnny Callison, Curt Flood, Vern Stephens, Charlie Keller and more . . .

Sunday, August 19, 2007

I Had No Idea: The Hitters (Pt. 3)

Brett Butler (1981-1997)
(Career 290/377/376, 2,375 H; 558 SB; 1-time All-Star)
Butler doesn't fit into the general timeline of player's that I'm working with right now, but that's just because I forgot about him. I know, it's ironic that I would forget about a player to put in my entry of forgotten players. Ha ha.
Actually, I've been reading a couple books lately. One is Rob Neyer's Big Book of Baseball Blunders; actually I'm re-reading it, it's one of the best and most accessible baseball books of the past few years. The other book I'm working on is Baseball Prospectus' new tome, It Ain't Over 'Til It's Over, about the closest pennant races. In both books, Butler's name came up. In Neyer's book, he's mentioned as part of the dreadful trade that sent Len Barker to the Braves. In the BP book, he's mentioned as part of the Indians' abortive run at the postseason in 1984. I said to myself, "You know, nobody really talks about Brett Butler anymore." Then I finally put two and two together and included him in this series.
The Atlanta Braves drafted Butler in the 23rd round of the 1979 amateur draft. I can't find the specific reason that Butler fell all the way to the 23rd round; sometimes there are good reasons that good players fall so far, but I haven't been able to find out what Butler's were. He was a college player out of Southeastern Oklahoma State University, which may not be the hub of the baseball scouting community, but then Butler is the type of guy that scouts have always liked. He was both small (5'10") and skinny (BR lists his weight as 160). But he was a fantastic contact hitter who could bunt and get on base as well as anyone. He played a pretty good center field and stole bases efficiently. There may have been a good reason for Butler to fall so far in the draft, but I doubt it had anything to do with his raw skill.
Butler got started right away, tearing through the low minors with astronomical batting averages, great bat control, walks, steals, you name it. After tearing through the Rookie League and Class A, Butler jumped all the way to Triple-A Richmond in 1981. He opened the season there hitting 335/456/412 in 125 games. He drew 103 walks (against 63 strikeouts) and went 44/60 in steals. My guess is that the only reason Butler stayed in the minors so long is that he was blocked (and how) in the majors by Dale Murphy. But eventually, the Braves brought him up and he got in 40 games with the big club. Murphy and right fielder Claudell Washington were hitting well, but the Braves were getting very little production from the left field spot. So Butler made 25 of his 41 appearances in left.
Butler's big league batting line wasn't too bad (254/352/317), but without a high batting average, he wasn't much of an asset. But the Braves figured he was their best option in left field, and he won the starting job in 1982. Unfortunately, he was awful. By June 30, his batting line was 228/238/310, worse than the man he replaced (Rufino Linares). I don't know if he was suffering from injury or just suffering, but Butler went back down to Triple-A. He played 41 games there that season and hit like his old self: 363/442/471. Recalled to the big leagues for the stretch drive (the Braves were actually contenders), Butler's improvement was modest at best; he finished at 217/291/225. The Braves, though, won the NL West by a hair, finishing at 89-73. Butler played two games in the NLCS, going 0-for-1 at the plate. The Braves were swept by the Cardinals.
Expectations were higher for the Braves in 1983, as they sought to defend their NL West crown. Butler was installed as the full-time left fielder (either due to management's confidence or the absence of better candidates) and responded with a much better season: 281/344/393. It wasn't great, by any means, but was a far cry better than his previous work. Butler gave the Braves very good defense in left (14 FRAA). He also stole 39 bases, but was caught 23 times for a self-defeating 63% success rate. Despite a second straight MVP for Dale Murphy and a strong lineup consisting of Murphy, Bob Horner and Chris Chambliss, the Braves finished a close 2nd in the NL West at 88-74, just 3 games back of the Dodgers.
But the real "highlight" of the 1983 season for Atlanta was the acquisition of Len Barker from Cleveland. The Braves got Barker on August 28 for cash and players to be named later. Ted Turner thought he'd gotten himself a gen-u-ine ace. But so late in the season, Barker could only make 6 starts. He went 33 innings and posted an ERA of 3.82, a bit better than league average. That was actually much better than he'd done with Cleveland so far that year; as an Indian, he'd posted a 5.11 ERA (ERA+ of 83) in 24 starts. Unfortunately for the Braves, it was this Len Barker who would return in 1984.
Barker was just 27 years old, and he had thrown a perfect game earlier in his career. But Barker not only wasn't a superstar; he wasn't even a star. In only one full season of Barker's career had his ERA been better than the league average; that was 1982, when he posted a 3.90 ERA (ERA+ of 105) in 244.2 IP, striking out 187 batters and walking 88. Barker had some good stuff that could make him look like a star, but he'd never been able to sustain superstar performance, and as it turns out, he never would again. Injuries limited Barker to just 20 starts in 1984 (3.85 ERA, ERA+ of 100 -- exactly average), but in 1985 he was terrible, making 18 starts and throwing just 73.2 innings with a 6.35 ERA. He tried a comeback with Milwaukee in 1987, but his career was over.
The real problem with the Barker trade was not so much Barker's inability to pitch well and stay healthy; it was how much this cost the Braves. Not only did it cost them a top-tier salary, it would also cost them the aforementioned PTBNL.
As part of the deal, the Indians wouldn't receive the players to complete the Barker deal until after the season. Problem is, word got out that the two key parts the Braves would be giving up were third baseman Brook Jacoby and, yes, Brett Butler. The situation became quite awkward as the two men played out the string in '83, knowing that they would be heading to Cleveland after the season. There was actually some backlash in Atlanta to the deal, mainly because the hard-working Butler had become a fan favorite. Thoroughly embarassed over the whole ordeal, the Braves tried to substitute another player for Butler, but the Indians were adamant. And so, right after a pennant race that saw Butler and Jacoby both involved, the two players were sent (along with Rick Behenna) to Cleveland to complete the Barker trade. Butler must have felt some revenge as the expensive Barker helped drop the Braves out of contention, whereas he and Jacoby would help the Indians climb back to respectability at bargain prices.
To be fair, the Braves' move is somewhat understandable. Butler was blocked by Murphy and not hitting well enough to hold down left field. And Bob Horner's grip on the third base job was just as tight, blocking Jacoby. It's not so much that the Braves traded these players who may not have been the right fit for their roster, it's that they paid so much and got so little in return.
Butler's first season in Cleveland was similar to his last in Atlanta; good, but not excellent. He hit 269/361/355 as the team's full-time center fielder. Center field would be his position from now on; after one game as a DH in 1985, Butler never made an appearance at another position until 1997, when he split time in left field.
Butler's 86 walks and 52 steals may not seem like a lot, but he led Cleveland in steals by far (Tony Bernazard was 2nd with 20), and he and Andre Thornton were the only Indians with 55 walks (Thornton had 91). The team finished at 75-87, 6th place in the AL East and 29 games back of the Tigers.
At the overdue age of 28, Butler had his first great season in 1985. He hit 311/377/431 (the AL hit 261/327/406) with 14 triples, 63 walks, 47 stolen bases, and strong defense in center. It would be pretty moot, though, as the Tribe went 60-102 to finish dead last, their worst record since 1971.
Butler slumped a bit in '86 (278/356/375), but he played 161 games for a team that bounced all the way back to 84-78. Unfortunately, that was only good for 5th place, as the AL East was strong that year.
Butler's last year in Cleveland brought mixed blessings; the league-wide surge in offense helped him set a career high 9 home runs. Modest, yes, but he was never much of a slugger, and his 295/399/425 was just fine. The bad news was that Cleveland's 1986 surge was a mirage; they dropped back to last, this time finishing 61-101, only one game better than their record of two years ago. I can't say what kind of offer Butler got from Cleveland as a free agent that offseason, but even in the midst of collusion, Butler moved to a new team; the defending NL West champion San Francisco Giants.
Despite the switch in leagues, Butler hit well in '88, finishing at 287/393/398 and set a new career high with 97 walks. 1989 was a step down for Brett, whose 283/349/354 batting line is only somewhat ameliorated by Candlestick Park (not to mention his defense). No, the best news of '89 was that Brett was going back to the postseason; the Giants won the NL West, finishing 3 games ahead of the Padres. And this time, Brett would be a starter, not roster-filler like in '82.
Butler didn't hit well at all in the NLCS against Chicago (211/318/211), but the Giants still won in 5 games. In contrast, he hit well in the World Series (286/375/357), but the Giants were trounced by Oakland in a 4-game sweep.
The Giants finished 3rd in 1990, but it wasn't due to Butler, who was on the top of his game: 309/397/384. It was Butler's last year in San Francisco, and he used the positive finish to sign a nice 4-year contract with the Dodgers worth about $13 million (that was good money in those days).
Butler's first season in L.A. saw him selected to his only All-Star team, and for good reason; it was probably the best year of his career. He hit 296/401/343, setting career highs in OBP, walks (108), and runs (112) while laying in 161 games. He also stole 38 bases, but was caught 28 times for a %58 success rate. While Butler was always fast and stole a lot of bases, he wasn't a very good percentage stealer; he would finish his career as a 68% stealer (558-for-815), just barely breaking even.
The next three years in L.A. were all good ones for Butler. Brett was born to play a) for the Dodgers, and b) in Dodger Stadium. In an environment that made runs scarce, Brett's brand of small-ball was much more valuable. He got on base by any means necessary (he was one of the game's best bunters), stole a lot of bases (thought not at a good rate, as mentioned) and played good defense, covering L.A.'s wide outfield skillfully. His complete lack of power was surprising even for a slap hitter (his career SLG of .376 is poor even in context), but he did manage 131 career triples, so he was well equipped to take the extra base.
After an excellent 1994 season (314/411/446), Butler signed a one-year deal with the Mets, who were still trying to win by playing free agent Russian roulette. Brett got off to a good start in New York (311/381/392), but with his old team in the midst of a close division race, the Dodgers gave up two minor leaguers to get Butler back. Brett didn't hit as well in L.A., but he was part of the Dodgers as they won the NL West title for the first time in 7 years. Again, Brett struggled in October (267/267/267), as the Dodgers were swept out of the NLDS by the Reds.
Butler apparently had found something he liked, as he re-upped with L.A. in the offseason for a 1-year deal. But at 39 years old, Butler was no longer an everyday player. A mid-season battle with cancer (see below) left put a big dent in his productivity. He wasn't hitting his way into the lineup (267/313/290), and besides, the Dodgers had one former Rookie of the Year in the outfield (Raul Mondesi in RF) and one guy on his way to ROY honors (Todd Hollandsworth in LF). Roger Cedeno got most of the playing time in center (246/326/336), and while he was no great shakes, he was better than Butler. On the backs of 5 straight Rookies of the Year (Karros-Piazza-Mondesi-Nomo-Hollandsworth) and a good pitching staff, the Dodgers again made the postseason, this time as the Wild Card. Unfortunately, Butler didn't even play in the NLDS, but on the plus side, he didn't miss much; the Dodgers got swept by the Braves.
Now 40 years old, Butler made one more return to baseball with the Dodgers. He was actually fairly productive as a part-timer in 1997 (283/363/324), but his speed and defense no longer played in center, and he was once again fighting Roger Cedeno (273/362/392) for a job. The Dodgers were in the pennant race again in '97, but this time they missed October, finishing 2 games behind the Giants in the NL West. Butler hung up his spikes and took up coaching. Right now he's managing the Diamondbacks' High-A affiliate (Lancaster).
Butler is also active in a number of groups outside baseball, particularly as a cancer survivor. Years of smokeless tobacco use gave Butler a rare form of cancer of the tonsils known as Squamous cell carcinoma. As I said, it was in mid-1996 that Butler underwent surgery and treatment to remove the tumor. The very fact that he made it back to the major leagues was astonishing; Butler has since become an outspoken critic of smokeless tobacco. He has had some complications since the surgery (wikipedia reports a stroke suffered about a month ago), but appears to be sticking to his duties as a minor league manager.
Butler was a fine leadoff hitter, but as we've seen, he wasn't exactly a superstar. He had some seasons where he was among the best players in the league, but over his career, he wasn't good enough to merit Cooperstown discussion. He was around for a long time, you can say that for him, and he accomplished quite a lot. He was one of the best leadoff hitters of all time, and that's worth remembering, no question.
Ken Singleton (1970-1984)
(Career 282/388/436, 2,029 H; 246 HR; 1,263 BB; 3-time All-Star)
In case you're wondering, I'm listing these players in rough chronological order based loosely on where their careers were centered. Singleton retired two years before Cesar Cedeno, but because Cedeno's career was centered mainly in the 70's, with the 80's just a bare afterthought, his career is "centered" earlier than that of Singleton, whose career was up-and-down in a pretty straightforward manner.
Ken Singleton was one of the best hitters in baseball for about 10 years in the 70's and 80's. But the fact that he wasn't particularly memorable for any one thing, didn't compile any eye-popping career stats, and played in a context that hid his talents, he isn't often remembered among the era's great hitters. But that's precisely what he was. And even if he's not Hall-of-Fame material, he's well worth remembering among the other stars of that period.
Singleton was drafted by the New York Mets out of Hofstra University with the #3 overall pick in the 1967 draft. For a corner outfielder, Singleton didn't show a lot of power in the minors, but he progressed well none the less. At age 23, Singleton opened the 1970 season with Triple-A Tidewater and hit .388 with 17 HR in just 64 games. He was promoted to the big leagues, where he hit fairly well (263/361/379), but again without the power expected of a corner outfielder.
Singleton made the Mets' major league roster in 1971, but spent most of his time as a backup, compiling just 298 at-bats and hitting 245/374/393. Singleton again showed his strong plate discipline (61 BB), and while he showed more power than in '70 (13 HR but just 5 doubles), he still didn't look like a star. The Mets already had Cleon Jones established as their everyday left fielder, and there was an opening in right field, but the Mets apparently decided that Singleton wasn't the one to fill it. Instead, they used him as part of a trade to acquire a proven right fielder: Rusty Staub. The Mets sent Singleton, glove man Tim Foli, and bench player Mike Jorgensen to the Expos to acquire "Le Grande Orange," who was coming off an All-Star season where he hit 311/392/482 in 162 games.
It's hard to call the trade a mistake by the Mets. Singleton was valuable, but it's hard to argue (given what they knew at the time) that he was a safer bet than the more established Staub. Foli was a great glove at shortstop, but the Mets already had Bud Harrelson stuck there. And considering that Staub played very well for the Mets and helped them win the pennant in 1973, you really can't fault them at all for making the trade.
Foli never did learn to hit (although his glove would keep him around for another 14 seasons). Jorgensen never hit a lick, despite the fact that he was a first baseman/outfielder, so it's much harder to explain how he stuck around for 14 more seasons of his own (he finished with a career batting line of 243/347/373).
Singleton, on the other hand, salvaged what was otherwise a stinker of a deal for the Expos. He took a step forward in 1973, his first season in Montreal, hitting 274/363/410 with 14 HR and 70 walks (although it should be said that Jarry Park in Montreal was much more hitter-friendly than Shea Stadium). In 1973, on the other hand, Singleton finally broke through as an elite hitter. He played in 162 games and hit 302/425/479, setting new career highs in homers (23) and RBI (109). Despite the fact that the Expos were otherwise pretty unimpressive (their 79-83 record was just good enough for 4th place in the NL East), Singleton finished 9th in the MVP voting.
In 1974, however, Singleton took another step back, with only his plate discipline as a saving grace (276/385/376). Singleton dropped from 51 extra base hits in '73 to just 31 in '74 (hitting just 9 HR in 148 games). The Expos again finished 4th.
With Singleton struggling, the front office decided that he was expendable and included him in a trade to acquire veteran lefty Dave McNally from the Baltimore Orioles. If the deal had been Singleton-for-McNally straight up, it would almost make sense. The Expos' rotation was faltering, and McNally was indeed an established veteran with a good track record in Milwaukee. But while Singleton was 28 and had good promise, McNally was turning 32 and coming off a disappointing season with the Orioles that belied his 16 wins.
But the trouble is that the deal was not Singleton-for-McNally. The Expos also threw in Mike Torrez. Torrez was a right-hander, but he was also younger and (it proved) better than McNally. Torrez was just turning 28 and coming off three pretty good seasons in the Montreal starting rotation. He hadn't started pitching like an ace yet, but he was at least as good as McNally, reputations aside, not to mention much younger. So giving up Ken Singleton and Mike Torrez for McNally qualifies as a big mistake. The Orioles also sent along outfielder Rich Coggins, but after a couple good seasons in 1972 and 1973, Coggins had struggled through a terrible 1974 with Baltimore. After the trade to Montreal, he was even worse, and only played 101 more games in the majors.
McNally, for his part, made 12 bad starts with Montreal in '75 before injuries forced him into retirement. As if that weren't enough, McNally added his name to the Andy Messersmith grievance that ultimately led to free agency and the end of the reserve clause. As if the trade couldn't get worse . . .
Torrez blossomed in Baltimore in '75 and pitched a fine season, posting a 3.06 ERA in 270.2 IP. The Orioles then used him as part of a trade to bring over Reggie Jackson from the A's.
Singleton blossomed as well, enjoying the best years of his career with the O's. He found his old stroke right away in '75, hitting 300/415/454 and finishing 10th in the MVP voting. Singleton's power would never be much for a right fielder (he only topped 30 HR once), but he hit for a high average and drew as many walks as anyone around.
Singleton's first three seasons in Baltimore were tough; the Orioles played quite well, but finished 2nd each season from 1975-1977. They followed up with another 90-win season in 1978, but the bottleneck at the top of the AL East meant that they finished 4th.
'77 would prove to be the best season of Singleton's career. He hit 328/438/507, made his first All-Star team, and finished 3rd in the MVP race. Personally, I'd rank him a close second behind Rod Carew (388/449/570), who ended up taking home the award.
After just a decent season in 1978, Singleton (and the Orioles) rebounded in 1979. Singleton hit 295/405/533 with a career-high 35 HR as the Orioles finally won the AL East and took the ALCS from the Angels. They came just short in the World Series, though, losing in 7 games to the "We Are Family" Pirates.
This time Singleton finished 2nd in the MVP voting behind Angels DH Don Baylor. But Baylor's win was absurd, as Singleton was demonstrably better. I have him ranked 4th in the AL that year, with my personal MVP Award going to unsung hero Fred Lynn in Boston. Lynn led the league in AVG, OBP, and SLG, hitting 333/423/637 with good defense.
Singleton had another good year in 1980 (304/397/485), and the Orioles won 100 games. Unfortunately, the Yankees won 103, and the O's would have to settle once again for being a close second. The same was true in 1981, where the O's once again finished second to the Yankees, this time in the first half of the split season schedule. In the second half, they fell to 4th and missed the playoffs.
In 1982, Singleton's production dropped a good bit, to 251/349/381. He was 35 years old and was part of an Orioles team whose core was getting a bit older (they finished 2nd once again in '82). But the old players combined with some young studs like Cal Ripken and Eddie Murray, as well as a fine young pitching staff, to win the AL East in 1983, finishing at 98-64. Singleton, serving primarily as the team's DH, hit 276/393/436. The O's rolled over the White Sox in the ALCS (3-1) and stomped the Phillies to win the World Series in 5 games. Singleton hit well in the ALCS, but only got 1 at bat in the Series (he went 0-1 with a walk). Despite fielding what should rightly be referred to as a dynasty, it was the O's first World Series win in 13 years. It would also prove to be their last.
Singleton stuck around in 1984, but his hitting could no longer sustain him. Despite getting 363 at bats, he hit a bare 215/286/289, unacceptable for a full-time DH. Singleton wasn't the only one who slumped, as the O's fell to 5th place. Granted free agency after the season, Singleton retired.

Singleton's career numbers aren't amazing, and considering that he was a right fielder, he didn't display a lot of power. But he was a very good (and occasionally great) player who suffered from both a slow start to his career and an early end. Singleton didn't make the majors until he was 23 and didn't establish himself until he was 24. His last good season as a regular came just 12 seasons later, and he retired after just one more year.
This is why his career numbers are fairly unimpressive. But the other reason we don't remember him is that he just didn't stick out in his context. The importance of a high OBP (Singleton's career mark was .388) wasn't appreciated by a lot of baseball people, and his relative lack of power was striking for a career outfielder/DH. Singleton also played in an era where he was overshadowed by many other right fielders, many of whom weren't a whole lot better than he was. Still, he played at the same time as Reggie Jackson, Dwight Evans, Bobby Bonds, Rusty Staub, Gorman Thomas, Tony Armas, Kirk Gibson, Harold Baines, and many others. Of those listed, only Jackson had a significantly better career than Singleton. If you asked fans to rank these players and put Singleton in amongst them, he would probably be at the bottom. But Singleton was just as good over his career (if not better) than Thomas, Armas, Gibson, and perhaps even Baines and Evans. His lack of durability hurt him, but not so much as his lack of notoriety. There was nothing controversial or thrilling about Singleton (as opposed to Reggie and most of the players on the above list) and the perennial 2nd-place nature of the Orioles prevented him from being recognized as a "winner."

So our perception of Ken Singleton as a relatively unimportant player is a product of our ignorance and predispositions. It's high time that he got mentioned among the very good hitters of the 70's and early 80's.

Cesar Cedeno (1970-1986)
(285/347/443; 2,087 H; 550 SB; 4-Time All-Star; 5 Gold Gloves)
In baseball, we're constantly anointing young players the "next" superstar. If I had a nickel for how many times the "next Tom Glavine" turned out to be the "next Dave Fleming," I'd be a rich man. It's unfair for us to throw around these labels, because they inevitably raise our expectations of those players far beyond what they may be capable of. Instead of judging them on their own merits, we're expecting them to play like Hall-of-Famers, and we'll hold it against them if they just turn out to be All-Stars. It's no exaggeration to say that many of the players considered to be "disappointments" were not underachievers but rather those that did not live up to the arbitrary and unattainable standards set by baseball insiders.
Now, having said all of that, when Cesar Cedeno first came along, many people said he was the next Willie Mays.
And the craziest thing? He almost was.

