Looking Ahead: Colorado Rockies

2006 W-L Record: 76-86
2006 pW-pL Record: 81-81
Runs Scored: 813 (5th in NL)
Runs Allowed: 812 (13th in NL)
Free Agents: Vinny Castilla, Mike DeJean, Ray King, Jose Mesa

2006 Proj. Lineup:
1B -- Todd Helton
2B -- Jamey Carroll?
SS -- Troy Tulowitzki
3B -- Garrett Atkins
LF -- Matt Holliday
CF -- Cory Sullivan/Jeff Salazar
RF -- Brad Hawpe/Jeff Baker
C -- Chris Iannetta

2006 Proj. Rotation:
Jason Jennings
Jeff Francis
Aaron Cook
Byung-Hyun Kim
Josh Fogg

2006 Proj. Closer: Brian Fuentes

The Good News:
There's been a lot of talk about humidors and suchlike at Coors Field this year. And rightfully so, because Coors Field in 2006 played at its lowest level of offense in history. The Park Factor for offense in Coors Field last season was 107, meaning it was 7% above average in runs scored. This is still high, but it's not nearly as high as the peak years at Coors Field, and represents a big step down from last year's Park Factor of 113. Let's hope this continues, because now we can all delight in the fact that Coors Field is no longer a freak of nature; it's just a hitter's park. It wasn't even the best in the league -- Cincinnati's Park Factor was 108, and Arizona's was also 107. Yes, we're still dealing with a significant hitter's park, but it looks like the days of 130 Park Factors are over. This makes analysis a whole lot easier; we no longer have to consider Coors Field as a park in and of itself.
This means that the impressive performance by the Rockies' offense cannot be easily dismissed. The Rockies ranked 5th in the NL in runs scored last season, and even if we take their ballpark into account, it means that they were probably above-average. And when you consider the young talent they have about to reach the majors, there's even more reason for optimism.
It will probably just be a year or two before the Rockies are fielding an entirely homegrown lineup. Their current third baseman, Garrett Atkins, had an amazingly unlikely year in 2006, hitting 329/409/556. Remember, we can't dismiss this because of Coors; in fact, Atkins hit just as well away from Coors (313/402/531). There is some question as to where the hell this came from. Atkins has put up good offensive numbers before, but they were almost always a product of the parks he was playing in. He'll be 27 next year and is a butcher on defense, so he may not stay at the position, especially considering the players the Rockies have coming up.
Pushing Atkins off the hot corner will be the likes of Jeff Baker and Ian Stewart. Baker has fought through injury problems to post back-to-back respectable seasons between Triple-A Colorado Springs and the majors. In 2005, Baker hit 303/348/513 in Triple-A before a cup of coffee with the big club. This past season, he hit 305/369/508 before his promotion, and an impressive 368/379/825 with the Rockies. Other than his health, plate discipline is Baker's biggest problem; he posted a 47:124 BB:K mark in his combined 2006 stats. His batting average and power look impressive, but how much of this is the friendly thin air, and will it survive he transformati0n of Coors Field? It's looking doubtful that Baker will unseat Atkins, meaning he'll be spend 2007 back on the shuttle between Triple-A and the bigs.
Ian Stewart, on the other hand, has a much brighter future. Not only is he four years younger than Baker, he's shown a stronger skill set across the board. Strikeouts are an issue here, too, but Stewart has shown better defense, power, and patience throughout the minors. The only issue is that Stewart has never played above Double-A. He spent all of 2006 there and was slightly disappointing (268/351/452), this after a 274/353/497 performance in high A-ball the previous year. Long-term, Stewart will inevitably replace Atkins at third, but it's wishful thinking to expect him to start 2007 there.
With all these guys bouncing around third, the logical solution would be to shift someone across the diamond to first. But there resides the human roadblock known as Todd Helton. Helton is still a great defender with a great batting eye (career .430 OBP), but he's also 33 years old and amazingly expensive. The Rockies have Helton signed up through 2011 for an astonishing $85.5 million. As much as they would like to trade him (and they have tried), it's impossible to find a practical way to digest that contract. The Rockies have a fleet of young options to play the infield and outfield corners, and although Helton is still a fine player (302/404/476 in '06, including 266/360/421 on the road), he's going to be more of a hindrance than a help to the team's long-term plans. The grotesque spending spree that resulted in the Helton, Hampton, and Neagle contracts is still being felt in Colorado and, amazingly, their architect, GM Dan O'Dowd, is still in office. Helton has blocked the development of first basemen in the past and currently stands in the way of Joe Koshansky, who hit 284/371/526 at Triple-A and is not realistically capable of playing anywhere else but at first.
Okay then. Perhaps we could move someone (preferably Atkins) to the outfield corners? Fat chance. Left field is occupied for the foreseeable future by Matt Holliday. Holliday didn't let the humidor get to his head -- his numbers improved across the board in 2006 from his 2005 season (2005: 307/363/505; 2006: 326/387/586). Although we must still take into account Holliday's dramatic home/road splits -- 373/440/692 in Colorado, 280/333/485 on the road -- he's still one of the most effective offensive players at the position. Debating his relative merits in relation to his ballpark is largely academic; Holliday is swatting the hell out of the ball, and at age 26 isn't going anywhere.
What about right field? This would seem to be a much more likely solution if not for the unlikely 2006 performance by incumbent Brad Hawpe. Hawpe was seen as a good hitter, but mostly a product of Coors Field; certainly not the kind of guy to block a better player. But then Hawpe hit 293/383/515 in 2006. Coors Field? Not at all -- Hawpe somehow hit better on the road (303/395/571, compared to 282/369/454). The big surprise season by this 27-year-old cannot be taken at face value; it's doubtful that this fair hitter suddenly became one of the best right fielders in the league. But you can't take that 2006 performance for granted, and it's more than likely that Hawpe will return as the starting right fielder.
In center field, the Rockies have two candidates for the job, but the difference is that neither man has performed well enough to win it outright. Cory Sullivan held the job in 2006 and showed why he's considered fourth outfielder material; he hit 267/321/402 in one of the best hitter's parks in baseball. Prospect Jeff Salazar was supposed to come in and snatch the job away from Sullivan, but that hasn't happened quite yet. Salazar had great success in the low minors by displaying strong defense and good plate discipline, but then slowed down at the higher levels. Salazar's 2006 in Triple-A may look good -- 265/357/433 -- but it's not so amazing in the thin air of Colorado Springs. Salazar will have to improve his average and hit some more doubles and triples if he wants to win the center fielder's job for good. With Sullivan as his competition, that doesn't look too hard.
The rest of the Rockie infield is also full of young hope. The Colorado faithful got a look at shortstop of the future Troy Tulowitzki in late 2006. Although his time in the bigs was disappointing (240/318/292 in 25 games), the 21-year-old tore through the minor leagues, showing a strong all-around game as well as some power potential that should blossom at Coors. While he may still need some time to adjust to the big leagues (he made the jump after 104 games at Double-A, skipping Triple-A entirely), Tulowitzki is one of the best shortstop prospects in the game.
At second base, the Rockies have a familiar problem: too damn many people. But unlike at the other positions, where they have a list of talented (or vaguely talented) players, the list of potential second baseman is a list of everbody who lost their jobs when the good rookies came to town. Clint Barmes parlayed a good half-season in 2005 into instant fame, despite the fact that a) it was at a still-historic Coors Field and b) he'd never shown any signs of being a good player in the minors, where he'd been rotting since 2000. Both shortcomings became hideously obvious in 2006: Coors underwent a downward shift in offense, Barmes' luck ran out, and everyone noticed that he couldn't quite handle shortstop. That combined with a 220/264/335 hitting line, and Barmes was probably the worst player in baseball to get at least 500 PAs. He'll be in the mix for the second base job next year, out of habit I suppose.
The Rockies can point proudly to the season Jamey Carroll had at second in 2006. The resident Lil' Scrappy Infielder Guy hit an other-worldly 300/377/404 -- well above his career levels of 280/356/362. But for those who think this utility infielder suddenly improved at the age of 32, consider his 219/302/320 batting line away from Coors Field. Don't anoint his head with oil just yet.
The other second base possibility is Kaz Matsui, former New York Met washout obtained in a trade out of desperation. Colorado is friendlier to hitters than Shea Stadium, but no one told Matsui, who hit 267/310/379 with still-forgettable defense. The Rockies do have two young second basemen in Omar Quintanilla and Jayson Nix. Unfortunately, neither has shown signs of being anything but a slightly younger version of Carroll.
The Rockies moved another hot prospect into the everyday lineup in 2006 when they installed Chris Iannetta behind the plate. There was no doubt or competition inherent in this decision -- it was the only no-brainer the Rockies could enjoy. A college hitter out of North Carolina, Iannetta pulverized the minor leagues in barely two years spent in the Colorado system. He moved from Double-A (321/418/622) to Triple-A (351/447/510) to the majors (260/370/390) in 2006, installing himself in the starting lineup for the foreseeable future. Hitter's parks or not, Iannetta is one of the best young catchers in baseball and will give the Rockies a glorious respite from the likes of Danny Ardoin and J.D. Closser.

As if that weren't enough good news, the Colorado rotation took to the new Coors Field immediately. All past disappointments were forgotten when Jason Jennings, 2002 NL Rookie of the Year, went from a 5.02 ERA to a 3.78 mark. Although he still suffers from control issues (85 walks in 212 IP), Jennings proved that his breakthrough was at least somewhat legitimate by setting a new career high in strikeouts with 142.
Combining with Jennings was groundball specialist Aaron Cook, who had already shown the ability to succeed at Coors. Cook's low strikeout rate may not seem like an ideal fit for Denver, where balls in play mutate into doubles and homers, but Cook has consistently succeeded with a heavy sinker and the ability to keep the ball on the ground. Even in Denver, it's hard to hit a ground-ball home run.
But the best news was probably the success of young Jeff Francis. Considered one of the best pitching prospects in the game going into 2005, Francis struggled through a difficult season at Coors, posting a 5.68 ERA and a 70:128 BB:K ratio in 183.2 IP. It looked like Coors may have ruined yet another good pitcher. But while his peripherals still bear watching (69:117 BB:K ratio in 2006), he lowered his ERA down to 4.16, a sign of success beyond the change in his playing environment. The return to relative normalcy by Coors Field may be better news to Francis' career than anyone else's.
Behind these three the Rockies were able to get solid innings from Byung-Hyun Kim and Josh Fogg. Despite the fact that their ERAs were near 5.50 (with no 1.30 Park Factor to explain it), they were able to eat up innings and keep the Colorado offense in the game.
As if all of this weren't enough reason to celebrate and yell, "caloo-callay," the Rockies appear to have a top-notch closer who can consistently produce at Coors. Brian Fuentes saved 30 games with a 3.44 ERA and 73 K in 65.1 IP. Despite pitching 286.1 of his 298 career innings at Coors Field, Fuentes has a career 3.62 ERA and a 134:342 BB:K ratio.

The Rockies may have a lot of issues and questions going into 2007, but they're still in fabulous shape. When your problem is having more good players than you have spots in the lineup, you're obviously doing something right. The Colorado youth movement is really starting to pay off, putting the franchise in its best condition in nearly 10 years.

The Bad News:
Really, there isn't a lot to say here. The Rockies may not have the talent to push the Dodgers in 2007 and may, in fact, get stuck behind Arizona and San Diego. But it's really hard to be pessimistic. This franchise appears to be heading into contention, with a strong young lineup and a capable pitching staff. They may have their work cut out for them against the other hot, young teams in their division, but we can finally call the Rockies contenders for the first time since 1995. Let the good times roll.

Offseason Game Plan:
The Rockies are returning all of the important players, losing only a few relief arms to free agency. The bullpen could always use some improvement, but the Rockies need to avoid spending money on overpriced veterans in the 'pen, which is what they've been doing since O'Dowd took over.
While I am optimistic about the Colorado rotation, it's not ironclad by any means. Jennings and Francis look capable of throwing 200+ above-average innings, and Cook isn't far behind them. But if they want to compete with Arizona and Los Angeles, they're going to have to sport something better than a medocre pitching staff. There aren't a lot of options within the system, and it would be folly to drop $60-70 million trying to lure a free agent pitcher to Colorado. But this is the club's biggest problem, and it needs a creative solution if the Rockies want to manage better than a strong 3rd place finish in the coming years.
The starting lineup should be in fine shape, if a bit overstocked. This is the Rockies' biggest advantage: good hitters rendered obsolete by the arrival of young talent. The Rockies are going to have to trade somebody eventually, and I would recommend pushing Atkins and Hawpe right now, when they're coming off what look like career years. You'd be losing a good player who might actually be better than good, but if you can get some pitching, it's worth the risk, especially since you can easily replace them. Look into trading Todd Helton as well, although that seems to be a hopeless proposition at this point.
You've got a lot of good young players, especially hitters. Don't screw it up by going after the next Mike Hampton.

Looking Ahead: Arizona Diamondbacks

I feel kind of bad about being so hard on the NL Central teams. It's not that they don't deserve it, but it tugs at my conscience to kick otherwise well-run teams (St. Louis, Milwaukee) when they're down (or as down as you can be in the midst of a World Championship parade). I have very little compunction about mocking teams like the Reds, but I hate to be such a Gloomy Gus about the NL Central.
Happily, though, we're moving on to the NL West. Just two years removed from being called the "NL Worst," this division boasts some of the best young talent in the game and could be the strongest division in the league as soon as next year. So we got to move on from a depressing division to a division full of bright futures . . . well, outside of San Francisco.
Never the less, we start with a well-run team, indeed: the Arizona Diamondbacks.

2006 W-L Record: 76-86
2006 pW-pL Record: 80-82
Runs Scored: 773 (7th in NL)
Runs Allowed: 788 (7th in NL)
Free Agents: Miguel Batista, Craig Counsell, Luis Gonzalez

Proj. 2007 Lineup:
1B -- Conor Jackson
2B -- Orlando Hudson
SS -- Stephen Drew
3B -- Chad Tracy
LF -- Eric Byrnes
CF -- Chris Young
RF -- Carlos Quentin
C -- Johnny Estrada

Proj. 2007 Rotation:
Brandon Webb
Livan Hernandez
Claudio Vargas
Edgar Gonzalez
Juan Cruz

Proj. 2007 Closer: Jorge Julio?

The Good News:
Any time a team can get rid of tens of millions of dollars in salary and improve, they're doing something right. It's unfortunate that the team's relationship with Luis Gonzalez had to end this way, and while he did mean a hell of a lot to the franchise, it really is best for the team to replace the expensive 39-year-old with a better, younger player. The same could be said for Craig Counsell, who's still good enough to start in the middle infield, but is superfluous with the emergence of Stephen Drew. Hopefully, both players will get good spots on other teams and everyone will end up happy.
Other expensive mistakes made by previous management include Shawn Green, Russ Ortiz, and to a lesser extent, Troy Glaus. Green wasn't so expensive -- Los Angeles was picking up a good deal of his salary -- but the friendly Arizona ballpark was hiding a ballplayer whose skill set was evaporating quickly. We'll never really know what suddenly turned Green into a 40-homer MVP candidate at age 26 or what stole his power away at age 31. Suspicious people would suggest steroids. While I'm as realistic/cynical as the next guy, it's hard to look at the 6'4", 190-pound Shawn Green and see this generation's Jose Canseco.
Russ Ortiz never had any sort of power spike; in fact, all of his "vital signs" were degenerating quickly as he entered free agency. Never the less, the D-Backs gave him gobs of money to become one of the biggest free agent busts ever. The new ownership decided Ortiz would be most valuable to the team if he didn't pitch, or take up a roster spot. So they released him in the summer of 2006 and ate the rest of his big contract. The saddest part of it all was that the D-Backs, like King Oedipus, didn't see the impending tragedy in Ortiz that was perfectly obvious to everyone -- everyone with two eyes, that is. (Greek tragedy humor --available exclusively at Aaron's Baseball Blog).
Glaus was expensive, coming in during the same offseason spending spree as Ortiz. But unlike Ortiz, T-Glaus was productive, hitting 258/363/522 in 2005. But it was poor foresight to sign a free agent third baseman -- the D-Backs already had a third baseman playing at first in Chad Tracy, and a perfect replacement for him in Conor Jackson. If you have two good, young corner infielders making the league minimum, you don't need Troy Glaus. The 'Backs realized this and traded him to Toronto, getting a good haul in exchange with Miguel Batista and Orlando Hudson. The Blue Jays weren't short of corner infielders, either, but we'll leave that puzzling decision for our American League blog.
What enabled the 'Backs to cut away so much payroll was the development of their young players. The first to arrive was Chad Tracy, a tough player in that he doesn't hit well enough to play first or field well enough to play third. But with Conor Jackson arriving at first, the 'Backs decided to err on the side of offense and live with Tracy's work at third. And his defense isn't really that bad, and if he keeps hitting like his 2006 line of 281/343/451, he's a perfectly acceptable compromise.
Jackson was a highly-touted prospect with precocious plate discipline. Jackson's "old player skills" -- power and patience, with little athleticism or contact hitting -- may not bode well for later in his career, but for now, he should be a good young first baseman for the team (291/368/441 in '06).
I mentioned before that the 'Backs got second baseman Orlando Hudson in the Glaus deal. The odd part of the deal was that the Blue Jays traded for a corner infielder -- of which they already had three or four -- and in the process gave up a good middle infielder -- of which they had exactly zero. And while the Jays young replacements continued to struggle in the middle infield, Hudson quietly had another fine year in Arizona. He may not look sensational -- he's a career 275/335/428 hitter who improved to 287/354/454 in his first season in Arizona. But when you're getting that production from the best defensive second baseman in baseball (19 FRAA in '06, with at least 15 FRAA in every full season of his career), you've got an underrated gem. Hudson is especially valuable for Arizona, whose top pitcher (Brandon Webb) gives up nearly 2/3 ground balls.
The club got good production and fine defense from Counsell at shorstop in '06, but will be letting him walk as a free agent this year. They'll be doing this because they have 23-year-old Stephen Drew to take his place. Drew, younger brother of Dodger outfielder J.D., is a big-time prospect who came roaring out of Florida State to make it through the minors and into the starting lineup in one-and-a-half seasons. Drew hasn't reached his full potential yet, but it's encouraging that in his 58 major league games this past year, he hit 316/357/517. Drew can handle shortstop, and with his power he has a lot of people excited about his future.
The Arizona outfield is no less exciting. The centerpiece is center fielder Chris Young. The D-Backs got him from the White Sox in the Javier Vazquez deal. It's understandable that the White Sox, with more than one major league-ready center fielder, would be prepared to trade one of them away. But the general consensus in the year since that trade is that the White Sox got rid of the wrong guy. Young is an exciting all-around prospect, with power, plate discipline, speed, and defense. He's only 23 years old next year, and like Drew, has already made it to the big leagues. Young's time in the majors was less successful -- he hit only 243/308/386 -- but that was in a mere 70 ABs. And even if he does have a bit more developing to do, he's got nothing left to prove in the minors and is the best (and cheapest) choice for the organization.
Right fielder Carlos Quentin's numbers are jaw-dropping even in the hitter-friendly minor league system that the Diamondbacks enjoy. Quentin started the minors in 2004 at high A-Ball and hit 310/428/562. He was promoted to Double-A in mid-season and hit 357/443/533 there. He spent the entire 2005 season in Triple-A Tucson and destroyed the PCL to the tune of 301/422/520. With Gonzalez and Green still clogging things up, Quentin started out 2006 in Triple-A, but got promoted to the bigs after hitting 289/424/487 in his first 85 games. He played 56 games with the big club, hitting 252/339/534. He's already shown power with the big club, and his minor league stats suggest a wide range of offensive skills. He hits for a good average, draws walks, and almost never strikes out despite good power. He is, in other words, a gift-wrapped major league right fielder waiting to be unwrapped for next year. He, along with Young, has the potential to break out big-time in 2007. He's also still a wee lad, just 24 years old. It's because of players like this that I get so optimistic about the D-Backs' future.
The only downside is that with Gonzalez gone, the sub-par Eric Byrnes will be slotted in left field. Byrnes shares Ryan Freel's unfortunate predilection for high-speed collisions with outfield walls, and at age 31, he isn't going to get any better. Byrnes' 2006 "improvement" was tied up entirely in his power; he hit 267/313/484, which looks suspiciously like a poor hitter taking advantage of the cozy Arizona park. The only good news here is that Byrnes isn't expensive, and the 'Backs have enough production from the rest of the lineup to compensate.
At catcher, the 'Backs have capable, tolerable Johnny Estrada. GM Josh Byrnes wisely nabbed Estrada from the Braves for a pair of non-essential relief arms in early 2006, after the D-Backs' other catching prospects had failed miserably in '05. Estrada provided welcome stability behind the plate and should do so again in 2007. Whether he will be in Arizona is questionable; the 'Backs look like they finally have a young catcher ready for success in Miguel Montero, who had a good year even by Triple-A Tucson standards in 2006 (321/396/515). The Backs may choose to stick with Estrada and phase Montero in, or they may just trade him now and give the job to the youngster. It's really a win-win scenario when you have more major league catchers than you need.
Pitching-wise, it's a less optimistic story. Granted, the 2006 squad managed a 4.48 ERA, which is respectable in that park. But they'll be losing a big part of that in Miguel Batista, who will provide his LAIM (league-average innings-muncher) services elsewhere. They will be returning ace Brandon Webb, who finally got some well-deserved recognition in 2006 with a performance that may earn him a Cy Young. Webb, a Kentucky native, improved upon a solid 2005 by managing an excellent 3.10 ERA in 235 innings, posting a fine 50:178 BB:K ratio. It's true that Webb's Cy Young case is mainly due to the weak field in 2006, but he's also a fine pitcher with a solid track record who should be pitching well in Arizona for some time to come.

The Bad News:
Behind Webb, things in the starting rotation get a little hairy. The club acquired Livan Hernandez at the trading deadline and will have him for another year in 2007. Hernandez managed a solid 3.76 ERA with the team, although his 26:39 BB:K ratio indicates that he may still be the disappointing guy who started out the season with a 5.34 mark in Washington. While he may not be that good, Hernandez is the most durable starter in baseball, which is good news for a staff that may be working in some projects and rookies in the #3-5 spots.
Speaking of projects, you have Juan Cruz. Cruz used to be a highly-regarded starter in the Cubs system, but amazingly, some time spent under Dusty Baker didn't do his career any favors. He found some success in Oakland as a relief pitcher, but after coming to the Diamondbacks, the club tried to resurrect him as a starter to fill out their weak rotation. Cruz did tolerably well -- his 4.18 ERA in 15 starts and 16 relief appearances masks a lot of inconsistency, but he did notch 88 strikeouts in his 94.2 IP. He's not a sure thing by any stretch of the imagination, but even a makeshift starter would be a blessing for this club.
Claudio Vargas isn't really a project, I guess; he's a 28-year-old with a 4.92 career ERA that accurately represents his abilities. But he is able to stay in ballgames and pitch some innings, and even a Livan Lite could work as a fifth starter on this club.
The club has a few other options. Edgar Gonzlaez and Enrique Gonzalez are not only confusing to tell apart on the scoresheet, they're both pitchers who have yet to translate their minor league success to the majors. They've got some other young pitchers in their system who could start in the majors -- Dustin Nippert or Adam Bass -- but you couldn't really expect them to be much better than either Gonzalez. While the D-Backs could go out and get a #3 pitcher -- or just re-sign Batista -- they may decide to be fiscally conservative (for a change) and just do the best they can with what they've got in Spring Training. I'm not sure which would move be the right one -- the lower minors don't look much more promising than the high minors in terms of pitching prospects -- but at the same time, I can understand an unwillingness to spend $8 million a year for the likes of Jeff Suppan. Unfortunately, it might take free agency to improve the Arizona rotation -- unless they can swing a good trade.
The Ariz0na bullpen is a work in progress, but in a more positive sense than the rotation. The closer's role is still open, although the club will likely opt for Jorge Julio. Julio won't help you much (career 4.20 ERA), but he won't kill you either. And the 'Backs got good work in the 'pen from Luis Vizcaino, Brandon Lyon, and Brandon Medders last season. Combine that with whichever E. Gonzalez is left out of the rotation and some minor league possibilities, and you should end up with a P.A.B -- perfectly acceptable bullpen.

Offseason Game Plan:
Have a cup of coffee and read a nice book. Seriously, though, the Diamondbacks have little to gain from the free agent market apart from the occasional role player. While a #3 starter would be good, my hunch is that the D-Backs will save their money and go with what they've got. This puts them in the enviable position of getting to sit back and watch other teams scramble to save their dying teams (most notably San Francisco) while most of their hard work is already done.
This isn't to suggest that the front office should be idle or complacent. On the contrary, Byrnes should keep his ear to the ground for any good pitchers on the trading block. The 'Backs should be willing to work from a position of strength and improve their pitching staff, but they also don't have any truly pressing need to do so. Their offense alone should make them contenders in a division where 90 wins could mean a trip to October. But it will take some smart work in putting together a patchwork pitching staff to get them that far. Especially since their division rivals in Los Angeles have some good young talent of their own.