Cedeno was signed out of the Dominican Republic as an amateur free agent by the Astros in 1967. Cedeno was an enormously talented five-tool player, whose all-around talent reminded a lot of people of Willie Mays. Cedeno showed off in the minor leagues, inspiring the Astros to move him all the way up to Triple-A for the 1970 season. He was 19. Even though he'd skipped Double-A, Cedeno hit well enough in Triple-A Oklahoma City to get a call-up to the big club. Still a teenager, Cedeno hit 310/340/451 in 90 games and finished 4th in the Rookie of the Year voting. Suffice to say, any teenager who can hit that well in the big leagues is on their way to a superstar career.
Cedeno's first full season, however, would have to be considered a big disappointment. Despite playing good defense and going 20/29 in steals, Cedeno hit a bare 264/293/398, hitting only 10 HR and striking out more than four times as often as he walked (102:25). To be fair, Cedeno's performance isn't as bad as it looks. The entire National League in 1971 hit 252/316/366, and Cedeno played in the AstroDome, which reduced offense by 3%. Still, it was a below-average season and a big sophomore setback for the budding star. In 1972, however, Cedeno broke out with an MVP-quality season. He made his first All-Star team and won his first Gold Glove, and he also hit 320/385/537 in the offense-damping AstroDome. He hit 22 HR, stole 55 bases, and his BB:K ratio was a much-improved 56:62. The Astros posted a winning record (84-69) in just their fourth season of existence, and although they tied for 2nd in the NL West, it was a distant 2nd (10.5 games) behind Cincinnati. Cedeno finished 6th in the MVP voting, but in my opinion, he was the 3rd-best player in the league, behind future Hall-of-Famers Steve Carlton and Joe Morgan. It was more of the same in 1973, as Cedeno hit 320/376/537, won a Gold Glove, and made the All-Star team. He finished 11th in MVP voting, but I would have put him 4th.
Cedeno suffered a setback in 1974, merely hitting like an All-Star rather than an MVP (269/338/461). He still managed to finish 16th in NL MVP voting. In 1975, his performance flipped; his home run production cut in half (from 26 to 13), but his strikeouts cut nearly in half, his batting average went up, and he drew nearly as many walks despite playing in fewer games (131, as compared to 160 the year before).
Which brings me to another aspect of Cedeno's career: injuries. Even in his prime, Cedeno was hampered by all sorts of injuries that cut into his playing time. He may very well have won an MVP award if he'd been able to stay in the lineup and stay productive. Even in his first two great seasons, 1972 and 1973, Cedeno only played 139 games. One of the reasons for this was Cedeno's overagressive style of play. For whatever reason, Cedeno (like Pete Reiser) felt the need to go all-out in ballgames, even if it meant running into a wall. This is the kind of 110% baseball everyone is taught to play, but at some point it hurts the team when your best player (which Cedeno was on the Astros after they traded Joe Morgan) makes one great catch but loses 10-15 games because of it.
At any rate, Cedeno kept coming back, and in 1976 he made the final All-Star game of his career, batting 297/357/454 in 150 games. The AstroDome was becoming more and more pitcher-friendly at this point, making Cedeno's numbers even better than they look. Cedeno had another good year in 1977, but injuries limited him to just 50 games in 1978. He came back for 132 games in 1979, but still wasn't the same (262/348/374).
Another uncomfortable aspect of Cedeno's career was the unfortunate shooting death of his girlfriend in a hotel room. The circumstances surrounding the death were never made perfectly clear, and Cedeno (who fired the gun) was never brought up on murder charges (that I'm aware of). But the incident was a great blot on his reputation and his accomplishments, and some have suggested that this great shock was one of the reasons his career started to deteriorate in his later years.
However, 1980 was a big comeback year not just for Cedeno, but the Astros as well. The Astros had become a respectable franchise very soon after their founding in 1961 (certainly compared the Mets), but they had never broken through from "respectable" to "dangerous," despite developing a wealth of talent in the late 60's and early 70's. Under manager Bill Virdon, though, things started to change. In 1979, the Astros were true contenders for the first time ever, finishing at 89-73 -- a bare 1.5 games out of 1st place to the Reds.
In 1980, though, the Astros finally made it; their 93-70 record put them a game ahead of the Dodgers, and they won the NL West for the first time ever. The club had re-acquired Joe Morgan who, along an outfield of Jose Cruz, Cedeno, and Terry Puhl, formed a surprisingly potent offense. But the Astros also had a potent starting rotation, made up of free agent signee Nolan Ryan, knuckleballer Joe Niekro, Ken Forsch, and Vern Ruhle. Niekro and Ryan actually weren't all that good, and the club suffered a major shock when ace starter J.R. Richard was felled by a career-ending stroke in mid-season. But they had some help from the bullpen, as ace closer Joe Sambito and Dave Smith provided excellent work. The Astros were new to the postseason and posed a serious threat to the NL East champion Phillies.
It was a threat indeed, and the 1980 NLCS is remembered as one of the most exciting ever. The Phillies took Game 1, with Steve Carlton and Tug McGraw shutting down the Houston offense. Game 2 was a 10-inning affair that saw the Astros prevail after putting up 4 runs in the 10th. Game 3 was a pitcher's duel that went scoreless into the 11th inning. Starters Joe Niekro and Larry Christenson gave way to relief aces Dave Smith and Tug McGraw. The Astros won in the bottom of the 11th when Danny Walling's sacrifice fly off of McGraw scored Rafael Landestoy with the winning run.
Game 4 was another extra-inning nailbiter. Vern Ruhle took a 2-0 lead into the 8th inning, and the Astros were just a few outs away from their first-ever pennant when the Phillies put a 3-spot on the board against Dave Smith and Joe Sambito. The Astros managed to tie it in the 9th and force it into extra innings, but Greg Luzinski hit a go-ahead double in the top of the 10th, and Tug McGraw close out the victory for the Phillies.
Game 5 went into extra innings as well, cementing this NLCS as one of the closest ever. With the game tied 2-2. the Astros scored three runs in the bottom of the 7th to take a 5-2 lead. But then the Phillies exploded for 5 runs off three Astro pitchers in the 8th to take a 7-5 lead. Amazingly, though, the Astros tied the game once again in the 8th, with Jose Cruz singling in the tying run. But the Astros' luck ran out in the 10th inning, when Garry Maddox hit an RBI double off of Frank LaCorte. Dick Ruthven shut out the Astros in the 10th, and the Phillies won the pennant.

It was perhaps the most exciting NLCS of all time. It was alsothe last hurrah for Cedeno, who I have ranked as the 6th-best player in the league that season. For a variety of reasons, including those discussed above, Cedeno's time as an elite player was over.

But for a second, let's consider what might have been. Before the 1981 season began, Cedeno was 30 years old. His best years may have been behind him, but there was no reason to think he wouldn't continue to play like an All-Star for several more years. And if he had, he almost certainly would have earned a spot in Cooperstown. Here's what Cedeno's career numbers looked like at age 30:

Cedeno (before '81): 1430 G, 290/353/458, 1,576 H, 158 HR, 475 SB
If a player is doing this well at age 30 (especially considering his context), he's almost certainly going to Cooperstown.
But for Cedeno, alas, the future wasn't so bright:

Cedeno ('81 and after): 576 G, 271/327/401, 511 H, 41 HR, 75 SB

Cedeno retired after the 1986 season -- where he got 78 at bats with the Dodgers -- at age 35.

There is one very notable postscript to Cedeno's later years. After a dismal 1981 season (271/321/382), the Astros traded Cedeno to the Reds for Ray Knight. He spent the next three and a half years with Cincinnati, struggling to hold on to a starting job.
In 1985, however, the St. Louis Cardinals came calling. The Cardinals were in a tight pennant race and were desperate to replace injured slugger Jack Clark. Cedeno didn't seem like the man for the job --he was hitting just 241/307/336 with the Reds that season -- but the Cards got him anyway, giving up a minor league pitcher in the trade.
What happened next became part of legend and was as unlikely as it was inspiring. Cedeno took over first base for the Cardinals and played in 28 games down the stretch -- hitting 434/463/750, with 6 HR. The Cardinals beat out the Mets for the NL East title by 3 games. Without Cedeno, it's quite possible the Cardinals wouldn't have made it. It was one of the most successful trade-deadline deals of all time.
This performance earned Cedeno a low-end free agent contract with the Dodgers. He played very poorly (231/294/282) and was released in June. He was picked up by the Cardinals a few weeks later, but didn't make it back to the majors. The career that had started out so promising, with Cedeno playing like an MVP at age 21, ended with a whimper at age 35.
It's clear that Cedeno was not the next Willie Mays, and over the years, it's been pointed out that giving him this title may have been part of what plagued him. We'll never know for sure what sent Cedeno's career down the tubes after age 30, but we can say without question that he was one of the NL's best players in the 1970s and was well on his way to at least Hall-of-Fame consideration before things fell apart.
So let's try to think about Cedeno's career not for what he wasn't -- Willie Mays -- but for what he was: an excellent player whose career met a premature end.

Gene Tenace (1969-1983)
(Career 241/388/429; 1,060 H; 201 HR; 1 All-Star berth)
Can we, in all good humor, really put Gene Tenace on the list of the top 50 catchers of all time? He wasn't considered to be anything of the sort during his career, due mainly to his low batting averages and his less-than-stellar defense. But Tenace was a very, very good hitter whose low averages disguised one of the best-hitting catchers of his time. He would later spend a lot of time at first base (and some third base and --gulp-- second base), but that just shows how good a hitter he was to be able to hold down these positions offensively. I'm not going to make a crazy claim that Tenace is a Hall-of-Famer, but I'd say that he's a lot closer than many people would think.
Tenace was drafted by the Kansas City Athletics in the 20th round of the draft 1965, just three years before they left for Oakland. Tenace was just one of many young players developed by the A's in the years just before they left town; it laid the foundation for the dynasty of the early-to-mid 70's.
Tenace was a pretty raw player coming out of high school; he made the majors only after three-and-a-half seasons spent in the minors. There don't seem to be any record of walks in the minors during Tenace's time there, so we're only left to ponder whether or not he was drawing them at the amazing rate he would show in the majors. But when you're hitting .211 with 1 HR in 91 games (as he did in High-A Leesburg in 1966), it takes a lot of walks to make a difference.
A strong 1968 season finally got Tenace promoted to Double-A in 1969. He hit .319 with 20 HR in 89 games before getting called up for a cup of coffee with the Oakland team. He did poorly in 16 games (158/200/237) and got sent back to the minors for 1970.
At age 23, Tenace finally reached Triple-A and hit like he belonged: .282 with 24 doubles and 16 HR in 93 games. He got another shot at the big club later in the season, and this time, he hit well enough to stay (305/430/562 in 38 games).
In 1971, Tenace shared time at catcher with another youngster, Dave Duncan. This despite the fact that Tenace (274/381/430) out-hit Duncan (253/307/419) by a mile. This could be attributed to defense, since Tenace wasn't any kind of Johnny Bench behind the plate, but the difference in offense is still enough for him to win the starting catcher's job. But manager Dick Williams insisted on sharing time between Tenace, Duncan, and erstwhile catcher (and no-while hitter) Curt Blefary. Tenace did have platoon problems in '71, suffering against righties. But Duncan was a right-handed hitter, just like Tenace, so there was no platoon there. The platoon was more likely an offense/defense platoon that played too heavy on the defense if Duncan got about twice as much playing time as Tenace (which he did).
But the issues at catcher didn't make a difference in the standings; the homegrown A's finished 101-60 and ran away with the AL West (Kansas City finished 2nd, 16 games out). It was the upstart A's against the established winners (Baltimore) in the ALCS, and the establishment prevailed, in a 3-0 sweep. But the A's would be back.
They'd be back in 1972, as a matter of fact. They fell to 93-62, but the West still wasn't much of a division, and Oakland's winning margin was 5.5 games, over the White Sox.
Again sharing time with the punchless Duncan (218/283/392; his best moments would come as a coach), Tenace's offense suffered; he hit just 225/307/339. To be fair, though, Tenace made barely 250 plate appearances despite being overqualified for the starting catcher's job. Anyone might be expexcted to regress.
The A's won a close ALCS against the Tigers in 5 games (Tenace was wretched: 059/200/059), setting themselves up for a 7-game showdown with the Big Red Machine. The A's took a 3-games-to-1 lead over Cincinnati and were on the verge of a major upset when the Reds rebounded for 2 straight wins to force a Game 7 at Riverfront Stadium. The A's sent out all their pitching aces (Blue Moon Odom, Catfish Hunter, Ken Holtzman, Rollie Fingers) to hold off the Reds for a 3-2 victory and their first World Series win since 1930. Tenace, who lit up the Reds to the tune of 348/400/913, with 4 HR, won the World Series MVP. Finally, he was starting to get noticed as one of the best-hitting catchers in the game.
Tenace's World Series heroics finally tipped the scales in his fight with Duncan; in 1973, Tenace was the starting catcher for Oakland, and he responded with a fine season: 259/387/443, with 101 walks and 24 homers.
The A's won their division again, and in the ALCS this time they faced their old foes, Earl Weaver's Orioles. It took 5 games, but the A's won and won their second straight AL pennant. In the World Series, they would face the Mets, who finished the season at 82-79, one of the worst teams ever to make the postseason. This time the A's were prohibitive favorites. But the Mets weren't pushovers; they'd won a tense NLCS over the Big Red Machine.
After splitting the first two games in Oakland, the Mets took 2 of 3 in New York to lead the Series 3 games-to-2. Much had been made of Oakland's excellent playoff rotation of Catfish Hunter, Vida Blue, and Ken Holtzman, but the Mets had them matched and thensome with Tom Seaver, Jerry Koosman, and Jon Matlack. It would be Seaver starting Game 6 with a chance to give the Mets the Series. But Catfish Hunter, starting for Oakland, got some run support early and held the Mets off, and the A's went on to win 3-1.
Game 7 would be Matlack .vs. Holtzman. The tension was broken, however, with a 4-run inning off Matlack by the A's. The A's held on to win 5-2 and become the first non-Yankee team to repeat as World Champions since . . . the Philadelphia A's of 1929-1930.
In reality, though, the 1973 World Series victory was just the latest chapter in the extraordinary tale of the 1973 A's. Books could be (and have been) written about the subject, but the short version is that the players hated each other, with clubhouse brawls a not-so-rare occasion. They also hated their manager, Dick Williams, whose amazingly strict style led to strained relations with many of the players. And everybody hated owner Charlie Finley, who spent most of the season fighting with Vida Blue over a contract when he wasn't threatening to move the team. The last straw came during the series, when Finley tried to put series goat Mike Andrews on the DL (Andrews wasn't sick with anything but error-itis). Commissioner Bowie Kuhn blocked the move, the latest in the ongoing battle between the staid commissioner and the maverick owner. Manager Williams, having seen enough, announced before the series was over that he'd be leaving the A's after the season.
And so with all of this in the background, the A's entered the 1974 season under Alvin Dark. The 1974 A's then went on to prove that good chemistry is not -- repeat not -- necessary to win ballgames. The mood had lifted somewhat, but this was still the A's; they hated each other.
The team returned most of their key players in '74, including Tenace (211/367/411), who proved once again to be one of the best-hitting backstops in the game. The A's had a closer race in the early months of the season, but were able to pull away from the pack and coast to a 5-game margin of victory. The postseason was also not nearly as interesting as the previous two; the A's won the ALCS from the Orioles in 4 games and topped the Dodgers in just 5 to become the only non-Yankee team to win three consecutive World Series titles.
But the great sense of accomplishment that should have come with this achievement just wasn't there. The players still weren't thrilled with Finley, and Finley was still livid that the team's attendance only increased moderately during their dynastic run (in '71, the A's drew 914,993 fans; in '75, after 3 straight World titles, they drew 1,075,518).
The loss of Catfish Hunter proved a sign of things to come. Finley stubbornly refused to honor a section of Hunter's contract that provided that the club would purchase the pitcher an annuity. Finley never purchased it and thus violated the contract. Much to everyone's horror, the independent arbitrator gave Finley more than a slap on the wrist (which had been the Commissioner's role for half a century); he declared Hunter a free agent. Finley, still in shock, watched as the Lords of Baseball literally came begging Hunter to join their team. Hunter signed a big-time deal with the Yankees, making tons more than Finley would ever have paid him. This was a sign that Finley could not compete financially with other clubs for top talent and, when the reserve clause was struck down shortly thereafter, it would prove the death knell for Finley's A's (thanks to Lords of the Realm).
In 1975, however, the only thing different was the absence of Catfish. The A's still dominated, though, going 98-64 and winning the AL West (for the 5th straight year) by 7 games over Kansas City. Tenace was at his best, hitting 255/395/464, with 29 HR and 106 BB. The A's got a rude awakening in the ALCS, though, when they were swept by the Red Sox.
In the 1975 offseason, the grievance brought by Andy Messersmith and Dave McNally was upheld by the independent arbitrator. The ruling declared the reserve clause, as it had been interpreted for decades, to be null and void; a player's "option year" was just that: an option year. Ignoring Charlie Finley's pleas to "make 'em all free agents, every year," thereby flooding the market and keeping prices down, the owners negotiated a system that would stagger the number of free agents per year, driving salaries up to the Catfish Hunter range and beyond.
Finley worked quickly; he took his cue from Connie Mack and started selling off his dynasty for parts. He traded Reggie Jackson and Ken Holtzman to Baltimore for a package that included Don Baylor and Mike Torrez. (Baylor spent one season in Oakland and left as a free agent; Torrez stuck around and went to the Yankees as part of a deal for Dock Ellis. About six weeks later, Finley sold Ellis to the Rangers).
This was just the first step in the self-destruction of Finley's club, but it showed in the standings. The 1976 club fell to 87-74 and finished a close 2nd to Kansas City. Still around was Gene Tenace (249/373/458), moved to first base to give catcher Larry Haney (226/280/237) a spot.
Tenace left the A's as a free agent. So did third baseman (and team leader) Sal Bando, ace closer Rollie Fingers, shortstop Bert Campeneris, outfielder Joe Rudi, and legendary first baseman Willie McCovey. Finley got rid of the rest of the team the old-fashioned way. Young outfielder Claudell Washington was traded to Texas for the dismal return of Jim Umbarger, Rodney Scott, and cash. Veteran Ron Fairly was sent to the expansion Blue Jays for a minor leaguer and cash. Second baseman Phil Garner went to the Pirates in a trade that, it must be said, netted the A's a truckload of useful players: Dave Giusti, Doc Medich, Doug Bair, Rick Langford, Tony Armas, and Mitchell Page. Third baseman Ken McMullen was sold to the Brewers.
Finley tried to arrange a bank-busting sale of ace pitcher Vida Blue, but the deal was blocked by Commissioner Bowie Kuhn, who felt that the sale of a player for pure cash was against the league's best interests in allowing the richer teams to buy up talent at will. This resulted in more profanity and name-calling from Finley. He wasn't able to trade Blue until after 1977, when he sent him to the Giants for a whole slew of nobodies (which Kuhn apparently preferred).
As for the free agents, it's doubtful that Finley offered them anything like what they got from other owners; not only was Finley ideologically opposed to free agency, he was also too damn cheap to pay the going price for a star.
After '76, all bets were off; Finley got rid of what was left. The '77 A's went 63-98 and finished dead last. Thus endeth a dynasty.
For Gene Tenace, however, 1977 was a chance to start over with a new team. He filled in as catcher and first baseman for the San Diego Padres. The Padres weren't in much better shape than the A's at this point; they'd gotten off to a slow start even by the standard of expansion teams, having sucked since 1969. What they did have was an owner, Ray Kroc, who was no averse to spending big money on free agents. The team Tenace joined wasn't considered any kind of contender, but it did have its bright spots: franchise player Dave Winfield, former #1 overall pick Bill Almon, useful outfielders George Hendrick and Gene Richards, slugger Dave Kingman (for a couple months, at least) and Tenace's former teammate Fingers. But on the whole, the lineup was spotty and the starting pitching was wretched. The Padres went 69-93 and finished 5th.
Tenace spent most of his time at first base in 1978, hitting 224/392/409. His batting average was deceptive; he drew 101 walks and hit 16 homers. The trouble is that hitting standards for first basemen are much higher than they are for catchers, and Tenace struggled to maintain the former.
The Padres as a whole, however, took a big step forward to 4th place with an 84-78 record. That may not sound like much, but it was the first winning record in franchise history. Key additions were shortstop Ozzie Smith (already a hitter but not yet a major league hitter), slugger Oscar Gamble, and 39-year-old Gaylord Perry. The Padres also got the last good season from overworked starter Randy Jones.
It was back to reality in 1979, though, as the team fell to 68-93. Flip-flopped back to catcher, Tenace responded with a great season, hitting 263/403/445, with 105 walks and 20 HR. But he and Winfield were the only remotely decent hitters in the batting order, and although the pitching was good, it wouldn't last.
Tenace spent his last year in San Diego (1980) mostly as a catcher. His batting average had fallen to near-Mendoza levels (.222), but he was still drawing enough walks to sport a good OBP (.399) and he added 17 HR as well. But it was still the Padres; they finished last and decided to capitalize (?) on that by getting rid of most of their good players. The Cardinals were looking for some help (and willing to take on some salary), so the Padres traded Tenace, Fingers, Bob Geren and Bob Shirley to St. Louis for Terry Kennedy and six relatively warm bodies. Kennedy would later replace Tenace as a good-hitting everyday catcher, but the Padres had given up a whole lot just to fill out the minor league roster. The year after the trade, the Padres finished last again (41-69) by a long shot, 26 games behind Cincinnati, who had the best overall record in the split season of 1981.
In St. Louis, Tenace represented the antithesis of "Whiteyball," Whitey Herzog's speed-and-defense style of play. Not only that, but he was well blocked at first base by Keith Hernandez and behind the plate by Herzog favorite Darrell Porter. Tenace still hit well (233/416/403), but he made less than 150 plate appearances. Nowadays, a Moneyball-style team would rescue Tenace from the bottom of Whitey's roster and at least use him as a DH. As it was, Tenace was hitting well, but toiling in obscurity. And at age 34, things weren't going to get better.
Tenace returned to the Cards in '82 and made about 150 plate appearances once again. This time, though, he was even better (258/436/500). He didn't even play in the NLCS against the Braves (which the Cards won), but he did get 6 at-bats in the World Series against Milwaukee. He went 0-for-6 (with a walk), but picked up another World Series ring (his 4th).
As a free agent, Tenace signed with the Pirates, even though he was blocked out of an everyday job there, too. This time he got less than 100 PAs and hit poorly (177/346/258). He returned to Spring Training camp with Pittsburgh in 1984, but was released right at the end of camp. His major league career was over.
When you consider his environment, Gene Tenace was an excellent hitter (career .309 EQA). As a catcher, that's even more brilliant. Reports on Tenace's defense are middling-to-poor, but I can add that a catcher's defense isn't considered as important as it once was, and Tenace scores well with FRAA (although that's a pretty dodgy measure for backstops). So is Gene Tenace a Hall-of-Famer?
No. He might have been good enough to make it, but he just didn't play enough. Yes, Tenace was around for 15 seasons, but he was only a regular for 8 of them (the only 8 seasons where he tops 100 games).
Is that his fault? I don't think so. I think that Tenace's reputation as a poor backstop and his low batting averages (plus the fact that his walks were underappreciated) just made it seem like he didn't deserve a full-time job. You could argue that Tenace had earned a starting job for two or three years at the start of his career, when he was inexplicably stuck behind Dave Duncan, and another year or two at the end, where he was stuck on a team that neither needed nor (likely) wanted him in a full-time role. Give him those four or five full seasons, and we're talking about several hundred more games, which could make a difference in our perception of his Hall-of-Fame credentials.
But Hall-of-Fame or not, Tenace just isn't appreciated as one of the top catchers of all time. But if I have anything to say about it, he will be someday.
Still to Come: Bobby Murcer, Roy White, Jim Fregosi, Frank Howard, Curt Flood, Earl Battey and others . . .

What's New

I apologize if the font size and/or line spacing looks off in some of my previous blogs. I'm trying to correct this, but it's hard because what I see before I publish a post and what ends up on my blog have been very different lately.
And with that, here's the latest updates in my baseball world:
  • I recently caved in and subscribed to MLB.TV for the month of August (their monthly rate isn't too bad). It's not as good as the Extra Innings package, but it's a chance to see a lot of baseball in the heat of the pennant race (which is especially important, since my TV is on the fritz).
    My biggest problem with MLB.TV is the blackout restrictions. I knew going in that all of the Cincinnati games would be blacked out. But I can pick up those games on the radio (with Marty Brennaman), so that's not a big deal.
    The other problem is that with MLB.TV it's not as easy to switch between games. On TV, of course, you just change channels. But with the internet, of course, you have to wait a good deal longer. And then sometimes you'll wait a minute to connect to a game and find out it's in a commercial. But then I have that problem on TV, too; no matter how many games I'm watching, it seems like there's always a moment where they are all in commercial.
    What I usually will do is pick three or four games to alternate between. I'll pick the Braves first and then any game with postseason implications or really interesting players. I usually wouldn't have Twins .vs. Rangers high on my list, but Johan Santana is pitching today, and so that one's in my rotation.
  • With the new collective bargaining agreement, the MLB tried to put a lot more pressure on keeping down signing bonuses in the amateur draft and pressuring teams not to pay "above slot," that is, if a player is a #10 overall pick, he should be paid like other #10s, and teams should play hardball if players ask for more.
    With the only thing stopping them being the "pressure" from the commissioner's office, teams essentially disregarded Bud Selig and paid the prospects (for the most part) what they were asking for, going over slot more than once. Baseball Prospectus' Kevin Goldstein does a great job of analyzing the draft results here, saying that despite the MLB pressure, teams (shockingly) continued to operate in their best interests, paying over slot when they deemed it necessary to get the right player. Goldstein quotes one scouting director, whose first comment about the new rules was, "Well that didn't work." Goldstein quotes a few scouting directors from around the bigs whose basic response was, "Well, what the hell did you expect?" It's going to take a lot more than nasty e-mails from the commissioner's office to keep teams from signing what they believe to be the best talent available. And one scouting director was more direct in basically saying, "Who the hell are you guys to tell me what to pay my draft picks?"
    The new rules did not accomplish what they were set out to do, and Goldstein among others presents some possible ways to resolve these issues. This will be an ongoing story, but suffice to say that the players and their agents won this round.
  • The Cubs signed Carlos Zambrano to a big contract extension, which will pay him $91.5 million over five years. The $18 million+ AAV (average annual value) is a record for a pitcher, not counting Roger Clemens' pro-rated deals.
    Is Zambrano worth this? Yes and no. Yes in that the Cubs really need him, can afford to overpay him, and are paying less than Zambrano would have gotten on the open market. No in the sense that Zambrano isn't strictly worth this much money, but as I said before, that's just semantics. They're not overpaying by too much, and my main worry is that Zambrano stays healthy and can handle his insane workload. The really good news is that Zambrano is just 26, so he'll just be 32 in the last year of the deal, which is pretty reasonable under the circumstances.
    So the Cubs did overpay, but not by so much that I'd get too worried.
  • I saw a note earlier in the week that the White Sox had signed Jermaine Dye to a $22 million extension. I wasn't too thrilled that the Sox, who aren't going to be really contending for a couple years or so, signed Dye, a good but not great right fielder, to a contract extension. Better to let someone else overpay him.
    I was also surprised in that, when I saw the $22M figure, I assumed that it was a 3-year, $7M per deal. Instead, it was a 2-year, $11M per deal. I don't think Dye is worth $11M per year, especially to the White Sox. But I am impressed that the Sox were able to limit the deal to two years, a very canny move. I was surprised that Dye would take less than three, but maybe he likes Chicago.
    I still don't think the deal is so great; they'll be overpaying Dye and probably won't be in a position where his contributions will be the difference between making and not making the postseason. But I guess you could do worse. And at least they just got him for 2 years. It's almost always better to pay a higher AAV for shorter years, especially when the player in question is over 30.
  • Diamondbacks pitching prospect Micah Owings had one of the best games by a pitcher in years. It wasn't his pitching that made the difference, although he threw a good game, shutting out the Braves through 7 innings. No, it was Owings' performance at the plate: Owings went 4-for-5 with two HR, six RBIs, and 4 runs scored. The last time a pitcher got 4 hits, 4 runs, and 6 RBIs in a game was . . . well, never. How amazing is that?
    According to espn.com: "The last pitcher to record four hits and four runs was Danny Jackson in 1988. Owings' 11 total bases are the most by a pitcher in the last 50 seasons. The last Arizona player to have four hits, two homers, four runs and six RBIs was Shea Hillenbrand in 2003."
    I knew that Owings was a big-time prospect for the D-Backs, but I didn't know that he could hit like this. It doesn't get talked about much, but a pitcher's hitting does make a small, but significant difference. In the National League, a pitcher will mount up a lot of at-bats, and the difference between a bad-hitting pitcher and a legitimate hitting threat like Owings or Jason Marquis is pretty significant over the course of a season. But it's almost impossible to find hitting stats for pitchers, and few people discuss the fact that a good-hitting pitcher can really make a difference.
  • Congratulations to John Smoltz, who just today passed Phil Niekro to become the Braves' all-time leader in strikeouts with 2,913.

Stay tuned for more underrated players, as well as a look at the always-interesting AL East.

Thursday, August 16, 2007

State of the Baseball Union: NL West

The NL West has proven, thus far, to be a really exciting race. It's doubly exciting in that these are teams that are fairly young and setting up rivalries and races that should last for a while. The Giants aside, this is a pretty competitive division, and while I would give certain clubs the edge, you have to consider this a good example of competitive balance.

Arizona Diamondbacks (68-53)
My Prediction: 85-77
On Current Pace: 91-71

The Diamondbacks have, as of Wednesday's games, out-performed their Pythagorean prediction (58-63) by ten games. In terms of runs scored and allowed, they should be in 4th place, 1/2 game out of 5th (last). Instead, they've got a three game lead ahead of some darn good teams.

Will their luck continue to hold? It's impossible to say, but I wouldn't bet on them staying so lucky. That said, a team's Pythagorean record isn't everything, and even if it is, they just need to stay lucky for about 6 weeks and they're good.

The Diamondbacks have scored 516 runs so far this season. That ranks them 12th in the league and 3rd in their own division, despite playing in a favorable ballpark. What are the problems, and is there any hope that they can improve upon this rather poor showing?

The D-Backs' best hitter so far has been Eric Byrnes, who's been rewarded with what is, in my opinion, a ludicrous contract extension. Still, he's hitting 301/366/495 this year, and that's hard to argue with. After Byrnes, the top guy has been Orlando Hudson. Hudson is hitting 295/376/436, which is great for a second baseman, especially when you're packing a Gold Glove.

After that, the D-Backs have been hard-pressed to get any good production out of anyone, especially their big-time rookie prospects that I gushed over in my preseason predictions. Center fielder Chris Young is hitting 231/283/437, which is a big disappointment for someone who was supposed to be major-league ready this year. Catcher Miguel Montero wasn't supposed to be the next Joe Mauer, but he was expected to hit better than 241/306/394. Alberto Callaspo, middle infielder and utility man, has been wretched, hitting 206/257/254. One bit of sunshine: Justin Upton, recently called up to the bigs, has responded well so far (273/333/545 in 48 PAs), especially considering he's just 19.

But they're not the biggest disappointment. Even Carlos Quentin (208/297/343) isn't the biggest disappointment; he's dealt with some injury problems. No, the biggest clunker for Arizona this year has been shortstop Stephen Drew. Drew was expected to help anchor the order; he debuted in the majors last year and did quite well (316/357/517), with the team expecting even bigger things from him this year. Instead, he's hit 234/302/363 and proven a massive disappointment.

So offensively speaking, the thing that's kept Arizona contending isn't their squadron of rookies, it's the so-called "transitional players" such as Byrnes, Hudson, and more veteran players such as Chad Tracy and Conor Jackson. On the plus side, this means that there's huge room for improvement in the batting order; if even a couple of these guys start living up to the potential, it could shoot the D-Backs to the front of the NL West for good. I do think a couple of these guys will fight back in the remainder of the season; I just don't know if it will be enough to keep them on top of the division.

The D-Backs' pitching staff, which was supposed to be their weakness this year, is actally third in the league in team ERA. The star here is, of course, fellow Kentuckian Brandon Webb (2.77 ERA, 56:155 BB:K in 175.2 IP), but he's had some help. Doug Davis, acquired to fill out the back of the rotation, has actually done quite well for himself (3.92 ERA), although it should be said that his peripherals don't indicate that he'll be maintaining that for very long. Randy Johnson was doing well (3.81 ERA in 10 starts), but he's out for the season (at least). The D-Backs have gotten some innings-munching from Livan Hernandez (chairman of the board for LAIM, Inc.) and even Micah Owings has contributed. But it would be really swell for one of Arizona's pitching prospects to accelerate their development and help out now, at least if they want to stay in the race this year.

The bullpen has been quite good so far, thanks mainly to closer Jose Valverde (36 saves and counting), but he's gotten strong support from Brandon Lyon (2.78 ERA) and Tony Pena (the one who doesn't play shortstop for the Royals). Doug Slaten and Juan Cruz have been reliable as well, so the 'pen isn't the D-Backs weakness by any means.

What can the Diamondbacks do to put some legitimacy to their win-loss record? The best thing they can do is to get some of their young talent playing like they're able to ("our phenoms ain't phenominating"). That's a tough thing to do, especially with a 6-week deadline, so there are no guarantees there. The D-Backs could try to pursue a waiver wire deal for a starter, but I don't think the team's going to mortgage the farm for 2007, and I totally agree with them there.

Arizona has a great group of young talent, and even though they're not doing well this year, they will soon. Keep in mind that this is a team that lost 111 games a couple years ago around the same time they doled out tens of millions to Russ Ortiz and were staggering under the burden of debt created by the previous administration. A strong second place finish isn't what the Diamondbacks want, but -- in the scheme of things -- it would have to be considered a victory.

San Diego Padres (64-55)
My Prediction: 84-78
On Current Pace: 87-75

The Padres are the team that has looked (and played) like the best team in the West. They've got the legitimacy that the Diamondbacks lack and none of the confusion and front office roster-stuffing that plagues the Dodgers. They've also got a pitching staff that is good . . . really good.
Viz:

NL Runs Allowed/Game:
1. San Diego (3.84)

2. New York Mets (4.30)
3. Chicago Cubs (4.33)
4. L.A. Dodgers (4.35)
...
You get the idea. The Padres defense has helped -- their .706 DER is 3rd in the NL -- but their pitching really has been this good, ballpark or not. The Padres' ERA+ is 118, well ahead of the Mets, whose 105 mark is 2nd in the NL. To be fair, the ballpark is a factor -- the Padres' aren't as historically good as the raw numbers suggest -- but they're a far sight better than everyone else in the league, and that's what really matters.

Chris Young and his 1.93 ERA have been getting all of the attention -- and rightfully so. Young really was a steal from the Rangers and is pitching in a ballpark now that's much more suited to his talents. Young's BB:K ratio is good (46:125 in 130.2 IP) but he's only allowed four home runs -- four -- this season. As great as that number is, it's also probably a big fluke. Young allowed 28 last year under the same circumstances.

No, the real star of the Padres (and the best pitcher in the National League) is Jake Peavy. Peavy's 2.23 ERA isn't as pretty as Young's, but fundamentally he's the better pitcher. He's got more strikeouts (164) and more innings (157.2) and still with a better strikeout rate. He, too, has benefited from some good luck with homers -- allowing just 5 -- and yes, that's mainly a fluke, but Peavy's the real deal. Any way you slice it, however, the Padres have a deadly 1-2 punch of Young and Peavy.

And unlike most other teams, the Padres have a decent #3 and #4 to back them up. Their #3 is Greg Maddux, who needs no introduction. He's benefiting from Petco Park, no doubt; but he's freakin' Greg Maddux, and his ERA (4.00) is better than it looks (his RA is 4.06). The Padres have gotten some quality starts from Justin Germano as well, who's managed a 4.16 ERA in 17 starts despite not striking many out.

The Padres will also benefit from replacing David Wells (5.54 ERA) as the #5 starter, but as far as who will replace those innings, we don't know yet.

The bullpen has also been strong behind closer Trevor Hoffman. No one who's pitched any significant number of innings in the bullpen has an ERA over 4.00; and unknown Kevin Cameron actually has an 0.80 ERA (walks and all -- 27 in 45 IP). But then the Padres have traditionally been able to get good work from their bullpen without spending a lot of money.

The San Diego pitching staff isn't as good as Petco makes it look; and, as I've pointed out earlier, they've been the beneficiaries of some home run luck. But they are still, fundamentally, the best in the league, and that's a big point in their favor as we assess the different NL West contenders.

As for offense, the Padres have scored 515 runs (1 less than Arizona, but they've played more games), and that ranks them 13th in the NL. Park effects must be considered, but this is still (as usual) the Padres' weakness.

They don't have any real studs in the lineup, although guys like Adrian Gonzalez (265/338/475) and Brian Giles (294/385/418) have done well enough, considering. And Milton Bradley has been great since coming over from Oakland (360/461/627 in 89 PAs), although if you look up "volatile" in the dictionary, you'll find his mug shot. And after that, you've just got a lot of "maybes" and "almosts."

The middle infield has been a total disaster. Khalil Greene (238/275/451) still hasn't recovered the form that almost made him Rookie of the Year. And Marcus Giles (223/294/306), who looked such a steal from Atlanta, has made the Braves' front office look pretty good.

The outfield has been pretty disappointing. After Giles and Mike Cameron (who's been decent), the Padres have failed to come up with a halfway-decent left fielder. Jose Cruz, Jr. wasn't it (234/316/375), and Terrmel Sledge sure as hell wasn't it (212/311/372). That's one of the reasons they traded for Rob Mackowiak (who's been pretty dismal since coming over).

In the preseason, the Padres gambled when they traded away Josh Barfield for third baseman Kevin Kouzmanoff. The Padres won the gamble, if only by default; Barfield has been awful (243/271/325) whereas Kouzmanoff has just been bad (239/294/419), and his combination of power and little else didn't fill the hole. So the Padres picked up Morgan Ensberg (273/314/636 in just 35 PAs so far).

Behind the plate, the Padres may have erred by trading away Rob Bowen (who was hitting 268/371/349 before the trade) to Chicago for Michael Barrett (who has hit 231/238/288 since). It's hard to predict these things, but then Wrigley Field's much different than Petco (though surely not that different).

GM Kevin Towers has at least been proactive in addressing these problems; he hasn't let guys waste away in the lineup before acting, he's worked to give his manager options when holes open up. And while I don't agree with all of his moves, it's hard to blame him for this; the Padres are pretty much acting our their worst-case scenario at the plate. That does mean that there's room for improvement, but there's so much room for improvement that it's hard to be cheerful about the fact.

Are the Padres the favorites to win the NL West? They're close, but I don't think so. Their pitching staff is excellent and may still be able to carry the load, but it's not as good as it looks, and there's not a lot of offense to pick up the slack if the pitchers slow down. And unfortunately, with a lot of these guys, you just can't reasonably expect them to get a whole lot better than they are right now.

Colorado Rockies (62-57)
My Prediction: 78-84
On Current Pace: 84-78

Boy, if ever a franchise needed a feel-good year it was the Rockies. No, they're not as wretched as the Royals or Pirates, but they've been stuck in a 70-win neverland for many years now, though truth be told it was a hole they helped dig themselves. Regardless, it's always encouraging for a losing franchise to get a clean breath of fresh air from some fine young players.

The Rockies' 604 runs scored is 2nd in the NL to the Phillies. It's park-inflated yes, but it's no mirage. The Rockies have some long-term, impact players in Matt Holliday (338/399/583), and especially Troy Tulwoitzki (283/357/444). They're also getting some cheap young offense Brad Hawpe (289/387/540) and Ryan Spilborghs (331/383/580), and of course Todd Helton is still around (301/420/461), although his power isn't so much. And this isn't even considering guys like Jeff Baker, Chris Iannetta, and Ian Stewart, who have yet to make a real impact in the majors. The Rockies' offense is in good shape, and even if they don't reach the playoffs (which is indeed a long shot), they can at least celebrate 2007 as a breakthrough year for the franchise.

The Rockies are 9th in the league in runs allowed. They're 8th in team ERA and in ERA+. For most teams this would be mediocre. For the Rockies, it's another step on the road to respectability. And if the Rockies can field a respectable pitching staff with any sort of regularity, that's not just a victory; it's a miracle.

The Rockies haven't gotten a really good performance from any of their starting pitchers. Their two best have been Jeff Francis and Aaron Cook whose numbers are, relatively speaking, above-average but nothing to scream about. Josh Fogg has been surprisingly mediocre, and that's good news, but the Rockies have to be disappointed with Jason Hirsh, the prize of the Jason Jennings trade. Hirsh's 4.81 ERA isn't that bad for Coors, but it's not what they were hoping for when they looted the Astros' #1 pitching prospect. Fortunately, Hirsh has time to grow, as the Rockies aren't in any rush to contend this year.

It's the bullpen that has been their real strength, as they've gotten strong contributions from a number of unexpected people. If this is starting to sound like the 1995 Rockies team that won the Wild Card, it's not a coincidence. That team made the playoffs with a park-inflated slugger-oo team (I made up the word "slugger-oo") and a strong bullpen that somewhat made up for a dismal rotation. Maybe this is a formula that works in Colorado particularly.

As I said before, it's doubtful that the Rockies will outlast the competition in the NL West and make the playoffs this year. And it doesn't get much simpler in the future, as the other three contending teams will be back next year as competitive as ever. But for the Colorado franchise, which has been run so poorly for so many years, this sense of renewal has to be considered a victory in and of itself. 84 wins may not sound like reason for rejoicing, but in Colorado -- where they've never won more than 83 -- it's a reason to cheer.

Los Angeles Dodgers (61-59)
My Prediction: 94-68
On Current Pace: 82-80

I don't know who I pissed off in the Dodgers organization. Because I've been making predictions for three years now, and in two of them (2005 and 2007), the Dodgers have embarassed me. In '05 I picked them to win the division and they crashed and burned. I picked them to win the division again this year, and while they haven't crashed and burned yet, they're spiralling downward and haven't yet found a heroic stewardess to take over the controls.

Maybe I'm making too much of the Dodgers' current struggles. After all, what's a bad few weeks? The Dodgers were on top of the division, and while they traded in what seemed like a sure thing for a 4th-place berth, they've got as much talent as anybody and are still perfectly capable of pulling this thing out. But you'll excuse me if I decline to issue any more sweeping "predictions" about them. You know . . . in case there's a curse.

The Dodgers are 10th in the NL in runs scored. Dodger Stadium is a pitcher's park, yes, but this is still a bad sign, considering the Dodgers plunked down big money to bring in free agent hitters (Luis Gonzalez, Juan Pierre, Nomar Garciaparra) to go with their impressive stable of rookie mashers.

Granted, I could argue that the Dodgers shouldn't have signed any of those three players to a deal, and I can certainly say that two of them have been disasters (Gonzo is doing fine). But they still have those young hitters, don't they? Yes, so long as they can connect the dots between the guy sitting on the bench and his name being written on the lineup card. I said before the season that you'd know the Dodgers were sunk if all their great hitting prospects ended up sitting on the bench playing Sudoko. And for the early part of the season, that was the case. But now, more out of necessity than insight, they're starting to play these guys, and I think it could be the difference between winning and losing the division.

I covered a lot of the Dodgers' personnel issues in my earlier "birthday baseball" blog, so I'll try to keep this brief. Suffice to say that there isn't a position on the baseball diamond that Nomar Garciaparra can play that wouldn't be better (and more cheaply) filled by someone the Dodgers already had. First base? Try James Loney (317/367/481 this season). Third base? Try Wilson Betemit (231/359/474 before being traded to the Yankees) or rookie Andy LaRoche (who's only gotten 55 at-bats despite clearly being ready for the majors). Second base? Jeff Kent, who's no glove wizard (tho neither is Nomar) but has hit 286/362/479. Shortstop? Even if we enter an alternate reality where Nomar's glove could play at that position, the Dodgers are already committed to Rafael Furcal (275/339/367, but at least with a great glove). But still the team ignored all the widely available evidence and signed Nomar, an expensive player they didn't need. Their reward? 280/326/363.