Looking Ahead: St. Louis Cardinals

I felt that this would be the appropriate place to discuss the Cardinals' World Series victory. Everything that needs to be said about the Cardinals has been said: they're the worst World Champions ever, but it's not such a big deal. Not only is their winning percentage the worst ever for a World Champion, but two more sophisticated measures of team quality agree. Baseball Prospectus uses third-order wins and ELO (which I thought was the name of a boy band) to demonstrate that the Cardinals were indeed worse than the '87 Twins, '03 Marlins or '00 Yankees.
But it's not such a big deal. Right now, everyone's totally positive about the Cardinals (and anyone who isn't gets an earful from a not-always-sensible fanbase). But in the months and years to come, I think a lot of people are going to use the example of the Cardinals as a way to debunk the Wild Card or to change the current playoff system.
Phooey.
Anytime you expand the playoffs, you're increasing the possibility that a lesser team will win the World Series. It happened with two divisions per league, and it's happening with three divisions. And even then, no switching around of divisions will change what happens in the Series itself. Were the '69 Mets a better team than the '69 Orioles? Highly unlikely. But they won the World Series. Any time you reduce a 162-game season to a 5- or 7-game affair, this is the risk you take.
Is it a risk we can live with? Yeah. I think too many people have spent all of their lives believing in the magic of October destiny and are quickly becoming disillusioned. I never had such illusions. The idea that the magic of October and the World Series somehow show the real best team in baseball is farcical. I've always known and felt that luck and talent have far more to do with it than magic. But for those romantics (usually writers), it's a difficult disillusionment.
This isn't to say that I'm thrilled that the Cardinals won, but I guess I just look at it philosophically. The '87 Cardinals were definitely a better team than the Twins, the '85 Cards were probably better than the Royals, and the '04 Cardinals were better than their Series sweep would indicate. I look at 2006 as the Cardinals' "lifetime achievement award." This is for all those times you deserved to win but never did; we'll make it up to you now. It's never too late. The Cardinals have achieved semi-dynastic status since 1996, but had no World Championship to show for it; even the Braves got at least one. And the world is a better place when the best player in baseball, Albert Pujols, has a World Series ring. Too many great baseball players -- such as Mel Ott, Ernie Banks, Phil Niekro or even Craig Biggio -- never did.
As for the baseball itself, it could best be described as "ugly." The games were usually close, but there was rarely any thought that you were watching top-notch baseball. The errors by the Tiger pitchers received a lot of press; I don't think they prove much at all, but the freaky nature of it is astounding. No pitching staff ever made as many errors in a World Series and remember, this one only lasted five games. What would we have seen in a Game 6 or Game 7? Kenny Rogers colliding with the right field umpire? Nate Robertson getting a ball stuck inside his shirt? I shudder to think.
A lot of it was attributed to youth, and I guess this was somewhat true. Anyone with any idea of body language could certainly tell that Justin Verlander was nervous as hell and pitching like it. It was jaw-dropping to see him make the exact same error as Joel Zumaya -- throwing the ball to third when he should have thrown it to first, and sending it about a foot or two out of the reach of Brandon Inge. But at least those were explainable by the quick thinking required in tense circumstances. Fernando Rodney's error was more puzzling; it was a slow comebacker that he had plenty of time on. But he bare-handed the ball and then let it fly about two or three feet over Placido Polanco's head. They should check Rodney's vision for depth perception; Placido Polanco is not going to be mistaken for Andre the Giant.
But that's really something about nothing, at least in the big picture. Obviously, those errors cost the Tigers big; all of them came in high-leverage situations and all of them led to at least one run. But it's hard for me to believe that these were the result of much more than chance; it's evident that the Tigers have some defensive issues, but to pass sweeping judgment on them all based on 5 games is silly. Curtis Granderson is not a bad center fielder, but anyone who slips and falls while tracking a fly ball is going to look like one. Craig Monroe isn't a bad left fielder, either; but he played a line drive oddly and then had it skip off the end of his glove. Bad decisions, absolutely -- but not bad players, not necessarily.
One of the problems with baseball (and a lot of things in life) is that people pass sweeping judgments based on very little evidence. This is especially true of baseball commentators; it is, after all, their job. They can take one play and make it turn into a statement about the entire team and sometimes even about baseball in general. This makes what they're doing sound more interesting, and it makes them sound smarter. But it's still just one play; one of a million in a baseball season. But as I said, it's their job; people want to hear things about Kenny Rogers' "personal transformation in the heated crucible of October;" they don't want to hear someone say, "Yeah, he's a good pitcher who was unlucky a few years back . . . yup . . . that's it."
As for the Tigers, their weaknesses finally caught up with them. I said sometime back in July that i'd finally stopped waiting for the Tigers' poor plate discipline to severely affect them; well, I guess I waited long enough. The Tigers finally ran up against a pitching staff that was able to exploit their hack-happy ways. As Keith Law said, the Tigers were hitting like there was a bomb in the dugout. The Cardinals' finesse pitchers were indeed finessing, and the Tigers were able to go up against the likes of Jeff Weaver and make themselves look bad. This isn't to say that Weaver pitched poorly, but if anything the Tigers were helping him out.
After Game 4 of the Series, Tiger leadoff hitter (and at the time, hitless wonder) Curtis Granderson said the Tigers needed to be "more aggressive" at the plate. Coach Andy Van Slyke echoed these sentiments. This is roughly akin to a drowning man saying, "Yes, I know I'm drowning, so I'm going to dive down to the bottom of the ocean and look for oxygen down there." It's like an army general claiming that there weren't enough Japanese bombers at Pearl Harbor. It's like a doctor treating brain cancer with an appendectomy.
More aggressive? Were the Tigers really getting tired of all of those two-and-three pitch at-bats? Did they think that standing at the plate for longer than 3 seconds would freeze their brain? My goodness but some people don't have the best problem-solving skills.
Unfortunately, the American viewing public was well aware of the dim nature of this year's Series combatants and showed it by decisively not watching it. I haven't seen the data on the Series as a whole, but early reports showed that Game 3 was the worst-rated Game 3 in history, and that the 3-game average was also the worst ever. I doubt things got better for Games 4 and 5.
This just isn't good news; it never is, when you're consistently setting new lows with every consecutive postseason, interrupted only by the once-in-a-lifetime Boston Red Sox spectacular in 2004. Attendance at baseball games is flourishing, and the money is flowing into the game at an unprecedented level. But there's just no good way to spin news that's this bad; baseball may be the national "pastime," but it hasn't been the national sport since the 1960's. Baseball has fallen far behind football and basketball and is getting dangerously close to hockey, NASCAR, and soccer. Actually, the sport baseball bears the closest resemblance to is golf. It's something that many Americans do, and they very much enjoy getting outdoors and being a part of it. But they don't want to watch it on TV.
A lot of this has to do with the growing regionalism of baseball; I'd say that more than ever, fans in baseball are tied solely to their hometown teams and show little interest in games played by other teams, with the possible exception of the Yankees, Red Sox, Cubs, Dodgers and Braves.
Example: I came across a picture in a book I read recently. It showed a throng of a couple thousand people in Times Square. They were all gathered around a board set up in the middle of the square, but were spilling out into the street and bringing everything to a standstill. Why were they there? To watch the returns from the World Series. Now, keep in mind, they weren't watching the Series itself; they were watching the games reenacted on a large board with a baseball diamond displaying the score and the action. The news was sent in by telegraph and posted on these boards in cities across America. They drew crowds everywhere to follow the games, even though they were second-hand from thousands of miles away. This World Series drew a few thousand into Times Square just to watch this re-enactment. The kicker is that this was the 1919 World Series -- between Cincinnati and Chicago, both of them very far away from New York. Neither of the two teams had a significant national following; indeed, the Reds were a perennial doormat that had just won their first pennant of the century. While allowing that there may have been an inordinate number of gamblers in this particular crowd, the picture struck me a stark contrast to where baseball is today. We can't even get people excited enough to sit on their own couches and watch the game. These people were standing out in the cold on a city street to watch a chalkboard re-enactment of a baseball game. There were thousands like them in every major city in America, major league or not.
The only modern parallel is the Super Bowl; everyone watches the Super Bowl, even if they're not football fans. What a brilliant achievement in marketing this is! To get people who don't like your product to watch it anyway, but only once a year so you can charge historically exorbitant amounts for advertising. Football has taken baseball's place as the national pastime, and I don't think that's going to change in my lifetime.

But enough of that gloom and doom. We can all celebrate for the Cardinals, who hadn't won the Series in 22 years. They'll always have the flags and the rings, even if nobody was watching when they won them.
Is there any chance the Cardinals could return to the Series in 2007? Let's find out (sorry, I take the segues when I can get them):

2006 W-L Record: 83-78
2006 pW-pL Record: 82-79
Runs Scored: 781 (6th in NL)
Runs Allowed: 762 (5th in NL)
Free Agents: Ronnie Belliard, Gary Bennett, Jason Marquis, Mark Mulder, Scott Spiezio, Jeff Suppan, Jeff Weaver
Pending Options: Jim Edmonds, Preston Wilson

2007 Proj. Lineup:
1B -- Albert Pujols
2B -- Aaron Miles
SS -- David Eckstein
3B -- Scott Rolen
LF -- Chris Duncan
CF -- Jim Edmonds*
RF -- Juan Encarnacion
C -- Yadier Molina

2007 Proj. Rotation:
Chris Carpenter
Anthony Reyes
Adam Wainwright
Brad Thompson?
???

2007 Proj. Closer: Jason Isringhausen

The Good News:
Well, if it worked this year, it might work next year. But that rotation is about as stable as Danny Bonaduce. GM Walt Jocketty will certainly take steps to address this in the offseason, but it will be difficult; pitching will be going at historic prices this year, and the Cardinals don't have anyone ready to step up from the minors.
Yeah, I know this is supposed to be the good news, but I can't just start off with optimism without setting it in a very tough reality. The optimism surrounds the lineup, which returns pretty much intact. To my knowledge, the option on Jim Edmonds in center field is still pending for 2007, but I imagine the Cards will pick it up. He's still a star player so long as he isn't concussed, and the Cards certainly don't need guys like So Taguchi getting 300+ ABs again next year.
If the is option picked up, the Cardinals will be returning their star troika of Pujols-Edmonds-Rolen. The good news is that Pujols is still a perennial MVP, and Rolen and Edmonds are still perennial All-Stars. The latter two are starting to get pretty brittle, especially for their age (Rolen will be 32 next year, Edmonds turns 37 next June). You can't exactly bank on those guys for 600 PAs a year, especially not at the level of their historic 2004 performances. But if they're in the lineup and are still mostly productive, they're still dangerous, as they proved in the Series.
Beyond these three, the lineup lacks depth. Chris Duncan emerged as an unlikely power hitter in 2006; his 293/363/589 performance in 90 games helped replace Reggie Sanders and give the Cardinals something besides out machines Preston Wilson and Juan Encarnacion in the outfield corners. But notice that I said "unlikely." The odds that Duncan slugs anything near .589 in the future are beyond remote. In the minors, his best mark was .473, at Double-A in 2004. It's true that hitters can develop power, but it's wishful thinking to imagine that Duncan has developed from a decent slugger into a monster. That makes his role in 2006 especially touchy, especially since his outfield defense is obviously sub-par. Some people are bad outfielders, but get by with it, because their weakness is range, which is mostly invisible. Sadly, Duncan's weaknesses are all too apparent, and he got to show them to the world in October. It's not fair for him to catch too much heat; he's a natural first baseman who obviously isn't playing there in St. Louis. Even if he's just a sometime slugger, you have to get his bat in the lineup. And it doesn't hurt when your Dad's the pitching coach.
While the Cardinals do have several quality defenders, as far as offense goes it's hard to get excited about any of the remaining slots in the lineup. Juan Encarnacion is one of the most overrated guys out there; he has the reputation of being decent, when he's not even that. He has occasional power on mistake pitches when he's not maintaining that .316 career OBP. But at least he has a .269 career average. And he did hit 20 home runs . . . once. But other than that, he's aces (sarcasm fully intended).
I've talked about David Eckstein before. He doesn't really hurt you much -- solid defense, above-average on-base skills -- but he's not going to help you either. He was the World Series MVP, yes, in the proud tradition of Bucky Dent (1978), Pat Borders (1992), and Ron Cey, Pedro Guerrero and Steve Yeager (all 1981, talk about your indecisive voters). But really, he only won the award because 1) he's short and therefore scrappy -- tall, strong guys are genetically incapable of being "scrappy" -- and 2) the Tiger outfield turned a couple outs into doubles. Eckstein played his part, but let's calm down and call a halt to the coronation.
At second base, the Cardinals have no one. There will be no one 0n the field playing the position at all, leaving Eckstein and Pujols to shift closer together to compensate. Runners stealing second will make it easily when the catcher's throw sails into center field, and a shortstop throwing to second for the double play will only send the ball hurtling into the right field corner. Unless they can find a center fielder with really good range, they will be in trouble.
All kidding aside, though, this is a big hole. The Baseball Prospectus annual said before the season, "Realistically, a team looking at [Junior] Spivey, [Deivi] Cruz, [Aaron] Miles annd [Hector] Luna as their second base alternatives has no second baseman. On the plus side, the loss of Ronnie Belliard (237/295/371 with the team) doesn't really hurt them at all.
At catcher, the Cardinals find themselves in a familiar dilemma; they have a player whose great defensive talent is equalled only by his great lack of offensive talent. Yadier Molina is a fine defensive catcher, and I'm not just saying that. But when you're a weak hitting catcher and you go into a slump (216/274/321 in 47 ABs), you should just not bother. On the plus side, Molina is only 24 and should get better. He has good power potential, too. But here's hoping he doesn't go on the official Molina Brothers diet and turn out like his brother Bengie, who runs as if his legs were sewn together.
I shouldn't take such pleasure in making semi-witty comments about the Cardinals. They ranked 6th in the NL in scoring this past season, and that was with a concussed Jim Edmonds and a touchy Scott Rolen. The bar is set low in the NL Central, and maybe they can pitch their way to a repeat as division champions.

The Bad News:
I know I made that last paragraph sound like the bad news, but it really, really wasn't. The Cardinal rotation is the bad news, in its most violent form.
Well, first off, I'll just put it right out there that Chris Carpenter is an ace pitcher. I'm not going to qualify that statement in any way, except perhaps to say that he's turning 32 and has thrown a lot of pitches recently. But that's splitting hairs; he's an excellent pitcher and should be top-notch in 2006.
And the rest of the St. Louis rotation will be crafted in Gepetto's shop. To be fair, Anthony Reyes has a great deal of promise as a starter, even though he was inconsistent this past year. Adam Wainwright had a great showing as closer when Jason Isringhausen got injured, but the Cards need him in the starting rotation, especially when Izzy comes back. He's got a lot of promise, which is more than I can say for everybody else.
In trying to come up with another two pitchers for the St. Louis rotation, I was pretty much stumped. Look back at that list of free agents: that is the Cardinal rotation from 2006, minus Carpenter's full season and Reyes' half-season. I give Walt Jocketty credit for being able to wangle something out of a tough free agent market, but he's got his work cut out for him. And there isn't really a Plan B. The only real option I could find was Brad Thompson; he was a starter in the low minors before being shifted into the bullpen last year. Realistically, though, Thompson's shift was with good reason; he was struggling as a starter. The Cards do still have Jorge Sosa, I think, but it shouldn't have to come to that.
But since I put so much bad news in the good news heading, I'll compensate with this: if Jocketty can find someone to fill in the middle of the rotation, the Cardinals wouldn't be in bad shape. Perferably, this would be someone with the quality of a #2, because as good as Reyes could be, you don't want to count on him to be the second best pitcher on your team. But if you've got someone ahead of him, then you've got a lot more depth and much more quality in your starters. Finding a fifth starter isn't easy, but it's not nearly as difficult as getting a #2; Walt Jocketty should be up to it.
I would criticize the Cardinals for their slim farm system, but this is hardly appropriate for a team that just won the World Series. Jocketty has never been a gung-ho, homegrown sort of fellow, but unlike other GMs, he usually makes the right decisions and keeps the right people. The Cardinals did have a few possibilities among both pitchers and players in the minors, but it seems (from what I saw) that the Cardinals' prospects took a collective step back this year. This hurts them both in the outfield, the middle infield, and in the pitching department. But that kind of thing is hard to predict; you just have to roll with the punches. And Jocketty rolls about as well as anyone.

Offseason Game Plan:
Pitching help is obviously top priority. There are issues with the lineup, but first attention should be paid to getting a strong pitcher. It would preferably be someone who's clearly above-average and can fill in with 30+ good starts in the #2 role. Realistically, there are about 15 teams looking for that kind of guy, and the market prices will be crazy. If you can find a #3-level guy who's durable, then settle for that. Look into re-signing Suppan, who knows (if he's smart) that he's dead meat if he goes to the AL.
If you can get a good starting pitcher, turn your attention to the lineup. The bullpen isn't a real issue; you've got several good arms knocking around out there, and this year's postseason shows that Tony LaRussa has the personnel to prosper even without Isringhausen. As for the #5 starter's spot, this shouldn't be a problem for a clever man like Jocketty. Look for a low-end guy who can provide you some returns (I would say Jeff Weaver, but his postseason performance has jacked up his asking price). Sign some emergency guys to minor league contracts, etc. etc. Don't go for anything as volatile (and as awful) as Sidney Ponson; if Russ Ortiz calls, hang up.
In the lineup, second base is your top priority. It's not a thick market for second baseman, and in fact, the talent at this position is pretty poor around baseball. There will be rich teams going after Julio Lugo, but give him your best sales pitch. He can play all over the infield, steal bases, and bunt; LaRussa will love him. He's got a good enough bat and glove that he'll actually be a true asset more than just a placeholder. Don't make the Deivi Cruz mistake; you can sign three guys that are just as good/bad as Miles, and while that does increase your depth, it doesn't help your ballclub, because your second baseman is still going to suck.
There's really nothing you can do at catcher, nor should you; Molina is so good defensively that you should just stick with him and hope that this year was as bad as it gets. In left field, you really have to stick with Chris Duncan until he proves otherwise. As much as I think he's a sizable fluke in left field, he's the best thing you've got. Unless Moises Alou just drops in your lap for a 1-year/$5 million deal, you'll have to stick with Duncan.
Juan Encarnacion, however, should be traded, but won't. He's got a free agent deal of his own, and you know how GMs are at admitting their mistakes. That plus I don't know if the Cardinals are really aware of how much of a liability he is; he's one of the worst starting right fielders in baseball. And it's not like this is some sudden development; he's been one of the worst for years.
A #2 or #3 pitcher and a second baseman should be at the top of the Cards' shopping list this off-season. Keep your ears open for a good deal on a corner outfielder, but don't get desperate and sign another Encarnacion. You've got as much chance as anybody at winning the division next year. Just try to maintain what you've got.

Looking Ahead: Pitt. Pirates

2006 W-L Record: 67-95
2006 pW-pL Record: 71-91
Runs Scored: 691 (16th in NL -- last)
Runs Allowed: 797 (9th in NL)
Free Agents: Joe Randa, Victor Santos
Pending Options: Jeromy Burnitz

2007 Projected Lineup:
1B -- Xavier Nady
2B -- Jose Castillo
SS -- Jack Wilson
3B -- Freddy Sanchez
LF -- Jason Bay
CF -- Chris Duffy/Jose Bautista
RF -- Jeromy Burnitz*/Nate McLouth
C -- Ronny Paulino

2007 Proj. Rotation:
Zach Duke
Ian Snell
Paul Maholm
Tom Gorzellany
Shawn Chacon?

2007 Proj. Closer: Mike Gonzalez

The Good News:
This is always a short section in Pittsburgh. But truly, the Pirates have some impressive young pitchers arriving in the majors. Duke, Snell, and Maholm all have some potential either as quality hurlers or at least reliable arms. That's quite an accomplishment for the Pirates, who have been terrible at developing pitchers for years now; in fact, you could argue that the Pirates are among the worst franchises ever at developing them. Vern Law and Wilbur Cooper were fine pitchers, don't get me wrong; but if you've been around for over 100 years and those two are the best you've come up with, then that's a problem.
The Pirates fell victim to the need for an "established closer" from 2004-5 and were lucky they got nothing worse than moderate production from Jose Mesa. This past year, the Pirates finally just gave the job to a talented young hurler out of the bullpen and saw strong results. Mike Gonzalez came over from Boston along with Freddy Sanchez in what now looks like a pretty lopsided trade from Boston. True, the Red Soxs weren't giving up any Hall-of-Famers, but all they got in return was a poor half-season of Jeff Suppan. After toiling in relative obscurity, the Pirates finally decided to take the conservative route and make a closer out of someone in the organization. Gonzalez repaid them by posting a 2.17 ERA with 64 K in 54 IP. That's not out of line with his true level of talent, either; in three full seasons of relief, Gonzalez has managed a 2.37 career ERA, with 183 K in 155.2 IP. Hopefully, the Gonzalez experiment will encourage more teams to make closers out of strikeout pitchers already in their bullpen.
As far as the lineup goes, there's not much of note here, but there are some promising factors. Jason Bay stands head and shoulders ahead of anyone, but then he's one of the best players in the National League, so it's indeed surprising to see him in Pittsburgh at all. Bay won Rookie of the Year in 2004 (the first Pirate ever to do so) and has compiled a 292/390/546 lifetime batting line. He's a slugger, but he also has well-rounded hitting abilities, although he is prone to strikeouts. But in any event, the Pirates are truly lucky to have him. Let's see if they can turn his prime years into anything useful for the team.
Third baseman Freddy Sanchez won the batting title in an unlikely breakout campaign this past season. His final hitting line of 344/378/473 belies anything he's done since the minor leagues. But even if he does fall back below .300 (as is likely), he'll still be a useful third baseman, and that's worth something.
After #1 catching prospect Ryan Doumit failed to impress (208/322/389), the Pirates turned to their #2, Ronny Paulino, and were paid off in aces (310/360/394). Paulino has a fine defensive reputation and his hitting skills are for real. He may not make any All-Star teams, but there's a lot worse things to have than a solid defensive backstop with some offense to boot.
The Pirates, disappointing though they always are, do have some promising pieces in place. This is a team with low expectations, but it's not unreasonable to expect this team to finish over .500 in the next few years, something they haven't done since winning the NL East in 1992.

The Bad News:
This is a pretty poor team, and the prospects for improvement are, realistically, not that great. While the Pirates do have the pieces in place to form a competitive team, there's no reason to think that this organization, one of the poorest in baseball, will be able to translate that into long-term success.
The Pirates have had some promising young pitchers since 1992, but have almost never been able to translate that into success. The Pirates at one point had the semi-promising troika of Jason Schmidt, Esteban Loaiza, and Francisco Cordova. While that might seem like the basis upon which to build at least a .500 ballclub, the Pirates failed miserably. Although the front office personnel is different, their level of competence is unfortunately pretty much the same.
It's for this reason that I refuse to get too excited about the Pirates' young pitchers. It's not that I don't see their talent; it's just that I don't expect that talent to be developed and exploited to any great degree. 2006 was a disturbing prelude in this regard; Zach Duke led the team in ERA with a 4.47 mark. Snell finished at 4.74 and Maholm at 4.76. This was not out of line with their peripherals, as only Snell managed a respectable strikeout rate (74:169 in 186 IP). This could just be the sign of the growing pains experienced by any prospects, and to some extent I'm sure it is. But I also think it's a sign that we should never be optimistic about the future in Kevin McGlinchy's Pittsburgh.
As far as the lineup goes, the Pirates finished dead last in the NL in runs scored, and there's nothing to suggest that it's a fluke or a passing phase. You could argue that they were somewhat better than the Cubs, due to ballparks and all, but that's a dubious distinction if ever there was one. The Pirates have a decent base of talent in Bay, Paulino, and Sanchez, as well as defensive whiz Jack Wilson, but that's about it. A small trickle of prospects makes the offense look better in 2007, but it will probably still be a below-average batting order by any measure.

Offseason Game Plan:
Don't do what you do in every other offseason: don't sign low-level free agents that do nothing to help your long-term plans. The Pirates, like the Royals, do this every year. I'm convinced that they do this not just out of incompetence (although that could always play a part), but because they're more interested in creating a small buzz and selling some season tickets than actually putting together a winning ballclub.
I think that, in a fan's eyes, the worst thing a GM can do in the offseason is nothing at all. In the eyes of fans, reporters, and players, a GM has to make some "moves" to prove the franchise's commitment to winning. Inaction means incompetence. They say that you should go out and sign some people, even if they're low-level, to help push the team into contention.
I think that this is ludicrous; it's a ludicrous thing for fans and reporters to ask for, and it's ludicrous that the Pirates kowtow to it instead of building up a long-term winner. In the 2006 preseason, the Pirates traded for Sean Casey and signed Joe Randa and Jeromy Burnitz to free agent deals. I'm sure that every columnist in Pittsburgh wrote that this showed the Pirates' "commitment to winning," that they were willing to spend money to improve the team.
I'm sorry, but no team that goes out and gets Casey, Randa, and Burnitz is committed to "winning," and it's ludicrous to suggest that these players are much help at all in that regard. You'd be better off spending your money on a flashy center-field fountain than on Sean Casey. But if the only standard is that a GM must do "something," we can't really blame guys like Kevin McGlinchy for making useless, expensive free agent moves just to keep their jobs and protect the slow trickle of season ticket sales.
We fans and reporters are as much to blame as anyone for this. I challenge a reporter to come forward in Pittsburgh and say that the Pirates must do nothing in the offseason free agent market. That doesn't mean that they can't explore a valuable trade or look for some underrated help to sign to low-end deals, but the Pirates have to stay away from any sort of major money commitment. If the reporters will take a stand on this, that will be a big help. The next thing is that the fans must hold the team to a more reasonable commitment: do what's best for the team, never just make a move for its own sake. If you make a lot of moves that only end up hurting the team, we're not going to call in to the "Jimmy Whine Whine" local sports talk show and say that the team has a "commitment to winning" or that "hey, at least they did something." We want what's best for the team. And besides, saying that the Pirates are "committed to winning" is like saying that Josef Stalin was committed to human rights.
Stay the course with your young talent and resist the urge to sign the next Reggie Sanders, or Jeromy Burnitz, or Benito Santiago, or Randall Simon or . . . you get the idea. Some low-budget teams can get by with making small free-agent deals, but you've shown such sheer incompetence at choosing which players to take a chance on that it's better you do nothing at all. Always explore trades, and never settle on someone for the sake of continuing mediocrity. Of course, while I'm getting the Pirates to stop settling for mediocrity, I might as well get the Palestinians to stop settling in the West Bank.
This is a hopeless franchise; not because there are no talented players, but because there is no clue in this organization how to win baseball games. Until they get one, the relative talent of their young players is pretty much irrelevant.