Good job, Ned.

What about the outfield? While anyone could do a better job than Juan Pierre (Andre Ethier has hit 300/364/470 this year, compared to Pierre's 288/324/341), who was going to play in Luis Gonzalez's spot? Well, I'll admit that it's hard to argue with Gonzo. His signing may not have been completely necessary, but he wasn't that expensive and he has hit quite well. I'd certainly rather see him in left field than Marlon Anderson or Brady Clark. And if Pierre were gone, the Dodgers would have a fine, good-hitting, cheap outfield of Gonzo/Ethier/Matt Kemp (321/359/506).

I can't argue with catcher; the Dodgers knew they had something special in Russell Martin (291/359/464) and stuck with it.

So really, all it boils down to is getting all the right players in the right spots. They've got all the pieces to the puzzle, they just can't seem to figure it out. But really -- how long does it take to solve a 9-piece puzzle when you've got all the pieces right there in front of you?

Pitching-wise, the Dodgers are fine; their 4.03 team ERA is 3rd in the NL. Brad Penny has gotten all the press as the ace -- and rightfully so -- but let's hear it for Derek Lowe and Chad Billingsley, adding some good depth to the rotation! After that, it's been pretty ugly; Randy Wolf struggled and then got injured (not such a surprise) and Brett Tomko has been dreadful (ditto). The Dodgers were forced to call on Mark Hendrickson (who should have "DFA" stitched to the back of his shirt) as an emergency starter. It's hard to say who's going to pick up the slack as the #4 and #5 guys, with the injuries to Wolf and Jason Schmidt, as well as the general sucktitude of Tomko and Hendrickson.

Luckily, the Dodgers have a pretty sweet bullpen to fall back on. Takashi Saito has proven to be anything but a one-year wonder, and Jonathan Broxton has been equally nasty. Scott Proctor has pitched well since coming over from the Yankees, but L.A. hasn't really been able to fill in the blanks behind Saito and Broxton. Luckily, those two are so good that it shouldn't matter.

So the Dodgers have a good (and if things work out, a very good) pitching staff and a lineup that just needs to be reshuffled to move from below-average to above-. In normal circumstances, I'd predict that the Dodgers would right the ship and win the division (or at least the Wild Card).

But considering how my Dodger predictions have been coming out lately, I'm going to ride the fence on this one, and don't mind if I do.

San Francisco Giants (50-70)
My Prediction: 73-89
On Current Pace: 68-94

I still, still cannot believe that Giants GM Brian Sabean recently got a contract extension. I thought that, at this point, even Sabean was like, "Okay, sorry guys, I'll be gone next year and then you can, you know, start cleaning my s*** up."

It's almost like owner Peter Magowan was the only one not in on the joke. You know how that is? There's some kind of hidden joke or clever turn of phrase, and everybody gets it and starts laughing . . . except this one guy, who either looks around blankly or just starts laughing in a big, fake way to disguise the fact that he doesn't have a clue. That's Magowan to me, and the sad part is that the joke's on him. Sabean's fine; he's getting a good salary for a couple more years and I think the Giants are really at the "nowhere to go but up" point. The real victims here will be Magowan and the fans, and we'll see who catches on last.

I mean, the Giants do have Barry Bonds (280/495/589). But after that? YIKES. According to VORP, the best position player on the Giants after Bonds has been . . . Ryan Klesko (268/358/430), who has hit well, but he's a defensively challenged guy anyway, and if that's the second-best guy in your whole lineup, you're up a creek. Dave Roberts and Bengie Molina have been basically stinking up the joint. But they're positively golden compared to Pedro Feliz (255/294/423), a sort of walking monument to Sabean's blunders, or Rich Aurilia (253/299/373), Ray Durham (226/303/356), or Omar Vizquel (248/302/305), all of whom have gotten a significant amount of playing time. Like I've said before, the merely bad isn't nearly as offensive as the obvious and totally predictable bad.

Lucky for the Giants, they're pitching is actually all right. This is invariably what people stress when they talk about the future of the Giants, so they can avoid talking about what a Sahara-like desolate wasteland the lineup will be without Barry Bonds. They've got two young studs in Matt Cain and Tim Lincecum, as well as Noah Lowry (who isn't as good, but is a lot better than people think). They've also got Barry Zito, who is obscenely expensive (his contract alone -- and his 5.13 ERA -- should be reason enough to fire Sabean). To be fair though, they did get rid of Matt Morris (thank you, Pirates). And Jonathan Sanchez should be a fine pitcher, especially if he's at the back of the rotation.
Their bullpen is a work in progress, but then that's true of a lot of people, isn't it? They unloaded the Benitez contract (one small step for man, one Giant leap for mankind) and have gotten some good work out of Hennessey, Messenger, Correia, and Chulk this year. That's not a murderer's row of relievers, but it's a start, and it's nice to see that the Giants are shying away from some of the expensive mistakes they've made in the past . . . we hope.

So, with Barry Bonds the Giants are next-to-last in the league in scoring. Without him . . . look out Nationals, for falling objects. The Giants desperately need to get some source of sustainable production in that bare lineup, but it's going to take quite a while. They've got a good pitching staff to support them, but they've also got some terrible contracts (Zito's especially) weighing them down. Several of those contracts will expire soon, but then who's to say Sabean won't run out and sign more (he's made that mistake before).

I know I've talked about this before, but Brian Sabean has a reputation in some circles as an excellent general manager that I'm at a loss to explain. I know that there's a lot of inside baseball that I'm not privy to, and I willingly accept that a lot of a general manager's duties and responsibilities are beyond the scope of this blogger. But ultimately, it comes down to wins and losses. And while Sabean may try and take credit for them, the credit goes first and foremost to Barry Bonds because without Bonds, Sabean would have lost his job years ago and the Giants would have degenerated to Royals-like levels. I mean, come on -- does the Chief of Police in Metropolis really get to take credit for defeating Lex Luthor and Brainiac?

More to come, as I move to the American League and keep adding to my list of unknown and underrated players . . .

Wednesday, August 15, 2007

State of the Baseball Union: NL Central

Milwaukee Brewers (62-57)
My Prediction: 83-79, 2nd place

At Current Pace: 84-78

The Brewers have experienced their fair share of ups and downs so far this season. They got off to a great start and then slowed down, allowing the Cubs to catch up with them. They've really stumbled as of late, but fortunately for them so have the Cubs (who've lost 7 of 10). The Brewers now possess a 1.5 game lead in the NL Central, and it's become a real neck-and-neck race with Chicago.

So what chance do the Brewers have of making their first postseason in 25 years? I'll give them the edge over the Cubs, but it's such a small edge that it may prove irrelevant over the 7 weeks left in the season.

Offensively, the Brewers have scored 568 runs, tops in the Central and 5th in the NL. I think they can keep up this pace; they've got good depth offensively and have several players due to bounce back from a slow first half. They'll be getting full-time play from Rookie of the Year-to-be Ryan Braun (348/392/666), as well as Corey Hart (276/340/505) and J.J. Hardy (274/326/468). They should also get better production from Rickie Weeks, who struggled mightily in the first half (209/336/358). And then, of course, there's Prince Fielder (289/383/614), who isn't going anywhere.

I'd be more concerned with the pitching staff. The team's 4.42 ERA is 9th in the league, and is notably worse than the Cubs (4.01). The Cubs are also working with a stronger defense (.710 DER to the Brewers' .687, which ranks 13th in the NL).

Milwaukee's bullpen is actually doing fine. Francisco Cordero is still doing fine as closer, and the Brewers have gotten good work out of Derrick Turnbow, Brian Shouse, Matt Wise, and trade acquisition Scott Linebrink. Each of those five has an ERA above the league average.

No, the Brewer's big problem is their rotation. They've gotten great work from ace Ben Sheets, but injuries have again limited his performance to just 119.1 IP. He's on the DL now, but should be coming off soon. The sooner the better, because the Brewers' best starter after him has been young Yovani Gallardo (4.20 ERA in 8 starts). Gallardo, the team's top prospect, has been a godsend even though he's not been as dominant as hoped. Because after Sheets and Gallardo, here are the pitchers who have started the most games for Milwaukee:

Jeff Suppan: 25 starts, 4.90 ERA, 54:80 BB:K ratio in 150.2 IP

Dave Bush: 22 starts, 5.07 ERA, 136.2 IP, 33:102 BB:K ratio but 19 HR allowed

Claudio Vargas: 21 starts, 4.87 ERA, 118.1 IP

Chris Capuano: 21 starts, 4.96 ERA, 114.1 IP, 46:99 BB:K ratio



Without Sheets, the Brewers are in serious trouble, even if their offense is good. The best-case scenario is that Sheets comes back and pitches well, Gallardo improves, and Capuano starts pitching m0re like his previous self (4.33 career ERA). If they can do that, then they can survive the low-end garbage pitching of Suppan and Vargas at the back of the rotation.

It's a tough call to make, but I'm going to go out on a limb and pick the Brewers to hold on and win the Central. They've got their share of problems, yes, but then so do the Cubs . . .



Chicago Cubs (60-58)
My Prediction: 78-84

At Current Pace: 82-80

The Cubs, after a first half that saw everything go wrong, are starting to turn things around and play to their potential. It's really surprising how many things are going right for the Cubs. Although, as you can see from my prediction, I was pessimistic about their chances to begin with.

But really, who could have predicted such strong work from all these people:



Mark DeRosa: 288/363/418

Mike Fontenot: (297/347/443)

Ted Lilly: 3.51 ERA, 41:124 BB:K ratio, 151.1 IP

Rich Hill: 3.85 ER, 140.1 IP, 48 BB:K ratio

Carlos Marmol: 1.83 ERA, 22:61 BB:K ratio in 44.1 IP

Jason Marquis: 4.18 ERA, 140 IP (although Marquis' numbers are really a great start followed by a few months of pitching like ... well, himself.)

The Cubs have also gotten strong production from several different relievers (Angel Guzman, Michael Wuertz, etc.), which is one of the biggest improvements in this year's squad, to my mind. Give Lou Pineilla credit for getting creative with job descriptions in the bullpen. He's taken the talent available to him and done a fine job deploying it, with the success of Marmol the best example.

If only the offense were nearly as successful. You'll notice that the only real surprises on the offensive side of the ledger were Mark DeRosa -- who's played more outfield than infield -- and Mike Fontenot, who isn't really that good. Sure, the Cubs have gotten the usual great work from Derrek Lee and Aramis Ramirez, but here's a short list of their offensive disappointments:

Alfonso Soriano: 297/336/511 (no, that's not bad, but it's very disappointing considering his salary and the expectation that he would hit like an MVP at Wrigley)
Ryan Theriot (286/348/367): Theriot's a great guy to have on your roster and is a good emergency fill-in at second, but there's no reason for him to come to bat more than 400 times (416 PAs and counting)
Cliff Floyd (290/366/382): Say goodbye to power. The Cubs entered the season with too many corner outfielders on the roster; why then did they end up moving their second baseman (DeRosa) to right field? It's because Floyd and Jacque Jones (see below) couldn't keep their jobs.
Jacque Jones (265/326/375): This guy shouldn't even be on the club anymore. He should have been traded in the offseason while he still had some value. As it is, he's just dead weight on the roster.
Matt Murton (263/335/391): The good news (relatively speaking) is that Murton is much better than this. And he's also much cheaper than Jones and Floyd.

Cesar Izturis (246/298/304): Thank God the club finally left the Dusty Baker era once and for all. Izturis is horrible, and he's now right where he belongs: Pittsburgh.

The Cubs' inactivity at the trade deadline may seriously come back to haunt them. They've got plenty of players on the roster, yes, and many of them are expensive. But that's doesn't mean that they actually have someone to play catcher or shortstop, and they're still short two outfielders.
As much as things have gone right for the Cubs' pitching staff so far, their lineup has been pretty disappointing. The best plan now would probably be to release Jacque, move Soriano to left, and install Felix Pie in center. Pie hasn't hit well so far this year, but he's not much worse than Floyd and Jones and is at least much cheaper and a good defender. It would also be a good move for the future to get him more at bats at the big-league level.

As for catcher, the best thing would have been to keep Michael Barrett, but I can understand that there were some personality issues there (how extreme they were depends on whom you ask). Without Barrett, they should have just promoted Geovany Soto. He's not great, but he's not bad either (Koyie Hill is bad) and he's cheap. Instead the Cubs made a trade -- premeditated, I assume -- to get one of the worst players in baseball, who also comes with a pretty big salary. Jason Kendall has hit well for the Cubs so far, but don't count on that lasting very long.

If the Cubs do lose the NL Central to the Brewers, it will mainly be their own fault. They've done a very poor job of maximizing production from their lineup, although to be fair, a lot of that is due to the large amount of inefficient dollars being spent on otherwise useless players.

If the Cubs do win the NL Central, it won't be because of Alfonso Soriano, Mark DeRosa, Jason Marquis or even Ted Lilly. It will be thanks to Lou Pineilla (for removing the shackles of ignorance from the pitching staff's deployment) and the guys who were here to begin with: Lee, Ramirez, Hill, Marmol, and others. If you could find a measure for dollars spent compared to positive effect on the team, this year's Cubs would have to rank as one of the worst ever. The team has improved, yes, but not nearly in proportion to the money spent, and most of the improvement came not from the new players acquired but from a better understanding of the talent they already had.

So even if the Cubs do win the division, it may not exactly be something to be proud of. Because they'll be winning it in spite of the hundreds of millions of dollars they spent this offseason.

St. Louis Cardinals (56-60)
My Prediction: 86-76

On Current Pace: 78-84

The Cardinals are fooling themselves if they think they're going to get back into contention this year. They're slowly working their way back to .500 -- and bully for them -- but I can't see them making it past the Cubs and Brewers. The Cardinals just aren't that good.
Their offense is especially weak. The glory years of Pujols/Rolen/Edmonds are over, and the Cards need to get to work about replacing the latter 2/3 of that troika. Rolen and Edmonds are still falling far sheet of even their career averages. And considering their respective salaries, this is very bad for the organization.
After Pujols and Chris Duncan (276/371/522), the Cards haven't gotten consistently good production from anyone. They've gotten some promising work from some part-timers, and this might lead some to believe that the Cards just need to put it all together to succeed. But I'm very dubious.
Assuming that Pujols (1B), Rolen (3B), Duncan (LF) and Edmonds (CF) are in the lineup, who's filling in elsewhere? In the outfield, the Cardinals have gotten decent work from Juan Encarnacion (290/330/440), but even that modest production is above what we'd expect from him. There's also been some promising work done by Brendan Ryan, Ryan Ludwick, Skip Schumaker and, most recently, Rick Ankiel. But what the Cardinals have here is a small group of very good bench players but no one to step up with significant offense, the kind of offense that's needed for a batting order with so many holes.
In the middle infield, the Cards have deployed David Eckstein and Adam Kennedy. Eckstein has been fair, as usual (295/342/358), but Kennedy has been the worst player on the team this year, hitting 219/282/290 in 306 plate appearances! If they'd replaced Kennedy with a halfway decent guy, they'd already be above .500.
And catching is Yadier Molina, whose defense is so good that it almost makes up for his dreadful offense (268/337/318).
The Cardinals' batting order isn't getting any better. I know Cardinals fans are optimists, and there's a lot to get excited about with the promotion of Rick Ankiel to the majors. They rank 11th in the NL in runs scored, and are a lot closer to last than they are to first.

Throughout this whole entry, I haven't even mentioned the St. Louis pitching. That's because they rank 14th in the NL in ERA, behind only Houston and Cincinnati (who hit in more hitter-friendly parks). And they'd be even worse than that if it weren't for the fact that their mediocre bullpen somewhat makes up for their catastrophic starting rotation.
Sorry, but the Cards aren't going anywhere this year, and in any other division, they wouldn't be going anywhere next year either.

Houston Astros (54-65)
My Prediction: 75-87
On Current Pace: 74-88
Carlos Lee is a good hitter, and he's done a wonderful job so far this year (302/356/536). But if there's ever been a free agent signing more irrelevant to a team's postseason chances, I can't think of one. The Astros are a team barren, barren of talent. They're very top-heavy, with legitimate stars like Lance Berkman, Roy Oswalt, Hunter Pence, and Lee, but no mid-level players to fill in the gaps. Instead, it's a long drop from the stars to the rest of the roster, which is 5th-place material, easily. By the time the Astros are able to rebuild their roster into something of a contender, Lee will be much older and no longer justifying his salary. That's the real waste of his contract; the fact that it's money that won't mean a damn thing to the team's long-term interests and would have been better off invested in draft picks and scouting.
As it is, the Astros are lucky to have Berkman, Pence, and Lee backed up with unlikely slugger Luke Scott (255/355/507) and Mike Lamb (296/375/478). That means they only have four gaping holes in the lineup (well, five, now that Pence is on the DL).
In the middle infield, the Astros have defensive expert Adam Everett at shortstop, but he's also the team's worst hitter (228/275/316), and that's saying something. At second base, the Astros will be lucky to rid themselves of Craig Biggio (248/285/396); the future Hall-of-Famer is no longer justifying a spot in the lineup, which was evident last year, but oh well. His replacement-in-waiting, Chris Burke, hasn't fared any better (224/304/360).
The Astros still have Brad Ausmus behind the plate, and we can only hope that they've finally run out of sentimental reasons to keep this millstone (233/313/319) around their necks.
Next to Lee and Pence, the Astros need someone else in the outfield. They haven't much luck so far, as they've given over 250 at bats to the dreadful duo of Orlando Palmeiro and Jason Lane.

The sad part isn't how bad the Houston lineup is, it's how predictably bad it was going into the season. Not to mention the fact that it should be worse; Lamb and Scott aren't usually this good.

On the pitching side of the equation, things are equally depressing. Only the Reds and Marlins have allowed more runs and, just like with the offense, this eventuality was not only thoroughly predictable, it's going to be their reality for the near future. Top pitching prospects Jason Hirsh and Taylor Buchholz were traded to the Rockies for Jason Jennings, who's been so awful (6.15 ERA in 16 starts) that the Astros couldn't even trade him away.
Roy Oswalt has been one of the NL's best pitchers (3.32 ERA in 172.2 IP), as advertised. But here's the rest of their rotation:

Jason Jennings: 6.15 ERA, see above
Woody Williams: 5.09 ERA, 41:78 BB:K ratio
Wandy Rodriguez: 4.34 ERA in 139 IP; 41:120 BB:K ratio
Matt Albers: 6.20 ERA in 9 starts

Neither Jennings nor Albers are really this bad, but that's small consolation. Williams is indeed this bad, and league-average pitching is the best you're going to get out of Wandy.
In the bullpen, the story is the continuing yo-yo act by Brad Lidge. Lidge sports a 3.26 ERA, with a 20:66 BB:K ratio in 49.2 IP. Considering their future prospects, it's insane that the Astros haven't traded Lidge by now, especially given the fact that every contending team is always looking for bullpen help. The 'Stros did trade Dan Wheeler, but they didn't get prospects in return; they got a mediocre 29-year-old corner infielder (Ty Wigginton).

The Astros aren't going to be doing much winning this year or next. They do have some hope in prospects such as Pence, but they've let so many positions on the field go to pot that they're now left facing a complete overhaul if they want to compete. It's doubtful that the team will trade big-money guys like Lee or Oswalt (at least not yet), so we're probably left with a couple more years of the team acting like contenders even though we all know they aren't. That's a depressing prospect, especially for a franchise that's been one of the league's best for over ten years now.

Cincinnati Reds: (51-67)
My Prediction: 78-84
On Current Pace: 70-92
The Reds are doing worse than even I predicted. Wow.
Some local sources are still in denial; the Cincinnati weekly Citybeat actually ran a cover story claiming (once again) that all the Reds needed were some relievers. I should point out that Citybeat ran a baseball story with the same gist four years ago, and I wrote back saying that they were deluding themselves (my response was published). It would seem that time had proven me right, but learning from past mistakes isn't high on the list of requirements for sportswriters.
The Reds rank 7th in the NL in runs scored right now, with 553. Considering their ballpark, that's a travesty, and it demolishes the Citybeat argument. The Reds' best hitters have been Ken Griffey, Jr., Adam Dunn, and Scott Hatteberg, all of whom will be gone sooner rather than later. Fotunately, the Reds do have some A-level hitting prospects, such as Jay Bruce and Joey Votto, but unless they can hold onto Dunn or find some way to replace these guys, it will all just come out even.
The rest of the Reds' order is full of qualified successes. Brandon Phillips has done well (271/317/460), but he's not the All-Star many Cincinnati fans see him as. His unlikely career after failing in Cleveland's farm system is inspiring, just not quite historic. He's done a good job on defense, but he's not the sort of player you can build a franchise around, especially not with that OBP.
Josh Hamilton has been a great success (278/369/541), and there's really not much I can say about him except that he's still probably too good to be true. That's not to say that he won't stick around as a very useful player, but we can't assume that the first 241 plate appearances of his pro career are going to be a representative sample.
Ryan Freel is a heck of a utility player and has become an institution in the Queen City, but I hate to burst your bubble, he's not good enough to start everyday. He can be a great help filling the super-utility role, but he'll be 32 next year and hasn't learned to stop running into walls. As a result, he's played in just 75 games this year and hit an awful 245/308/347.
Edwin Encarnacion has had a terrible year (261/336/371). I've predicted big things for Edwin (well, big as in he'll be a quality everyday player), and it may just be a rationalization, but I wonder if the Reds' total ambivalence toward Edwin and the silly minor league stints aren't hurting him. This is a lot like what happened to Austin Kearns, where the Reds were far too focused on a player's faults and just wouldn't let them do what they do best. And for Edwin, that's (usually) hitting. He's also the only guy on the current lineup who can reliably be expected to be around the next time Cincinnati contends.
The Reds need offense; they especially need offense that they can rely on for the foreseeable future. Combining Bruce and Votto with (hopefully) Encarnacion and Dunn would be a good start, but considering the upper management, I really don't think the Reds are able to accurately determine their problems and issues.

The Reds have one of the worst pitching staffs in all of baseball; their team ERA of 4.83 is the worst in the NL, and their DER of .677 ranks them 15th in the league in defense (just ahead of Florida).
That ain't good.
The Reds do have a good 1-2-3 starting rotation projected for the near future in Bailey-Harang-Arroyo. The problem this year is that Bailey wasnt quite ready for the majors after all, and Bronson Arroyo fell off a cliff. Arroyo isn't as good as he was last year, when he was one of the best in the league, but I think he's a solid #3, and let's hope (for the Reds' sake) that he is.
After that, the Reds need help. Matt Belisle's move to the rotation has worked out about as well as you'd expect (5.40 ERA in 23 starts), and while Bobby Livingston has done well so far, he's not apt to keep it up. But still, in the scheme of things, having three good starting pitchers for the foreseeable future is a victory for the Reds. And let's not forget Aaron Harang, who is indeed better than people think.
The Reds' bullpen has been a big problem, yes, and luckily this year Wayne Krivsky didn't try to solve it by driving a dump truck out to the Relief Pitchers' Landfill and loading up. The Reds have shown patience with their in-house pitchers and, while things have gone horribly, they haven't yet panicked and made things worked like I expected them to. I wouldn't be averse to seeing them sign a mid-level innings eater to a free agent deal, but they need to avoid the Baltimore Solution of buying out every free agent reliever. And considering this administration's track record with relief pitchers and impatience, that may be exactly what they do. And can you blame them? It would be Citybeat off their backs.

The Reds have some good pieces to put together a contender and may actually be in better shape, long-term, than Houston or even St. Louis. But that requires that the front office uses what talent they have well and does a good job of targeting areas for improvement.

Which likely means that Krivsky & Co. will screw it all up again and get fired. Let's just hope (as Reds fans) that those rumors about Walt Jocketty are true . . .

Pittsburgh Pirates (49-68)
My Prediction: 69-93
On Current Pace: 68-94
I pledged in these entries to discuss major league baseball teams. I've already discussed the 5 major league teams in the NL Central, so I don't see any need to discuss the Pirates.

Have a nice day.

Monday, August 13, 2007

I Had No Idea: The Hitters (Pt. 2)

Will Clark (1986-2000)
(303/384/497, 2,176 H, 284 HR, 6 All-Star Games; 1 Gold Glove)

Will "The Thrill" was not only a very good defensive first baseman but an underrated hitter who put together a very good 15-year career. Will may not be a Hall-of-Famer, but he was a superstar who never got the credit he deserved.
Will was drafted out of Mississippi State by the Giants as the #2 overall pick in the 1985 draft. Will made the majors the following year and hit a home run in his first at-bat. He hit 287/343/444 in 1986 and finished 5th in Rookie of the Year voting.
He took a big step forward in '87 (as did the whole league), hitting 308/371/580. The Giants won the division, but lost in the NLCS (Clark hit 360/429/560). Will finished 5th in the NL MVP voting (this was probably a bit much; I've got him about 9th in the league that year. He was the second-most valuable Clark in the NL that year behind Jack of the Cardinals).

Will had another good season in '88 before breaking through with a truly excellent 1989. Clark hit 333/407/546 as the Giants won the pennant. Considering that Clark was hitting in pitcher-friendly Candlestick Park, and his numbers look even better. He finished 2nd in the MVP voting to teammate Kevin Mitchell (291/388/635) whose power and RBIs were more appealing to the voters. Clark and Mitchell eased the team past the Cubs in the NLCS, and the Giants went to their first World Series since 1962. The Giants got their behinds handed to them by the A's (Clark hit a measly 250/294/313).

Will had a sub-par season in 1990 before bouncing back with a better 1991 (301/359/536) that got him a 4th-place finish in the NL MVP race despite the fact that the Giants finished 4th. He also took home the only Gold Glove of his career. Will had another good season in 1992, making his 5th straight All-Star appearance and hitting 300/384/476. Will didn't hit quite so well in '93 (283/367/432), but the addition of free agent Barry Bonds helped drive the Giants to 103 wins, just 1 game back of the Braves in the NL West.

The Giants had really turned things around after about 25 years of poor performance and poor attendance at Candlestick. Arguably the best franchise in the NL through 1962, the Giants fell apart in the late 60's and only made one postseason appearance (losing the 1971 NLCS) before Will came along.

The resurgence of the Giants in the late 80's and early 90's was due to some excellent homegrown talent and some surprisingly good luck with pitchers. The team had produced tons of talented players in the 60's and 70's but the problem was that many of them flamed out (John Montefusco, Jim Ray Hart, Mike McCormick) or that none of them stuck around (Gaylord Perry, Darrell Evans, Gary Matthews, Garry Maddox, George Foster, etc.).

But the 1993 Giants represented a very strong lineup. Their infield was made up entirely of homegrown 1st-round picks (Will Clark, Robby Thompson, Royce Clayton, Matt Williams), and their outfield was centered around free agent superstar Barry Bonds. They had a decent catcher in Kirt Manwaring and a good closer in Rod Beck. If they'd been able to build a starting rotation worth a darn, they'd have gone places. As it was, the 1993 team's starters were either one-year wonders (John Burkett, Trevor Wilson) or washed-up veterans (Bill Swift, Bud Black, Scott Sanderson).

It was something of a surprise, then, when Clark left the team to sign a big free agent contract with the Texas Rangers. The Rangers were looking to lure veteran hitters to their new, compact ballpark (The Ballpark at Arlington) and were, apparently, willing to pay more than the Giants. It's possible that San Francisco just wasn't ready to open up their pocketbooks so soon after doling out a historic amount to Bonds. Clark's departure certainly hurt the Giants, as it would be a few more years before they managed to replace him with J.T. Snow.
Clark's first year with the Rangers was brilliant; he hit 329/431/501. But it was also 1994, and when the strike hit, they were in 1st place and on their way to the first postseason appearance in franchise history. Granted, their record was 52-62, but they were in the 4-team AL West and somebody had to win the division

The Rangers were looking to surround homegrown sluggers Ivan Rodriguez, Juan Gonzalez, and Rusty Greer with some veteran support in their quest to make the postseason. A trade for Jose Canseco was somewhat successful, although the highlight of his tenure would be a home run ball that bounced off his noggin and over the fence.

The Rangers finally made it to the postseason in 1996, despite an off year by Clark (284/377/436). The Rangers added Mark McLemore, Dean Palmer, and Mickey Tettleton to their lineup to form an extremely potent order. Their pitching staff, on the other hand, was execrable, a problem which continues to plague them to this day. Apart from starter Ken Hill (3.63 ERA in 35 starts), no one in the starting rotation had a very good season at all. The problem was somewhat countered by a surprisingly good bullpen (Dennis Cook, Jeff Russel, Ed Vosberg), but it was not at all surprising when the Yankees knocked the out of the ALDS in 4 games. Clark hit an abysmal 125/263/125 in the series.

The Will Clark that had shown such a fantastic all-around offensive game was being replaced with a guy who survived on batting average an walks. Clark was still hitting quite well, but he wasn't up to his old standards, and he didn't respond as well as others to the friendly dimensions of the home Texas ballpark. When he hit 23 HR in 1998, it was considered a breakthrough (he hadn't hit as many since his 1991 season in San Francisco -- the last year that he was an MVP-caliber hitter).

Will was a free agent in the 1998-1999 offseason, and his resurgent 1998 (305/384/507) helped land him a pretty good contract with Baltimore. In 1999, at age 35, Clark continued to hit well (303/395/485) despite not meeting his previous standards; most of his big numbers were a product of the new run-scoring environment, and his best years were actually in pitcher-friendly Candlestick Park before the new offensive era began in 1993.
The Orioles missed the postseason in 1999 and were well on their way to another 4th-place finish in 2000, with Will still hitting well (301/413/473) despite a continued power drought. But the Cardinals were looking for a veteran bat to help them in the NL Central race, so the Orioles sent him to St. Louis for semi-prospect Jose Leon.

Clark played 51 games with the Cardinals and was positively brilliant, hitting 345/426/655 down the stretch and easing the Cardinals into an NL Central title with a 10-game lead over 2nd-place Cincinnati. Will continued to mash in the postseason, but the Cardinals dropped out in the NLCS, losing to the Mets in 5 games.

After his inspiring finish to 2000 could easily have landed a job as a free agent. Instead, Will "The Thrill" decided to retire while he was on top and left the game at age 34.

In the past, I've argued that will deserves a spot in Cooperstown. In the years since then, though, my enthusiasm has mellowed, and I've come to grips with the fact that his early retirement cost him a spot. Still, if you were to start talking to a friend about the great first basemen of the past 20 years, Will Clark's name probably wouldn't come up. But it should. Because if Mark Grace gets more support for the Hall than Will Clark, it's an absolute crime. At his best, "The Thrill" was excellent, and he helped make a lot of good teams even better than they already were.
Willie Randolph (1975-1992)
(276/373/351,; 2,210 H; 6 All-Star Games)

Another claim I made in my ignorant youth (say, 2005) was that Willie Randolph deserved consideration for the Hall of Fame. Well, he certainly deserves consideration, but really don't think he deserves induction. On the other hand, we need to make sure there's a spot in baseball history with Willie's name on it. Because while he may have been the least colorful member of the Bronx Zoo Yankees, he was also one of the best.

Willie wasn't a superstar coming up; he was drafted by the Pirates in the 7th round of the 1972 draft. Only 18 when drafted, Willie did very well in the low minors. He consistently hit for a high average while also taking walks, stealing bases and showing strong defense. He looked at this point like a budding leadoff man. In 1975, Willie opened the season with Class-A Charleston and hit an impressive 339/411*/479 (OBP info. is incomplete). This earned him a late-season call-up with Pittsburgh, but Willie (who had never played above Double-A) struggled, hitting just 164/246/180 in 30 games.

After the season, Willie was essentially a throw-in in a trade between the Pirates and Yankees. The Pirates wanted Yankee starter Doc Medich, a 23-year-old righty who had shown promise in three seasons in the Bronx. In return, though, the Pirates gave up Dock Ellis (who was older and more established than Medich), and Ken Brett (who still had some decent pitching left in him. Medich gave the Pirates one decent season before they included him (and Tony Armas, Doug Bair, Dave Giusti, Rick Langford and Mitchell Page!!) in a trade with Oakland that brought them Phil Garner and one good season of Tommy Helms. The Pirates would finish 2nd in each of the three seasons after they traded Randolph, with Rennie Stennett and Phil Garner manning 2nd base. Neither would be as good as Randolph, with 1978 providing an interesting comparison:

'78 Randolph: 279/381/357
'78 Stennett: 243/274/309


Stennett was a better glove man, but Randolph still has the clear edge here. The kicker? The Pirates finished 1.5 games out in '78

Never the less, the Pirates had lost an All-Star second baseman and the Yankees had gained one. Randolph took over second base in New York from Sandy Alomar, Sr., who wasn't exactly tearing up the league. The Yankees still hadn't recovered from the Horace Clarke years; Clarke manned second for the Yankees from 1967-1973 while hitting about as well as Mario Mendoza.

It would be too simple to say that the Yankees won the pennant in '76 because they got Randolph. Randolph gave them good defense and 37 steals, but he didn't hit especially well (267/356/328). He earned an All-Star berth regardless. The real difference was a big improvement from a lot of resident Yankees, giving the team a comfortable 10.5 game division win over the Orioles. The Yankees took the ALCS from the Royals in dramatic fashion, but got swept convincingly by the Big Red Machine in the World Series (Randolph hit 071/133/071).

For the next three years, Randolph gave the Yankees good production. He hit for a good average, drew some walks, stole some bases, and played fine defense. He took home a World Series ring with the Yankees in '77, but injuries prevented him from competing in the '78 Series (which the Yankees also won).

Randolph had perhaps the best year of his career in 1980, hitting 294/427/407, going 30/35 in steals, and playing sound defense for the division winners. He won his only silver slugger award that year, made the All-Star team, and finished 15th in the MVP voting. But despite great play from Randolph, the Yanks lost to the Royals in the ALCS.

Randolph slumped terribly in '81 (232/336/305), but made the All-Star team again anyway. The Yanks won the division again, and Randolph hit well in the postseason, but the Bombers lost the series to the Dodgers. It would be the team's last series appearance for 15 years.

From 1982-1985, Randolph was as reliable as they came. He didn't contend for any more MVPs, but he hit for a decent average, drew his walks, and played fine defense (his stolen base totals dwindled to 10-15 per year). But around him, the Yankees were fading. A pathological desire to sign and trade for expensive veterans at the expense of prospects made the Yankees an expensive team, just not a very successful one.

Willie had two top-notch years left in him: 1986 and 1987. In '86, Willie hit 276/393/346 with 94 walks, and in '87 he finished at 305/411/414, which looks a lot better, but is more a function of the Year of the Hitter.

Willie slumped badly in '88, hitting 230/322/300 in 110 games. At 33 years of age, it looked like Willie's best years might be behind him. In the offseason, the Yankees signed second baseman Steve Sax to a big free-agent deal, and the writing was on the wall for Willie. A few weeks later, he signed a two-year free agent deal with the Dodgers, replacing the departing Sax (who wouldn't fare too well in New York).

Randolph hit fairly well with L.A. in '89 (282/366/326), but with his base-stealing a thing of the past and his defense starting to decline, it was tougher to tolerate his hitting, which was a liability when his OBP dipped under .375.

Injuries limited Randolph' playing time in 1990, and he ended up going to the Oakland A's for the stretch run (the Dodgers got Stan Javier in return). Willie fared better than Mike Gallego in Oakland, but that wasn't hard (Gallego finished at 206/277/272 on the season). The A's won the division and were the favorites going into the postseason. They trampled the Red Sox in the ALCS but fell to the Reds in a shocking World Series sweep. Willie hit 267/313/267 in what proved to be his last postseason series.

The next season, Randolph signed a low-end free agent deal to fill in at second for the Milwaukee Brewers. As it turned out, Willie had one great season left in him, as he hit 327/424/374 in 124 games for the 4th-place Brewers. That performance earned him a better contract with the Mets for the 1992 season. It was a bittersweet return to New York, because the Mets were full of expensive players and unproductive veterans and failed to contend, suffering the wrath of the New York press in the process. 1992 would be his last season, as Willie retired after 18 big-league seasons.

Randolph went on to coach several years with the Yankees, his former team, and in 2005 was named manager of the New York Mets. Randolph earned a great deal of respect during his playing days as an intelligent player with poise on the field, and it got him a job managing in New York.

Randolph career numbers aren't so great as I thought they were when I first saw him. But he was a very capable second baseman for a number of years, and that's worth something.

Darrell Evans (1969-1989)
(248/361/431,; 2,223 H; 414 HR; 2 All-Star Games)

In his Historical Baseball Abstract, Bill James names Darrell Evans as the most underrated player in baseball history. He then goes on to define and discuss the different aspects of being underrated in Evans' entry.

As James points out, Evans meets pretty much all the criteria for being underrated. He did several things well, but was not great at any one thing; he spent his prime years on bad teams; his "secondary skills" (patience and power) were much stronger than his ability to hit for a high batting average; he played in an era and in ballparks that hid his skills; etc., etc. What Evans was was a very good source of offense for quite a long time, and it's disappointing that he's never even been considered a star, let alone a superstar.

I've tried to make sense of Evans' history in the amateur draft, and here's what I've got so far: The best I can figure is that the amateur draft, as we know it today, was infinitely more complicated in Evans' time. The Rule 4 draft (or the draft, as we know it today) was for high school players and college seniors who graduated in the summer. There was another draft, however, in January for high school and college players who graduated during the winter (thanks to wikipedia for this info). There was also, after both the June and January drafts, a "'secondary" phase of the draft for players who had been previously drafted but hadn't signed. From what I've read, all these permutations of the draft were concessions to those who opposed the idea of the draft in the first place. The January draft was dropped after 1986.

But when Evans was entering baseball -- he graduated high school in 1965 -- the draft was still a multi-headed creature. And Evans was involved in one or another at some point. Here's his draft record (according to baseball-reference.com):

June 1965: Drafted by Cubs in 13th round, didn't sign.
January 1966 (secondary): Drafted by Yankees in 2nd round, didn't sign.
June 1966 (secondary): Drafted by Tigers in 5th round, didn't sign.
January 1967 (secondary): Drafted by Phillies in 3rd round, didn't sign.
June 1967 (secondary): Drafted by Athletics in 7th round, signed.

Darrell Evans went on a personal tour of the brand-new (at that time) baseball amateur draft system. I don't know what the specific issue was, but Evans took his sweet time deciding on a major league team to join. He wasn't done, either; he stayed in the Athletics' system for a year and a half and was lost to the Braves in the Rule 5 (minor league) draft in December 1968.

Evans was done pinballing around for the moment and made it to the majors with Atlanta in 1969 for 12 games. He hit very poorly and was left off the postseason roster (the Braves won the NL West but lost the NLCS to the Miracle Mets). It would be his last chance at the postseason for some time.

Evans got in another 12 games in 1970 and at least hit well this time (318/423/386). The Braves had a washed-up Clete Boyer playing third that season, but still they weren't ready to commit to Evans at third. In 1971 Evans played just 89 games (242/338/431, 12 HR), sharing third base duties with erstwhile (read: awful) catcher Earl Williams.

In 1972, however, there would be no denying Evans his spot as the Braves' starting third baseman. Evans hit 254/384/419 with 19 HR and 90 walks for a 4th-place Atlanta team. He was even better in 1973, as part of the Braves' power surge, hitting 281/403/556 with 41 HR, 124 walks, and sparkling defense at third. Hank Aaron and Davey Johnson (?) also hit 40 HR, as the Braves led the league in homers (206, the Giants were 2nd with 151) and runs scored (799, Cincinnati was 2nd with 741). . . but finished 5th because they also led the league in runs allowed (4.78/G). Such were the vagaries of Atlanta-Fulton County Stadium AKA "The Launching Pad."

The 1974 team actually surged up to 3rd place in the NL West at 88-74, but it was a distant 3rd behind the 102-60 Dodgers. Evans again hit well (240/381/419 with 25 HR, 126 BB, and more good defense), but that was as good as it got for the Braves; they didn't make it back to .500 until 1980.

The Braves of the late 1970's were a relatively popular team that made a lot of headlines, but it was rarely good in either case. Both were the result of eccentric owner Ted Turner, who broadcast the Braves throughout the south, turning them into a national sports powerhouse. The trouble is that Turner's broadcasting acumen did not extend to the baseball field (where, for one game in 1977, he ventured as manager). Turner, even moreso than George Steinbrenner, was the impetus for skyrocketing salaries in the era. But whereas Steinbrenner generally made sound investments with his many millions, Turner did not, and the difference showed on the field.

This meant that it was difficult for any Braves player not named Hank Aaron to be taken seriously. Hell, Phil Niekro had to wait four years to get into Cooperstown despite overwhelming credentials, just because no one really took him seriously as the dominant pitcher he was.

Evans continued to toil in obscurity for Atlanta. He had yet another good season in 1975 (243/361/406), but after a slow start in 1976 (173/320/194) the Braves traded him to San Francisco.

It's hard to say that the trade hurt Atlanta, in the standings at least. They weren't contenders again until 1982, by which time Evans probably would have been somewhere else anyways. But I also doubt that the Braves really appreciated what they had in Evans. Evans was a Moneyball player 20 years before his time. He hit for low batting averages even considering his era, but he had good power, very good defense at third, and drew walks like nobody's business. It took a 40-home run season to get him on the All-Star team (in 1973), and he wouldn't make it back again until he hit 30 (in 1983 with the Giants). And it's not as though the Braves had a clear replacement for Evans; Jerry Royster's 15 minutes of fame could wait. (The Braves did get a fine replacement by drafting Bob Horner in 1978, but it's also fair to say that the world would have been a better place with Horner playing somewhere other than third).

In return for Evans (and futility infielder Marty Perez), the Braves got Willie Montanez, Craig Robinson, Mike Eden, and Jake Brown from the Giants. Robinson was a young shortstop that couldn't hit water if he fell out of a boat. Eden was a 26-year-old second baseman with a hint of offense, and Brown was a former 1st-round pick (#2 overall in 1969) who never panned out. Suffice to say, the deal boiled down to Evans for Montanez.

Montanez was a year younger than Evans at the time of the deal (28) and was coming off some decent seasons as a first baseman/sometime outfielder with the Phillies. The Giants had gotten him in exchange for a 25-year-old Garry Maddox (well done there), and he had done a good job with them in the second half of '75.

But Montanez simply wasn't a replacement for Evans. Montanez did draw some walks (although his walk rate had been slowly dropping since his rookie year to just 49 in 156 games the year before), but his offense was entirely made up of batting average. Montanez did have back-to-back .300 seasons to his credit, and that's all well and good, but a batting line of 302/353/415 wasn't great for a first baseman even in '75.

And great is exactly what Evans was. Especially when you consider that Evans was a Gold Glove-quality third baseman (his defense would later slip, and he never actually won one), and all things being equal, you'd rather have that than a first baseman. The Braves did need a first baseman (Earl Williams had since gone kaput), but why gain a decent first baseman if it costs you a great third baseman? But then this is the Braves we're talking about . . .

In San Francisco, Evans' power took a hit, as would be expected going from hitter-friendly Fulton County Stadium to the wind tunnel known as Candlestick. Evans would spend seven and a half seasons with the Giants, and while he never contended for any MVPs, he was surprisingly consistent, keeping his offense in the range of 255/360/410. The big difference was that Evans' defense at third fell from excellent to merely adequate, and he began spending even more time at first (apart from an inexplicable experiment from 1982-1983 that saw him play 22 games at shortstop).

Evans turned 36 in his final season in San Francisco, and it may have looked like he was nearing the end. Amazingly, though, Evans found the fountain of youth in his late 30's and played what was likely his best season 1983: 277/378/516, with 30 HR and 84 BB. It was his highest HR total in ten years, and it earned him a spot on the All-Star team and a 14th-place MVP finish.