Looking Ahead: Milw. Brewers

2006 W-L Record: 75-87
2006 pW-pL Record: 71-91
Runs Scored: 730 (14th in NL)
Runs Allowed: 833 (14th in NL)
Free Agents: David Bell, Jeff Cirillo, Tony Graffanino, Dan Kolb, Tomo Ohka

2007 Projected Lineup:
1B -- Prince Fielder
2B -- Rickie Weeks
SS -- J.J. Hardy
3B -- Corey Koskie
LF -- Bill Hall/Corey Hart
CF -- Brady Clark/Anthony Gwynn
RF -- Geoff Jenkins
C -- Damian Miller

2007 Proj. Rotation:
Ben Sheets
Chris Capuano
Dave Bush
Doug Davis
???

2007 Proj. Closer: Francisco Cordero

The Good News:
Pretty much everything went wrong for the Brewers in 2006. They came in as a team considered to be a dark horse contender for the Wild Card. They finished a few furlongs back, in the uncomfortable company of the Cubs and Pirates. The long-term plan for Milwaukee is still solid, although you can't ignore the ugly setback that was 2006.
The Brewers will be fielding a top-notch infield in 2006, 3/4 homegrown and pretty cheap. Fielder (271/347/483) and Weeks (279/363/404) have already proven themselves in the majors, although both performed a shade worse than was anticipated. Shortstop J.J. Hardy was held back by injuries once again, but should be back on track in time for 2007. He was projected to be a very strong young shortstop, and still is, although the past two years must be taken into account. Third base will be manned by trade acquisition Corey Koskie. Koskie is very expensive, but is also solid (261/343/490 in '06) when not struggling with his own injuries. Damian Miller picked up his option to return as catcher. He's not that good anymore (251/322/390), but he's by far the best option in the organization for 2007.
Most of the questions in the lineup are in the outfield, as you might have deduced from the squadron of players who will be competing for playing time. Almost nothing is set in stone, and while there is a lot of potential, there are also a lot of questions. Things didn't turn out so well in 2006 (especially after the team replaced Carlos Lee with Kevin Mench), but there is good hope for 2007.
The one certainty will be Geoff Jenkins, although it's unclear whether he'll be in left or right field. Jenkins is the last holdover from the bad old days and is still earning the salary of a mediocre player who is nonetheless a franchise staple. Jenkins has had a couple of good years recently, including a surprising 271/357/434 in 2006, but this is the last year of his deal, and at age 32, it's doubtful the Brewers will pick up his option for 2008.
The other corner outfield spot will likely come down to Corey Hart, the organizational Prospect Without a Position, converted infielder Bill Hall, imported Blue Jay Gabe Gross, and imported Ranger Kevin Mench. Hart has had stardom in his cards for some time now, and finally broke through to the majors with an impressive 283/328/468 part-time performance in 2006. He's young yet, and may not get the everyday job to start 2007, but will be around in a bench role until he can right his way into the starting lineup.
The starting role will most likely go to Bill Hall. The trouble with Hall is that while he's an excellent hitter for a middle infielder (career 267/322/479 with, clearly, some big power), he's not so swell when moved to the outfield corners. Moving him there would remove his poor defense from the infield and open up a spot for Hardy at shortstop, but it's doubtful that Hall can hit well enough to hold down the position. He's probably the best option the Brewers have right now, although I'd rather see them stick with Corey Hart. Another alternative would be to put Hall at third and trade Koskie (and his salary).
Neither Gross nor Mench are likely to get in the way of Hall and Hart. Gross was a really nice bonus picked up in the Overbay trade with Toronto, hitting 274/382/476 in part-time work this past season. But it's not likely that he'll upset the organizational insiders. Ditto for Mench, who looked pretty ordinary away from Texas' friendly walls (230/248/317 with the team). With so many options and so few spots on the roster, I wouldn't be surprised to see the Brewers to trade an excess man at some point.
In center field, the question is whether the Brewers will go with the disappointing (and aging) Brady Clark, or give way to young Tony Gwynn, Jr. Gwynn has shown good contact hitting skills and a solid batting eye in the minors, but he doesn't yet have the major league pedigree to confidently predict his success in the bigs; it's still to be seen whether his batting eye will translate to the bigs, since he's not really able to punish the pitchers who do throw strikes. Clark had a career year in 2005 (306/372/426) but a disastrous 2006 (263/348/335). He is still a good center fielder, and normally I'd be tempted to predict that his 2007 performance would be somewhere in the middle of those two extremes. But Clark will be 34 in April, and it's just as likely that we're seeing the decline of someone who wasn't that great to begin with. The result of this two-man race will likely be played out in Spring Training.
There is a strong nucleus of talent here supported by more prospects still coming out of the minors. While the Brewers are strong all over and have great depth, they lack superstar strength at any one position. This could change, say, if Fielder hits .300 next year or Rickie Weeks finds his rhythm. But there's no guarantees that the Brewers will be anything more than above-average, especially given the crude reality check that was 2006.
Pitching-wise, there's little to be happy about here, especially if starter Ben Sheets continues to fall prey to injuries. However, if Sheets is healthy, he and Chris Capuano would give Milwaukee the best 1-2 punch in the division. The Brewers have good depth behind this two, with durable arms Dave Bush and Doug Davis, but they'll need to be on the positive side of durable in 2007; Davis especially suffered through a very rough 2006 (4.91 ERA, 102:159 BB:K ratio in 203.1 IP). The good news is that the Brewers had three starters go 200+ innings last year. If Sheets is healthy, they could have four in 2007, which would be great news for the team and especially the bullpen. The bad news is that, as I said before, durability is only an asset if you're good; the team ERA of 4.82 last year was due mainly to an awful bullpen, but the starters played their part as well. Cautious optimism is in order for the pitching staff, but really, everything revolves around the health of ace pitcher Sheets.

The Bad News:
If the good news is the offense, then the bad news is the pitching. I've already spoken about the starting rotation, but let me say again what a difficult scenario it would be if Sheets is only good for 100 innings, as he was in 2006. The loss of Tomo Ohka hurts, but not as much as you'd think; the Brewers already have several guys who can suck up innings, and they've got enough loose arms in their system to cobble together a #5 starter. But if Sheets falls apart, the onus is on Dave Bush and Doug Davis to produce. Bush has proven to be solid and pretty reliable in his work with Toronto and Milwaukee, but it's hard to tell in advance which side of the 4.50 ERA he'll be on. Ditto for Doug Davis, whose main problem is his penchant for wildness; he's been second in the NL in walks for two years running. The Brewers will need both Davis and Bush to keep their ERAs closer to 4.00 than 5.00 and to pump out quality starts like both men are capable of.
The bullpen was a horrific mess in 2006. On one hand, there's really nowhere to go but upfrmo here; the Brewers have too many good arms in the 'pen not to be able to make something out of it. On the other hand, they had pretty much the same talent base last year and couldn't find anyone able to stay healthy and productive. The acquisition of Francisco Cordero is a big help. Cordero will likely end up as the most valuable man taken in the Carlos Lee trade, and since they got him in mid-slump, they should be sitting pretty. Cordero's recent troubles are enough to raise eyebrows, but he's a lock to stick in those close games and notch some strikeouts; he's also one of the toughest pitchers in the game to homer against. And anything is better than what the Brew Crew got from Derrick Turnbow last year (6.87 ERA in 56.1 IP).
With Cordero acked up by Turnbow (who shouldn't be nearly as bad), Jose Capellan, Brian Shouse, Matt Wise, and a fleet of other possible options, the Brewers should be able to find somebody who can handle the middle innings. But once again, 2006 hangs over us; I was confident in the Brewers' bullpen last year and look what happened.

As much as I may compliment the offense, it's hard to ignore a team that finished 14th in the NL in scoring. Even if things do go right for the team, they'd probably just be elevated to above-average status; still not enough to carry what should be a work-in-progress pitching staff. The Brewers can't really afford free agents, and with their options, they shouldn't go for any; however, the relatively low ceiling this offense suffers from could be what keeps this team from contending in what is still a winnabe division.

Offseason Game Plan:
Aside from the Lee deal, which is looking like a bust, Doug Melvin has proven to be efficient and intelligent in making trades and improving his team on a budget. This is still a team that's kept its long-term strategy intact and could very well have the best 5-year outlook of any NL Central team. But someday the Brewers will have to get all of their good prospects in the lineup and producing at the same time -- as one baseball man once put it, their "phenoms ain't phenominating."
The most pressing problem, though, is the pitching staff, as I said. But even here, Melvin's hands are tied; there's not much the General Manager can do in this situation. All of the pieces are there, and it's not worthwhile to try changing them out unless you really think you can make an improvement. But the Brewers' problem isn't so much with the personnel -- it's with getting the personnel to produce. I've heard nothing but positive things about manager Ned Yost and pitching coach Mike Maddux, and I tend to agree; but they're going to have to start turning all of this potential into more than 75 wins one of these days. The Brewers may seem like the team that's about to break out, but we shouldn't get ahead of ourselves; as good as their future may look, they're not there yet.
It's up to those within the organization to turn all of this potential into a winning season. The good news is that in Melvin, Yost, and Maddux, I think they've got the right men for the job, and I'll keep saying so until they finally prove me wrong.

Looking Ahead: Houston Astros

2006 W-L Record: 82-80
2006 pW-pL Record: 83-79
Runs Scored: 735 (12th in NL)
Runs Allowed: 719 (1st in NL)
Free Agents: Jeff Bagwell, Craig Biggio, Roger Clemens, Aubrey Huff, Andy Pettitte, Russ Springer

2007 Projected Lineup:
1B -- Lance Berkman/Mike Lamb
2B -- Chris Burke?
SS -- Adam Everett
3B -- Morgan Ensberg
LF -- Lance Berkman/Luke Scott
CF -- Willy Taveras
RF -- Jason Lane
C --Brad Ausmus

2007 Proj. Rotation:
Roy Oswalt
Fernando Nieve
Jason Hirsh
Taylor Buchholz
Wandy Rodriguez/Matt Albers/?

2007 Proj. Closer: Brad Lidge

The Good News:
The Astros were better at preventing runs than any other team in the National League by a significant margin. Their pitching staff was fabulous, headed up by Roy Oswalt. Oswalt is in the running for the Cy Young Award this year, but then he's a Cy Young candidate every year he's healthy. The Astros recently signed him to a hefty contract extension (5 years, $73 mil.), but if anybody's worth it, it's him.
The Astros will be losing a great deal of their pitching this offseason, with both Roger Clemens and Andy Pettitte departing as free agents. My guess is, though, that if the team fails to re-sign either player, they will go after someone either via free agency or a trade. With Clemens and Bagwell especially, the 'Stros will be dropping a lot of salary in the off-season, giving them plenty of room to maneuver.
Although the loss in depth behind Oswalt is disturbing, the Astros do have some young arms coming up that could help mitigate the problem. While guys like Buchholz and Rodriguez are little more than placeholders, Nieve and Hirsh both have the potential to become quality big-league hurlers. But neither man has yet established himself in the majors. Nieve debuted with 100 decent innings in 2006, while Hirsh only managed a 44.2 inning cup of coffee late in the season. Neither man is a lock for quality production in 2007, which is why the Astros may look outside the organization to add depth while these two continue to develop. The loss of Brandon Backe to Tommy John surgery hurts, but not as much as people think; Backe is a postseason hero, but has a career 4.71 ERA in 317 major-league innings. Matt Albers could get himself a shot for the simple reason that he's not as bad as Wandy Rodriguez; this would give me the continued satisfaction of yelling out, "Hey, hey, hey! It's Matt Albers!" every time he enters a game. (If I do nothing else with this blog, I would like to add at least one nickname to the big-league lexicon.)
It should also be noted that the Astros' pitchers were helped by one of the best defenses in the game. The guiding lights here were shortstop Adam Everett and center fielder Willy Taveras, both of whom are among the league's best at their position. Morgan Ensberg is a quality third baseman, and the Astros also have the benefit of above-average, athletic role-players in the outfield corners.
The Astro lineup is weak, but they have the benefit of a few big boppers out there. Lance Berkman is probably the most underrated player in baseball; he hits like an MVP every year (career 304/416/567) but only twice has he finished in the top 5 in the MVP voting. Berkman will be just 31 next year; he's making a heap of money, but he still hits for a high average and is more athletic than he seems, meaning he's still got a lot of great hitting left in him.
Third baseman Morgan Ensberg is another underappreciated hitter. Injuries hampered Ensberg in '06, leaving him with a final batting line reminiscent of Adam Dunn (235/396/463). Ensberg is a quality third baseman, and while his inconsistency can be maddening, he's a true asset to the team.
Offensively, the only real bright light for the Astros was the flashy debut of Luke Scott. Scott had been knocking around the minors for six years before finally reaching the majors for good in 2006. He'd shown off some good-hitting chops in the minors, but his 336/426/621 performance in 65 major league games this year was a giant surprise. At age 28, it's not a surprise that we're ever going to see again, but it's a refreshingly good story from amongst the horde of weak-hitting outfielders the Astros have developed in recent years. Organizational blue-chipper Hunter Pence had a fine year in Double-A, but he isn't likely to crack the majors until at least the middle of next year unless the team gets desperate.

The Bad News:
The Astros are a team with a barely adequate offense that can't afford to lose any of its good pitchers. It's very hard to imagine the Astros coming up with anybody to replace the innings and effectiveness that Clemens and Pettitte have given them. They could try and make it up by improving their offense, but that's also unlikely. The team has made overtures toward some free agent hitters, but this team is so full of holes that's it's probably more than just one hitter away from .500 ball.
The holes mentioned above are primarily shortstop, catcher, and the outfield. At shortstop, the Astros have one of the best defenders in baseball in Adam Everett. They will most likely just live with his anemic bat and seek to improve elsewhere, which is wise.
The best place to improve would be catcher, where the Astros have an equally impotent hitter who is nothing like the defensive asset that Adam Everett is. The trouble is that the Astros have convinced themselves that Brad Ausmus is a defensive asset; how else would you explain signing a 36-year-old backstop to a 2-year, $7.5 million contract after hitting 258/351/331 in 2005? Especially when you consider that, for Ausmus, 2005 was a career year -- he's a lifetime 253/326/347 hitter. But the Astros are stuck with the Ausmus millstone for at least another year, because they somehow think he's saving millions of runs as a catcher. Sorry, folks -- not true. And it's hard to win when you've got what amounts to three pitchers hitting 7-8-9 in you lineup, as anyone who saw the 2005 World Series will attest.
The other big zero is center fielder Willy Taveras. Taveras is pretty much a .280 hitter, but he does steal a lot of bases. Therefore, he hits leadoff. But no one with a .333 OBP (career .329) should hit lead-off. You'd have to steal about 300 bases a year to make up for all those outs (410 this year), I don't care how good a bunter you are. Taveras also has no power, which makes him a further liability.
The Astros are therefore somewhat hamstrung in that their two biggest defensive assets are also their two biggest offensive liabilities. It's for this reason that the Astros have to maximize what they get from every other spot in the lineup to compensate. Thus keeping Brad Ausmus and Craig Biggio (who hit 246/306/422 at age 40) around is a luxury that the Astros really can't afford; not if they want to contend in 2007. Because if you're getting less than a .330 OBP from five spots in your lineup guaranteed (2B, SS, CF, C, P), it doesn't really matter if you have Lance Berkman at first or Lou Gehrig.
The Astros do have a whole lot of talent on their bench, but too much of it is seeing regular playing time. Players like Chris Burke, Eric Bruntlett, and even Jason Lane have proven a poor solution to the team's corner outfield problems.
That said, the Astros have compensated for this terrible offense in recent years by putting together a dynamite pitching staff. This hasn't gotten them more than 92 wins yet, but it did get them a couple of unlikely Wild Card berths (including an equally unlikely pennant in 2005). But that pitching -- which is what kept this team in contention for three years -- is taking a big hit this offseason. They've got a huge drop-off in talent after Oswalt, which they can only somewhat fix through free agency or a trade. They certainly don't have the money to fill two holes, and even filling one hole wouldn't replace Clemens and Pettitte.
With the arrival of some good young talent, the future does look brighter. And the Astros have the advantage of playing in baseball's most winnable division; their chief rivals, the Cardinals, have the exact same problems: no depth in pitching after the #1 starter, good defenders clogging up the lineup with their terrible hitting, and only a few true stars, most of whom are aging. So the Astros, provided they can get good support from their young players, might actually be contenders in the NL Central after all. But that's more an insult to the NL Central than it is a compliment to the Astros.

Offseason Game Plan:
Don't get rid of Brad Lidge. Lidge's poor season (5.28 ERA) doesn't really jibe with his peripheral stats (36:104 BB:K ratio in just 75 IP). Although he is allowing more HR (10, after giving up just 5 last season), that's not enough to explain the ERA.
While I can't dismiss the issues surrounding Lidge's confidence, his strikeout numbers lead me to believe that he's still a good pitcher. He didn't earn an ERA over 5.00 last year, and he should rebound to something closer to his 2.29 performance in 2005. This is the worst possible time to trade Lidge; his return value will be at its lowest. There's no reason to trade someone this good, especially when you won't get anything really worthwhile in return. Lidge will earn his arbitration money, mark my words. And if the Astros trade him, it will be to one really lucky team.
You have to do something significant to improve your offense. Under ideal circumstances, it would mean replacing your least valuable player in Brad Ausmus. But the Astros have an emotional commitment to Ausmus that belies logic, so that won't happen. In that case, you have to milk everything you can out of the corner outfield spots. You got rid of Preston Wilson; don't make the mistake of replacing him with someone just as worthless.
Commit to your youth movement. You just missed the playoffs this year and despite your mediocrity, should be contenders again next year. There's no reason to shoot the moon and go for it all this year, not when you've finally got a little promise for the future. You've got money to spend, but should spend it wisely; that normally goes without saying, but of course, it too often goes unheeded.
Don't panic. You're up there with the Cardinals and Brewers among the top contenders in your division and don't need to ruin the future to try and pass them.

Looking Ahead: Cincinnati Reds

2006 W-L Record: 80-82
2006 pW-pL Record: 76-86
Runs Scored: 749 (9th in NL)
Runs Allowed: 801 (10th in NL)
Free Agents: Royce Clayton, Eddie Guardado, Chris Hammond, Scott Hatteberg, Kent Mercker, Scott Schoeneweis, Javier Valentin, David Weathers, Paul Wilson
Pending Options: Rich Aurilia

2007 Projected Lineup:
1B -- Rich Aurilia*
2B -- Ryan Freel
SS -- Brandon Phillips?
3B -- Edwin Encarnacion
LF -- Adam Dunn
CF -- Ken Griffey, Jr.
RF -- Chris Denorfia
C -- Jason LaRue

2007 Proj. Rotation:
Bronson Arroyo
Aaron Harang
Eric Milton
Kyle Lohse?
Elizardo Ramirez/Brandon Claussen/Matt Belisle/???

2007 Proj. Closer: Todd Coffey?

The Good News:
Well, there's not a whole lot for this section, but it's worth pointing out that in 2005, the Reds finished last in the NL in runs allowed with 889, and were next-to-last in 2004 with 907. It may be a relative compliment, but the Reds' pitching is getting better.
The #1 reason for this was the acquisition of Bronson Arroyo. Unless Wily Mo Pena becomes a superstar (which I doubt), this was a good trade for Cincinnati. Arroyo was a quality guy in Boston and should continue to be one in Cincinnati. Getting above-average innings and some strikeouts from anybody is reason for celebration in the Queen City. Don't expect a Cy Young-caliber performance every year, though. Arroyo's 2006 ERA of 3.29 was almost a full run better than his career mark (4.21). He'll probably be better than that, having moved to a bad division in the lesser of the two leagues, but I don't anticipate another season below 3.50.
More promising than Arroyo even was the continued development of Aaron Harang. When the Reds sold off their roster -- including their entire bullpen -- back in 2003, they got pretty much nothing in return; reason enough to fire Jim Bowden the following year. The one worthwhile guy they did get was this man: Aaron Harang. He didn't look like a superstar, but the Reds took him anyway in a deal with Oakland for Jose Guillen.
Harang started out by developing into a decent pitcher, thus isolating himself from the rest of the staff. Since then, he's actually started to become dominant. Would you believe that Harang led the entire league in strikeouts last season, with 216? It is the NL, yes, but he was up against the likes of Oswalt, Carpenter, and Zambrano. He's not as good as those guys, but simply putting himself in the same sentence is great news for the Reds. They've actually got a 1-2 punch of Harang-Arroyo that is -- as of right now -- the best in the NL Central. What a turnaround that is.
There's no good news behind Arroyo and Harang, although there is a prospect that's turning a lot of heads in the minors. Not only will Homer Bailey be only 21 years old next year, but he's already dominated at the Double-A level. Bailey split 2006 between high A-ball and Double-A and impressed at both stops, striking out 154 batters in 138.2 IP (combined). There was some talk of bringing Bailey up mid-season to help the Reds' sagging postseason chances, but the front office wisely decided that they would most likely be shooting themselves in the foot there. I would even venture to say that Bailey should start 2007 at Double-A; he only threw 68 innings there, and while they were good innings, they were the only innings he's ever thrown above A-ball. But no fan cares about patience or the specter of future injury when a guy posts a 1.59 ERA at Double-A; fans are no better than spoiled kids when that happens. "We want him!" "You can get him next year." "But we want him nooooowww! WAAAAAAH!"
Still, if Bailey impresses in Spring Training, he will likely find a spot in the Reds' starting rotation. There certainly isn't anyone better, and he may indeed be ready for the majors. Let's just hope that the scouts and executives exercise more caution and maturity than the fans. Because as good as this guy could be, you don't want to be the one that screws him up.
The back end of the Reds' rotation is sloppy as ever, as I said, but they've actually managed to solidify the bullpen somewhat. David Weathers may not have been the best bang for your buck a bad team like Cincinnati needed, but he's been durable and versatile, filling in as closer in parts of his two seasons in Cincinnati, posting ERAs of 3.94 and 3.54. The Reds probably didn't imagine in the pre-season 2005 that among their recent acquisitions Eric Milton, Ramon Ortiz, Kent Mercker, and David Weathers, that Weathers would be the most valuable. Too bad for the Reds the 38-year-old is a free agent.
Of the guys they've still got, their best bet is likely Todd Coffey. The Reds are fond of drafting high school pitchers. That's okay if you know what you're doing. But most of their guys either get injured or don't pan out. The Reds simply have to realize that when you draft an 18-year-old, it's going to take him a little longer than usual. He also has three more years of potential injuries ahead of him, unlike a college draftee. Coffey went through the injuries but, unlike his Cincinnati draft compatriots, survived to make the majors and contribute. The 26-year-old wasn't dominant, but he did manage a 3.58 ERA in 78 innings, with a 27:60 BB:K ratio. He's a valuable bullpen arm who may be turned into a closer out of necessity.
The only other real bright spots in the Cincinnati bullpen are two arms obtained from Washington: Gary Majewski and Bill Bray. Bray is a prospect who should turn in to a solid contributor, whereas Majewski already is a solid contributor, although he was hampered by injuries in 2006. Too bad the Reds had to gut their lineup to get him.
Speaking of the lineup, the Reds are fading fast, but they do have some bright spots. The biggest is easily Adam Dunn, who hit 234/365/490 with 40 HR and 194 strikeouts (1 less than the all-time record he set in 2004). Dunn is the answer to the question "Is it possible to be a good hitter if your batting average is .234?" The answer is yes, but very rarely. You have to draw your walks and hit your homers, and Dunn does both very well. He's a better version of Ron Kittle, although the defense is unfortunately similar. Kittle is, in fact, Dunn's #1 comp. A list of Dunn's top-10 comparables is a Who's Who of 1-year wonders, with the likes of Jim Gentile, Henry Rodriguez, Nate Colbert, John Jaha, and Nick Esasky. That may not bode well for his long-term career, but rest assured that he's going to be slugging for a while yet. Just don't be the one stuck with him when he turns 35.
Other than Dunn, the top contributor is third baseman Edwin Encarnacion. Edwin's defense needs some work, but there's really no reason for the Reds to play anybody else at third base -- not that they have anybody else. Encarnacion started hitting to his potential last year, finishing at 276/359/473. He's erratic, certainly, and no one would mistake him for David Wright. But he's just going to be 24 next year and is a bright spot in the Cincinnati order.
Unfortunately, most of the other bright spots in the order come with several "buts" attached. Thus, we will continue . . .

The Bad News:
Perhaps the biggest problem with the trade that lost Austin Kearns and Felipe Lopez is that the Reds don't have near the depth it would take to replace them. They don't have another shortstop, and they already traded away their backup right fielder to get Arroyo. So the Reds, who looked to be forming a long-term powerhouse lineup, are now a team with a couple of good guys, a couple old guys, and some failed youngsters. I wish I had faith in GM Wayne Krivsky's ability to tell them apart.
I already mentioned that the Reds had assets in Dunn and Encarnacion. They do have other hopeful players, but they come with a few caveats:

• Ryan Freel is a good leadoff man who can get on base and then steal them. He's also very versatile on defense. BUT it's unclear if he can keep up the .370+ OBP necessary to compensate for someone with no power and a .270 average. His ability to play hard and with great heart is what makes Cincinnati fans love him nearly as much as managers and GMs love him. But his propensity for running into walls when not absolutely necessary is simply not a good long-term career choice.
• Ken Griffey, Jr. still has some power BUT that's absolutely it. The man hit .250 last year, and drew 39 walks, his fewest ever for a full season. His defense is becoming abysmal, and he needs to be moved from center field to a position where he's less harmful and less likely to be harmed. But no one in Cincinnati seems to have noticed Griffey's declining defense, whereas everybody and their mother jumped on Bernie Williams the second he slowed down. Part of this is due to injuries, sure, but hey -- do you think he's ever going to stop getting injured? Or that he's going to become more resilient at age 38?
• Chris Denorfia has a nice set of skills that worked well for him in the minors and has finally got him a semi-regular job in the big leagues BUT he might be stretched in everyday work as a corner outfielder. The best plan would be to move Denorfia to center field, where his offense would be more valuable and his defense an upgrade over Griffey. They could move Griffey to left, Dunn to first, and let Rich Aurilia go wherever it is that players like Rich Aurilia go (I would say Cincinnati, but then he's already here). But that would leave the Reds with a hole in right field. They tried Ryan Freel in the role, but he's much better cast as a second baseman. His offense is a plus there, whereas it's a zero in right. It also keeps him a good distance away from any walls.
  So where can the Reds find a good right fielder? Well, that Kearns fellow in Washington sure looks like he can handle the position . . .
• Brandon Phillips had a real breakout year at second base for Cincinnati this year and has the former prospect status to back it up BUT it's still doubtful that he's for real. He got off to a hot start, yes, but a 149/204/253 September sent him crashing back to earth (or, more likely, reality). Phillips finished with a batting line of 276/324/427 which is to say that he's a below-average hitter who's lucky to be in Cincinnati (he hit a dreadful 250/293/408 on the road this year). I've heard rumbling that the Reds are planning to move Phillips to shortstop, which is puzzling to me. The Cincinnati Post news article quoted Reds manager Jerry Narron as saying that Phillips was a gold glove-quality second baseman. Apparently, there is some evil twin of Brandon Phillips who shows up and plays good defense for Jerry Narron. Because he sure can't be watching the same guy that I (and the stats -- a dreadful -15 FRAA) are watching. He's not too bad at second, but I truly think he'd be awful at shortstop.
  Are the Reds secretly run by the Barnum & Bailey Circus? Or are they slowly transforming themselves into a sort of baseball version of Whose Line Is It Anyway? Inquiring minds want to know.