Evans' 1979 contract was up, and he picked a wonderful time to have a career year. The Tigers signed him to a 3-year deal to be a DH/1B/3B. The Tigers picked up Evans (232/353/384) and replaced 1B Enos Cabell (First Baseman Enos Cabell, a phrase that should never have been born) with Dave Bergman and won 104 games. It wasn't that simple, of course. The biggest move of the offseason was a trade with the Phillies that netted not only Bergman, but also relief specialist Willie Hernandez, who made the American League his bitch and won the Cy Young and MVP Awards in '84 as the Tigers romped to World Series victory.

It wouldn't be quite as good for Evans or the Tigers again. Evans actually improved on his poor '84 by posting back-to-back strong seasons in 1985 and 1986. Evans set a record in '85 by becoming the oldest player (38) to hit at least 40 HR (he hit 40 exactly).

In 1987, at age 40, Evans was still great, but the league-wide boom in offense made him look better. He hit 257/379/501 and finished 12th in the MVP voting as the Tigers won a close AL East race. Evans hit well in the postseason (.294 with 4 walks but no power) but the Tigers lost the ALCS to the Twins.

Few players are as good at age 40 as Evans was, and 1987 proved to be his last hurrah (Collusion kept him with the Tigers for two more years, 1987-1988, after entering free agency in '86). He played 144 games in 1988, but apart from his walks (84) his offense was gone (208/337/380).

Evans, now 42, re-signed with the Braves for a nostalgia run, but there's no DH in the senior circuit and, besides, his offense was gone (207/303/355). Evans retired after the season.

To understand Evans' value, you have to place it in its context. A career batting line of 248/361/431 may not look very impressive now, but for a career spent mostly in a pitcher's era (and in Candlestick, a pitcher's park), it's very impressive. Add in Evans' strong defense at third (especially early in his career), and you have someone with borderline Cooperstown credentials, as argued by James and others.

Evans will never get into Cooperstown, because no one saw him as a star when he was active and baseball writers are right up there with medeival geocentric astronomers when it comes to radically reevaluating their beliefs. And people will just never be able to get past that .248 career batting average (even in this day and age). But Darrell Evans was a good player -- and occasionally a great player -- for quite a long time, and attention should be paid.

Bobby Grich (1970-1986)
(266/371/424; 1,833 H; 224 HR; 6-Time All-Star; 4 Gold Gloves)

Another easy way to be underrated (according to Bill James) is to play in an era that obscures your contributions. This is why a lot of people on my lists are pitchers from high-offense eras or hitters from low-offense eras. Grich played in the one of the lowest offensive environments in modern times, and when you make that adjustment to his numbers and consider his defense, you end up with a pretty strong case for induction into the Hall of Fame.
A fine defensive shortstop and a good hitter, Grich was drafted in the 1st round (19th overall) by the Baltimore Orioles in the 1967 draft. Grich advanced steadily through the minors, earning a promotion to the big club in 1970 after pummeling the International League. Grich played at second, short, and third, but didn't hit well (211/279/284 in 3o games) and was left off the postseason roster (the O's won the World Series).
Grich killed the International League again in 1971, but the O's were pretty well set in the majors with defensive whiz Mark Belanger blocking Grich at shortstop. The club also had Davey Johnson at second and Brooks Robinson at third, so Grich had to bide his time in the minors for most of the season.
But Grich was 23 in 1972 and ready for the majors. Despite the fact that he was seriously blocked in the infield (Gold Glover Paul Blair was in center), the O's brought Grich up to the majors to stay. Manager Earl Weaver somehow got Grich into 133 games, and he hit 278/358/415 as a sort of rolling replacement for the second-third-short positions. Grich saw most of his playing time at shortstop, presumably as an offensive replacement for punchless Mark Belanger (186/236/246).
The O's removed a roadblock in the offseason by trading Davey Johnson, who would be 30 in 1973, to Atlanta as part of a deal for professional hitter Earl Williams. With Belanger's defense far superior even to Grich's, the club moved him to second base, where he was still a valuable defender and a fine replacement for Johnson. Grich's batting average (and thus slugging percentage) went down in '73 (251/373/387, 12 HR), but he drew plenty walks (107, 2nd in the AL) and played all 162 games. The Orioles won their division but lost the ALCS to the A's.
1974 was the best year of Grich's career to date. He hit 263/376/431, set a new career high with 19 HR and finished 9th in the MVP voting as the Orioles again won the division (and again lost the ALCS to the A's). The Orioles fell to second-place in 1975 and again in 1976, but Grich was still playing good defense and hitting as well as ever. He had become, after Rod Carew, the league's premiere second baseman.
Grich entered free agency in the 1976 offseason and received an offer he couldn't refuse from the California Angels. The Angels, thanks to owner Gene Autry, had leapt into the free agent market with relish, taking home Grich, Don Baylor, and Joe Rudi for starters. They added them into a lineup that already had solid second baseman Jerry Remy and left fielder Bobby Bonds and -- along with the 1-2 punch of Nolan Ryan and Frank Tanana in the rotation -- the Angels were considered favorites by many to win the AL West.
It didn't work out that way. Grich hit well enough (243/369/392), but injuries limited him to 52 games. Rudi played just 64, and Baylor was the only big free agent to stay healthy (he fared decently -- 251/334/433, but not good enough to satisfy the fans). The lineup was filled with non-stars Terry Humphrey, Danny Goodwin, Mario Guerrero and Gil Flores, and while Ryan and Tanana pitched well, the rest of the starting rotation was a big disappointment. The Angels finished 5th in the West, just another in a long line of disappointments for that team, but the first in the otherwise impressive career of Bobby Grich. The Angels improved to 87-75 and finished 2nd in 1978, but Grich had his worst season yet: 251/357/329.
In 1979, though, Grich rebounded with one of the best seasons of his career. He demolished his previous career highs by hitting 30 homers and knocking in 101 runs. He hit 294/365/537, made the All-Star team, and finished 8th in the MVP voting. More importantly, the Angels won the division and made their first-ever postseason appearance. But they lost the ALCS to Grich's former club, the Orioles.
Grich returned to form in 1980, with a fine 271/377/408 performance. Then in 1981, he broke through with what was easily the best season of his career. In the strike-shortened season, Grich hit 304/378/543, with 22 HR. But the Angels missed the postseason, so he finished 14th in the MVP voting. In my opinion, he was the 2nd-best player in the AL, behind only Rickey Henderson of Oakland.
Grich again had a fine year in 1982 (261/371/449), and the Angels returned to the postseason, winning the AL West. This time they won Games 1 and 2 of the ALCS against the Brewers, but the series returned to Milwaukee, and Harvey's Wallbangers won the next three games. The Angels had become baseball's resident chokers, and unfortunately, Grich's excellence was overshadowed by it. But the biggest choke was yet to come.
Grich posted two more fine seasons in 1983 and 1984, but in 1985 he finally showed signs of slowing down, at age 36 (242/355/372). He wasn't the only one, as the decrepit Angels (the oldest lineup in the AL by far) ended the season just one game back of the Royals.
Grich rebounded somewhat in 1986, hitting 268/354/412 in 98 games. For the third time in his Angels tenure, the team made the postseason, winning the AL West by 5 games over Texas. They took a 3 games-to-1 lead in the ALCS and were one out away from the World Series, but then Dave Henderson hit the home run and the Red Sox went on to come back and win the pennant.
It must have been demoralizing for Grich and all of the Angels who had come so close so many times. Despite still having some good baseball left in the tank, Grich didn't get a bite on the free agent market after 1986 (the owners were colluding). As a result, Grich left baseball at age 37, coming off a year where he hit better than every AL second baseman except Willie Randolph and Tony Bernazard.
Many have argued that Grich's excellence has earned him a spot in Cooperstown, and I'd like to add my name to that list. Grich didn't compile a lot of raw numbers; he played over 2,000 big-league games, but didn't compile a lot of hits. His 224 career homers were great for a second baseman, but he's since been passed by Ryne Sandberg, Jeff Kent, Craig Biggio, and my Aunt Edna. He drew 1,087 career walks and finished with a .371 career OBP in a pitcher's era. He was a good shortsop and a fine second baseman; he finished his career at 110 FRAA.
Here are Grich's career stats compared to other second basemen: (* indicates stats don't include 2007 season stats; "dt" means stats are Clay Davenport translations):
Win Shares: 329 (12th)
...
10. Lou Whitaker 351
11. Ryne Sandberg 346
12. Bobby Grich 329
13. Willie Randolph 312
WS/162G*: 26.54 (8th)
...
7. Charlie Gehringer 26.71
8. Bobby Grich 26.54
9. Larry Doyle 26.51
dtAVG*: .279 (not in top 20)
dtOBP*: .386 (T-8th)
...
6. Willie Randolph .394
7. Miller Huggins .391
8. Bobby Grich & Chuck Knoblauch .286
10. Cupid Childs .385
dtSLG*: .492 (12th)
...
9. Tony Lazzeri & Joe Morgan .495
11. Hardy Richardson .493
12. Bobby Grich .492
13. Larry Doyle .491
14. Ryne Sandberg .488
EQA*: .296 (7th)
...
5. Nap Lajoie .306
6. Rod Carew .303
7. Bobby Grich .296
8. Roberto Alomar .295
WARP3*: 122.0 (10th)
...
8. Lou Whitaker 123.9
9. Craig Biggio 123.5
10. Bobby Grich 122.0
11. Frankie Frisch 119.8
So Grich was about the 7th-best offensive second baseman of all time, quality-wise. While on one hand he didn't pad out his career numbers (thank you, Mr. Ueberroth), on the other hand, he was a good -- and sometimes great -- defensive player.
If that's not a Hall-of-Famer, I don't know what is.
Still to Come . . .
Cesar Cedeno, Ken Singleton, Bobby Murcer, Roy White, Vada Pinson, Johnny Callison, and many others . . .

I Had No Idea ... The Hitters

One of the really fun things about looking back through baseball history is finding the great stars that you'd never really heard of. I've always been a fan of the underdog, and so it's always fun for me to find an excellent ballplayer I'd never heard of. Either that, or someone I'd heard of but didn't know how good they were.
I decided to dedicate some blog time to these players but wasn't sure how to frame it. I could call them "underrated," but the truth is that many of these guys aren't underrated among knowledgeable fans, they were just underrated by me. Which just goes to show how relative the terms "underrated/overrated" are. So instead, since this is my blog, I'll talk about the players who were a surprise to me.
Starting with modern players and moving backward, here are the guys who surprise me . . .

Gary Sheffield (1988 - )
(297/398/525; 2,504 H; 479 HR; 9 All-Star Games)
I guess I always knew that Gary was great. But it's only in recent years that I've been able to look past his prickly persona and see a true Hall-of-Famer.
Gary's been around for a while. He's played for a number of teams, and that's not an accident. He's with his 7th team right now (Detroit), and while that's not a lot in this day and age, it's a sign that Gary tends to get disgruntled if he stays in one place for a while. And the people he works for tend to get even more disgruntled.
Sheffield grew up in Tampa, Florida and was drafted in the 1st round (6th overall pick) of the 1986 draft by the Milwaukee Brewers. Sheffield was already a fantastic hitter, and while he hadn't yet found his true position (he came up as a shortstop, but that didn't last long), everyone knew that his real position was as an all-around hitter. And when he made the majors at age 19, he seemed destined for stardom.
The trouble is that Sheffield's transition from prospect to star was rough, even rougher than usual. This was partly due to being shifted around the infield (he would end up at third base for the moment), but mainly due to his own attitude. Even Sheffield himself has admitted that he wasn't the ideal rookie when he was with Milwaukee, and management soon grew tired of the outspoken youngster who wasn't always giving 100%.
Sheffield's hitting finally showed up in 1990, as he batted 294/350/421 as the team's de facto third baseman. But his 10 HR weren't what the Brewers were hoping for.
Sheffield suffered an injury in 1991 that limited him to 50 games and a 194/277/320 batting line. Even though he was just 22, the team now had the excuse to get rid of their headache. They traded him to the Padres for Ricky Bones, Jose Valentin, and Matt Mieske. My guess is that, attitude or not, the Brewers regretted that one. It may have been the change of scenery, but Sheffield blossomed in San Diego, hitting 330/385/580 with 33 HR and finished 3rd in the NL MVP voting. The Brewers, on the other hand, finished just 4 games out of first place in 1992, with Kevin Seitzer (270/337/367) as their everyday third baseman. Ricky Bones made 28 forgettable starts (4.57 ERA), and the only good to come out of the trade would be some decent seasons from Valentin in the future.
Sheffield got off to something of a slow start in 1993 (295/344/473) and wasn't exactly helping with his defense at third. Padres ownership was looking to shed salary, so they dumped Sheffield's contract on the new Florida Marlins for three prospects. (Luckily for San Diego, one of those prospects, a fellow named Trevor Hoffman, would indeed pan out).
Sheffield hit very well in Florida, providing a superstar hitter to build the franchise around. And Florida management did indeed start building, paying out money to sign free agents to surround Sheffield in the order. It didn't look like Sheffield himself was going to be the team's MVP; he was hitting well, but was still injury-prone, a charge that had been leveled on him since his Milwaukee days. In 1995, for instance, Sheffield hit an MVP-worthy 324/467/587, but only in 63 games (out of 143 played by Florida in the strike-shortened season.
But Sheffield had his best season to date in 1996. He again hit like an MVP (314/465/624 with 42 HR and 120 RBI), and finished 6th in the MVP voting. His defense wasn't as much of a problem, as he'd been playing reguarly in right field since '94. Sheffield probably deserved better in the MVP voting, but Ken Caminiti hit nearly as well (326/408/621) and played fine defense for San Diego, who made the postseason (the Marlins finished 3rd). My guess is that Sheffield's reputation still wore heavily on the voters' minds. Caminiti won the MVP, even though I would have voted for Jeff Bagwell (315/451/570 in the AstroDome).
It all came together for the Marlins in 1997, when they became the youngest franchise ever to win the World Series, upsetting the favored Cleveland Indians in seven games. Sheffield experienced an odd dip in his hitting (250/424/446) and wasn't at 100% health, but he hit 292/485/458 in the World Series and took home a World Series ring.
Right after the Series, of course, Florida ownership started selling off their expensive assets. Sheffield survived through 40 games of the 1998 season (his near-$15 million salary was the highest in baseball, which likely made him more difficult to deal), but he was eventually traded to the Dodgers along with Bobby Bonilla, Jim Eisenreich, Charles Johnson, and Manuel Barrios in exchange for Mike Piazza and Todd Zeile (Florida would send off Piazza after just 5 games and Zeile at the end of the season).
Sheffield's three full seasons in Los Angeles were actually three of the most healthy and productive of his career. Viz:

1999: 152 G, 301/407/523, 34 HR, 101 RBI, All-Star
2000: 141 G, 325/438/643, 43 HR, 109 RBI, All-Star, 9th in NL MVP voting
2001: 143 G, 311/417/583, 36 HR, 100 RBI

But things weren't entirely pleasant. The first problem was that the Dodgers, who had made the postseason in 1995 and 1996, were degenerating into also-rans in the NL West. They became dissatisfied with Sheffield's contract (and, presumably, his attitude), and Sheffield became increasingly dissatisfied with a number of things in L.A. With Sheffield issuing demands to be traded, the Dodgers finally worked out a mutual salary dump with the Atlanta Braves; the Braves got Sheffield, and the Dodgers got Brian Jordan, Odalis Perez, and some guy named Andrew Brown.
The trade was a winner for Atlanta. Jordan was clearly done and, despite being nearly as expensive as Sheffield, wasn't nearly as productive (he hit 285/338/469 in his first full season with L.A.). Jordan's ineffectiveness was somewhat countered by Odalis Perez, who gave L.A. some good, cheap pitching, but Sheffield finished out his contract in Atlanta by hitting like crazy.
Sheffield suffered from some nagging hand injuries in 2002, and "only" hit 307/404/512 in 135 games. He broke through in 2003 with another MVP-caliber year, hitting 330/419/604 in 155 games. He finished 3rd in the NL MVP voting, behind only Bonds and Pujols. It should also be said that Sheffield seemed to be relatively happy in Atlanta, and his attitude was almost never an issue in his two fine seasons there. Sheffield has since spoken very highly of Bobby Cox, more evidence that the Atlanta skipper must be working some kind of magic.
Sheffield entered the 2003-2004 free agent market with an MVP-caliber season under his belt and plenty of words to say. He ended up landing with the Yankees with a three-year deal worth about $13 million a year, plus an option on a fourth year. Rumor has it that the Yankees were pursuing Vladimir Guerrero, but owner George Steinbrenner declared by executive fiat that Sheffield should be the new Yankee right fielder. The two men were both excellent hitters, but not only was Guerrero younger, he was far, far more pleasant to deal with. As the Yankees would discover . . .
Sheffield's first year in pinstripes wasn't as good as his previous season in Atlanta, but it was close. He led the Yankees to the division title by hitting 290/393/534. He finished 2nd in the AL MVP voting to . . . Vladimir Guerrero, who had signed with the Angels.
But as all Yankee fans remember, the 2004 postseason was ruined by an unheard-of collapse in the ALCS against the Red Sox. Sheffield wasn't the culprit; he played in all seven games and hit 333/444/533 with three doubles and a homer. The goat horns went to the Yankee pitching staff, although it was also the start of the bashing of Alex Rodriguez (another big off-season acquisition). Problem is that A-Rod hit 258/378/516 in the ALCS; Yankee hero Derek Jeter hit 200/333/233.
The 2004 failure was another step in the aura of dissatisfaction that now plagued the Yankees. Owner Steinbrenner was dissatisfied, the fans were (especially) dissatisfied, and many of the players became dissatisfied. It was not the ideal time to add Gary Sheffield to the mix. The bad feelings didn't hurt Sheffield's production, as he had another fine year in 2005 (291/379/512, 8th in AL MVP voting). But this time the Yankees lost to the Angels in the Division Series, and the bad feelings only got worse.
Sheffield came to the last year of his contract in 2006, which is traditionally the time in which he gets most vocal in his displeasure with the planet Earth. Making matters worse was that Sheffield was injured; he missed most of the season and his offense suffered (relatively speaking; he hit 298/355/450 in 39 games). With trade acquisition Bobby Abreu installed in right and Jason Giambi stuck at DH, the team didn't have a place for Sheffield anymore. Down the stretch, they tried him at first base, which shored up the offense but was pretty ugly on defense. And once again, despite being heavy favorites, the Yankees lost the Division Series; this time to the Tigers in four games.
With Abreu and Giambi in the fold, the Yankees had little need for a fussy 38-year-old with injury problems. Sheffield was issuing demands that the Yankees either pick up his option or trade him. The Yankees were only too happy to take him up on the latter. They sent him to the Tigers (who agreed to sign him to a contract extension). The Yankees got some good pitching prospects, mainly young Humberto Sanchez, in return. It was the fourth time Sheffield had been traded in his career, and each trade had been predicated to some good degree on Sheffield's attitude and demands. That may not be a record, but it's close.
Sheffield has, throughout his career (and in a recently-published "auto"biography) claimed that his perceived attitude problems are mainly the white power structure's attempt to marginalize an outspoken black man. To a certain extent, he may be right. In an entry about Albert Belle I wrote about a year ago, I stated that the media is much more tolerant and even accepting of white athletes with "attitude" problems. They also tend to indeed marginalize or demonize outspoken blacks, or blacks who play with a strong competitive edge (like Belle, Sheffield, or dozens of others I could name).
So in general, Sheffield's theory is true. But I don't believe it to be true in his specific case. Racism certainly plays a part in the depiction of Sheffield as an attitude problem, but it could also be that Sheffield is indeed an attitude problem. I can respect the fact that Sheffield is more outspoken than most athletes today and that this fact alone does indeed get him into trouble in an era when we want public figures to keep their opinions to themselves. But I can also respect the fact that, from what I know of Sheffield's case in particular, he is an ass. In a recent interview, he claimed that manager Joe Torre treats black players and white players differently. But he then denied that Torre was a "racist." He has since stuck to that depiction, but he hasn't helped us understand how those two statements are anything but a contradiction. It must also be said that we've never heard anything like this about Torre before. That doesn't mean it isn't true, certainly, but consider the source. It should also be said that Sheffield named Kenny Lofton specifically as an object of Torre's double-standard, but Lofton recently went on the record as denying Sheffield's claims.
Sheffield's just one of those guys that stirs things up wherever he goes. Things are going well in Detroit (Sheffield's hitting 289/393/522, and the Tigers are strong contenders), but I strongly suspect that things will change as his contract winds down. I don't think that Sheffield is a liar, I just think that he has strong prejudices of his own that lead him to mistake or misrepresent other people's (i.e. Torre's) actions or feelings. I cannot deny Sheffield's general claims that there is racism in sports and that it influences our views of African-American athletes. But he has already shown that he is ill-qualified to point out specific instances of this racism. Also, it's no coincidence that the person he so often sees as its victim is himself.
Gary Sheffield is a truly great player who, I think, is more than qualified for the Hall-of-Fame. Here's how he ranks among other right fielders in career numbers (* indicates stats don't include 2007 season stats; "dt" means stats are Clay Davenport translations):

Win Shares: 421 (10th)
...
8. Al Kaline 443

9. Paul Waner 423
10. Gary Sheffield 421
11. Dave Winfield 415
12. Tony Gwynn 398

WS/162 G*: 29.36 (8th)
...
6. Manny Ramirez 30.22
7. Frank Robinson 29.94
8. Gary Sheffield 29.36
9. Sam Crawford 28.70
10. Bobby Abreu 28.04

dtAVG*: .302 (T-15th)
14. Bobby Abreu .303
15. Harry Heilmann & Gary Sheffield .302
17. Sam Rice & Frank Robinson .300

dtOBP*: .406 (5th)
1. Babe Ruth .451

2. Manny Ramirez .415
3. Bobby Abreu .413
4. Mel Ott .408
5. Gary Sheffield .406
6. Tony Gwynn .404
7. Ken Singleton .401

dtSLG*: .556 (16th)
...
14. Chuck Klein .561
15. Elmer Flick .558
16. Gary Sheffield (.556)
17. Sam Crawford (.555)

EQA*: .319 (T-6th)
1. Babe Ruth .366
2. Manny Ramirez .344
3. Mel Ott .328
4. Hank Aaron .326
5. Frank Robinson .325
6. Vladimir Guerrero & Gary Sheffield .319
7. Bobby Abreu .314

WARP3: 120.3 (12th)
...
10. Paul Waner 124.9
11. Tony Gwynn 124.3
12. Gary Sheffield 120.3
13. Dwight Evans 119.1

Considering that so many great right fielders have played the game, Sheffield easily ranks high enough by any measure for induction to Cooperstown, especially considering he's got some good baseball still left in him. And, on the lists that are averages, consider that many active players listed (Vlad Guerrero, Bobby Abreu) are still in their early 30's and have several years of declining to bring down their numbers, whereas Sheffield is 38 and not likely to dilute his raw averages much before he retires.

I've gone on rather longer than I intended talking about Sheffield, but I really wanted to make the case for him as an all-time great. He's no Babe Ruth or Hank Aaron; he's not even a Mel Ott or Frank Robinson. But he's good enough to rank with Paul Waner, Tony Gwynn, and Dave Winfield as first-ballot Hall-of-Fame right fielders.

No matter what he says.

To be continued (hopefully with briefer notes about the 30-odd players I still want to talk about) ...

Thursday, August 09, 2007

Milestones

2007 has really been a landmark year for reaching statistical milestones. The end of Hank Aaron's reign as home run king is big enough, but add to that a new member of the 3,000 hit club (Biggio), two new members of the 500 HR club (Frank Thomas, A-Rod) with possibly more to come, and the charter member of the 500 save club (Trevor Hoffman). And Tom Glavine has become the newest member of the 300-win club (and the last for quite a while). With this in mind, let's take a look at these milestones, and see what they mean now and what they mean for the future.

Barry Bonds hits his 756th home run
There's not a whole lot for me to say about Barry's mark that I haven't said before. I certainly can't top what's already been said in almost every media outlet. Instead of revisiting a rant I've gone on before, I'll just say that, compared to his peers, Bonds' greatest accomplishment isn't his home runs, it's his ability to get on base.
Bonds' .445 career OBP is far and away the greatest of his generation. You could argue that it's the greatest of all time; the only other players in the top 20 whose careers lasted past 1960 are Mickey Mantle (.421) and Frank Thomas (.422). And even considering that Bonds played in an offense-heavy environment, that offense was primarily slugging rather than a higher batting average or OBP. Batting averages have actually been falling since WW2, making Bonds' numbers much more impressive when compared to those of John McGraw or Billy Hamilton. The only real challengers to Bonds' title of "greatest real OBP ever" are Ted Williams (.482) and Babe Ruth (.474). Even taking the era into account, it's hard to argue Bonds past Williams. So while Bonds is the best of his era, I guess he's not the best ever.
And he's certainly not the greatest slugger ever. As I said, when you compare Bonds to his contemporaries, his slugging exploits don't compare at all with those of Hank Aaron or Babe Ruth. And it's Ruth, especially, who easily holds the title of greatest slugger ever. He was out-homering entire teams in his day. Ruth hit 714 career home runs and the only player from his era to come close was Jimmie Foxx, with 534. Bonds has 757 HR right now, but there's another player from his era with more than 600 (Sammy Sosa), one who will soon have 600 (Ken Griffey, Jr.) and another who will finish with at least 700 or more barring catastrophe (A-Rod). That's not even including the lesser home run hitters. Here's how the two eras compare (take into account that the book hasn't closed on Bonds' era, with most of the players below still active):
700 HR club:
Ruth's era: Babe Ruth
Bonds's era: Barry Bonds
600 HR club:
Ruth's era: N/A
Bonds's era: Sammy Sosa
500 HR club:
Ruth's era: Jimmie Foxx, Mel Ott
Bonds's era: Ken Griffey, Jr., Mark McGwire, Rafael Palmeiro, Frank Thomas, Alex Rodriguez
400 HR club:
Ruth's era: Lou Gehrig
Bonds's era: Fred McGriff, Jim Thome, Manny Ramirez, Gary Sheffield, Jose Canseco, Jeff Bagwell, Juan Gonzalez, Carlos Delgado, Mike Piazza
I won't even list the 300-HR club, because that's becoming overcrowded with new members and increasingly irrelevant as a strong career standard.
I guess this is just a way of rationalizing my dismissive attitude towards' Bonds's accomplishment. He is a great player. PEDs have played a part in that, but to argue that they were the predominant factor is not only irresponsible but factually untenable. If Barry Bonds were a nice guy, his reputation would be hugely improved.
And yes, if I had a vote, I would put Bonds in the Hall of Fame.
Alex Rodriguez hits his 500th home run
Alex Rodriguez is the youngest-ever member of the 500 home run club, knocking the first pitch he saw from Kyle Davies out of the park. It's not like A-Rod's spot in Cooperstown was ever in doubt; he has a career batting line of 305/387/575 in some pitcher's parks in the good league, not to mention he did it while at shortstop, making himself the best shortstop of all time not named Honus. He's a third baseman now, but he's still an offensive juggernaut and one of the best players ever.

A-Rod just turned 31 and has 1,452 career RBIs. He's within shouting distance of Hank Aaron's all-time record of 2,297. A-Rod should reach 2,000 with relative ease (which would rank him 4th all-time behind Aaron, Ruth, and Anson, although Bonds should sneak into the 2,000 RBI club soon). He needs just 548 more RBI to reach 2,000 and 846 more to become the all-time leader. Assuming A-Rod plays 10 more seasons, that means he just has to average about 85 RBI per year for the rest of his career -- not an unreasonable goal if he keeps himself surrounded by a good offense.

A-Rod has 2,186 hits, meaning if he averages 125 hits per season for about 10 more seasons (a pretty conservative estimate), he'll finish with 3,436, which would be 6th all-time behind Rose, Cobb, Aaron, Musial, and Speaker (pretty impressive company, and all outfielders).

But the more intriguing question is: how many homers will A-Rod finish with? If he averages 30 HR a year for ten more years, then he'll reach 800. But that's a pretty daring estimate; granted, all my estimates are pretty daring to keep him at an All-Star level for 10 more years. But is it really so unreasonable? A-Rod's HR totals with the Yankees so far have been 36, 48, and 35. He already has 36 this year, meaning he should finish with more than 50 on the season. If he can hit a lot of homers now, he won't have to stay active into his early 40's.

It's also hard to guess whether A-Rod will become the all-time HR leader, because we don't know what Bonds will finish with when he does decide to retire. He could hang on for another year or two as a DH in a quest for 800, but I don't know if that's going to happen.

So what are the odds of A-Rod hitting 800 HR? Pretty slim, but he's close enough for us to get excited about it.
Craig Biggio records 3,000th hit
It's unfortunate that Biggio had to outlive his usefulness to the Astros in his quest for 3,000 hits, but if it means he'll get into the HOF on the first ballot, so be it. Biggio was criminally underrated while he was in his prime, and only now that he's snuck up on 3,000 hits are people really getting behind him.

Biggio's career batting line of 282/364/434 isn't that impressive given his context. But then he did spend his most productive years in the cavernous AstroDome. If he'd been elsewhere, he would have something like 350 HR as opposed to his current total of 288. Biggio's EQA (Equivalent Average) is .286. Here's how that looks compared to other HOFers and future HOFers from the MLB:

CAREER EQA
Rogers Hornsby: .338
Eddie Collins: .311
Joe Morgan: .311
Nap Lajoie: .310
Jackie Robinson: .310
Rod Carew: .302
Roberto Alomar: .296
Jeff Kent: .294
Charlie Gehringer: .293
Tony Lazzeri: .288
Biggio: .286
Billy Herman: .286
Ryne Sandberg: .283
Bobby Doerr: .280
Frankie Frisch: .277
Johnny Evers: .271

Bid McPhee: .262
Red Schoendienst: .261
Nellie Fox: .256
Bill Mazeroski: .249

Actually, Biggio has a similar profile to Billy Herman. Both had a good eye and could take a walk without striking out a lot. Both hit for a high average, and their adjusted career batting lines are similar. But Biggio gets a big edge in power (288 career HR to 47 for Herman) and HBP, Biggio's secret weapon. Biggio also stayed around for longer than Herman, although the latter did lose a couple years to WW2. If you look at Biggio as one step above Billy Herman and Ryne Sandberg, I'd say that's about right, and I think both Herman and Sandberg are legit HOFers. Biggio isn't in the upper echelon of all-time second basemen with Morgan, Collins, and Hornsby, but he's right in there with other legit guys like Herman, and that should be good enough for first-ballot induction.

Frank Thomas records 500th HR
Thomas is considered a borderline case for the Hall-of-Fame. This is due to his offensive drop-off in the early 00's and the fact that he's a 1b/DH (realistically the latter) with limited defensive value. But I think that Thomas was good enough -- and for long enough -- to make it into the Hall.
Thomas wasn't just a great hitter; he was a historically great hitter. He won back-to-back MVP awards and might have deserved another. His career batting line is 302/422/561. That's just great, even for a first baseman. Thomas' career EQA is .341 right now. Let's compare (also with HOFers and future HOFers:

CAREER EQAs
Lou Gehrig:
.346
Frank Thomas: .341
Dan Brouthers: .333
Jimmie Foxx: .329
Johnny Mize: .328
Hank Greenberg: .326
Jeff Bagwell: .323
Willie McCovey: .318
Roger Connor: .317
Harmon Killebrew: .307
Bill Terry: .307
Cap Anson: .303
Orlando Cepeda: .302
Frank Chance: .302
Eddie Murray: .302
Jim Bottomley: .289
Tony Perez: .288
George Sisler: .287
Jake Beckley: .284
George Kelly: .268

Yeah, that's how good Frank Thomas was. To be honest, my senses are telling me that this overrates Thomas' ability, but even if it does, he's still a lock for Cooperstown. He was, at his peak, one of the best hitters of his time (all time?) in so many ways. He was one of the best players in all of baseball for ten or more years, and more productive than people think for the rest of his career. He's about done, but he's still got some life left in him (252/370/438 so far in Toronto this season). He's got over 2400 hits, over 1600 RBIs, one of the best OBPs of all time, and two MVP Awards.

What's the problem?
Trevor Hoffman saves 500th game
Some time ago I resolved (in this blog) to do a complete study of Trevor Hoffman's career to come to a greater understanding of what he's accomplished. The problem isn't so much whether Hoffman is one of the greatest closers of all time (he is, of course) but how we measure closers against starters, especially when the criteria for each role is constantly changing.
Well, that's a very big question, and I could probably spew out some data and ramble on about it for hours without coming to a strong conclusion one way or another. I'll try not to bite off more than I can chew until I feel like I'm ready to tackle one of the more significant challenges to sabermetric historians of our time.
Instead, let's just talk about Mr. Trevor Hoffman. Hoffman is 39 years old and is entering his 15th major league season and his 14th as the closer for the Padres (Hoffman actually debuted with the inaugural Florida Marlins of 1993 before getting traded to San Diego as part of the deal for Gary Sheffield.
Hoffman's career ERA of 2.68 is more than 50% better than the league average (ERA+ of 151), even taking into account his pitcher-friendly home ballparks (Jack Murphy/Qualcomm and Petco). He has a K:BB ratio of 991:259 and has recorded more strikeouts in his career than innings pitched (925.1). He's pretty stingy with the HR, allowing about 6 per season and hitting just 8 batters in his whole career.
Although Hoffman is a closer in the modern sense (his role is tailored to the save stat rather than the situation), he's not as limited as it would seem. He's averaged about 72.2 IP per "season" (as defined at baseball-reference.com), which is good in an era when few closers top 60 innings pitched in a season. He's always averaged more than 1 inning per game, although his workload has decreased in recent years.
One problem is that traditional statistics don't usually help us rate closers. Wins and losses are irrelevant, and saves are the product of so many factors beyond a pitcher's performance that I don't even pay attention to them anymore. Luckily, there are several new statistics in use to help us pinpoint exactly what we want to know about relievers.
How does Hoffman rank when compared to his peers (the modern closers)? I'll also include some other great closers for context. Let's take a look at them using some standard and not-so-standard stats:
CAREER ERA:
Mariano Rivera: 2.31
Billy Wagner: 2.31
Trevor Hoffman: 2.68
Dan Quisenberry: 2.76
Bruce Sutter: 2.83
John Franco: 2.89
Robb Nen: 2.98
Lee Smith: 3.03
Troy Percival: 3.09
Jesse Orosco: 3.16
Jeff Reardon: 3.16
Randy Myers: 3.19
Jeff Montgomery: 3.27
CAREER INNINGS:
Jesse Orosco: 1295
Lee Smith: 1289.1
John Franco: 1245.2
Jeff Reardon: 1132.1
Dan Quisenberry: 1043.1
Bruce Sutter: 1042.1
Mariano Rivera: 929.1
Trevor Hoffman: 925.1
Randy Myers: 884.2
Jeff Montgomery: 868.2
Billy Wagner: 752
Robb Nen: 715
Troy Percival: 628.2
CAREER ERA+:
Mariano Rivera: 197
Billy Wagner: 186
Trevor Hoffman: 151
Troy Percival: 150
Dan Quisenberry: 146
Robb Nen: 138
John Franco: 137
Bruce Sutter: 136
Jeff Montgomery: 134
Lee Smith: 132
Jesse Orosco: 125
Randy Myers: 122
Jeff Reardon: 121
CAREER K:
Lee Smith: 1251
Jesse Orosco: 1179
Billy Wagner: 992
Trevor Hoffman: 991
John Franco: 975
Randy Myers: 884
Jeff Reardon: 877
Bruce Sutter: 861
Mariano Rivera: 833
Robb Nen: 793
Jeff Montgomery: 733
Troy Percival: 718
Dan Quisenberry: 379
CAREER BB:
Dan Quisenberry: 162
Mariano Rivera: 231
Billy Wagner: 251
Trevor Hoffman: 259
Robb Nen: 260
Troy Percival: 268
Jeff Montgomery: 296
Bruce Sutter: 309
Jeff Reardon: 358
Randy Myers: 396
Lee Smith: 486
John Franco: 495
Jesse Orosco: 581
(I left out Dennis Eckersley because his time as a starter skews his numbers and makes him an inaccurate comparison. I left out Goose Goosage and Rollie Fingers because their careers extend earlier into the 60's and 70's when the role of the closer was even more different. Gossage, also, has time as a starter that skews his numbers and makes him an ill fit for this particular comparison).
So according to what he have so far, Trevor Hoffman is a very good closer, but it's hard to really separate him from the pack. While Rivera and Wagner have adjusted ERAs that put them into their own category, it's hard to separate Trevor from Dan Quisenberry or Robb Nen. Hoffman has thrown more innings and notched more strikeouts than most of his modern counterparts.
In my opinion, there's just not enough here to separate Hoffman from the pack enough to merit induction into Cooperstown. The main argument, that he was a very good closer for a long time, is true, but no moreso than it was for non-inductees Goose Gossage and Dan Quisenberry. The raw number of saves accumulated by Hoffman has caused us to vastly overrate him compared to his peers.
The only real salvation for Hoffman is to prove that his saves (and innings, strikeouts, etc.) were more important to his team than his competitors'. If Hoffman did his saving and striking out at more meaningful times, then obviously that would make his modest showing in the above statistics less of a problem. So now we can use the more modern, uber-mathematical stats. We can also use some of these same stats to look for one round number to represent Hoffman's value compared to his peers.
CAREER PRAR (Pitching Runs Above Replacement):
Mariano Rivera: 787
Lee Smith: 758
Trevor Hoffman: 744
John Franco: 714
Billy Wagner: 604
Jeff Reardon: 575
Jesse Orosco: 550
Bruce Sutter: 535
Jeff Montgomery: 511
Randy Myers: 511
Robb Nen: 493
Troy Percival: 473
Dan Quisenberry: 443
TRANSLATED* CAREER ERA:
Mariano Rivera: 2.53
Billy Wagner: 2.54
Trevor Hoffman: 3.02
Troy Percival: 3.05
Jeff Montgomery: 3.32
Robb Nen: 3.39
Lee Smith: 3.41
Bruce Sutter: 3.43
Dan Quisenberry: 3.48
John Franco: 3.54
Randy Myers: 3.62
Jeff Reardon: 3.63
Jesse Orosco: 3.67
* -- Clay Davenport translations
CAREER WARP3:
Mariano Rivera: 90.5
Trevor Hoffman: 83.1
Lee Smith: 82.5
John Franco: 80.0
Billy Wagner: 66.7
Jesse Orosco: 61.9
Jeff Reardon: 60.6
Bruce Sutter: 58.1
Jeff Montgomery: 57.3
Randy Myers: 55.5
Robb Nen: 54.3
Dan Quisenberry: 53.1
Troy Percival: 51.1
PRAR and even WARP are more favorable towards quantity rather than quality; this is why Lee Smith and Jeff Reardon rate so highly despite having such dismal adjusted ERAs. I would love to have career numbers for WXRL or Leverage or Fair Run Average, but as it is these numbers are only available on a season-by-season basis from Baseball Prospectus and I don't have the math ability (nor the statistical formulas) to compute the raw data into a final career number.
These measures do, however, favor Hoffman. They do reward his quantity, but they also recognize his quality, as his ERA is 3rd in the group even with the adjustments. Once again Rivera and Wagner top the group in terms of quality, although Wagner hasn't amassed enough quantity yet to top Rivera. So we can safely say that Mariano Rivera is the era's greatest reliever (no surprise there) and the #2 spot is neck-and-neck between Wagner and Hoffman. Hoffman has more quantity and Wagner has better quality. Both WARP and PRAR seem to favor Hoffman.
So we've come up with a tentative answer to our question (Hoffman is the second-greatest reliever of our time), but we've still failed to place it in a wider context. Is the second-greatest reliver of our era good enough to get into Cooperstown? I'm inclined to say yes, but I have to remind myself of the sobering facts above that tend to argue against it. That said, if I were forced to decide today, I would cast a very reluctant ballot in favor of Trevor Hoffman's induction into Cooperstown.
Hopefully when that decision comes around we'll have a better understanding of the context of our era.
Tom Glavine wins 300th game
Has there ever been a pitcher as great as Tom Glavine with a less-imposing resume? If Glavine weren't such a great pitcher, you'd never think he was a great pitcher. That is to say, there's not much outside of his actual statistical record to suggest a first-ballot Hall-of-Famer (which I do believe Glavine is).
People often refer to Greg Maddux as the pitcher who did the most with the least amount of "stuff," or raw pitching talent. But that honor should really go to Glavine. Maddux doesn't throw hard, but he combined a great sense of poise and intelligence with some really good breaking pitches (circle change, anyone?) to establish himself as one of the greatest pitchers of all time. Yes, Maddux only struck out 200 batters once in his whole career (Randy Johnson did it 13 times; Nolan Ryan 15 times), but he struck out at least 190 5 times and at least 170 batters 10 times. Maddux's 3,245 career strikeouts rank 11th all-time. Even considering that strikeouts are at an all-time high, Maddux was a more dominant strikeout pitcher than his reputation suggests.
Compare that to Glavine. Despite pitching roughly the same amount of time, Glavine is 7,001 strikeouts behind Maddux. Glavine ranks 28th all-time, just behind Jerry Koosman and Tim Keefe. He has never struck out 200 batters in a season (his career-high is 192 in 1991), a remarkable thing for a dominant pitcher in this day and age. Only twice has he struck out 170 or more (compared to Maddux's 10 times), and he's only struck out 150 or more batters in a season 5 times. And whereas Maddux was a fantastic control artist who has allowed just 965 free passes in 4759.1 career IP, Glavine is much more walk-prone, allowing 1449 in 500 fewer career innings (4293.2 IP).
Glavine not only has a low strikeout rate, he has a poor K:BB ratio. His career ratio is 2544:1449, or about 1.76. Here's how that compares to other HOF pitchers (and HOF-bound pitchers):
CAREER K:BB RATIO
Pedro Martinez*: 4.28 (2998:701)
Greg Maddux*: 3.36 (3245:965)
Dennis Eckersley: 3.25 (2401:738)
Juan Marichal : 3.25 (2303:709)
Randy Johnson*: 3.25 (4616:1422)
Fergie Jenkins: 3.20 (3192:997)
Roger Clemens*: 2.97 (4653:1568)
Christy Mathewson: 2.96 (2502:844)
Sandy Koufax: 2.93 (2396:817)
Don Drysdale: 2.91 (2486:855)
Rube Waddell: 2.88 (2316:803)
Jim Bunning: 2.86 (2855:1000)
Ed Walsh: 2.81 (1736:617)
Bert Blyleven*: 2.80 (3701:1322)
Bruce Sutter: 2.79 (861:309)
Don Sutton: 2.66 (3574:1343)
Rollie Fingers: 2.64 (1299:492)
Tom Seaver: 2.62 (3640:1390)
Robin Roberts: 2.61 (2357:902)
Walter Johnson: 2.57 (3509:1363)
Dizzy Dean: 2.57 (1163:453)
Gaylord Perry: 2.56 (3534:1379)
Dazzy Vance: 2.43 (2045:840)
Pud Galvin: 2.42 (1806:745)
Chief Bender: 2.40 (1711:712)
Bob Gibson: 2.33 (3117:1336)
Carl Hubbell: 2.31 (1677:725)
Pete Alexander: 2.31 (2198:951)
Cy Young: 2.30 (2803:1217)
Steve Carlton: 2.26 (4136:1833)
Catfish Hunter: 2.11 (2012:954)
Tim Keefe: 2.10 (2562:1220)
Eddie Plank: 2.10 (2246:1072)
Charley Radbourn: 2.09 (1830:875)
Hoyt Wilhelm: 2.07 (1610:778)
Nolan Ryan: 2.04 (5714:2795)
Mordecai Brown: 2.04 (1375:673)
Lefty Grove: 1.91 (2266:1187)
Rube Marquard: 1.86 (1593:858)
Phil Niekro: 1.85 (3342:1809)
Jack Chesbro: 1.83 (1265:690)
Warren Spahn: 1.80 (2583:1434)
Whitey Ford: 1.80 (1956:1086)
Glavine*: 1.76 (2544:1449)
Jim Palmer: 1.69 (2212:1311)
John Clarkson: 1.66 (1978:1191)
Kid Nichols: 1.47 (1868:1268)
Bob Feller: 1.46 (2581:1764)
Hal Newhouser: 1.44 (1796:1249)
Mickey Welch: 1.43 (1850:1297)
Vic Willis: 1.36 (1651:1212)
Lefty Gomez: 1.34 (1468:1095)
Herb Pennock: 1.34 (1227:916)
Joe McGinnity: 1.32 (1068:812)
Early Wynn: 1.31 (2334:1775)
Red Ruffing: 1.29 (1987:1541)
Eppa Rixey: 1.25 (1350:1082)
Stan Coveleski: 1.22 (981:802)
Red Faber: 1.21 (1471:1213)
Waite Hoyt: 1.20 (1206:1003)
Burleigh Grimes: 1.17 (1512:1295)
Amos Rusie: 1.13 (1934:1704)
Jesse Haines: 1.13 (981:871)
Bob Lemon: 1.02 (1277:1251)
Ted Lyons: 0.96 (1073:1121)
Some observations:
  • First of all, it's important to note that while K:BB is a good indicator of a pitcher's quality, it's not absolute. The above list is not meant to be a list of the best pitchers in history in order. It's a very instructive list that strongly correlates with quality and Hall-of-Fame standards.
  • Having said that, would anyone (myself included) have guessed that the Hall-of-Fame starting pitcher with the best K:BB ratio was Juan Marichal? Marichal will be passed by Maddux and Pedro when they're inducted, but considering that Marichal pitched 30 years ago (albeit during a pitcher's era), that has to raise our opinion of him somewhat.
  • It's also interesting to note that this list shows some underrated pitchers in high places. As I said, K:BB ratio itself is not proof enough to change our opinions of someone, but it's nice to see perennially underrated hurlers like Marichal, Fergie Jenkins, Jim Bunning, Bert Blyleven, and Robin Roberts do well on this list.
  • And on the other hand, it's not surprising that the pitchers at the bottom of the list are mostly those with marginal Cooperstown credentials, such as Welch, Willis, Gomez, McGinnity, Rixey, Coveleski, Faber, Hoyt, Grimes, Rusie, and Haines. Not all the guys at the bottom are bad pitchers, but this list is more evidence that Glavine is perhaps the greatest non-strikeout pitchers of all time (we'll talk about Ted Lyons later).
  • I should also mention that the list favors modern pitchers, as the strikeout rates have risen dramatically over the past century, while walk rates have not. So we should make an appropriate timeline adjustment when viewing the list. That makes the presence of four active pitchers at the top of the list a little less surprising. It's also a real credit to the deadball-era pitchers who do rank highly; namely, Christy Mathewson and Rube Waddell.
  • Along the same lines, it's worth noting that the old spitballers (Faber, Grimes, Haines) rank low on this list. This is for the same reason that deadball-era pitchers do relatively poorly: the goal was not to strike out the batter at all, but rather to get them to put the ball in play. The old spitballers wanted the batter to make contact and send a soggy, lifeless ball into play for the defense to handle. It's why they have so few career strikeouts and walks.
  • I'm still astonished at how Pedro Martinez ranks head and shoulders above every other pitcher in history. I don't think we truly realized how special Pedro was when he was at his peak. He may not put together a lot of milestone numbers as his career ends, but it's important to note that Pedro Martinez was indeed a better pitcher than Sandy Koufax and right up there with guys like Lefty Grove for quality, if not quantity. This is borne out not just by BB:K ratio, but by pretty much every significant measure of pitcher quality.
  • How about that Ted Lyons? He's the only pitcher in the Hall of Fame with more career walks (1121) than strikeouts (1073). Was Lyons really such a great pitcher (as his 260 wins would indicate)? Or was he the beneficiary of a fair amount of luck?
    Well, it's worth noting that Lyons pitched for a long time (21 seasons, 4,161 innings), so if he was just lucky it was some kind of miracle. Lyons' career ERA was above-average for his era (3.67, for an adjusted ERA of 118). And it's also worth noting that his won-lost record (260-230) owes a lot to the teams he played for: the Chicago White Sox from 1923-1942 (with a 5-game stint in 1946). The White Sox of Lyons' era won more than 82 games just once: a relatively excellent 1937 that saw them rise all the way up to 3rd place at 86-68. Lyons' career fits almost perfectly in the worst era in White Sox history; the period after the breakup and disintegration of the Black Sox teams and before the regeneration of the 1950's (After finishing 60-94 in 1950, the Sox were above .500 for the rest of the decade and never finished lower than 3rd, culminating in the 1959 AL pennant). So Lyons did, all in all, put up a significantly better record than his team, which is evidence that he was not just a mediocre pitcher taking advantage of a good team.
    Yes, but even so, how much credit can Lyons really get? He allowed so very many balls into play, even considering his era, that he himself wasn't the one getting all those outs. It's times like these where it would be great to have the modern tools and play-by-play statistics to more accurately measure a pitcher's skill and especially be able to separate it from his team's defense.
    What evidence do we have of Lyons' context? Well, his home ballpark, Comiskey Park #1, was more friendly to pitchers during his career, though not to a huge extent. We could give Lyons credit for pitching to his ballpark, knowing that it was not a friendly place for the new breed of slugger to ply his trade.
    The big question I've been avoiding so far is Lyons' knuckleball. The knuckler was Lyons' main pitch throughout his career, though I haven't been able to pin down exactly to what extent he used the knuckler compared to other pitches. It would be easy to write off his stats and say, "Well, he was a knuckleball pitcher," but that's a generalization that I'm not comfortable making.
    The trouble is, that may be the best answer we can get. I'm sure if I kept looking I could find more anecdotal (and conflicting) evidence about the nature of Lyons' knuckler, how often he threw it, and how he was able to be so successful despite allowing so many balls into play. Because even compared to other knuckleballers, Lyons was still a low-strikeout guy (Phil Niekro compiled 3342 career K's; Charlie Hough managed 2362 and fellow White Sox Wilbur Wood struck out 1411 in just 2600 IP).
    The problem is that it seems like no two knuckleballs are the same. Some are "true" knucklers, where a pitcher actually holds the ball with his knuckles; the more common form is held by the fingertips, giving the ball its trademark "flutter." There's also a big difference in how often a pitcher throws a knuckler. Many pitchers have used it as simply a part of their arsenal (although that's less true nowadays) and others use it the vast majority of the time.
    We just can't read between the statistics and see what Ted Lyons really looked like without the aid of a time machine. In my opinion, the best we can do is say that Lyons did get people out for a very long time and how he did it is relatively unimportant.