That's the Cincinnati lineup, folks, a group who ranked below-average in the NL in run scoring before you take their ballpark into account. Is there any help in the farm system? Well, the only real bright spot is a first baseman named Joey Votto. The first problem is that Votto is a first baseman/DH who's probably a better fit for the latter. The Reds already have a couple of guys like that roaming the outfield in Dunn and Griffey, and it may be truly ugly if they try to add a third. The other problem is that scouts worry that Votto's long swing won't translate well to the majors. That may be true. But it's also true that, at age 22, Votto clobbered Double-A to the tune of 319/408/547 this season. Double-A Chattanooga is a hitter's park, but Votto's offensive skills look sharp across the board. He's got a few "buts" himself, but he may be the best hope for the immediate future. And he might be better (and definitely cheaper) than Rich Aurilia.

As far as the pitching staff goes, I touched on a lot of their shortcomings in the first part of my entry. But there isn't a lot that's awful to say; yes, the back end of their rotation is a mess and their bullpen is very much a work in progress. But it's also true that they're significantly better than they have been in years, and it doesn't appear to be a passing phase. If they hadn't squandered most of their offense, they might have made the postseason. Might have.

Offseason Game Plan:
First take a long, hard look at that 76-86 Pythagorean W-L record. That's how good this club really is. While the NL Central does suck and this club could contend, you can't afford to piss away the future on any more bone-headed trades. The Reds are good enough to play .500 ball if everything goes right, which means that they do have an outside shot at contending in the NL Central.
But be realistic. No matter how much pressure you may be under, don't go out and commit another Eric Milton-esque blunder because you think your team's a lot better than it actually is.
Move Ken Griffey to left, Adam Dunn to first, and Chris Denorfia to center. I'd recommend keeping Brandon Phillips at second base. This means that you need a shortstop and a right fielder . . . wait a minute -- didn't we just have a shortstop and a right fielder? Call Jim Bowden in Washington and see if he'll nullify the Kearns/Lopez deal on account of "diminished capacity."
Seriously, as much as I may have legitimate hope for the Reds, I don't think that Wayne Krivsky is the man to realize their potential. It's rough and probably unfair to judge anyone by their first year on the job, but then few people have made such a mess of things as Krivsky. If he had done absolutely nothing, it would have been better than doing the deal with Washington and trading for every relief pitcher in the Western Hemisphere not in prison. Krivsky is from the "pitching and defense" school in Minnesota and has evidently decided that scoring runs is bad, and we that should get rid of those people.
I only speak partly in jest. Recently, Krivsky was asked to comment on the 2006 season and the progress made by the Reds, and while he gave your boilerplate GM speech about fundamentals, etc., he did specifically state how much he hated strikeouts, and how he wanted to reduce his offense's strikeouts.
He might as well have cut off a horse's head and put it in Adam Dunn's bed. Because Adam is Mr. Strikeout.
While this may be material for a column in and of itself, I'll be brief by saying that everybody gets far, far too bent out of shape about strikeouts. All sorts of research into events and outcomes has shown that strikeouts aren't that much more harmful than regular outs. So if you've got a great hitter who also happens to strike out a lot -- Mr. Dunn -- you just live with it.
I'm very, very afraid that Krivsky is going to screw up the centerpiece of his offense under the delusion that he's actually making his team better. Adam Dunn is no Albert Pujols -- he's not even a Jason Bay -- but he's a good hitter that shouldn't be taken for granted. I don't have any direct evidence, but I just know that Krivsky is going to remake this team into a "pitching-and-defense" squad and pay a gajillion dollars to guys like Juan Pierre and Dave Roberts. He's going to take a team with one strength -- offense -- and systematically get rid of it.
Many people are perfectly aware of the fact that it's no longer 1913. Krivsky -- along with an ever-shrinking but still-vocal horde of baseball beat reporters and TV analysts -- think that all it takes to win is hiring a few slap hitters, pitching to contact, and getting good team chemistry. I'm sorry, folks, but the John McGraw era ended almost a century ago. Baseball is a different game, but I guess there's no convincing them of that. There's really no point in trying to present evidence to someone who is quite clearly not in full command of his senses.
If the Reds can only split 50/50 the bone-headed mistakes with the smart moves, it will be an accomplishment. Because Cincinnati doesn't need another entrant in its revolving door of general managers.

Can't Believe it hAppened

The MLB and MLBPA officially announced the agreement on a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) that will guarantee labor peace for 5 years, or until 2011. Bud Selig and Don Fehr both appeared on TV at Game 3 of the World Series to discuss the agreement before the game.
As I said before, the glorious and unprecedented aspect of this agreement was how easily it was done, without any of the rancor and invective of past years. We'd all be too naive to assume that the players and owners now love each other. But they've obviously grown to tolerate each other enough to negotiate without petty personal attacks and accomplish what's in the best interests of both parties.
What I heard from everyone coming int0 this negotiation was that there was too much money in baseball now for anyone to want to mess it up, but that didn’t mean that they wouldn't try. I don't know enough about the true back-room realities of how this was accomplished, so I don't know who to hug and kiss. But great credit goes to both sides for taking steps to solve what was really the biggest problem in baseball: distrust and hatred between owners and players.
There isn't anything revolutionary in the new agreement. But there are some interesting changes. I don't have all the information, and I'll update with anything new I come across. But here's what I've found out so far:

• The luxury tax threshhold has been raised to $148 million, meaning that only teams with payrolls exceeding that will be required to pay a tax. In 2006, only the Yankees exceeded $148 million in payroll at $194.6 mil. The Red Sox were second at $120 mil. The threshhold will creep upward each year of the new agreement, ending at $178 mil. in 2011. Buster Olney speculates that this indicates a lot of free agent spending on the horizon, as teams use their gobs of money the only way they know how.
• In a move that must thrill young players and marginal players, the major league minimum will rise from the current $327,000 to $380,000 in 2007. It will creep up to $400,00o by 2009, with a cost-of-living adjustment added for the final year of he deal.
• As was speculated, there has been a change in draft pick compensation for free agents. Previously, teams that lost a free agent got a compensatory pick in the amateur draft, based on the talent level of the player lost. Baseball utilized a formula to determine whether a player was an "A," B," or "C" free agent, based on quality. Each level represented a different type of compensation in the coming year's amateur draft. Under the new agreement, compensation for Type C free agents will be abolished completely. Compensation for Type B players will be lowered; in the past, the team that lost the free agent would receive a draft pick of the signing team. Now, teams that lose a Type B free agent will only get "sandwich" picks, or picks inserted between rounds. The system for categorizing types will also change; the standard for Type A free agents will change to the top 20% of free agents (it was previously the top 30%), and Type B free agents will now be the 21-40% of free agents (changed from 31-50%).
  In the early days of free agency, draft pick compensation was a bone thrown to the owners to soften the blow of losing a free agent. The owners originally wanted a compensatory major league player from the signing team; that is, if the Red Sox signed Roger Clemens from the Astros, they'd have to give up Tim Wakefield in return. This was a huge deterrent to free agency, so it didn't last long (although it did send Tom Seaver to the White Sox from the Mets). Now the "compensatory" draft pick system has been scaled back considerably. This hurts the owners in the short run, certainly, and will only further encourage free agent signings. I heard one person speculate that the owners eventually want to do away with any sort of "compensation" for free agents in the amateur draft. The reason for this is that the owners want to fool around with the amateur draft system, but while that system is tied directly to free agency, they cannot do so without the agreement of the players' union. If they remove compensation, it would give them greater freedom to act unilaterally.
• Management has agreed that no contraction will take place under the terms of the agreement. From what I'd heard, the idea was pretty much a dead letter after Selig's 2002 announcement was roundly criticized. It was also embarassing that one of the teams he suggested for contraction, the Twins, went on to win 3 division titles in the 4 years since. Good riddance to a bad bargaining ploy.
• The current drug testing system, which was set to expire with the old CBA, is reaffirmed for the next 5 seasons. The two sides left open the possibility of adding a urine test for HGH, provided that a viable one comes along. Fehr made the statement that there isn't currently a viable blood test for HGH, which -- to my understanding -- isn't true. I guess it depends on what you would call viable. But if a urine test comes along (which it hopefully will), baseball will have the option to adopt it without having to go through the mess of reopening the CBA. It seems to me that there was a failure to adequately explore the blood testing issue, but then I doubted that the players' union would ever agree to that. And with baseball flush with money, I doubted that Selig would push very hard for it.
• Eligibility for the Rule 5 draft has been pushed back a year. This is the draft whereby teams can acquire players from other organizations not listed on the team's 40-man roster. A minimum service time was required before eligibility. This meant that teams didn't have to worry about losing newly-drafted prospects, but that players stuck in one system without sniffing the majors would have a chance to escape to another organization. This has been further limited, though, further strengthening the minor league reserve clause.
• The only other really notable bits are the change in severald deadlines. The deadline for clubs to offer salary arbitration to free agents has been moved up, as has the deadline for players to accept arbitration.
  One important piece of information is stuck herein, though. Previously, teams faced the restriction that if they could not re-sign a player entering free agency by Dec. 7, they lost rights to sign that player until May 1. In other words, if you can't agree to terms with a player you're losing by then, then you can't get him back until one month into the season. I'm not sure exactly why this rule was in place, except perhaps to keep clubs under a deadline to re-sign any players they're losing. But this is pretty important. This is the rule that kept Roger Clemens out of the majors for so long this year. He and the Astros could not agree on the contract, and the Astros refused to offer arbitration. So they lost the right to re-sign Clemens until May 1. Which is exactly what ended up happening. This change won't be very significant in most cases, but it will remove a pretty big obstacle that teams faced in re-signing their free agents; a deadline gives the player leverage in naming a price. Now there is no deadline, and the negotiations can continue apace, albeit with competition from other teams.

If I get any more information or analysis, I'll pass it along. Most of this is from the official press release, so if there are any undiscovered nuggets or hidden jewels not mentioned here, we probably won't find out until the columnists and reporters have a chance to sift through it.

Other notes:

• With a win behind the excellent Chris Carpenter, the Cardinals move a big step closer to the World Championship, winning Game 3 to take a 2-1 Series lead. Unless they lose each of the next three games (which is possible, but unlikely), the Cards will have Carpenter ready on full rest to start a decisive Game 7 in Detroit. The Tigers do still have a chance, as the pitching match-ups all go in their favor in Games 4, 5, and 6. But they're backed into a corner now. All it will take is a good start from Jeff Suppan or another unlikely gem from Anthony Reyes, and the Tigers will be facing one of the NL's best pitchers in an uphill battle in Game 7.
• Well, after going through Kenny Rogers' Dirt-gate, we now have Zumaya-gate (and I for one would like to end the adoption of the word "gate" for anything remotely scandalous). Apparently, the radar gun reading on Zumaya's pitches (which routinely top 100 MPH) were reading about 95 at Busch Stadium. This was odd, because the Fox TV telecast and the MLB.com Gamecast both showed that he was indeed in the 100s. It wouldn't be such an odd thing (radar gun readings can be off, or inconsistent), but according to Jayson Stark, Zumaya was the only pitcher suffering from the slow radar gun.
  This could be perhaps the most petty and juvenile issue in the postseason, and it's not like there haven't been others. But the accusation right now is that Tony LaRussa somehow arranged it so that Zumaya's pitches would read slow, for whatever reason; either he wanted to worry the Tigers, give his hitters extra confidence, who knows.
  The surprising thing isn't that this is getting so much attention, but that someone actually might try to do something as petty and meaningless as this in the World Series. One commentator said that it sounded like the sort of thing LaRussa would do. He may have been sarcastic; I've never heard such things about LaRussa. But then maybe I haven't been listening.
• There's a good deal of debate online as to whether the Cardinals, if they win the Series, will be the worst team ever to win the World Series. Judging by the online debate, they're running neck and neck with the '87 Twins, who at least had an obscene home field advantage to explain their upset. It would be justice, I guess, if the Cardinals did win. Because when the Twins won the Series in 1987 . . . they beat the Cardinals. And although the Tigers have had a much rougher go of it since 1984, the Cardinals have actually waited even longer since their last World Series win, in 1982. As I said, though, the wait for the Tigers seems longer, as they've fielded much, much worse teams. But this is the fourth time since 1982 that the Cardinals have won the pennant. I guess they're due for some good luck.
• The Yankees are holding firm in their commitment not to trade A-Rod. Which leads me to believe that what they're really doing is driving a hard bargain for whomever steps up. The newest convert is A-Rod's agent, Scott Boras. Boras says that he talked to the Yankees and reiterated that A-Rod has a blanket no-trade clause. Boras guaranteed that A-Rod will not move this off-season, but take that with a grain of salt. While Boras usually tells very plausible lies, he rarely tells a big, fat stinker. Which is what this is: "There's nothing about playing in New York City that [Alex] finds as a negative."
• Two people, Joe Girardi and Terry Pendleton, have taken themselves out of the running for the job of Nationals manager. Should it be taken as a disturbing sign when people go out of their way to state that they're not available to manage your team? And this after having gone through the interview process . . .
• Bad news for the Twins and their fans. Reports are that wunderkind pitcher Francisco Liriano has stopped his rehabilitation after feeling pain in his elbow. This could mean Tommy John surgery for Liriano -- which would keep him out for all of 2007. Although it would be awful for the Twins in 2007, it might be in the team's best long-term interests for Liriano to have the surgery, rather than to try and pitch through it. Many players come back from Tommy John surgery throwing just fine; better that than to risk a more serious injury.
• The word around baseball is that the Yankees plan to pick up Gary Sheffield's $13 million option for 2007 -- and then trade him. Apparently, the Yankees have gotten some interesting offers for Sheffield. And if they're going to lose him, they'd rather get something in return and also ensure that Sheffield doesn't sign with an American League rival (or the Mets).
  If I were a GM, I wouldn't be too quick to take a flier on Sheffield. This isn't because of his prickly personality, but because injuries finally forced the soon-to-be 38-year-old slugger to miss the majority of a season. I think it's fair to say that Sheffield's days as an MVP candidate are gone, and he's now just an above-average hitter with severe defensive limitations. I could certainly understand taking a risk on him on the off-chance that he does have some more great hitting left in him. But there's a big difference between a risk and a $13-million risk.
• An0ther rumor is that Rich Aurilia may not exercise his option to stay in Cincinnati, seeking greener pastures elsewhere. Espn.com speculates that the Staten Island native may get interest from New York. The Yankees do need a first baseman. But if you need a first baseman, why would you sign Rich Aurilia? Aurilia is a first baseman in the sense that he owns a first baseman's mitt. He did hit an impressive 300/349/518 in 440 ABs last year. But there's a difference between hitting in Cincinnati against the "pitchers" of the NL Central and going to New York to play in Yankee "Death to Right-Handed Hitters" Stadium against the AL East, which is actually a part of Major League Baseball. Aurilia would be one of the worst first basemen in the AL on any team. If you're a baseball fan, hope that your GM passes the "Aurilia Test." If your GM is the one that signs Rich Aurilia to play first base, go ahead and book the world cruise for October.
• Espn.com's "Rumor Central" also reports that Scott Boras will be asking a hefty price for Andruw Jones, who is due to become a free agent in 2008. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution has reported that Boras might start the bidding at $20 mil. a year. Now it's not unusual for Boras to start off asking a truly ridiculous price, on the off-chance that someone will actually pay it (which happens, usually in Texas). But if he tries to make Andruw Jones sound like a $20 mil./year franchise player, he's got his work cut out for him. Andruw is now little more than an above-average defensive center fielder. He's a career 267/345/505 hitter and will be 31 years old for the 2008 season. I'm sorry; he's not the second coming of Alex Rodriguez or Ken Griffey, Jr. He's actually a player who is, long-term, not significantly better than Vernon Wells, who has the benefit of being a year and a half younger and with the track record of being able to hit in the American League. Wells is a career 288/336/492 hitter. He gets the cosmetic benefit from playing the league with the DH and in a friendlier ballpark, but that's probably evened out by the general superiority of his league and the tougher pitching he faces. Andruw is a better defender, yes, but he's also older and due to lose his value sooner, especially on defense. I doubt Boras will spend much time comparing Andruw to Vernon Wells; he'll probably start by comparing him to Willie Mays or John the Baptist or Thor or something. But if I'm a GM in the 2008 off-season, I'm probably going to take Wells (unless Toronto signs him to an extension) over Jones, if Boras' asking price is any indicator.

More to come.

Looking Ahead: Chicago Cubs

2006 W-L Record:66-96
2006 pW-pL Record: 70-92
Runs Scored: 716 (15th in NL)
Runs Allowed: 834 (15th in NL)
Free Agents: Henry Blanco, John Mabry, Wade Miller, Juan Pierre
Pending Options: Aramis Ramirez, Kerry Wood

2007 Projected Lineup:
1B -- Derrek Lee
2B -- Ryan Theriot/Eric Patterson
SS -- Cesar Izturis/Ronny Cedeno
3B -- Aramis Ramirez*
LF -- Matt Murton
CF -- Felix Pie?
RF -- Jacque Jones
C -- Michael Barrett

2007 Proj. Rotation:
Carlos Zambrano
Mark Prior
Rich Hill
Kerry Wood*
Sean Marshall/Jae-Kuk Ryu

2007 Proj. Closer: Ryan Dempster

The Good News:
Dusty Baker is gone. Rejoice.
If Derrek Lee is healthy and Aramis Ramirez decides to stay in town, the Cubs will have a potent combo at the corners. They also have a plethora of middle infield options. None of them are stellar, but there are the makings of a solid bunch here. You'll forgive me if this entry starts reading more like a minor league recap special. The Cubs don't really have any "star" prospects ready for the majors, but they have enough mid-level guys ready to make it that they could be dangerous.
At second base, the most likely starter will by Ryan Theriot. Theriot has absolutely no power; but, he hits for a good average, draws his walk, steals a few bases, and solid defense. He's best suited at second, but could play shortstop in a pinch. Young Theriot made a big name for himself when he took over the second base job toward the end of the 2006 season, hitting an outstanding 328/412/522. Now, he will not be hitting that well again. A more reasonable batting line would be closer to his Triple-A numbers last year: 304/367/379. Combine that with his reliable defense, and he could be a very solid contributor. He'll be 27 years old next year and is making the league minimum. It's very important that the Cubs exploit as much young talent as possible, giving them more money to spend on a possible big-time free agent.
While his 2006 numbers should win him the starting job, Theriot could get some competition at second base. Young Eric Patterson has proven to be a much better hitter than the Cubs anticipated. Like Theriot, he hits for a high average and draws his walks, but he's also shown great speed and promising power. He looked like a king in the low minors, but has yet to produce that well above Class A. For this reason, it's likely that he'll start the season in the minors, although if he hits well, he could find himself in the bigs fairly soon. Patterson will be just 24 next year, and his broad base of skills makes him a promising prospect, but it doesn't look like he'll be making much noise in the majors next year.
At shortstop, there's less to get excited about. I mentioned that Theriot could be stretched to the shortstop role, but then that just creates a hole at second. The competition for the starting job will likely come down to Ronny Cedeno and Cesar Izturis. Izturis is the veteran and is a better fielder than Cedeno, although Ronny's not too shabby himself. But Izturis has never been worth a damn as a hitter, and young Cedeno hasn't looked very good either so far (a horrific 245/271/339 in 2006). The Cubs will probably just have to resign themselves to great defense and terrible offense from the shortstop position. If I had my druthers, I'd go with Cedeno, who at least has the promise to develop as a hitter, using Izturis as a super-sub. But I doubt that will happen, or the simple reason that Izturis is a veteran. Sigh.
There are some good signs in the outfield, although it's a fuzzier picture. Matt Murton wasn't great in left field (297/365/444) but he was good enough, and he should only get better. The Cubs are stuck with Jacque Jones in right field, which is their own fault. They should just hope that his semi-renaissance in 2006 (285/334/499) was for real.
Unless the Cubs do something really stupid like re-sign the overrated Juan Pierre (which is quite possible), the starting center fielder will be Felix Pie. This is just an educated guess; the final word probably won't come down until Spring Training. But not only is Pie a cheap, homegrown talent, he's also the best choice they've got. Pie was having some trouble turning his tools into production, but he had a promising enough season in Triple-A last year (283/341/451) that he should at least get strong consideration for the center fielder's job. He's still got issues, namely plate discipline and base-stealing, a dismal 98-for-155 (63%) in the minors. But he's probably the best option the Cubs have, and while he may not be much better than Juan Pierre, he is much cheaper, and that matters.
Catching-wise the Cubs are set with Michael Barrett, who's given the club three good seasons now, the first Cub catcher to do that since the Vietnam era.
As far as pitching goes, the Cubs are in trouble, as their 2006 runs allowed would suggest. But there are several promising prospects in the system. They cycled through most of them during 2006, and only Rich Hill was able to stick and show any strong durability. But even if these guys aren't ready to start 2007, there are plenty of good arms here to shore up the Cub pitching staff in the near future.
Carlos Zambrano is the ace of the staff, and he certainly pitches like one. He's perhaps the most volatile pitcher in baseball today, but it doesn't stop him from being very effective. The only thing that will stop him is a big arm injury, which I fear may be inevitable at this point. The good news for Zambrano (and especially the young Cub prospects) is that Dusty "Simon Legree" Baker is gone. That's not to say that Lou Pineilla is Mr. Rogers to his players, but at least he doesn't abuse them in the physical sense.
Behind Carlos is a lot of hope and very few guarantees. Mark Prior will be returning, but we have to be amazingly skeptical about his durability at this stage of his career. Prior has still been able to pitch well through thsee injuries, so there is some hope. But getting him healthy is looking more and more like a lost cause. That's doubly true for Kerry Wood, who has an even more extensive injury history than Prior and has much less hope for the future. The Cubs would have to be insane to pick up Wood's $13.75 million option for 2007. It's a mutual option, so it could mean that Wood will exercise his half and end up staying anyways. If I were the Cubs, I'd try to get him to sign a new deal full of incentives.
The pitching prospect that's done the most in the majors so far is Rich Hill. Hill has a solid minor league track record of success and was pretty successful in 2006, managing a 4.17 ERA with a 39:90 BB:K ratio in 99.1 IP. This was after he absolutely dominated Triple-A in the first half of the season, earning himself a call to the majors. Hill will be 27 next year, which is the biggest mark against him; he's not likely to get much better than he already is. But if he can reach even some small measure of his potential, it will be a blessing for the Cubs, who haven't found anyone to replace Prior and Wood since they started getting injured in 2004.
Sean Marshall represents the other side of the Cub farm system. The Cubs have done a fine job of producing prospects over the past 5 or 6 years, but unfortunately they have a large number of outright failures (Corey Patterson & co.) as well as several careers derailed by injuries. Marshall is a very promising starting pitcher, his dismal 2006 in the big leagues notwithstanding. The biggest issue with him will be staying healthy; 2006 was the first time in his professional career that he'd thrown more than 100 innings in a season -- and he's supposed to be a starter.
Other pitchers of note: Jae-Kuk Ryu will be just 24 next year, but should be ready for the big leagues. He doesn't have such a high ceiling as some of the other prospects, and he's also had some injury problems that could pop up again. Even so, he had a fine season in Triple-A Iowa this year, although he was greeted rudely (8.40 ERA) in 15 major league innings. Carlos Marmol is another prospect who got handled roughly in the majors. He's still got some time to spend in the minors before he breaks into the rotation.
The Cub bullpen isn't all wine and roses either. Ryan Dempster had a rough year as closer, and while Scott Eyre and Bobby Howry pitched well in middle relief, both were worked hard and are still overpaid as they get even older. The Cubs don't have much in the way of bullpen arms ready to break into the majors. Hopefully, they will avoid overspending on relief help. But if Jim Hendry has a middle name, it's probably "I'll Pay You a Gazillion Dollars for the 7th Inning."

The Bad News:
The bad news for the Cubs is pretty apparent. They're at best a 90-loss team who doesn't appear to be improving very much in 2007. There are a lot of promising rookies, but few if any have made any impact in the majors yet, so it's folly to predict that they will all reach their potential next year. And while Baker and team President Andy MacPhail are gone, Jim Hendry is still there. With Hendry and new manager Lou Pineilla, there's just no guarantee that the young players will a) get a chance, or b) be handled well even if they do.
The success or failure of the Cubs' efforts to be competitve within 2-3 years rely almost entirely on the front office's ability to handle their success and not buy up any more Jacque Joneses, and also the ability of the prospects to produce at the major league level. The continued presense of Jim Hendry makes the former a really big problem; the good news is that he's on a short leash and may not make it past this season. As for the latter, a lot of that depends on the Cub minor league system (which is better at producing prospects than it is at turning them into major leaguers) and new manager Lou Pineilla.
I think I've mentioned this before, but I just don't think that Lou Pineilla is the right manager for the Cubs. Pineilla left the Devil Rays because he had many problems with the organization and had become very frustrated. In Chicago, he's entering a situtation that is strikingly similar to the one he faced in Tampa. He's going to have to bring along young players and show great patience with him, and patience is most definitely not Lou's strongest suit. He's going to have to deal with a front office that could lay a few eggs and hamper his chances on the field. And he's going to be under a huge amount of scrutiny and a much higher expectation of success than he was in Tampa. I'm not saying that Lou is a bad manager; I'm just saying that I don't think he's the right manager for the Cubs.

Offseason Game Plan:
If you can trade for A-Rod, go ahead and do it. Get the Yankees to eat a big chunk of his salary, and you won't be paying much at all. F*** the Tribune Company; they can afford it. You may have to give up one of your good pitching prospects, but it's worth it; you've got the benefit of depth in that department.
Focus on middle infield help and perhaps a corner outfielder. The odds are remote that the Cubs will do either of these things. They have a great opinion of Cesar Izturis that would seem to indicate either severe brain damage or a built-up immunity to common sense. And getting a corner outfielder would mean getting rid of Jacque Jones. Not only would this be admitting that Hendry made a big boo-boo in signing him last year, but it would also be hard to find anyone who would take him without the Cubs getting left with 30-40% of his salary.
The best advice I would give is to look into trades. The A-Rod trade would, of course, be at the top of the list. This will be tough for Jim Hendry, because Hendry has a bizarre weakness for signing lots of supporting players for inflated contracts, leaving very little money to spend on the guys who are actually good. I also wouldn't expect Hendry to accurately assess his weaknesses; re-signing Juan Pierre or getting another bloated relief pitching contract would only make matters worse. Resist the urge, Jim.
The best thing for the Cubs to do is to take a conservative approach to the off-season. This will be very difficult for Hendry to force himself to do, or for the Cub fans (and reporters) to accept. Fans become inflamed by moronic reporters who think that a team has to "make moves" in the off-season, or else they've incompetent. Someone should break it to these clowns that sometimes the best thing you can do is nothing at all. Overspending on what should be an irrational free agent market wouldn't do anyone any good. The Cubs aren't one good player away from contending; they lost 96 f'n games last year! They won't have to wait 5 years to contend, not with their young players; but they shouldn't go into another do-or-die off-season where they shoot themselves in the foot.
The more the Cubs do this off-season, the worse it will probably turn out for them.

Looking Ahead: Washington Nationals

A few quick notes before we get to the Nats:

• All the buzz in baseball today is about Kenny Rogers' alleged cheating in Game 2 of the World Series. I saw the game on TV and the TV cameras showed clearly a dark spot on Rogers' pitching hand. I'd never seen TV cameras expose cheating before, so that was odd. The umpires convened and told Rogers to go wash "it" off. Both Rogers and the umpires say it was just dirt.
  Dirt, my ass.
  At first, I was willing to give Rogers the benefit of the doubt. It looked fishy, but if Tony LaRussa and the umpires didn't make a stink, I was ready to let it slide. And then I saw the pictures showing that Rogers had the exact same discolored spot in the exact same place on his hand in previous games, including the postseason. Dirt does not behave so conveniently.
  It was pine tar.
  From what I read, pine tar probably doesn't help give the pitchers any extra break. But it does help them get a better grip on the ball, which is important given how terribly cold it was in Detroit last night.
  Many people speculated that if it weren't the postseason, the umpires would have inspected his hand and maybe thrown him out of the game. But since it was the World Series, they let it slide. This is a wonderful precedent to set in a game which prides itself on the rules and the "sanctity" of the on-field competition. Tony LaRussa didn't make a big fuss about it either. The reason for that is -- as several people mentioned online -- that no manager really makes a big deal about pine tar, because he probably has pitchers that use it too. It's pretty much winked at. And if you'll remember, Jose Guillen pointed out that an ex-teammate on the Angels used pine tar; the umpires caught him and ejected him. Angels manager Mike Scioscia was enraged -- not because his pitcher was ejected for a game from cheating -- but because Guillen broke the "unwritten rule" by pointing it out. Scioscia boasted that he would have all of the Nationals' pitchers inspected from now on.
  Gary Gillette made a very sane suggestion; go through the rulebook and just get rid of the rules that no one enforces. Then add in all of the "unwritten" ones. This is getting too silly.
• Reports are in that Major League Baseball and the MLBPA (players' union) have reached a tentative agreement on a new Collective Bargaining Agreement. This is NOT getting the attention it deserves. The big news here is not what happened, but rather what did not happen. In the past, CBA renewal meant strife; owners versus players, ugly public fights, and ultimately ending in strikes and lockouts. In fact, every negotiation for a new CBA ended in some sort of work stoppage from the 1960s all the way through 2002. And in 2002, it literally came down to the last few minutes before the strike deadline. The fact that this got done so (apparently) easily is HUGE news. I'll talk more about this later, especially when the deal is finalized details of the new CBA come out.
• To update yesterday's report on the Phillies, Jamie Moyer has signed a contract extension to stay with the team. It's for two years and $10.5 million. The price is reasonable enough -- but two years?! Jamie Moyer is going to be 44 years old next year. Do you really want to give a 44-year-old junkballer a 2-year deal to pitch in the bandbox in Philadelphia? This does help stabilize the rotation in Philly, and it's not expensive, as I said. But two years for Moyer is hard to swallow.
• On to the Washington Nationals AKA The Home To Ex-Prospects Who Have "Tools" But Nothing Else

2006 Record: 71-91
2006 pW-pL Record: 70-92
Runs Scored: 746 (11th in NL)
Runs Allowed: 872 (16th in NL -- last)
Free Agents: Tony Armas, Pedro Astacio, Zach Day, Robert Fick, Jose Guillen, Brian Lawrence, Ramon Ortiz, Felix Rodriguez, Alfonso Soriano

Projected 2007 Lineup:
1B -- Nick Johnson
2B -- Jose Vidro
SS -- Felipe Lopez
3B -- Ryan Zimmerman
LF -- Ryan Church
CF -- Marlon Byrd?
RF -- Austin Kearns
C -- Brian Schneider

Projected 2007 Rotation:
John Patterson
Michael O'Connor
Billy Traber?
???
???

Projected 2007 Closer: Chad Cordero

The Good News:
Wow. This is tough. Well, the Nats have a fairly dismal lineup, but there are some good pieces there. Their infield isn't too shabby. They wisely re-signed the underrated Nick Johnson (290/428/520) to go with star rookie Ryan Zimmerman (287/351/471 and stellar defense) to form a fine combo at the infield corners. The middle infield is much thinner, but not too awful. Jose Vidro is a shell of his former self and isn't likely to change back. Felipe Lopez isn't anyone's idea of a good defender, but he hits well for the position. He's a good guy to have if you're a low-budget team looking to spend money elsewhere.
The Nats also have Austin Kearns in the outfield. Kearns really took well to Washington; he hit 250/381/429 in his 63 games there. It's not likely he'll keep that up, but if he could just approach is career hitting line (265/361/463) he'd be a great guy to have in the middle of your lineup.
Where this offense would be without Kearns and Lopez (acquired in a sweetheart deal from the Reds), I shudder to think. To be fair, though, the Nats do play in a big pitcher's park. So they're not really as bad as their 11th-place ranking would seem.

The Bad News:
Remember what I said about RFK Stadium being a pitcher's park? That means that not only did the Nats have the worst pitching staff in the National League (which is saying something) -- they're actually even worse than that.
And as if the news couldn't get any worse, they're actually losing some of their better pitchers to free agency. Now, I certainly wouldn't clamor to keep Tony Armas around, and I can understand the Livan Hernandez deal if you're looking to shed payroll. But the Nationals' starting rotation is the worst in baseball right now -- yes, even worse than the Royals' and Devil Rays'. The Nats have no one left to start ballgames. John Patterson had a strong showing in 2005 (3.13 ERA, 185 K in 198.1 IP) but he threw just 40.2 innings this year due to injuries. That's never a good sign. And don't expect Patterson to bounce back easily; 2005 was the only time in his career he's thrown 100 innings in a season.
And Patterson is their ace. After him, they have very little. Michael O'Connor is just 26, but he's coming off a season with a 4.80 ERA and a 45:59 BB:K ratio in 105 innings. He's not a bad prospect -- that's why he's in the majors -- but when he was promoted to Washington, he'd only pitched 6 innings above Class A in his career. He could contribute in the future, but his 2006 performance seems to indicate that the future won't be in 2007.
Behind them, the Nationals have nothing. There are three spots in the Washington rotation that are currently manned by replacement-level pitchers like Billy Traber, who make a living of shuttling back and forth from Triple-A. It's not bad to have a few of these guys fighting for the #5 spot in the rotation. But if these are the guys going for #3 -- who's #5? Who's going to pitch the 100 or so games not started by Patterson and O'Connor? And that's given the generous assumption of at least 30 starts for each man!
The National bullpen isn't that bad, and Chad Cordero is a good, if homer-prone closer. But their pitching staff is a wasteland, and I don't think it's going to get much better anytime soon.

Offseason Game Plan
The Nationals must --repeat must -- resist the urge to go for the quick fix. When you are, at best, a 90-loss team, there is no sense in spending a lot of money on one or two free agents under the misguided impression that they can add 30 wins. You need to focus on rebuilding from within. They have a core of guys who can carry them above 100 losses for now. They've also got a fanbase still excited about baseball and a new stadium on the horizon. If they plant the seeds for success now, they should be able to reap a plentiful harvest by the time they move into their new stadium. Until then, there's really no realistic way for the Nationals to be contenders. You could certainly blow a lot of money trying, and there's always a chance that you could succeed. But it's more important for this franchise to wait; there's no need to take unnecessary risks. The NL East is a pretty competitive division; the Mets are in their prime, and teams like the Marlins, and Braves will soon be regaining their stride. It's a tall order to pass two of these teams, not even considering the still-potent Phillies. No, the best thing to do is to establish stability for the short term and invest your resources in the long term.
But I don't think GM Jim Bowden is the man to do it.
As the subtitle implies, Bowden will take any player who has speed and one or two other tools. These are usually cast-offs from other organizations (Nook Logan, Marlon Byrd, Carlos Baerga) who were let go for the simple reason that they were not good baseball players. He had a similar M.O. in Cincinnati; get as many toolsy players as you can and wait for them to win. If you pick the right toolsy players -- the ones who are good at baseball -- you will be rewarded. Otherwise you're left picking up players like Logan and actually believing that they're worthwhile, in spite of all the evidence to the contrary. It's funny that the two best players to come out of Cincinnati under Bowden's watch were Adam Dunn and Austin Kearns; neither of them could be described as a 5-tool threat. Bowden's record on pitching in Cincinnati was woeful. While it was hard to determine how much of it was his fault, his performance in Washington so far would suggest a good deal.
Bowden is not the man to re-build. You could argue that he's not even the man to build. He's the sort of man who will compensate for a last-place team by overspending on bottom-level free agents like Vinny Castilla and Cristian Guzman. While he will sometimes make good deals (e.g. the Kearns-Lopez one), they rarely outweigh the bad in either quality or economy.
My words on the best path for the Washingt0n Nationals are important, but no one in Washington is listening to me. Hopefully someone will stop Bowden from re-signing Alfonso Soriano; in doing so he would commit $40 million or so to a guy who will take you from 70 wins to 73. 73 wins is not worth wrecking your payroll and long-term plan.
Keep that in mind, Jimbo.

Looking Ahead: Phil. Phillies

2006 W-L Record: 85-77
2006 pW-pL Record: 86-76
Runs Scored: 865 (1st in NL)
Runs Allowed: 812 (T-12th in NL)
2006 Free Agents: Jeff Conine, David Dellucci, Aaron Fultz, Jose Hernandez, Mike Lieberthal, Jamie Moyer, Randy Wolf

2007 Projected Lineup:
1B -- Ryan Howard
2B -- Chase Utley
SS -- Jimmy Rollins
3B -- ??
LF -- Pat Burrell
CF -- Aaron Rowand
RF -- Shane Victorino?
C -- Chris Coste?

2007 Proj. Rotation:
Brett Myers
Cole Hamels
Jon Lieber
Ryan Madson
Gavin Floyd?

2007 Proj. Closer: Tom Gordon

The Good News:
The Phillies have a dynamite offense that led the league in runs last year. Granted, they play in one of the best hitter's parks in the league; they will also have to deal without Bobby Abreu, who was sent to the Yankees this summer in an odd trade. But the pieces are still there for an effective offense.
Ryan Howard got all the glory, and rightfull so (313/425/659), but Chase Utley was nearly as effective (309/379/527) and at a much more important defensive position. Jimmy Rollins is solid (277/334/478), but also extremely overrated; his relatively low OBP in the leadoff spot usually puts him among the league leaders in outs. He also hit almost twice as many home runs last year (25) than he ever has before (his previous career high was 14).
The Phillie outfield may be in flux, but Pat Burrell (258/388/502) is still there, productive as ever. The Phillies may be short on good defense, but they're still strong offensively, although they have more holes to deal with than before (more on that in a minute).
Poor as the pitching staff is, remember that they're working in a tough park. The bullpen isn't that bad (Gordon was effective in 2006 when healthy) and the starting rotation is getting better. The arrival of Cole Hamels means that there's finally someone else to support Brett Myers at the front of the rotation.

The Bad News:
Well, let's just say that the future doesn't look so good for the Phillies. I mentioned that they had three studs in Howard, Utley, and Burrell; they've also got some solid players, such as Jimmy Rollins and Aaron Rowand. But would you believe that the Phillies want to trade away Pat Burrell? I'll admit that Burrell is getting far too much money (2 more years and $27 mil. left on his deal), but that's your own fault for signing someone to a long-term contract after a career year. But that's not why they want to trade him. Espn.com quotes Phillies GM Pat Gillick as saying: "Pat has had a difficult time protecting [Ryan] Howard, so we're going to have to continue to make an adjustment in that area."
How in the world has Pat Burrell had a difficult time protecting Ryan Howard? He's the second-best hitter on the team and while he's not the best-hitting left fielder in the league, he's still pretty damn good. Maybe I just haven't noticed something; maybe Burrell only hits well when he's not hitting behind Howard; maybe he becomes Mario Mendoza when hitting behind the big man.
How have the Phillies convinced themselves of something that's pretty obviously untrue? Are they really that dense? I will say that it's possible that Gillick is just making up an excuse so he can get rid of Burrell's $27 million. But even so, I think Burrell is too good to trade away just to save money. The Phillies play in one of the nation's largest markets, but they still have a tough time convincing themselves of that. It's like they want to ignore their huge fanbase and pretend that they're "middle-market." Any trade that gets rid of Burrell would require the Phillies to pay a big chunk of his contract; at that point, it's completely not worth it. There's no one on the free agent market who can replace Burrell's bat, certainly noone younger than 30 (Burrell's age). It's true that the Phils traded away Bobby Abreu and then made a run at the Wild Card. But hopefully Pat Gillick hasn't convinced himself that trading away good hitters is a good idea for a team. Because the Phillies need Burrell a lot more than Gillick thinks.
Because, you see, the Phillies' offense isn't that great. When you take ballparks into account, the Phillies probably ranked 3rd in the NL in offense last season. And they're not getting better; they have a gaping hole at third base, and sizable ones in right field and at catcher. The loss of Abreu and David Dellucci leaves Shane Victorino as the team's de facto right fielder. Victorino is a fine fourth outfielder, but he doesn't hit nearly well enough (267/326/388 career) to hold down right field. Especially if the Phillies get rid of their slugging left fielder.
The Phils can also expect some regression in other places. As good as Ryan Howard is, there's really no reason to think he's as good as he was last year. What we probably saw was a great hitter having a career year that just made him look like MVP material. Howard's true ability is probably much closer to his 2005 showing of 288/356/567 than last year's 313/425/659 monstrosity. Catcher Chris Coste is someone else who just isn't as good as he looked. When a career minor leaguer hits 328/376/505, it's a good story -- it's not a sign of things to come. Center fielder Aaron Rowand is solid, but he's also coming off an injury that prematurely ended his season in 2006. He's not a good enough hitter (career 279/334/446) to pick up the slack. And I've already talked about Rollins' career high in home runs.
Over on the pitching side of things, the outlook is better, but not that good. Myers is a reliable ace when not involved in public domestic disputes. Young Cole Hamels does have a ton of potential (145K in 123.1 IP in '06); he's also got an injury record that doesn't inspire confidence in his future. Behind them is virtually nothing. It took a late-season surge just to turn Jon Lieber into a mediocre pitcher (his ERA on July 31 was 6.09; he finished at 4.93). And I listed Madson and Floyd more out of habit than anything; neither of them are likely to jump forward and provide quality innings. So when I say that the pitching staff has improved, I'm speaking in relative terms.

Offseason Game Plan:
Don't trade Pat Burrell. Wait, I'm not speaking the right language: "Don't make an adjustment in that area."
Don't expect everything to work out as well as it did last year. A GM has to be prepared for the worst; Gillick wasn't last year, which doesn't give me confidence in this year. However, we need to focus our primary attention on third base, catcher, and right field. Go for a third baseman and catcher first; Victorino isn't anyone's ideal right fielder, but at least he's a warm body.
Do what you can in the pitching department. The Phillies may not be able to afford a top-notch free agent pitcher like Jason Schmidt. That's okay. Don't compensate by taking a mid-level F.A. pitcher and paying him like a star (like with Jon Lieber). Look on the trade market and be creative in looking for a bargain. You don't need an ace -- Myers and Hamels should suffice -- but look for someone who can eat up innings better than Floyd and Madson with a better ERA than Lieber.
There are a lot of holes to hill, and the Phillies have a lot of money. This could be a good thing, but it could also mean spending it all on free agents regardless of their true worth. It's also necessary that the Phillies identify their problems correctly; Pat Burrell is not one of them. The Phillies do have a shot at contending for the Wild Card next year. But if the quest to trade Burrell is a sign of things to come, be sure to say hello to the Braves and Marlins as you pass them on the way down.

Looking Ahead: N.Y. Mets

2006 W-L Record: 97-65
2006 pW-pL Record: 91-71
Runs Scored: 834 (3rd in NL)
Runs Allowed: 731 (2nd in NL)
2006 Free Agents: Chad Bradford, Cliff Floyd, Orlando Hernandez, Roberto Hernandez, Ricky Ledee, Guillermo Mota, Darren Oliver, Steve Trachsel, Jose Valentin
Pending Options: Tom Glavine

Projected 2007 Lineup:
1B -- Carlos Delgado
2B -- ??
SS -- Jose Reyes
3B -- David Wright
LF -- Lastings Milledge?
CF -- Carlos Beltran
RF -- Shawn Green
C -- Paul Lo Duca

Proj. 2007 Rotation:
Tom Glavine*
John Maine
Brian Bannister
Oliver Perez
Pedro Martinez/??

Proj. 2007 Closer: Billy Wagner

The Good News:
The postseason aside, the Mets were the best team in the NL in 2006 and at this point look like the best team going into 2007. Their biggest strength by far is their lineup.
The Mets have a very solid lineup that, while it may be lacking in depth, is not lacking in star power. Carlos Beltran is an MVP-level player, and Carlos Delgado still has a few years of top-notch hitting left. David Wright is an all-around gem, and Jose Reyes is fast becoming one. Those four players alone represent a strong heart of the order for New York.
While the Mets are losing a lot of free agents, most of them are pitchers. Cliff Floyd won't be missed, although Jose Valentin may be difficult to replace.
While there are a couple teams out West who may end up with stronger lineups, none of them have as much money at their disposal as the Mets do. For this reason, I would predict that the Mets will be one of the best -- if not the very best -- offensive team in the National League. And if they can get pitching about as good as they had this year, they'll be back in the postseason.

The Bad News:
That's a big "if." The Met pitching staff is losing several key contributors to free agency, not to mention ace Pedro Martinez, who will miss at least half of the season with injury. It was a very difficult thing to find 5 starting pitchers to make up next year's tentative rotation, which is never a good sign. If the Mets don't retain Tom Glavine, they will have a pretty woeful young pitching staff. That's not to take away from the potential some of these guys have, but if the Mets want to compete next year, they're going to have to go to the free agent market for at least one pitcher.
The good news is that, as I said before, the Mets have more money at their disposal than most. So they will have the upper hand in the bidding for free agent pitchers. This does mean that they will likely overpay for whomever they get (Zito, Schmidt, Matsuzaka), but they can affford it, and they're certainly in a strong position of need. With one solid pitcher to go with Glavine (who may or may not be solid, at his age), the Mets should have enough to support their lineup.
The bullpen is also an issue, but to a lesser extent. The Met bullpen was one of the best in baseball this year, and while they're losing some key contributors, such as Bradford and Oliver, they still have a good core of talent. Shoring up the bullpen would help, but it's not worth it to land an overpriced veteran.

Offseason Game Plan:
The Mets should aggressively target the top free agent pitchers, namely Barry Zito and Jason Schmidt. But they shouldn't talk themselves into a corner and be forced to make a deal that's too cumbersome or irrational. They should have a Plan B in case they lose out on both or their asking price gets too high.
The lineup could use some depth, but luckily, this doesn't involve any big-time players or 8-figure deals. The Shawn Green trade hurts; the Mets need a better hitter (and fielder) in the outfield, but now that they've got Green, they'll end up playing him even if he sucks due to his contract. And they certainly aren't going to replace him before the season starts; his contract is basically untradeable the way he's performed, no matter how much it would mean to make an improvement. Hopefully, the Mets will give strong consideration to Lastings Milledge in either left or right field. He's a cheap, homegrown talent, and the Mets don't have enough of that. He needs to be given his fair shake; this decision doesn't need to be made by cranky veterans who d0n't like his attitude.
Overall, the Mets are in good shape. The overall state of the NL is such that they'd be strong contenders even if they did nothing. As it is, they just need to get some pitching help and shore up the middle infield and the outfield corners, preferably with someone besides Anderson Hernandez and Michael Tucker. Omar Minaya makes some poor choices, but is pretty effective at improving his team. Odds are very good that the Mets will repeat as NL East Champions.

Looking Ahead: Florida Marlins

2006 W-L Record: 78-84
2006 pW-pL Record: 80-82
Runs Scored: 758 (8th of 16 in NL)
Runs Allowed: 772 (5th of 16)
2006 Free Agents: Wes Helms, Brian Moehler

Projected 2007 Lineup:
1B -- Mike Jacobs
2B -- Dan Uggla
SS -- Hanley Ramirez
3B -- Miguel Cabrera
LF -- Josh Willingham
CF -- ??
RF -- Jeremy Hermida
C -- Miguel Olivo

Proj. 2007 Rotation:
Dontrelle Willis
Josh Johnson
Scott Olsen
Anibal Sanchez
Ricky Nolasco

Proj. 2007 Closer: Joe Borowski?

The Good News:
The Marlins are an amazingly young and amazingly cheap team. Whereas other young teams will have to worry about salary arbitration this year and next, the Marlins will -- for the most part -- be off the hook. Most of the young performers on the club will be making the league minimum for about two more seasons before they're eligible for arbitration. The Marlins have an absolutely rock-bottom payroll, but they win a lot because they're chock-full of cheap young players who are actually good.
Unlike most every other team, the Marlins have a reliable core of young pitchers. Their youth and inexperience makes it difficult to count on them for the fine performances they turned in last year. But considering their salary, it's best to just let 'em play and concentrate on the less-potent offense.
With the offense, too, it's tough to predict that things will go as well as they did last year, especially for surprise/flukes like Dan Uggla. But even if some guys do regress, there's enough depth here to carry the load. If Hermida is healthy he stands to make a name for himself. The only real problem areas are center field and catcher. The Marlins tried several options in center this past season and will likely do the same this year unless someone plays well enough to win the job. And while Olivo is cheap and relatively valuable, he's just not pulling his weight at the plate. Even considering this, the Marlins have a solid lineup. It's hard to predict much more than 80 wins for them next year, but with a run of good fortune (and the continuing mediocrity of the NL), they could easily contend for the Wild Card.

The Bad News:
In other circumstances, this would mean that the Marlins had plenty of flexibility to sign free agents and make trades, potentially turning themselves into favorites for the Wild Card. In reality, of course, the Marlins will do no such thing. Their two best players, Miguel Cabrera and Dontrelle Willis, will be breaking the bank in arbitration soon, and rather than sign them to long-term deals (Cabrera especially is a young stud), the Marlins will probably trade them. Unless the team gets a new stadium or moves, we're likely to see this process repeated. It's been clear for a long time that Marlins owner Jeffrey Loria has other things on his mind besides winning ballgames. Loria has decimated the team in order to blackmail the state of Florida. Then, the Marlins get mad that no one comes to see their games, even when they're winning. But this is no surprise. If you go to a restaurant and get a cockroach in your soup, you're not likely to go back. Florida fans know better than to invest any passion in the team. They've been burned twice already.
If the Marlins ownership is ready to spend a little to help the team (and bring their payroll up closer to the minimum wage), they would be contenders, as I said before. But they won't, and it will take a lot of good luck and good development from their young players to push them ahead of the other 8 also-rans in the league.

Offseason Game Plan:
Ideally, the Marlins would find some low-cost center fielder or a solid young catcher to supplement the lineup. I'd recommend signing a veteran pitcher as insurance in case the rookies collapse, but they're going to be so overpaid that it's just not worth it.
The most important thing the Marlins need to do is fire Jeffrey Loria. That's pretty much impossible, though, so it's up to everyone else to try and build something important in South Florida while the owner jerks the team back and forth and uses them as a poker chip in bargaining with and extorting the state of Florida. A lot of pressure is on GM Larry Beinfest and new manager Fredi Gonzalez to try and win under these incredibly difficult circumstances.
While the Marlins should contend for the Wild Card as they did in 2006, there's no clear sign that they're ready to take another big step forward. With so many young stars, their long-term outlook is great; but any long-term plan is subject to the will of Loria. As such, it's a safer bet to slot the Marlins in 3rd or 4th place as the shameful South Florida baseball saga continues.

Looking Ahead: Atlanta Braves

2006 W-L Record: 79-83
2006 pW-L Record: 85-77
Runs Scored: 849 (2nd in NL)
Runs Allowed: 805 (11th in NL)
2006 Free Agents: Danys Baez, Todd Pratt, John Thomson
Pending Options: John Smoltz

Projected 2007 Lineup:
1B -- Adam LaRoche
2B -- Marcus Giles
SS -- Edgar Renteria
3B -- Chipper Jones
LF -- Ryan Langerhans?
CF -- Andruw Jones
RF -- Jeff Francoeur
C -- Brian McCann

Proj. 2007 Rotation:
John Smoltz*
Tim Hudson
Chuck James
Kyle Davies
Horacio Ramirez?

Proj. 2007 Closer: Bob Wickman

The Good News:

The Braves have a young core of talent in their lineup which should keep them competitive in 2006. Despite issues in the corner outfield spots, the Braves still ranked behind only the Phillies in the league in offense. There's no reason to think that they will be any worse next year. The Braves will have some decisions to make, with Andruw Jones and Marcus Giles both entering walk years. It will be telling to see what, if anything, the Braves do with these guys in the offseason, be it sign them to extensions or explore trades. On the whole, the Atlanta lineup is in fine shape, with future stars like Jarrod Saltalamacchia on the horizon.