And this brings us back to Mr. Glavine (forgive my indulging in statistical oddities). It's really not so important how Glavine got so many people out but rather that he did -- for so very long that it cannot be given over entirely to luck. Both Glavine and Lyons may have relied on their defense and/or ballpark more than other HOF pitchers, but I don't think there's enough evidence in the record for us to penalize them for doing so.

And with Glavine, we do have the more detailed play-by-play data and we do have the videotape. We know enough to say that Glavine operated with an uncanny amount of control, enabling him to consistently get hitters out without resorting to the strikeout and without suffering a great deal from balls put into play. He was, quite simply, one of the best ever at getting people out. His career ERA isn't amazing (ERA of 119, just ahead of Lyons' 118). But if you can do that for over 20 years with consistency and durability, then you're a Hall-of-Famer.

That's my story and I'm stickin' to it.

Upcoming Milestones:

3,000 games played: Barry Bonds (2,959)

10,000 at-bats: Barry Bonds (9,776)

All-time Runs Scored:
1. Rickey Henderson (2295)
2. Ty Cobb (2246)
3. Barry Bonds (2213)

3,000 hits: Barry Bonds (2,916)

2,600 hits: Julio Franco (2,585); Omar Vizquel (2,568); Ken Griffey, Jr. (2515); Gary Sheffield (2501)

2,500 hits: Luis Gonzalez (2,476); Ivan Rodriguez (2,457)

2,000 hits: Jeff Conine (1,970); Shawn Green (1,970); Ray Durham (1,930); Vladimir Guerrero (1,921)

All-time Doubles:
5. George Brett (665)
6. Craig Biggio (662)

600 doubles: Barry Bonds (599)

600 home runs: Ken Griffey, Jr. (589)

500 home runs: Jim Thome (490); Manny Ramirez (489); Gary Sheffield (478)

450 home runs: Carlos Delgado (424); Mike Piazza (422)

400 home runs: Chipper Jones (375); Andruw Jones (363)

350 home runs: Luis Gonzalez (342)

300 home runs: Todd Helton (297); Richie Sexson (290); Craig Biggio (289); Ivan Rodriguez (286); Albert Pujols (274)

All-time RBI:
4. Lou Gehrig (1,995)
5. Barry Bonds (1,983)

All-time BB:
9. Eddie Yost (1614)
10. Frank Thomas (1607)

All-time Strikeouts:
1. Reggie Jackson (2,597)
2. Sammy Sosa (2,292)
3. Andres Galarraga (2,003)
4. Jim Thome (2,000)

All-time HBP:
1. Hughie Jennings (287)
2. Craig Biggio (285)

All-time Wins:
7. Kid Nichols (361)
8. Roger Clemens (352)
9. Tim Keefe (342)
10. Greg Maddux (340)

300 wins: Randy Johnson (284)

250 wins: Mike Mussina (246); David Wells (235); Jamie Moyer (226)

200 wins: Andy Pettitte (194); Tim Wakefield (164)

All-time Games Pitched:
1. Jesse Orosco (1,252)
2. Mike Stanton (1,160)

1,000 Games Pitched: Roberto Hernandez (996); Mike Timlin (991)

All-Time Saves:
1. Trevor Hoffman (511)
2. Lee Smith (478)
3. Mariano Rivera (431)

400 saves: Billy Wagner (350)

5,000 IP: Roger Clemens (4,889.2); Greg Maddux (4759.1)

All-Time Strikeouts:
1. Nolan Ryan (5,714)
2. Roger Clemens (4,653)
3. Randy Johnson (4,616)

3,500 Strikeouts: Greg Maddux (3,245); Curt Schilling (3,091)

3,000 Strikeouts: Pedro Martinez (2,998); John Smoltz (2,904)

All-Time Games Started:
4. Phil Niekro (716)
5. Steve Carlton (709)
6. Roger Clemens (702)
7. Tommy John (700)
8. Greg Maddux (697)

More to come.

Wednesday, August 08, 2007

A Birthday at the Ballpark: Reds .vs. Dodgers


Well, it wasn't really my birthday; August 7th was my 26th birthday. Yes, my 26th birthday was also the day when Barry Bonds broke the all-time home run record. I was just thrilled. Actually I wasn't watching the game at all -- I was watching Mystery Science Theatre's The Giant Spider Invasion with some friends. It was a lot more enjoyable.

So we set the day after my birthday as the day to go see the Reds. Not only was it $1 hot dog day (a fact which easily won over my friend Chris -- from the previous game -- and my roommate Jonathon), but all non-premium seats were 1/2 price! So we got ourselves some nice seats right down on the infield just past third base. Granted, we were pretty far back, but it was still a bargain at $20 a pop.

First, Jonathon and I had to drive to Newport to pick up Chris. Chris said that he was going to try and convince some more people to come along, but no dice. Apparently -- and I've noticed this before to -- it's hard to get people to join in on a social outing unless there's at least 5 other people involved. Everyone apparently said to Chris, "Well, I can't go. But who's going?" I guess if some really sexy people were going, then they would have changed their minds. Either that or they just want to keep tabs on what everyone's doing. But it was a disappointment that, evidently, Jonathon and I weren't enough to get people out of their houses. Sigh.

Granted, I could understand why people wanted to stay inside. As we were walking up to the ballpark, we passed a bank which showed a temperature reading of 101 degrees. And this was at 6:30 in the evening. It was hoooot and also humid.

But for $1 hot dogs, we made the trek. It was the Reds against the Dodgers, which sounded like a mismatch, although the pitching match-up was promising: Aaron Harang .vs. Chad Billingsley. Two good young starters there. I was also looking forward to getting to see some of the Dodgers' young talent.

The first thing that struck me was the Dodgers' lineup, which had Juan Pierre leading off. Now I've gone on at length in this blog about the problems people have when they put their faith in otherwise untalented but speedy leadoff men, and I've mentioned Pierre himself on more than one occasion. Pierre's OBP entering Wednesday's game was .318. That's below average for any hitter, which means that it's unacceptable from a leadoff man. And of course, Pierre isn't picking up the slack with a .280 batting average, a non-existent slugging percentage, and a throwing arm like a wet noodle. Yes, he steals bases, but at what cost? Mercy!

Not only that, but the Dodgers followed him up with Rafael Furcal (OBP of .345 entering the game), who wasn't doing much better at the plate. Now Furcal is usually better than that, so I can live with him leading off a game. But putting Pierre and Furcal at the top of the order is not going to get ducks on the pond for your big batters. Not coincidentally, the Dodgers were going on back-to-back games of being shutout.

The Dodgers had Russel Martin in the #3 spot. Martin's a good hitter, especially for a catcher (296/367/464 on the season), but he's not the classic #3 type. Jeff Kent (304/382/509) would have been better off at #3 or -- dare I say -- #2, with Furcal leading off.

Andre Ethier hit 5th, which isn't so bad (300/366/459) except for the fact that James Loney and Matt Kemp were at the bottom of the order. I know that a pennant race isn't always the best time for experimentation, but the Dodgers should try to get at least some of their impact rookies in the middle of the order. If they did, then maybe they'd be scoring more runs instead of turning their batting order on its head.


Nomar Garciaparra hit 6th, because he used to be a good slugger. Nomar's hitting 279/326/365 this season, which is eight different kinds of awful. At least now he's creating a hole at third base rather than at first (he was at third tonight, with Loney manning first. Since the Betemit trade, this could stick.) I don't have any great confidence in Nomar's defense or even his ability to start hitting like a good third baseman. Of course, the real problem is that they have Nomar at all, having signed him under duress after losing J.D. Drew. The Dodgers have a perfectly good young first baseman (Loney), a perfectly good young third baseman (Andy LaRoche, stuck in the minors), and expensive free agents in the middle infield (Furcal and Kent). Take into account that the team also had Betemit when the year opened, and it's simply an inexcusable blunder to re-sign Nomar Garciaparra.

That said, the Dodgers went into Wednesday's game with something less than an ideal deployment of their offensive resources. Part of this was due to tactical error (Pierre, Garciaparra) and part of it was the inevitable consequence of such a foolhardy offseason by the front office.

The Reds sent up the usual suspects, minus Ryan Freel. Freel will undergo season-ending surgery soon, and while I respect the fact that he's the poster child for Cincinnati baseball, he's 31 years old and just can't afford to continue playing as recklessly as he does.

A tale of two cities: leading off for Cincinnati was Scott "The Mad" Hatteberg (.401 OBP before the game), who has 0 stolen bases, but is still a much better leadoff man. Batting second was Pierre's Cincinnati counterpart, Norris Hopper. Well, no, they're not that similar, but they're both outfielders overrated for their speed and "hustle." With Hopper, at least they're aware he's mainly a fourth outfielder; I don't see him getting a mega million dollar payday.

After Hopper, it was Griffey-Phillips-Dunn. I wondered if it might make more sense to move Hopper down in the lineup and have it start out Hatteberg-Dunn-Phillips-Griffey. That's probably way too much Moneyball for most teams to stomach, especially at the top of the lineup.

The order was rounded out by Edwin Encarnacion, Alex Gonzalez, David Ross, and Aaron Harang. Edwin's having a tough year (269/344/384), but I think if they'd just stop messing with him, he'd be better off. He may not be a third baseman for long, but you're not in the pennant race; don't send him to Triple-A and stifle his growth just because of his errors. This guy's still young and should still be good if doesn't get "Kearns-ized" by the front office.

Gonzalez is a backup shortstop signed to be a starting shortstop. That's not so awful, so long as they're cheap, and A-Gonz isn't. With David Ross, the Reds fell in love with an aberrant 2006 season (255/353/579) and can't seem to pull the plug, even with Ross stinking up the joint (202/259/399). If he didn't have 15 homers, he'd be historically bad, rather than just bad.

Both pitchers started out well, moving pretty easily through the first three innings. Aaron Harang in particular was dominant, retiring the first 10 batters he faced. In the top of the 2nd, Andre Ethier hit a ball foul that was heading right towards us, but a little high. Our laps were full of hot dogs, so we couldn't even stand up, really. The ball bounced off the facade of the second deck and landed somewhere next to me. I was looking toward the floor, when my friend Jonathon raised his arms . . .


. . . and there it was. I've never caught a foul ball in my life, and here Jonathon catches one (or rather, it caught him) at his first-ever big league game. I was positively giddy, and I'm not often giddy. My friend Chris was just grumpy that he didn't catch it himself. That ball will hold a special place of honor back at the apartment.


But as I said, the first three innings went quietly. The Reds finally got things started in the bottom of the third. Hatteberg led off with a double, and after Hopper grounded out, Griffey singled him in (Reds 1, Dodgers o). Phillips grounded into a force play and, after issuing a walk to Adam Dunn, Billingsley got out of the inning when Edwin Encarnacion flied out.


Harang gave up his first hit in the 4th, a single off the bat of Rafael Furcal. Russel Martin then single, sending Furcal to third, but Harang struck out Kent and then Ethier flew out to left field to end the inning.


The Reds got some action started in the 5th, as Chad Billinsgley fell apart. Billingsley walked two, threw two wild pitches, and would have thrown more if not for some energetic work by Russel Martin. He looked like he was positively losing it, and it took two visits from Martin (we booed; it was hot) and one from pitching coach Rick Honeycutt to get Billingsley out of the inning. The Reds also helped him with a baserunning gaffe. They had runners at 2nd and 3rd after an excellent sac bunt by Harang when Hatteberg hit a ground ball to first. Alex Gonzalez, the runner at 3rd, broke for home and got caught in a rundown, as Loney had plenty of time to throw to the plate. Martin chased him back up the line, by which time David Ross was already standing at third. Gonzalez then made a big u-turn and got around Martin, but was rightly called out for leaving the baseline. With runners again on second and third, Billingsley walked Hopper to load the bases for Griffey (!). Fortunately for the Dodgers, Griffey flew out.


Harang allowed a leadoff single to Nomar in the 5th, then retired the next 9 batters he saw. He was very much in control.

Billingsley gave up another walk in the 5th, but otherwise made it through the inning. (The highlight of the 5th was an unheralded catch by Jeff Kent, who ran well into center field to make an over-the-shoulder catch on an Edwin Encarnacion pop-up).

Billingsley was relieved by Scott "Whipping Boy" Proctor in the 6th. Proctor threw two scoreless innings, allowing just one hit (a single by Griffey).

Right before the 7th-inning stretch, a small rainstorm burst out of the looming clouds. It wasn't much rain, and several people (especially Chris) welcomed anything that would cool us off. But most people started heading for the concourse, earning them the label of "party-poopers" in my book. The rain stopped less than 5 minutes later, so ha, ha!

The Pepsi Scoreboard Stumper for the game was: "Name the 4 batters to hit 40 or more HR in a season while with the Los Angeles Dodgers."

That was tough, but right away Chris and I came up with Mike Piazza and Shawn Green. The L.A. angle meant no Duke Snider, so I had to start thinking of big sluggers who played for the Dodgers. That's not a long list. I guessed Raul Mondesi (didn't he hit 40 back in the day?) and, just so we'd have somebody from before 1993, I also guessed Frank Howard. (We were right with Piazza and Green; the other two were Gary Sheffield and Adrian Beltre. Beltre's career year had already slipped my mind, and I didn't remember Sheffield being that healthy in LA).

Harang got in trouble in the 8th, as Loney led off with a double. He represented the tying run and stood in scoring position with nobody out in the inning and Matt Kemp due up. Kemp hit a line drive right at a diving Brandon Phillips, who then flipped the ball to Gonzalez at second to double off Loney. The crowd went wild.

Harang allowed a walk to pinch-hitter Olmedo Saenz (who was lifted for pinch-runner Delwyn Young). Juan Pierre followed up with a hard liner to left field, but it was right at Adam Dunn, who caught it to end the inning.

Jonothan Broxton came on for the Dodgers in the 9th and looked sensational. He struck out both Dunn and Encarnacion with offspeed stuff (unless the scoreboard was lying). Alex Gonzalez doubled with two out, but David Ross flew out to center to end the inning.

David Weathers came on in the 9th, and things got even more interesting. Rafael Furcal led off. Furcal hit a sharp bouncer back up the middle. Weathers, who had fallen to the left side of the mound, reached out with his bare hand and caught the ball in time to throw Furcal out at first. But that wasn't even the best catch of the inning. After Russel Martin popped out, Jeff Kent hit a screaming line drive back up the middle. I saw Brandon Phillips start to dive and said, "No way." But yes, Phillips speared the liner with a great diving catch and the Reds won, 1-0.

Harang took the win in a great 8-inning outing that saw him strike out 8 and walk just one. Billingsley took the loss, but even though he went haywire in the 4th, he still allowed just one run through 5. The save went to Weathers for his 9th-inning acrobatics.

A poor 20,462 was the paid attendance for tonight's game, which is disappointing even for a Wednesday. Granted, it was hot and threatening some rain, but it was also 1/2 price ticket night with $1 hot dogs to boot. If those promotions brought 15-17,000 into the game, I shudder to think what a regular game would have done.

Not only is it the dog days of summer, but the new ballpark halo is starting to wear off. I hope Cincinnati won't make it to Pittsburgh levels of empty seats, but it's been a long time since they were really good. They've got several really good players, but their depth sucks, and a lot of their problems are of their own making. I'm optimistic about the arrival of stud hitters like Bruce and Votto, but I still gotta wonder who's gonna pitch these here games.

Until next time.