The Bad News:
The pitching staff stinks and it's not likely to get much better. The Braves have yet to exercise Smoltz's option, but you have to figure that they will if they want to contend in 2007. Smoltz turns 40 next year, but he's been pretty darn good the last couple years, so he's a better bet than anybody. Tim Hudson is as enigmatic as ever, following a disappointing 2005 with a dreadful 2006 (4.86 ERA, 79:141 BB:K ratio). It's possible that Hudson can still be a reliable starter, and while that would be comforting, it doesn't look like the Braves are going to see the ace they thought they traded for.
Behind Smoltz and Hudson, it's very uncertain and unpredictable. Both Chuck James and Kyle Davies are considered to be the Braves' closest thing to young major-league ready pitchers, but neither has been too thrilling in the majors. Both will likely have spots waiting for them in the rotation. James should be able to hold it down and may even manage something of a breakout season. Davies, on the other hand, has had a lot more trouble getting established and thus has a darker future. Stand-ins like Horacio Ramirez, and the possibly healed (but still exorbitantly expensive) Mike Hampton aren't going to offer much help.
The bullpen is much worse. As much good luck as the Braves have found in past bullpens, they were completely frustrated in their attempts to get anything out of their 2006 pen. The Braves have re-signed Bob Wickman as closer. Wickman is a bit tough to predict, as his numbers would indicate. He's also going to be 38 next year and is listed at a generous 240 pounds. He's better than nothing, and the Braves didn't have to pay a lot to get him. But don't believe everyone who tells you that he's Mr. Reliable in the Braves 'pen next year.
In the lineup, Chipper Jones' health is becming more unreliable every year. It would behoove the Braves to move him from third base, where his defense isn't doing anybody any favors. The problem is that they'd create a hole at third that no one can fill; Willy Aybar might be able to in the future, but no one can right now. Of course, the Braves did have a top-notch prospect at third base in Andy Marte, but decided they'd be better off with Edgar Renteria.
Other than the corner outfield spots, every other position is stable in Atlanta. And since the Braves are never going to demote Jeff Francoeur, that leaves left field as the position most obviously in need of an upgrade. The Braves actually re-signed Brian Jordan this season, for reasons that escape even the most generous analyst; let's hope they don't take similar moves to fill the gap this off-season. Because Jordan, or even a Cliff Floyd, would cost far more than they're worth on the field. As empty as left field is for the Braves, they're getting enough contribution from the skill positions that they can focus their dollars on pitching. Left field could be a spot for a unorthodox solution or a cheap platoon. Frank Catalanotto is available. But, as I said, if the Braves throw mid-level money at someone like Gary Matthews or Cliff Floyd, Atlanta fans can sit back and get familiar with 3rd or 4th place.

Off-season Game Plan:
The Braves are in a transition period right now. Not just in the obvious sense, moving from past winner to future winner, but in the literal sense, with the team being put up for sale. Outgoing executives are often reluctant to sign big free agents or make sweeping trades when a sale is impending. Don't look for the Braves, who will be spending conservatively this winter, to land any big-name help. And considering the talent pool this off-season, that may be for the best.
The best bet for Atlanta is to come up with some smart trades to support the pitching staff over the short term. As we've seen, the Atlanta offense is good enough to win; it just needs a better pitching staff behind it. That help would be too overpriced on the open market, which is why talking trade may be the most fruitful move the Braves can make.
With the Mets entrenched atop the NL East, the Braves join the Marlins and Phillies as the NL East teams chasing for 2nd place and a shot at the Wild Card. Each team has a realistic chance, but so do most NL teams. It the Braves don't act strongly to strengthen their pitching staff this off-season, they should be prepared for another 3rd-place finish.

Managers

There has been a lot in the news about managers this off-season, and a lot more was added today, when Lou Piniella was hired to manage the Cubs and Ken Macha was fired as manager of the Oakland A's. A lot of opinions have been expressed this year (as they always are) about just what it takes to make a good manager, and what measures we can take to evaluate them.
I'm actually very fond of Bill James' 3-pronged system of evaluating managerial performance. I've never read James' Guide to Baseball Managers (which is out of print), but in his Baseball Abstract 1988 (later revised for This Time Let's Not Eat the Bones), James put forward 3 main levels of performance which are the essential features of a manager's job, and the means by which we can evaluate him.

A. Game-Level Decision-Making
This is the most focused-upon and most second-guessed element of a manager's job. We're all familiar with these choices, and we all have our own opinions about them. These include setting up the game plan, which involves close collaboration with scouts (or at least their reports), coaches, and also veteran players (especially catchers). Then the manager must decide upon the specific personnel for that game. This is, of course, a super-analyzed and over-analyzed job, but is nonetheless important. A manager has to determine a starting pitcher. This is usually a function of the starting rotation, although there will be many times, especially in the postseason, where the manager will deviate from the 5-man rotation -- either by necessity or design -- to choose his starter.
The selection of the lineup also has many set points, but is more fluid than many people think. It's not just the arrangement of the hitters from 1-9 (which isn't nearly as important as people think), but the decision about who starts and who doesn't. It seems to me that one of the most difficult things a manager must do is balance a half-dozen different needs in order to assemble the optimal lineup. A manager will usually have a set number of "everyday players," but even they must be given off-days, especially catchers and any injury-prone players. Some managers use a very predictable everyday lineup (Yankee manager Joe McCarthy was often criticized for his "push-button" managerial style). Other managers use what James calls a "hard platoon," that is a strict righty/lefty split. Much less frequent is a "soft platoon," or a platoon that can depend upon righty/lefty splits, but also the nature of the opposing team, opposing pitcher, and ballpark. These fluid lineups involve a lot of change and a whole lot more choices than do your typical order, which is why (I think) few managers use them. The managers that do -- Casey Stengel and Earl Weaver to name a couple -- usually see good results.
Most criticism of manager's personnel selections involve batting order. You can find entire articles devoted to where a hitter bats in the order. Some hitters will even complain about getting dropped in the order. But while batting is important, it's not nearly as important as many people think. The difference between the worst batting order and the best batting order is not that significant. And in baseball, nobody uses the worst batting order (batting your pitcher leadoff, hitting Albert Pujols in the #9 spot). Batting orders are generally constructed well, and all of the hoopla about them is generally overdone. Much more important is determining who starts the game and when.
Once the game starts, there are of course many different options available to managers. These range from selecting pinch hitters and relief pitchers to positioning the fields and deciding when to issue intentional walks. Most of these decisions are taken with the advice of the coaching staff, of course, but ultimately they are the manager's responsibility. The ultimate extent of a manager's influence over this part of the game is determined by the particular style of the manager. Some managers call pitches from the bench, give the batters hit and take signs, decide when to steal and sacrifice, all the while reacting to what the opposing team does.
This takes a great deal of concentration and skill. I know I'm often dismissive of specific managers, and to a certain degree the effect that a manager has on a ballclub. But managing in the major leagues is a very difficult job, and we (myself included) shouldn't be so quick to criticize everyone who proves incapable of doing it.
I'd also like to add that -- by and large -- a manager's skill in making in-game decisions are, generally speaking, not as important as his other responsibilities. Mistakes made in this field are more excusable and often a lot tougher to offer specific criticism towards.
This comes with several caveats, though. A manager who consistently makes poor in-game decisions is most certainly costing his team. And if an in-game decision is truly misinformed, it is certainly up to us to offer criticism.
That said, in-game management takes place on a very personal basis, making it pretty much impossible to criticise for the simple reason that we are not in possession of all of the facts. Here's a short list of the things that the manager knows that we do not:

• 1) who is completely healthy. We know who is on the DL, yes, but we do not know for sure who is hurting and who isn't, and we most definitely can't make that determination on a day-to-day basis.
• 2) the personalities involved. Those of us outside the game -- this includes on-the-spot reporters -- really know very little about the personalities and behaviors of those in the game. It is very gratifying to pretend that we do. But to do so is not only to accept bad information, it's patently unfair to the players. New York fans have already made up their minds that Alex Rodriguez is a prima donna. But there is far less reliable evidence of this fact than there was about, say, Reggie Jackson. Reggie's ego was legendary, and he didn't feel the need to hide it from anyone. Reggie did not see any reason to make a diplomatic response to an answer when he could make a self-serving one. There are rare cases like Reggie, or Albert Belle where it's hard to argue their central personality issues. But for the hundreds of other baseball players, we only know what other people tell us and what they say about themselves. And that's just not enough to make a reliable decision. A good manager knows his players much better than I do. This is a fact that fans (and especially beat reporters) are loathe to admit.
• 3) a manager's gut-level instincts. I'm often quick to dismiss the concept of team "chemistry" and "clutch" as truly significant. But a manager's gut-level instincts, while they must be taken with a barrel of salt, are important and informative. This is because they are typically based in experience. A manager knows his players, knows different baseball situations, and has (hopefully) experienced many similar situations in the past. So long as your gut instincts are grounded in this experience and wisdom, they can be very valuable to a team. That said, if you're a manager whose gut instincts never seem to work out, perhaps it's time you started using your brain more often (are you listening, Dusty?).

Hindsight is indeed 20/20. Managers take risks every day, and within seconds, everyone knows if it was a good risk or a bad one. But -- and this is important -- there's a specific difference between a risk and a blunder. A risk is doing something which may not be the accepted or safe decision, but which may be necessary under the circumstances. A blunder is doing something which isn't a good idea under any circumstances. Example: if Grady Little leaves any other starting pitcher in the game in Game 7 of the 2003 ALCS. It's a risk, but it's one that his "gut" told him was the right one to make. Even if the result was the same, we can still say that Little's decision wasn't a blunder, because he didn't know for sure what would happen. When that pitcher is Pedro Martinez, however, it is indeed a blunder. Pedro quite obviously (statistically and visually) turns into a different pitcher around the 100-pitch mark. That Grady Little either didn't know this or ignored it is unacceptable. If we can't think of a circumstance that could justify this choice, then we can call it a blunder.

B. Team-Level Management Decisions
These are the larger, broader decisions a manager must make about strategy and personnel. These decisions are typically made in collaboration with the General Manager or the front office in general. These include determining the roster composition, shifting player roles (starter to utility man; middle reliver to closer), and general team composition. This is where a manager chooses between a good-hitting rookie and a slick-fielding veteran; where he as to choose his team's closer from among the various options; and where he (in a larger sense) plans what sort of offense or pitching staff he wants. Some managers prefer a slap-hitting, speedy team. Others prefer the Earl Weaver "3-run homer" approach, with sluggers and plate discipline.
These decisions are easier to criticize and evaluate, because they are rarely taken in the "heat of the moment," are are much less dependent on individual variations and unknown quantities. They're also questions that statistics are very good at answering. Stats have affirmed the importance of plate discipline and the relative unimportance of the stolen base. They've determined that rookies can and should be trusted and that while veterans are worth seeking out, there is little relationship "veteran leadership" and winning. Most managers, who come from the background of gut-level decisions and a general sports-jock anti-intellectualism, don't want to hear this. They also resent the intrustion of the front office into decisions which were, in the past, up to the manager. But this is the future of baseball, and it can be a very successful one.
As I said before, this area of management is the easiest to criticize. They are usually made in advance, with full opportunity for analysis and forethought. They are typically broad-based decisions of philosophy which lend themselves more to stats and "playing the percentages." And they have further-reaching consequences, affecting entire seasons rather than just one game.

C. Personnel Management and Instruction
Well, we all know what this is, and I think we can all admit that it's the hardest to judge. How do we know if players don't like their manager? Unless they go to the press, we simply don't. And even then, it's often just one player, and we have to determine whether the player is just one grumpy guy or if he speaks for his teammates. We can look at the manager's overall record or past performance to see if there's any grounds to believe them. We can also look for any signs of discontent on the field, although these are very rare and so shrouded that we often don't know what we're looking for and at the same time seeing things that aren't really there. The on-field blow-up, however entertaining, is quite rare.
I think we can also all agree on the importance of a manager's skills as a motivator and uniter. I often talk about a player's personality being largely irrelevant, because it rarely affects what they do on the field. Acting like a professional is important, but it's not their job.
With a manager, on the other hand, being a professional is their job. And if you're failing at one of your primary duties, then you're probably not worth keeping around. The old saying goes that it's easier to fire the manager than to fire 25 players. It's essentially true; if the manager doesn't get along with the players, it's going to be the manager that gets fired. There are exceptions; if the players are just unusually grumpy, or if the front office wants to avoid the appearance that the players are running the team, they will keep on an unpopular manager. But usually, the guy has to go. It may take a while, but in my opinion, these guys usually keep their jobs much longer than they should. Especially if you're someone like Larry Bowa, who isn't doing anything on the field to justify being a hellacious horse's ass off the field.
This is not to say that a manager has to be a nice guy or that they shouldn't be firm. In fact, there are many managers whose main fault was, according to many, that they were too nice. A manager has to be firm, decisive, and in control. In the process, they may alienate people and even make some players not like them. But you must be assertive and very firm to be a successful manager; otherwise, the players will walk all over you.
But as I said before, it's very difficult to determine a manager's performance in this area, because it is almost entirely hearsay evidence and second-hand information. That's not to say that we can't get a clear picture of what's going on by piecing the evidence together, but I think we're often too quick to pass judgement, when we're not even in control of all of the facts.

Now, having set up this basic framework for managers, let's take it on a test run. Let's evaluate a man who was, in 2005, possibly the worst manager in the big leagues, Dusty Baker. But have I been too tough on Dusty? Let's take a look at the evidence.

A. Game-Level Decision Making
&
B. Team-Level Decision Making
We'll combine these, since Dusty's problems extend to both equally.
Dusty is not very good at assembling a batting order. Yes, I've said that batting order is generally not a huge factor; but that's because most people use a sensible batting order. On-base players at the top, sluggers in the middle, weaker hitters at the end. Dusty failed at even assembling this very basic batting order. Dusty is an old-fashioned manager who thinks that speed should be at the top of a lineup. It's true that this was the conventional wisdom in baseball for many years. But we know a lot more than we used to, and times have changed. Dusty's old-fashioned views are understandable, but not excusable. You wouldn't hire the Flat-Earth Society to manufacture globes, and you shouldn't have Dusty Baker assembling your lineups.
Case in point: Juan Pierre. Now, Juan isn't a bad lead-off hitter when he's hitting for a high average. Juan's best year was probably his 2004 season in Florida, where he hit 326/374/407. He stole 45 bases that year (which were cancelled out by 24 CS for a 65% success rate) and struck out only 35 times in 678 ABs. That Juan Pierre was a fine lead-off man, getting on base and striking out rarely, although he could be a lot more selective with the baserunning.
But that Juan Pierre was only for one year. The Juan Pierre who's played the last two years has not been a good lead-off man, or even a good baseball player. In 2005, he hit a woeful 276/326/354, although he improved his base-stealing to 57/74 (77%). But with a .326 OBP in 656 ABs (still batting leadoff), he made 504 outs. He ranked third in all of baseball for most outs made. This is someone that should not be batting leadoff, regardless of how fast he can run. Someone making that many outs a) is not getting on base for your sluggers b) is giving the team one less out to work with, and c) is making even more outs, because batting in the leadoff spot gives you more chances for ABs.
Pierre was traded to Chicago in the 2005-6 offseason. The friendly confines only moderately helped Pierre, who hit a still-poor 292/330/388. He was still a good base-stealer (58/70, 83%), but that was little comfort. He made 491 outs this season, only 6 behind Jimmy Rollins for the most in baseball.
You could argue about whether Pierre is a bad player, or simply below-average. His poor defense certainly doesn't help. You could also argue about which is the real Juan Pierre, the 2004 version or the 2005-6 version. But this is irrelevant; in the midst of 2006, when Pierre was doing just as bad as he had been doing the year before, Baker kept him in the lead-off spot. That is not a risk, that is an ignorant blunder.
Is is possible that Pierre was the best they had? No, not since nobody else on the team made nearly as many outs. Teammate Matt Murton doesn't steal any bases, but his .365 OBP was much better than Pierre's. Michael Barrett, Derrek Lee, and Aramis Ramirez all have too much power to hit leadoff. But any of them would still have been better than Pierre, even considering that you'd sacrifice having a true power hitter.
Baker also gave 534 ABs to Ronny Cedeno (245/271/339, or one of the worst hitters in 2006), but at least he had the good sense to bat him 8th most of the time (although he did bat lead-off in a couple games).
Baker's track record actually shows a preference for low on-base percentage. A high OBP would be, in Baker's words, "clogging up the bases." Baker has time and again shown preference for useless hitters such as Jose Macias (.292 OBP in 194 ABs '04; .274 OBP in 177 ABs '05) and Neifi Perez, who got off to a hot start with the team, causing Dusty to fall in love with him. The honeymoon should have ended before Perez got an unconscionable 572 ABs in 2005, hitting 274/298/383 with an 8/12 stolen base rate. Baker has no clue how runs are scored.
There are other baseball facts that Baker is clueless about. In Rob Neyer's Book of Baseball Blunders, Neyer devotes a whole chapter to Dusty, one of which begins with this 2005 quote:
"I remember my old general manager Al Campanis telling me that a player doesn't reach his peak until he's somewhere between thirty-two or thirty-six and beyond, and it depends on how his legs are and his desire and if he keeps his weight down and his waistline down."
My reaction is the same as Neyer's: Thirty-six and BEYOND?!! I'd like to give Al Campanis more credit than for saying something this stupid. This would explain, as Neyer points out, Dusty's unwillingness to give playing time to deserving young players (such as Hee Seop Choi, Juan Cruz, and Jason Dubois, who all got traded away mainly because Dusty wouldn't use them). His belief is so far beyond reality that I have to question whether this man has somehow suffered some sort of rare Toothpick Poisoning that's affecting his brain. That would explain why John Mabry got 237 ABs this year to hit 205/283/324. Mabry is, by the way, a first baseman. He hit like a backup catcher. But Dusty still stuck with him.
Part of the problem, I must admit, is that Dusty does not have a wealth of options, thanks to deposed team President Andy MacPhail and lame duck GM Jim Hendry. But a good manager should be able to get the most out of what he has. Not only has Dusty failed to do that, he's used his players in a manner which exposes their flaws and makes them even more costly to the team.
What about the pitching staff? Apart from a tendency to favor veterans such as Glendon Rusch beyond all points of usefulness, Dusty's greatest problem has been in his use (or abuse) of his young pitchers.
Dusty became Cubs manager in 2003. He inherited two aces in the rotation, Mark Prior and Kerry Wood. Subsequently, both pitchers have suffered a number of injuries that have severely limited their effectiveness and possibly affected their careers. Is it possible that this results from Dusty's treatment of them? Let's take a look. (To be fair, Wood had been suffering injuries ever since his sophomore season of 1999 . His injuries and overwork are not entirely Baker's fault).
Pitcher Abuse Points (PAP) are one metric of measuring how much a pitcher throws while fatigued. It rates different starts by category based on the number of pitches thrown. Category 1 is a low-fatigue outing; Category 5 is the highest. Pitches thrown in each category are assigned points, with the point value increasing exponentially as the category increases. While it's hard to establish one statistical metric to measure something as complex as pitcher fatigue, PAP does have a high correlation with future injury.
In 2003, Baker's first season in Chicago, two of the top four pitchers in all of baseball in PAP played for the Cubs. They were Mark Prior and Kerry Wood. Wood was #2 in the MLB, averaging 111 pitches per start, including an unfathomable 141-pitch outing, the longest outing in all of baseball that year.
Here's some (seemingly) simple wisdom. You have a flame-throwing young pitcher. He's already missed one whole season due to T0mmy John surgery. Under no circumstances should he be throwing 141 pitches. In addition to that one Category 5 outing (>133 pitches), Wood made 8 Category-4 starts (122-132 pitches) and 11 Category-3 starts (110-121 pitches). Now, it's true that some older pitchers have shown the ability to consistently throw high levels of pitches without injury. However, with young pitchers, we simply don't know what their breaking point is, and it's a stupid idea to try and find out.
Despite pitching only 140.1 IP in 2004, Wood still ranked 16th in all of baseball in PAP. There were (thankfully) no more Category-5 starts, but he did top out at one 131-pitch outing. There were also 8 Category-3 starts. Anything above Category-2 is a threat, especially for a young pitcher with an injury history. The fact that Baker essentially ended Wood's career (he's thrown 85.2 innings in the two years since) is unacceptable. Blame should be shared by those who abused Wood from 1998-2002, as well as the pitching coach and front-office executives (ahem) who allowed Baker to keep doing this. But, although Baker abused Wood, we cannot say for sure that it was his abuse that has basically finished him as a quality starter.
With Mark Prior, on the other hand, we can put the blame on Dusty. With the exception of his rookie half-seaosn in 2002, Baker has managed Prior's entire career. The results are depressing. As I mentioned before, Prior was #4 in all of baseball in PAP in 2003. 22-year-old superstar pitchers should be handled with the utmost care and caution. But Baker was a bull in a china shop. 20 of Prior's 30 2003 starts were Category 3 or above, with his highest a 131-pitch outing. He averaged over 113 pitches per game, and it's questionable whether you should ever let a 22-year-old throw 113 pitches, let alone average that many over 30 starts.
The effects were apparent right away. The next season, Prior threw only 118.2 IP because of injuries. Despite pitching barely half a season, he still ranked 49th in total PAP, with 6 of his 21 starts Category-3 or above, maxing out at 129 pitches once. The single-biggest reason the 2004 Cubs missed the playoffs was because of the injuries to Wood and Prior, injuries which lay at the door of Dusty Baker.
Prior managed a comeback of sorts in 2005, increasing his innings pitched to 166.2. But he was probably the most-abused pitcher in all of baseball. He ranks third overall in total PAP, and the two guys ahead of him both threw more than 220 innings. Baker still hadn't learned anything, giving Prior 10 of 27 starts Category-3 or above. In 2006, Prior succumbed, throwing 43.2 IP with a 7.21 ERA. It's questionable if he will ever be a truly effective pitcher again, giving us another career murdered by none other than the Mad Toothpick.
But that wasn't all for Baker. There was another pitcher involved here. He's a guy who's been abused as much or moreso than Prior and Wo0d, despite entering the 2006 season at 24 years of age. His name is Carlos Zambrano, and we're all unfortunately waiting for the other shoe to drop on his right arm.
Like Prior, Zambrano reached the majors for good in 2002. He threw 108.1 innings of very good baseball, despite showing a good deal of wildness. He was a fine young pitching prospect, but was overshadowed by the even more amazing Prior. Also like Prior, almost all of Zambrano's career came under Dusty Baker.
And therin lies the tragedy. In 2003, when both Prior and Wood made the top 10 in total PAP, Zambrano was 11th. He made 10 Category-3 starts and 3 Category-4 starts. But Baker was just getting started. With Prior and Wood being ridden to death by Baker, Zambrano was the only one left, and Baker rode him hard. In 2004, Zambrano finished 3rd in the MLB in total PAP, a 23-year-old ranking only behind two guys in their thirties (Livan Hernandez and Jason Schmidt). Zambrano had a whopping 7 Category-4 starts and 13 Category-3 outings. He made 31 starts, and 20 of them could be considered truly abusive.
The next year, 2005, Zambrano passed Schmidt to become the #2 man in all of baseball in PAP, behind only rubber-armed Livan Hernandez. Nearly half of Zambrano's starts were in Category-3 alone; this doesn't include 3 Category-4 starts and his first career Category-5 outing, a 136-pitch affair.
This season was much the same, with Livan #1 and Zambrano #2 in PAP. There was no Category-5 outing, but there were 13 more Category-3s and 6 Category-4s. Carlos Zambrano is one of the great young pitchers in baseball, and it's absolutely shocking that he hasn't yet suffered a career-altering injury. It's possible that Zambrano is one of the few who can handle the load. If so, thank God, and Dusty Baker should thank his good luck. But odds are that Carlos' time is running out, and if he keeps getting used this way (thankfully, Dusty is gone from Chicago), the odds are overwhelming that he will suffer serious injury.

But maybe I'm overstating the point. I'm using three pitchers to judge Baker's 4 seasons in Chicago. Granted, they were three young, supremely promising pitchers who aren't anymore (Zambrano excepted). But let's look at the team totals. Alas, they're even more damning. In 2002, the last season Before Dusty, the Cubs ranked 9th of 30 major league teams in total PAP. This is above-average, yes, but not significantly so. They were well behind the #3 Detroit Tigers, the #2 Arizona Diamondbacks and . . . wait a minute. Who ranked #1 in the 2002 season? Why it was the San Francisco Giants. And who managed those Giants? Take a big juicy guess: DUSTY BAKER! What a bizarre coincidence.
After 2002, the Giants fired Dusty. This was odd, since the Giants had gone to Game 7 of the World Series in 2002. Rob Neyer said today that if a manager gets fired after taking his team to the postseason, he probably deserved it. AlthoughI give Brian Sabean a lot of heat (and he seems to share Dusty's views on aging), he made one very smart, bold move in the winter of 2002.
After losing Dusty, the Giants fell all the way to 13th in total PAP. And who zoomed up to #1? Who do you think . . . Dusty's new team, the Chicago Cubs. In fact, the Cubs notched 643,236 total PAP, 90,000 more than the #2 team -- and twice as much as the #3 team (324,868). The Cubs' total was about four times the MLB average. That's bad, bad news.
In 2004, the Cubs fell all the way to fourth in total PAP(!). But perhaps that's because Dusty didn't have Prior and Wood to kick around. And great pitchers are the most likely to get abused, obviously, because managers want to get the most out of them. And the simple reason that the Cubs' PAP fell so much in 2004 is probably because, apart from Zambrano, the Cubs didn't have anyone worth abusing in their starting rotation.
Dusty "rebounded" in 2005, ranking second in all of baseball to the Washington Nationals. (It must be said, in passing, that Frank Robinson's teams are also consistently near the league lead in PAP. Although this is mainly due to the aforementioned rubber arm of Livan Hernandez, there may be something else there). It must be said that attention to pitch counts has increased across baseball, especially over the past 5 years. In 2003 and 2004, three ML teams averaged over 100 pitches per start. In 2005 and 2006, only one team did: the White Sox, blessed with a solid group of durable starters.
2006 also saw the Cubs fall back to #5 in baseball. It's odd that although the White Sox were averaging nearly 9 more pitches/start than the Cubs, the Cubs actually had the more abused pitchers. This says something about having a quick hook on tired starters, and the knowledge of steeply increasing risk as the counts rise.
It will be interesting to see where the Cubs fall in 2006 under Lou Piniella. The Devil Rays ranked in the top 10 in PAP in each of the three years Piniella managed them. They never ranked in the top 5, although it must be said that if Lou was that hard on such terrible pitchers, I shudder to think what he'll do with Zambrano. But we can at least give Lou credit for not being an imbecile. He should recognize his limitations. And it must be pointed out that in his Mariner days, Lou grew less and less abusive of his pitchers as time went on. (This may be due to the fact that the Mariner pitchers weren't nearly as good in the latter years of his tenure, but oh well). In fact, the 2000 finished dead last in baseball in PAP. So Zambrano should be in for an easier time.

I've spent so much time discussing Dusty Baker and the first two aspects of a manager, that I won't really waste so much verbiage on his skills as a personnel manager. Dusty seems to be good at handling players on the personal level, although the ugliness surrounding Sammy Sosa and his exit from the team occurred under his watch. But it's quite likely that Dusty is easy to get along with, as many have suggested.

Well, that's great. There's a lot of guys out fishing that Dusty can easily get along with. While he may get another job managing, let's all pray that it's not on a team with fragile young pitchers. Let's also hope that he can find someone to actually fill out the lineup card for him. And someone needs to sit down and have a chat about the age at which a ballplayer peaks.

Dusty may have a career as a TV analyst. Why, just the other day on Baseball Tonight, Dusty remarked that Scott Rolen's "power numbers are down some." Sure, it's not clear what he was referring to. As Baseball Prospectus pointed out, Rolen's slugging percentage in 2006 (.518) was actually higher than his career average (.515). Rolen did hit just 22 HR, whereas he averages 29 per 162 games in his career. But Rolen only played 142 games this year and also played some while injured, which affected his productivity. So he was hitting homers about as often as he ever has, all things considered. He drove in only 95 runs, but a lot of that can be attributed to the increasingly awful bottom of the Cardinal order, as well as the aforementioned injuries. Rolen hit 48 doubles this season, just one less than his career high -- this despite the injuries. So he made up for a slight dip in home runs by vastly increasing his doubles.
And unfortunately, this isn't something Dusty can back out of, because he specifically referred to his "power numbers." If he had just said power, well that's a vague term that's hard to measure absolutely. But he referred to "power numbers," and I'd be very much interested to see what numbers he's referring to.
In all honesty, I'm surprised that ESPN hired him. Yes, I know that they tend to hire ex-managers and GMs without painstaking attention to their actual level of intelligence. Some ex-managers work out fine; I wasn't exactly crazy about Bobby Valentine or Buck Showalter, but I thought they were as good as anybody else on the show (except, of course, Mr. Gammons). But hiring Baker is rough; this is not a man famed for intelligence or insight even among his supporters. I thought they stretched things when they put Ray Knight on the show, but he's the next Allen Roth compared to Dusty.

So why did I spend the first half of the article saying how we should be fair to managers and the second half reaming Dusty Baker? Well, to be honest, I sometimes just go where the wind takes me. But really, Dusty is the exception. I mentioned the difference between risks and blunders, and Dusty's mistakes unfortunately tend to be the latter. And I've only begun to talk about the flagrant errors of judgment and logic he made in Chicago. The next team that hires him will regret it, believe you me.

Hope and Faith

I'm glad to have Peter Gammons back. In an espn.com article (Insider password required; e-mail me for a summary), Gammons points out that since the White Sox were eliminated, this means that there will be seven different World Champions in the last seven years. All of the teams still involved have gone through a World Championship drought (Tigers - 22 yrs; A's - 17 yrs; Mets - 20 yrs; Cards - 24 yrs), which means that no matter who wins the Fall Classic among the four remaining contestants, some fanbase will be rejuvenated after a long, long wait. And for the Tigers (and to a certain degree, the Mets), that wait has been even longer than it seems.
Gammons argues that this is parity, the parity that Bud Selig has made his buzzword while in office. I agree 100%. While reaching the playoffs is still connected to payroll (but not nearly so much as Selig suggests), success once in the playoffs is not. The huge luck factor in the playoffs (especially in a 5-game series) is meant to give the underdog (read: worse team) the chance to win. The process has turned George Steinbrenner into knots, but has made the game better. That's what I mean when I say that I tolerate the Wild Card; I don't like it aesthetically, but I recognize its necessity. And while Gammons speaks of increased revenue sharing and the luxury tax (which are factors), the Wild Card itself and the random nature of the postseason have as much to with this as anything.
Recent years have seen several franchises who had been either frustrated eternally for a World Championship, or just frustrated waiting for a winning season, who have turned their ship around. The former refers to the White Sox and Red Sox. In the past three seasons, baseball has rid itself of 174 years worth of curses. It leaves the Cubs (and that will have to wait for a new GM) as the long-time losers, but who else?
After the Cubs, the team that's been waiting the longest for a World Championship is the Cleveland Indians. They haven't won it all since 1948, when the newly-integrated team of Lou Boudreau, Larry Doby, and Satchel Paige beat the Spahn-and-Sain Boston Braves. They lost in 1954 thanks to Willie Mays and the Giants despite winning 111 regular-season games. They then entered a long, long fallow period culminating in the utter futility of the 70's and 80's. They even had a movie made about their struggles. The Indians had to be the ultimate symbol of a team that had lost -- according to Selig -- "hope and faith."
Then came the 1990's, and the Indians were one of the best franchises in all of baseball. They still don't have that World Series (and that's big), but they've been competitive for most of the past 12 seasons and have won two pennants. They have a fine young team that's very much capable of winning it all in the future, so that counts as "hope."
The Giants have waited since 1954. It also seems odd to think that the San Francisco Giants have never won a World Series, but that's very true. They came very, very close in 1962 and 2002. But they still haven't done it. But, with a lot of money in the bay area, a beautiful ballpark, and a still-potent megastar on the roster, the Giants do have some "hope."
Who's next? The Senators/Rangers have been waiting for 45 years and have never even won a playoff series. They're the oldest such team in all of baseball. They've made the postseason three times, winning the division in 1996, 1998, and 1999. All three times they faced the Yankees. They won only one game -- in all three years combined. In one ALDS, they only scored one run. Their 1-9 postseason record is by far the worst for any team who's actually made it that far.
Could Selig be talking about the Rangers when he refers to "hope and faith?" I very much doubt it. The Rangers' history does not indicate a team afflicted with "small market-itis," it rather reflects a team that has been very, very mismanaged. They opened a new ballpark that made them a ton of money, then spent all that money in several dubious ways; the beat goes on this past year (Kevin Millwood, or Chan Ho Park Part 2: The Reckoning). The Rangers have good money to spend, play in a nice new ballpark, and have a very large, passionate state to split up with the Astros. They may not be in good shape, but their problems aren't going to be solved by revenue sharing. A luxury cap might be a good idea, if only to prevent more Millwood contracts.
Speaking of the Astros, they're also waiting for their first Championship, 44 years after the birth of the Colt .45s. The Astros have had much better teams than the Rangers; they've also had more teams make the postseason. But the luck that will sweep the occasional Marlins team to a fluke World Series swings both ways; the Astros never could get anything done in October, despite some fine teams.
Are they a team that has lost hope and faith? Not hardly. In the past 10 years, the Astros have made the postseason 6 times. Of those other four times, three were second-place finishes. Only a 72-90 2000 sticks out as a hopeless season. The Astros have actually been one of the more consistent contenders in the league for over ten years now. Hope and faith is not their problem. They also have money, as do the Rangers, and considering the state of the NL Central, they've got as much chance as anybody. Shed no tears for the Astros, last year's NL Champions.
Three teams from the 1969 expansion have yet to taste World Champion victory. The Padres and Expos, the NL entries, are both Series-less since their creation. Are these the hopeless teams Selig is referring to?
Not hardly. The Padres have won two pennants, and unfortunately had the misfortune of being horribly outmatched both times (in 1984 against the 104-win Tigers, and in 1998 against the 114-win Yankees). However, the Padres have suffered a great deal, especially in their early years. Their fanbase was getting dangerously burned out, and many people thought San Diego wasn't a good baseball town anyway because -- get this -- the weather was too nice. People were at the beach, not the baseball game. That gets an A+ in the Creative Excuses class.
This is all hogwash, anyhow. In 2005, the Padres' NL West Champion team drew 2.8 million fans, good enough for 6th in the NL, despite their dreadful record. Attendance fell slightly in 2006 as the Padres repeated, but their 2.6 million was still good -- 7th of 16 NL teams. They have a nice, new ballpark. They've made the postseason two straight years for the first time ever. Sounds to me like plenty of reason to hope.
The Expos are a tougher case. They were essentially Exhibit A in Selig's "hope and faith" case. But that's like Al Capone expressing sorrow over the St. Valentine's Day Massacre. The Expos were alive and vibrant until their owners -- lastly the MLB itself -- killed them.
In 1981, when the Expos won their division and came within a game of the pennant, they were second in the NL in attendance. I'm sorrow, I'll say that again -- SECOND IN THE NATIONAL LEAGUE. Yes, they were playing in la Stade Olympique, an ugly stadium. But they were a damn good team -- Carter, Dawson, Raines, Rogers -- and people were interested.
But did all of that die off? Not quite. Things looked bad in 1993; despite a close 2nd-place finish in the NL East, the Expos were the second-worst team in the NL in attendance. The famed 1994 team was 9th of 12 in attendance -- and they had the best record in baseball! Surely, this was a sign that Montreal wouldn't support a team. And, according to received baseball wisdom, it was the 1994 strike that killed the Expos.
Perhaps, but don't most dead people stay dead? In 1996, the Expos drew 1.6 million fans -- only about 25,000 fans less than their 1993 team. So if the 1994 strike really did kill Montreal attendance, it started really slowly.
The Expos were never really contenders again. You could argue the cause/effect until you're blue in the face: did bad teams kill the Expos, or was it the bad ownership that put together the bad teams? As early as 1996, when baseball in Montreal was still hanging on, ownership began to tear down the team to its bare bones. We all know the story after that, people didn't want to see a 90-loss team (shocking), leaving the Expos near the bottom of the league in attendance. The difference grew even more pronounced as the rest of the league saw attendance booms from building new ballparks while the Expos were still bringing up the rear.
But this isn't meant to be a history lesson; it's a lesson of "hope and faith." Right or wrong, the Expos were moved to Washington, where their attendance nearly quadrupled. Despite an inordinate amount of haggling and name-calling, the Nationals are in line for a new stadium, which will be great news for the team, especially since they basically suck, and the initial honeymoon period seems to be wearing off quickly.
Would more revenue sharing or a salary cap help? Perhaps. But remember, even Dr. Frankenstein took a lot of time before he could resurrect the dead -- and I'm not convinced that Jim Bowden is his baseball counterpart in the intelligence department. And if you want to know who killed the Expos, don't look at the fans of Montreal (who supported the Dodgers' minor league teams for ages), player salaries, or the system of sharing revenues. The smoking gun is in the hands of the Expo owners and Major League Baseball itself.
Speaking of Bud Selig (hey, it's a segue), how about his Brewers? They started as the Pilots in 1969 and went bankrupt, which is generally considered to be a bad thing. The Brewers struggled under Selig for years, and while the constraints of their market are very real, I also have to question why the Brewers have produced a grand total of 2 really good pitchers in over 35 years. And of those two, Teddy Higuera lost his career to injuries, and Ben Sheets isn't too far behind him. Revenue sharing would help the Brewers, but a change in the player personnel department would do far better. And wouldn't you know it, at almost precisely the same time as the Selig family sold the Brewers, they turned in their first non-losing seasons in years, going 81-81 last year. They're a great example of a team, like the Tigers, that is starting to turn around a decade-plus of losing.
We're running out of candidates for this "hope and faith" title that Selig has bestowed on teams. What about the Mariners? You mean the team that in 2001 won more games than any other team in history? The team that has seen its formerly small market blossom due to the combination of a winning team and a superstar Japanese player? They're just fine.
The only teams left are the recent expansion teams, the Rockies and Devil Rays. You could make arguments about their fans' "hope and faith," but 1) they're expansion teams, so give them a break and 2) if it's only two teams in baseball that have no hope and faith, isn't that a pretty good ratio? 28/30 baseball teams have a rough hope of contending, at least within a year or two. And you can count the Rockies among them, as they not only improved this year, but appear to be on the right track for the future.
So the only team in baseball without hope and faith is the Devil Rays?
GREAT!
Do you know how this era compares to past eras in terms of competitive balance? Selig's moans about degenerating comparitive balance are literally laughable.
Bud, do you remember that in the old days teams would go 40+ years without a pennant? That teams like the A's, Phillies, Braves, and Browns would go two decades or more without even making it into the first division? And you expect us to get bent out of shape about the Pirates' 14-year losing streak (boo f'ing hoo, says Chuck Klein, longtime Phillie), or the fact that an expansion franchise hasn't had a winning season in its 9-year history? Cry me a handful, Bud.
Is it possible that, while the current scene looks bad, things are getting worse? It's possible. More than ever, a baseball team's revenue comes from local broadcast rights. The difference between the best and worst local broadcast deals in the 1960's was significant, but not enough to cause alarm. That's changed; while the Devil Rays probably have to beg for local TV time, teams like the Yankees and Red Sox own their own local TV networks, thereby removing the middle-man and producing a stream of revenue to rival even their gate receipts. This imbalance is not likely to get better in the future; more likely, it will be worse. And the dwindling nature of baseball's national TV deal (which is shared equally among the 30 teams) means that local broadcast revenue is becoming a larger slice of the pie and a legitimate problem for small-market teams.
Is there any evidence of this over the past 20 years or so? Somewhat. The 1980's were possibly baseball's most competitively-balanced decade, at least in terms of postseason appearances. Only one team won more than one World Series (Dodgers), whereas the 70's were dominated by the A's ('72, '73, '74), the Reds ('75, '76) and the Pirates ('71, '79). That doesn't reflect the dominance at the divisional level. In the 1970's, the Pirates and Phillies won the NL East every year but one ('73; the Mets). The NL West was equally domainted by the Reds and Dodgers, who took home 9 titles ('71; Giants). Four NL teams accounted for 18 of 20 postseason appearances in the 70's. The other two teams were the aforementioned flukes. In the AL, it was only slightly better: 4 teams accounted for 16 of 20 postseason slots.
Did things change in the 1980's? You bet! No team made more than 4 postseason appearances in the 1980s. In the NL, all but two teams made the postseason (70's powerhouses Pittsburgh and Cincinnati missed), and 7 of those 12 teams made it more than once. In the AL, it was the same story. 11 of 14 teams made the postseason, 7 getting there at least twice. I mentioned before that only the Dodgers won more than on World Series in the 80's; in the 70's, four teams did it, with A's winning it three straight years. Hope and faith, indeed.
How did things change in the 1990's? The 90's were a less competitive decade, with the re-emergence of dynasties in New York and Atlanta. But a lot of this can be attributed to expansion teams, four of which were added during the decade, who of course were not normally competing for the postseason themselves and only serving as fodder to make the good teams better. But it was not all gloom and doom. 10 of 14 AL teams made it as the playoffs expanded to three rounds, only slightly worse than the previous decade (this doesn't include the Brewers, who were in the league from 1990-1997 and didn't make it). The Yankees did dominate by winning 3 World Series, and the Blue Jays did win a pair themselves. But 5 different AL teams won the pennant in the decade; not half bad, and not the way we remember the years so-called "Yankee dominance."
Things were even better in the NL, who had no Yankees. They did have the Braves, but the Braves' dominance did not extend into the postseason. The NL won the World Series three times during the decade; 3 separate teams took home the honor. 10 of 15 teams made the postseason (again, that doesn't include the three seasons of the Brewers), and 5 different teams won pennants.
Compare any of these numbers to the great Yankee dynasties, especially during the 1950's, and you'll find a sea change toward greater competitive balance. And if Selig wants to talk about "hope and faith," why doesn't he talk about everyone living outside of New York from 1947-1956. The three New York teams were doing great; but all those other cities were dropping attendance fast due to hopelessness (among other reasons).
And so we come to our present decade (or the first seven seasons of it). Good news, fans: competitive balance continues unabated. 10 of 16 NL teams have reached the postseason, and we've got three more postseasons yet for them to go for it. 9 of 14 AL teams have made it.
I'll sum up thus: if we can keep this 60-70% of teams in the postseason at least every ten years, we're in good shape, much more so than in past years. If it were the same 60-70%, then that would be a problem; but as we've seen in recent years, now is the time to turn your team around. Free agency, which many thought would ruin competitive balance, has had the opposite effect. While I'm sure Selig will pat himself on the back for revenue sharing and the luxury tax (and to some extent, rightfully so), it's really the third round of playoffs that we have to thank. It makes it much easier for an underdog or an unlucky team to still make the playoffs, where everything is possible. Think about what we've seen over the past ten years (or so):

• In 1995, the impossible happened: the Indians made it to the World Series. One hopeless franchise rescued, half a dozen to go. We must also note that the Atlanta Braves, dominant but hopeless in the postseason, finally reached the goal. There was a lot more frustration to come, but that 1995 victory was good enough to last for a while. After all, 1957 was a long time ago. Especially if you were around for Claudell Washington, Bruce Sutter, and Len Barker.
  The postseason also saw the appearance of the Colorado Rockies, who made a great argument for competitive balance by making it into the postseason in their second chance at it -- as an expansion team.
  And the Mariners made the postseason. Yes, the team with the worst record in the 1980's somehow managed to turn itself around. The banner-bearers of Hopeless, Inc. made the postseason and actually BEAT THE YANKEES. Goliath is dead! Long live David!
• The next season saw the Cardinals, who had fallen into disrepair since the days of Whiteyball, come back to life. They'd been waiting since 1982. They'd have to wait a while longer, though, as the Braves toasted them in the NLCS. 1996 also saw the return of the Yankees. Granted, there was not dancing in the streets of America over this, but the Yankees had themselves become a joke (and doesn't that seem like a long time ago). As it that weren't enough, 1996 saw the return of the Orioles, the dynasty gone horribly wrong under the likes of Frank Robinson and Cal Ripken, Sr.
  Not only that -- but the Rangers made their first postseason! Yes, they got their collective asses handed to them -- and again in 1998 and 1999 -- but as I said before: baby steps.
• In 1997, the Marlins did everybody one better. They won the World Series in their 5th season of existence, breaking the Blue Jays' record of 16 seasons before a title.
• In 1998, it was the Padres, one of the worst franchises ever, winning their second pennant and putting together a good team as well. Bad luck, though: the Damn Yankees strike again. Another thing happened in '98 . . . oh yeah -- THE CUBS DID IT! They made it to the postseason for the second time since Mr. Roosevelt died. Yes, they lost in the first round, but hey -- baby steps.
• After spending what seemed like a billion dollars only to lose every year, the Mets finally crept back into the postseason in 1999 and 2000, actually winning the pennant in the latter year. They would take a 5-year hiatus afterwards, but are right back on track today, putting those memories of Bobby Bonilla further into the past.
• Something else happened in 1999. The 1998 expansion team Arizona Diamondbacks made the postseason. Was baseball being turned on its head? We'll wait, of course, because the better story comes two years later.
• That would be 2001, when the Diamondbacks memorably beat the Yankees in the World Series. If ever there were a balance in the hands of Lady Justice, it was creeping back toward equality with this very moment: the most storied franchise in sports brought down by a team younger than some of my socks.
• And now we go into the CurseBreaking section of history. The Angels had a curse, but then they didn't have the whiny New England press to campaign for them, so no one knew about it. But the Angels had been around for 41 years and were perhaps the most famous "chokers" in baseball history. Like the Red Sox, they had come oh, so close on several occasions, only to see fate intervene. The Gods smiled upon them in 2002, however, as they won the World Series and put the past to rest. Plenty of hope and faith in Anaheim for a generation to come.
• There weren't any big breakthroughs in 2003. The Marlins and Cubs both improbably made it back into October. The Marlins won another unlikely World Series, proving competitive balance by defeating the superior Yankees. Unfortunately, they had to topple the Cubs on the way there. Maybe Selig should just grant the Cubs a World Series title under his "best interests" powers.
• We all know what happened next, but I'll sum up. Red Sox: 86 years erased. White Sox: 88 years erased.
• As for 2006? Will it be the Mets finally putting the Bonilla years to rest? Will the Cardinals, who have made the postseason 9 times since 1982 but still not won it all, finally make it to the end? Will the Tigers resurrect the deadest franchise in baseball and plant an improbably crown atop it? Or will the A's disprove the Moneyball myth and take home their first title since 1989? Whatever happens, it will be a strike towards competitive balance.

I've gone on long enough now, but I think I've made my point. While we must continue revenue sharing and determine more effective ways to level the playing field, any ideas of "gloom and doom" are spurious. We've been killing curses and resurrecting the dead all over baseball in recent years.

Who, outside of George Steinbrenner, could be unhappy about that?

Reflections on Pre-Season Predictions

The first number is my exact win-loss prediction for each team. The second puts my prediction in a range of 5 wins (because nobody's good enough to get it right on the dot). Under the actual prediction, the number in parentheses is how many wins I missed by (-2 means I underestimated by 2 wins, +5 means I overstimated by 5, and 0 means I'm a genius).
* -- indicates Wild Card

In the AL East, I predicted this:

1. New York: 95-67 (93-97 win range)
2. Boston*: 94-68 (92-96 win range)
3. Toronto: 86-76 (84-88 win range)
4. Baltimore: 76-86 (74-78 win range)
5. Tampa Bay: 70-92 (68-72 win range)

And this is how they actually finished:

1. New York: 97-65 (-2)
2. Toronto: 87-75 (-1)
3. Boston: 86-76 (+8)
4. Baltimore: 70-92 (+6)
5. Tampa Bay: 61-101 (+9)

What I said then:
"I think the Yankees will be the best team in the East, simply because of their powerhouse offense. Their defense still sucks, yes. But I think their pitching will be a bit better than it was last year" . . . "The Red Sox are, as I've said before, a volatile team" . . . "The Orioles will be better than they were last year, as will the Devil Rays."
Well, two out of three ain't bad. I at least recognized the potential for failure by the Sox and was indeed right about the Yankee pitching staff. I was dead wrong, however about Baltimore and Tampa Bay.
As far as the win and losses go, I came really close on some and missed big on others. The Yankees actually won 97 games, although their Pythagorean total is 95 wins, meaning I got them almost exactly right. The Blue Jays won 87 games, so I was good there, except that I picked them to finish third.
The team that did finish third, Boston, managed just 86 wins, a full 8 off of my prediction. What did I get wrong? I overstimated the offense, namely Mark Loretta, Coco Crisp, and Jason Varitek. But I also overestimated the pitching staff. Although I did exercise caution, even I didn't expect to see the train wreck that was their rotation. Although Curt Schilling and Jon Papelbon could be considered pleasant surprises, most everything else was a bust. The Red Sox obviously didn't win the Wild Card, and they were gone from the running by September.
The Orioles finished the season at 70-92. You know, I keep predicting that the Orioles will take a step forward one of these years, if only by accident. But again, I was too optimistic, missing their win total by 6. I was equally optimistic with Tampa Bay, but then so were many other analysts. I thought their offense would improve (it didn't) and that their pitching staff, led by Scott Kazmir, would be at least somewhat better (it wasn't, really). This is bad news for the D-Rays, as they again sit at 100+ losses (61-101) with a long way uphill.

AL CENTRAL
I predicted:

1. Cleveland: 95-67 (93-97 win range)
2. Chicago: 90-72 (88-92 win range)
3. Minnesota: 88-74 (86-90 win range)
4. Detroit: 78-84 (76-80 win range)
5. Kansas City: 65-97 (63-67 win range)

And this is how they actually finished:

1. Minnesota: 96-66 (-8)
2. Detroit*: 95-67 (-17)
3. Chicago: 90-72 (0!)
4. Cleveland: 78-84 (+17)
5. Kansas City: 62-100 (+3)

What I said then:
"The Indians are a bit better than I may have foreseen. But I have them in 1st because I realized how much I'd overrated the White Sox" . . . "I think the Twins are easily contenders, although I don't have as much faith in their offense" . . . "I knew the Tigers were a step better than last year, but I don't think I gave them enough credit."
Well, I was sure as hell right about not giving the Tigers enough credit.
I was really close in some predictions and way off in others. The Indians were my biggest miss, a whopping 17 wins off the mark. It's some consolation that their Pythagorean record was an amazing 89-73, but then they had a great pWin total last year, and it's starting to look like more than just bad luck.
I got the White Sox exactly right! While I do my victory dance, I will unfortunately admit that I had the White Sox finishing ahead of the two teams that ended up in 1st and 2nd place. I wasn't too far off on the Twins, but I just didn't give them the credit that other announcers did. I should have allowed for Francisco Liriano, yes, but did anyone see Michael Cuddyer coming or expect Torii Hunter to set a career high in home runs? Didn't think so.
The Tigers are the exact mirror image of the Indians: I predicted exactly right the win-loss records, I just pinned them on the wrong teams. Los Tigres outperformed my expectations by 17 wins. I just really can't explain it, other than to say that I wasn't betting on Kenny Rogers and Nate Robertson coming in, but they proved me wrong. I did make some mention of Verlander and Zumaya in my pre-season post, but even then I had no idea. I still maintain that their offense wasn't as good as it looks, but they did at least have Magglio Ordonez and Carlos Guillen healthy.
I did for the Royals what I did for the Devil Rays; I thought that surely no team loses 100 games three years in a row. If only by sheer accident, they will improve a bit. Well, I was half right. No team loses 100 games in a row. The 1970's Blue Jays did it, and the last non-expansion team to do it was the Pirates of the 1950's. And they were bad.

AL WEST
I predicted this:

1. Oakland: 97-65 (95-99 win range)
2. Los Angeles: 90-72 (88-92 win range)
3. Texas: 79-83 (77-81 win range)
4. Seattle: 76-86 (74-78 win range)

And this is how they really finished:

1. Oakland: 93-69 (+4)
2. Los Angeles: 89-73 (+1)
3. Texas: 80-82 (-1)
4. Seattle: 78-84 (-2)

Ladies and gentlemen, an entire division that fell within my win range! And all in the proper order! Thank God, because I needed some redemption after that Detroit/Cleveland switcheroo.
What I said then:
"[Oakland has] probably the best pitching staff in the AL, an excellent defese [sic], and an adequate offense with plenty of depth." . . . "The Rangers are pretty sad nowadays. They're just not significantly better or worse than they were last year." . . .
Most of what I said was essentially valid, except for my analysis of the Wilkerson-Soriano trade, which I've owned up to before. Oakland certainly needed all that depth, what with the injuries and general sucktitude that afflicted their entire infield. Dan Johnson and Mark Ellis sucked, Bobby Crosby sucked when he wasn't injured, and injuries sapped Eric Chavez's talents until he started to suck. A's fans were correct to thank God for Frank Thomas.
The "sad" state of the Rangers is likely what cost Showalter his job. I mentioned in April that if their young hitters made the majors and started producing, the Angels would beat out my prediction. They didn't, and they didn't.

NL EAST
Here's what I predicted:

1. New York: 92-70 (90-94 win range)
2. Atlanta*: 89-73 (87-91 win range)
3. Philadelphia: 86-76 (84-88 win range)
4. Washington: 77-85 (75-79 win range)
5. Florida: 67-95 (65-69 win range)

Here's how they really finished:

1. New York: 97-65 (-5)
2. Philadelphia: 85-77 (+1)
3. Atlanta: 79-83 (+10)
4. Florida: 78-84 (-11)
5. Washington: 71-91 (+6)

Whoops.
Here's what I said in April:

"I had questions about [the Mets'] pitching staff, but I should have remembered that the Mets finished 3rd in the NL in ERA last year with the same bunch of questionable guys. Their pitching isn't as bad as I thought it was, and they're a good bet to dethrone the Braves." . . . "The [Atlanta] bullpen is a fair mess, as many have noted, but I'm not too sure about the rotation either." . . . "[The Phillies'] pitching staff is suffering, although GM Pat Gillick has convinced himself (for some godforsaken reason) that his pitchers are going to be okay. Yes, if okay means 80-some wins and another near-miss in the Wild Card race." . . . "The Marlins will be bad, but not as bad as people think. They may not even be the worst team in the NL. That's a relative victory."

Okay, I cherry-picked the lines that made me look good, so I threw in that Florida quote just to balance things out. The Mets were better even than I had anticipated, thanks to a healthy Carlos Beltran and the pitching staff I so wisely noted. The Braves' fall was long and hard. But while I was absolutely right about their pitching (Smoltz was the only one worth a damn), I guess I just thought that they would "find a way," like the always did. Well, as time has shown, Danys Baez was not "the way." In my defense, however, the Braves' Pythagorean Win-Loss record (hereafter referred to as pWins, or pW-pL) was 85-77, much closer to my prediction. This doesn't change the fact that I was wrong, but at least it's good news for next year.
I really should have seen that the Nats were a big step below the rest of the crowd, but I (along with every other sports fan) was shocked to death by the Marlins. I kept thinking to myself that I'd predicted them for 70 or 72 wins, but that was just rationalization, and my April blog is proof of it. I guess I can't beat myself up too bad for making the same mistake everyone else did.

NL CENTRAL
I predicted:

1. St. Louis: 90-72 (88-92 win range)
2. Milwaukee: 84-78 (82-86 win range)
3. Chicago: 82-80 (80-84 win range)
4. Houston: 79-83 (77-81 win range)
5. Cincinnati: 75-87 (73-77 win range)
6. Pittsburgh: 71-91 (69-73 win range)

This is how the comedy of errors ended:

1. St. Louis: 83-78 (+7)
2. Houston: 82-80 (-3)
3. Cincinnati: 80-82 (+5)
4. Milwaukee: 75-87 (+9)
5. Pittsburgh: 67-95 (-4)
6. Chicago: 66-96 (+16)

Here's what I said then:
"The Cubs had everything go wrong last year (except for Derrek Lee), and they can't have all that happen again this year." . . . "They [St. Louis] won't win near 100 games again, and the back end of their pitching staff will run out of luck sometime soon, but they're still (I think) the best team in the division." . . . "The Brewers could exceed even my numbers." . . . "4 months of Roger Clemens won't make the Astros contenders; not with that offense."
That first statement about the Cubs is funny in retrospect. Of course, the Cubs could have everything (and more) go wrong this year. Last year was a positive paradise compared to the dreadful 2006 "season." There are so many things I should have seen coming, but even then I thought the Cubs would have something positive happen to them this year. I was 16 wins wrong (which is a lot).
I was right about the Cardinals, but only by about an inch or so. Boy, they fell apart and how, but somehow still succeeded in backing into the playoffs. The Brewers also embarassed me, thanks to a lot of injuries and a lot of stagnation, not to mention an uncharateristically shabby trade by GM Doug Melvin (Kevin Mench?!).
The Astros were the team I came the closest to, and I had a good handle on their team dynamic heading into things. It was only because I was so wrong about the rest of the division that the Astros were able to finish second. The Pirates weren't as bad as I expected, but maybe that's because they got to play so many games against the Cubs.

NL WEST
I predicted:

1. Los Angeles: 84-78 (82-86 win range)
2. San Francisco: 80-82 (78-82 win range)
3. San Diego: 78-84 (76-80 win range)
4. Arizona: 71-91 (69-73 win range)
5. Colorado: 67-95 (65-69 win range)

Here's what really happened:

1. San Diego: 88-74 (-10)
2. Los Angeles*: 88-74 (-4)
3. San Francisco: 76-85 (-4)
4. Arizona: 76-86 (-5)
5. Colorado: 76-86 (-9)

Wow. I understimated the entire division. That takes talent. Or something . . .

My opinion in April:
"The Dodgers aren't any kind of brilliant, but I really think they're the strongest team in the West." . . . "I won't go into my "Barry Bonds is no longer a superstar" rant again, but even with him, the Giants are still a geriatric center." . . . "The Padres aren't bad, but they're simply the 2005 team v.2." . . . "The Rockies are the Rockies and will be until further notice."
Let's begin at the beginning. I was pretty much right about the Dodgers, so there's my one smiley face. I was basically right about the Giants, but wrong about Bonds. Barry wasn't his old self, but he was much better (and healthier) than I expected. The Padres weren't simply last year's team; they had a much better pitching staff, and it got them back to the playoffs. I thought Arizona's luck would catch up to them; if it did, they compensated by better production all around, and now look like one of the division's best teams going forward (a dubious honor though that is).
I guess I got my "notice." I was totally wrong about Colorado. All of the things that they told us to wait for finally occurred -- it was like watching the Armageddon and having Pat Robertson say, "A-ha! I told you so." Yeah, we'd all waited at first, but after a while, we though he was just crying wolf. Not so, as the Rockies found a strong, stable core of young pitching talent. With the young hitting talent they have coming up, to go along with Helton, Holliday, Hawpe, Hardy, Holloway, and Hezekiah, they might actually (gulp) contend! They're still a bit behind L.A. and Arizona in terms of future hopes, but they're close enough to make it interesting, which is a milestone in and of itself out in Colorado.
Would you believe that I picked the A's and Mets in the World Series? I picked the A's beating the Yankees in the ALCS (which should have happened, until those Damn Tigers came along in the ALDS) and the Mets against the Braves in the NLCS in which case the Braves were replaced by the Cardinals, who are quite possibly a worse team.
Well, it doesn't look like the Mets will face the A's in the Series now, unless the A's start calling themselves Idiots and find some way to trade for David Ortiz and Curt Schilling. The Mets may have a tougher road in the NLCS than I thought, but they should get there. I got half of the World Series right -- so sue me.

AWARDS PICKS:
In the AL, I picked Travis Hafner as MVP. And, if he had stayed healthy, I truly think he would have been the league's MVP. He wouldn't have won the actualy vote, because the voters just don't seem to notice him. Not noticing Travis Hafner is like not noticing a melon-sized goiter; you must either be blind or in denial.
In the NL, I picked David Wright. I didn't really think Wright would deserve the award (I figured that was Pujols), but I thought his scrappy play fo a contender would get him the honor. And sure enough, early in the season, he was the consensus MVP. But then the Mets got boring and Ryan Howard came along, shunting Wright into 9th or 10th place, if he's lucky.
I picked Johan Santana for AL Cy Young. You're shocked, I know. I'm shocked that anyone else would get picked in a pre-season poll. So long as he's got both legs, Santana's your favorite.
In the NL, I went out on a limb and took Jake Peavy. This was partly because the Baseball Prospectus annual made a very convincing case that Peavy was the best pitcher in the NL. And it didn't take much convincing for me to at least somewhat come around to their thinking. Peavy's youth and strikeouts were on my mind, and there's no one like Santana in the NL; no one that dominant. Well, Peavy had injury issues and also some bad luck, but he will be back and competing for future Cy Youngs, don't you doubt it.
For AL Rookie of the Year, I went for Kenji Johjima. I like to pick ROY candidates who are at least assured of a full-time role early in the season. That's why I declined on guys like Liriano. But even I should have seen the convergence of a posse of great young pitchers on the AL. Johjima was good, no question; about as good as I predicted, maybe better. But he ranks, like, 9th on my ballot.
In the NL, I picked Jeremy Hermida. This was my biggest miss by far among any awards. Hermida pretty much sucked and lost his job amongst all the other great rookies in Florida. This was a surprise; I was told that Hermida wasn't just a future star -- but a future superstar. This was backed up by his impeccable minor league credentials, so I took the plunge. And I didn't see anyone sticking out as a major candidate ahead of him. So I was wrong, but find me someone who picked Hanley Ramirez in April.

A few other random bits before bedtime:

• I know that advertisers are finding new ways to horn in on MLB TV. They're not just buying awards, they're trying to sponsor every segment or every pause. The worst is the WebMD injury report. Now, this doesn't sound that bad at first. It's flagrant ad-placement, yes, but hey, it's nice to explain to a fan just where the ACL is or what the oblique muscle does. It could be useful.
  Instead, WebMD used their CGI 3-d rendering of a human body's musculature to illustrate, for the viewers at home: a sore wrist. I'm not f***ing kidding. How inconceviably DUMB do you have to be to need a TV animation to explain to you what a SORE WRIST is?!
  "Phyllis, I've got an ouch."
  "Where is your ouch, dear."
  "On this part of my body right here (pointing)."
  "Where, dear? I can't see you; I'm in the kitchen."
  "It's not my hand, and it's not my arm. It's where my hand becomes my arm."
  "Oh, your wrist."
  "(Pensively) Wrist."
  "And does it hurt?"
  "It ouches."
  "How does it ouch, Willie?"
  "It's kind of a slow ouch, but all the time."
  "Oh, that means it's sore."
  "(Never heard the word before) Sore?"
  "Here look, dear, on TV. See the sore wrist?"
  "I finally get it now! A wrist -- a sore wrist! That there on TV is a sore wrist!"
  "And how do you know it's sore?"
  "Because they colored it red!"
  "Good, honey. Finish your Spaghetti-Ohs."
  
  By the way, they later used the same animation to explain Scott Rolen's injury. Rolen's injury? "Shoulder fatigue." I don't even want to imagine what poor Willie had to go through to wrap his provincial brain around that one.
• Annny-ways, as I mentioned before, the ALCS is all but over. I, along with many commentators, felt that the series was so close that it would go at least six or seven games. Please, when it comes to the postseason, don't listen to me or anyone else when we start predicting. The Tigers are up 3-0 with two more games at home. The bright spot for Oakland is that Dan Haren, their Game 4 starter, is arguably their best starting pitcher. You may ask: "Then why is he starting Game 4?" Good question.
• In the NLCS, the Cardinals pulled off the improbable by coming back against the Met bullpen at Shea Stadium to win a 9-6 slugfest and even the series 1-1. Normally, when a team splits the first two games of a 7-game series at the opponent's ballpark, you'd say that they had the advantage. But these are the Cardinals, people. I'm still having trouble trying to fathom how they scored 9 runs at all. Yes, the Met starter isn't that great, but their bullpen certainly is. It was 3 9th-inning runs off of ace closer Billy Wagner that sealed the deal. Can a team this mediocre really be succeeding like this? Because if they win the World Series, it's an embarassment. They would be, I feel pretty confident in saying, the worst-ever World Champions. And if you remember the '87 Twins, or any of the Florida Marlin teams, you know that's saying something. Either way, the World Series is starting to look like a cakewalk for the AL team, the Tigers (barring catastrophe). While I think the Mets would at least put up a fight, I simply doubt that the Tiger pitching staff can be stopped. Because every advantage the Mets have over them is the same advantage the Yankees had. Lightning doesn't strike twice in the same place, right? Usually, no, but then the even discussing the Tigers as "AL Champions" seems as logical as a Beckett play.

Keep the faith.

Letter to Citybeat

In Cincinnati, there's an alternative weekly newsmagazine called Citybeat. It discusses news in a progressive manner, deals a lot with local art, music, and theater as well as film. But there is a sports column, written by Bill Peterson, that focuses on the Reds, Bengals, and UC Bearcats. I an otherwise progressive publication, Peterson is an "old-guard" baseball writer. While he doesn't usually bother me, sometimes he gets me so agitated that I had to write in. He wrote this article in the Oct. 11-17 issue, an article which knocked statistics in a vague way and said that the "little things" were the key to winning, especially in the playoffs. Well, that got my dander up (which is never a good thing), and I wrote a firm, but generally diplomatic letter in response.
Just to note: I've previously written a letter in response to Citybeat, back in the summer of 2004. Peterson wrote than that the Reds were one good starting pitcher away from contending for the Wild Card. I know that hometown columnists tend to be optimistic, but this was, in my words, "optimism bordering on self-hypnosis." I wrote that not only did the Reds have a horrifically understaffed pitching staff (this was before the emergence of Arroyo and Harang), but they weren't even hitting as well as their divisional rivals, the Cardinals. To my surprise, the letter was published. I doubt I'll have as much luck this time; this letter is longer and tougher on Peterson.


To the Editor --
This letter is in response to Bill Peterson's article in the Oct. 11-17 issue of Citybeat entitled "Oakland's reliance on 'little things' tested in baseball playoffs. I feel that Peterson has missed the point with his analysis and has vastly misrepresented the opposing viewpoints.
Peterson claims that the key to winning baseball (especially in the postseason) is in the "little things." His claim that Minnesota lost in the ALDS due to the "little things" is a bit odd. I disagree; Minnesota lost because they were outscored 16-7. That may sound a bit simplistic, but then that's the idea; wins come from scoring and preventing runs. There's a reason they call all that other stuff the "little things."
He claims that Jerry Narron has been proven right in his assertion that the Reds should focus on the "little things." Now, I don't dislike Narron. But it doesn't take more than a casual fan to see that while the Reds do need to improve their fundamentals, they missed a chance to reach October this year not because of a couple of missed bunts, but rather due to a 4.51 team ERA. The "little things" get you a base here and there, and can be very important; but more important is a pitcher or hitter than can give and take away bases by the hundreds. No amount of "little things" can replace Austin Kearns and Felipe Lopez, sent on their way in a trade so bad for the franchise that it seemed like an April Fool's joke.
Peterson also badly misrepresents the ideas and beliefs of the statisticians, or as his tone always seems to imply, "the ignorant geeks." Peterson actually tries to condense his conception of all accepted statistical knowledge into one paragraph in his article, wherein he makes several mistakes.
Peterson describes the statistical "doctrine" as such, apparently intending to dispute it: "A batting order of hitters who reach high on-base percentages by hitting, walking, or both accumulates the most bases." You know, like Barry Bonds. Or Babe Ruth. Or Ted Williams. Or Mickey Mantle, etc. etc. By the way, the idea that stat-heads are "crazy for OBP" is simply false. We love home runs as much as the next guy.
"A club that eschews sacrifice bunts and stolen base attempts proportionally minimizes outs."
Peterson has, like seemingly every other baseball columnist, taken a few pages from the book "Moneyball" as the proscribed doctrine of how every stat-head thinks. This is false. Contrary to popular belief, NO ONE, not Bill James or the writers of Baseball Prospectus, thinks that stealing bases and sacrificing are a bad idea. Not one of them. It's not that teams overestimate the stolen base so much as they underestimate getting caught stealing. You have to steal bases at about a 70% rate of success to contribute positively to your team. Even if you steal 100 bases but get caught 50 times, you're hurting the team more than helping it. The myth that stat-heads hate stolen bases is generally false.
The same is true of sacrificing. Most stat-heads agree that sacrificing is a good idea -- but only on certain occasions. Derek Jeter should NEVER sacrifice, because as such a good hitter, he stands a better chance of helping his team by swinging away. Sacrifices are more useful in the late innings, as time runs out on the offense. Sacrificing in the early innings is almost always a dreadful idea, even if you have the league's worst offense and are playing in Petco Park.
Too often people like Peterson will take the result of a small sample of games (i.e. the postseason) and draw very broad conclusions based on these games. This is absurd. NOTHING is settled in one postseason. Everyone in the game, from the biggest stat-head to hard-line old-timers like John Schuerholz and Leo Mazzone, admits that luck has more to do with winning in the postseason than talent. A 5- or 7-game series in October proves nothing more than it does in July. The best team wins, sometimes. But not always. If the Yankees can lose three out of five to the Devil Rays (and the Padres can lose three out of five to the Cardinals), it's proof that you can't make any major decisions based on 5 or 7 games. Peterson's general thesis seems to be that this entire great philosophical issue will be decided in this year's postseason. That's absurd. And if Peterson thinks that the "little things," combined with pitching and defense, always win in October, he is absolutely wrong. Why is he wrong? Two words: Atlanta Braves.
Peterson does say, and I agree, that statistics don't tell us everything, and that we shouldn't have blind faith in the stats. I agree, and so do most so-called "stat-heads." What most stat-heads spend their time doing is trying to find the answers that no one has been able to find.
And if anything, it's us stat-heads who are trying to convince people not to put blind faith in a statistic. Because every journalist who claims that they "don't look at statistics" is the very same journalist who automatically votes for the league RBI leader for MVP and the league Wins leader for the Cy Young. They value the statistic more than the underlying reality of what is really being measured -- something that we stat-heads are often accused of but that the mainstream media is just as guilty of.
Peterson mentions the problem of a ground ball to first that could either be an out or a double, depending merely on where the first baseman plays. He's right; this is an issue, and I guarantee you that there are dozens of hard-working baseball fans watching hours of game footage every day trying to come up with a system to justify that. Just because we use statistics doesn't mean that we're not baseball fans.
Peterson is simply looking for justification of what he thinks is the "right" kind of baseball. Unfortunately, he does not want to use any sort of logic, statistical or otherwise, to prove his case. Because logic is not on his side.
The future of baseball is to use statistics and scouting to complement each other and cover for each others' weaknesses. Those who attempt to shun statistics altogether are doomed to the mediocrity of making ill-informed decisions. And there's not better way than that to describe the recent incarnation of the Cincinnati Reds.

Aaron Whitehead
Alexandria, KY
(859) -------
whizball.blogspot.com

Awards Wrap-Up

And now to finish my review of 2006 baseball. But first, two quick notes.

• Baseball doesn't often intersect with the true drama of real life, but unfortunately, it did today. A plane reportedly piloted by Yankees pitcher Cory Lidle collided into a Manhattan high-rise today. Lidle and an unnamed passenger were killed, but fortunately, no other fatalities are confirmed at this time. Lidle was a licensed pilot and had spoken of his plane to reporters in the past. Lidle's passport was reportedly found among the wreckage. Lidle has been confirmed as dead, although not yet by city officials. The building in question was a luxury high-rise in the Upper East Side of Manhattan overlooking the East River. Lidle's plane hit the 20th floor, which consists of only one apartment. This is fortunate; if Lidle's plane had hit a densely-populated building, other fatalities would no doubt have occurred. As it is, it is lucky, in a sense, that the plane hit a sparsely-populated building.
  I try not to mix politics with my baseball analysis, which is difficult as there are many political issues I feel strongly about. This only confirms my opinion that America is not sufficiently prepared for a true terrorist attack. According to espn.com, FAA spokeswoman Diane Spitaliere confirmed that pilots flying small-engine aircraft by sight are not required to be in contact with air traffic controllers. It's absurd that this rule should apply over Manhattan, or any other densely-populated area. With all of the bipartisan bluster that has gone into the war in terror, is it really this easy to crash a plane into a New York building? I worry that political fear-mongering over groundless rumors has replaced true defensive readiness in this country, and I worry that more people will have to die before this unforgivable short-sightedness in Washington is remedied.
• That aside, we move on to another, less-controversial event. Baseball legend Buck O'Neil passed away this Friday at the age of 94. O'Neil had been a baseball institution since his years of play in the Negro Leagues and was featured prominently as a master storyteller in Ken Burns' documentary, Baseball. The unfortunate nature of O'Neil's passing was made even moreso due to the controversy surrounding O'Neil's exclusion from the Baseball Hall of Fame. I blogged earlier about the special committee on the Negro Leagues that convened and voted to induct 17 players and executives as part of this year's induction ceremonies. O'Neil, perhaps the most popular and well-known of them all, fell one vote short.
  This was met by a firestorm of negative response from the baseball press, former players, and many fans. O'Neil was considered to be one of the most important figures in baseball during his more than 50 years involved with the game, and in his later years became one of the game's foremost ambassadors. How could he be excluded from the Hall? Perhaps the most vocal critic was MSNBC commentator and former Sportscenter host Keith Olbermann, who set aside special condemnation for the voters on the Negro Leagues committee has the "worst people in the world," (according to Olbermann's nightly segment of the same name).
  But I can understand exactly why O'Neil didn't make it into the Hall. The rules for induction into the Hall have always been interpreted conservatively. Players are inducted, of course; and so are umpires, executives, and "pioneers." (Note: sportswriters and announcers are often called "Hall of Famers," but they are not officially. They receive a Hall-sponsored award that enshrines them in a "special wing." They are not considered Hall-of-Famers in the sense that Babe Ruth or Ty Cobb are. They do not get plaques. Keep this in mind the next time Peter Gammons or Marty Brennaman is referred to as a "Hall-of-Famer."
  The fact is that Buck O'Neil simply does not fit into any criteria typically set for induction into the Hall. He was a good player in the Negro Leagues but was, by his own admission, not that good. He was a manager in the Negro Leagues as the leagues died out, but again, could hardly be called a Hall-of-Famer based on that alone. He was the major leagues' first African-American coach, with the Chicago Cubs. This is important and is often forgotten. But no "coach" other than a manager has ever been inducted into the Hall. He served for many years as a scout and special advisor both with the Cubs and in his "home" of Kansas City with the Royals, scouting future All-Stars Joe Carter and Bo Jackson. But again, no scout has ever been inducted into Cooperstown. In his advancing age, O'Neil served many key roles as an ambassador for baseball in general and the Negro Leagues, specifically. But this does not meet any of the criteria for induction into the Hall.
  The voters simply did not induct Buck O'Neil for his "lifetime achievements," because no one else had ever been inducted under that dubious reasoning. The Hall voters love precedent, and there was no precedent for inducting someone like Buck.
  I can understand this completely. But I also believe, with all of my heart, that it should not be the case.
  I think the Hall should induct great coaches, and perhaps even great scouts. I think there should be consideration for "lifetime achievement," which, believe it or not, the Hall rules do allow for. Some have even suggested a "Buck O'Neil Award," which would go to someone whose lifetime achievements have earned them baseball's highest honor, although their specific roles do not fit existing criteria. This would also be a good idea.
  The real problem is that the Hall has never made preparations or allowances for this eventuality. Buck O'Neil was 94 years old, and people have been touting him as a possible Hall-of-Famer for years. Did it really take people this long to suggest that maybe there ought to be some special allowance for Buck and people like him? This is, unfortunately, characteristic of Hall voters. Many people have to wait until they are dead (or near death) to get a "sentimental" bandwagon going for their induction. That any such thing has to exist shows how senseless the current Hall voters and election system is. Any suggestion that they should revise voting rules to more closely reflect the changing game is met with derision by many. And the Veterans Committee, baseball's official "last chance" for those not inducted by the BBWAA, moves with all the speed (and intelligence) of the George Wallace Desegregation Committee.
  There needs to be a revision of the Hall rules that allows for people like Buck O'Neil, Lefty O'Doul, Johnny Sain, Leo Mazzone, and (dare I say) Bill James to be considered for baseball's greatest honor. Realistically, I think there will; Buck's death has galvanized enough people that he should be inducted, either through the Veterans' Committee, or some newly-created "Buck O'Neil Award." It is, of course, too late for that. And I mean this not just as a sentimental plea for a great man, but as a realistic plea for a hidebound organization. They shouldn't just be arguing over Ron Santo and Gil Hodges; let's bring people like Buck into the discussion. And after Buck is inducted, we can move onto the next great man who deserves induction, but likely won't see it in his lifetime: Marvin Miller.

And now, having worn out my soapbox, I'll finish up my 2006 Awards:

National League Rookie of the Year: Hanley Ramirez
This looked like a race between Ramirez and keystone-mate Dan Uggla, but Uggla's star faded down the stretch (finishing 282/339/480) and I believe that Hanley (292/353/480, 51/65 in steals) is left on top of the rookie world. The Marlins as a whole had a flock of ROY candidates. Apart from Ramirez and Uggla, the best position player was left fielder Josh Willingham. A converted catcher, Willingham showed he could hit like a left fielder, batting 277/356/496. Despite his strong numbers, Willingham loses ground in my eyes not just for his position, but because he was visibly still learning it (-12 FRAA). Playing the outfield does, admittedly, involve a bit more running than catching.
We're not done, though, because the Marlins also had several key rookie pitchers. (These guys are why the Marlins were contenders despite having a payroll 90% less than the Yankees'). Anibal Sanchez had a good year, not even taking his no-hitter into account. Sanchez (nicknamed "Anibal Lee" by a more literate commentator than most) posted an impressive 2.83 ERA. The trouble is that he pitched only 114.1 IP, with a less-than-amazing 46:72 BB:K ratio. It was good, but not great.
No, the best rookie pitcher on the Marlins was Josh Johnson. Johnson finished the season with a 3.10 ERA, notching an impressive 68:133 BB:K ratio. But Johnson has the same problem as Sanchez; innings (only 157). If Joe Girardi had set the Marlin rotation sooner, then we wouldn't have this problem. But Johnson just doesn't really compare with Ramirez with just more than half a season's worth of playing time.
Are there any non-Marlins to consider for the ROY? The biggest one is Washington's Ryan Zimmerman. Dubbed the "next Scott Rolen" coming into the season, Zimmerman actually managed to somewhat meet those expectations, hitting 287/351/471 to go with strong defense at third. Like Ramirez, Zimmerman played a full season in a pitcher's park. He also has the defensive advantage, since Ramirez wasn't that strong at shortstop. It's close, but I went with Ramirez for three reasons: Florida is a tougher hitter's park; he plays a more important defensive position; and he stole 51 bases with a good success rate.
Other notables include Dodger closer Takashi Saito, who I mentioned before as the NL's best relief pitcher. The 36-year-old Japanese veteran is a rookie only in the technical sense, but his very strong relief season should earn him a spot on some ballots. The Padres had the dynamic duo of Clay & Cla. Clay Hensley had a surprisingly good season as a starter, but his 3.71 ERA doesn't cut the mustard in pitcher-friendly San Diego. Cla Meredith was dominant, posting a 1.07 ERA with a 6:37 BB:K ratio. But you just can't earn the ROY with 50.2 innings of work, especially if you're a middle reliever.
It was a great year for rookies in baseball, so I haven't even mentioned some of the other marginal candidates in the NL, such as Luke Scott, Russell Martin, Prince Fielder, Jonothan Broxton or the underrated Matt Cain. But I feel comfortable with my choice of Ramirez. And by any standard of measure, this great crop of rookies is good news for baseball.

1. Hanley Ramirez, Marlins
2. Ryan Zimmerman, Nationals
3. Takashi Saito, Dodgers
4. Josh Johnson, Marlins
5. Dan Uggla, Marlins

American League Rookie of the Year: Francisco Liriano
There's really little argument that Liriano was the best rookie in the AL this year. He posted a 2.16 ERA, with a 32:144 BB:K ratio and just 9 HR allowed. By almost any measure, objective or subjective, he was dominant.
The problem here is innings: only 121 of them, to be exact. The AL is literally overflowing with good young rookies; was Liriano good enough in his 121 innings to beat out guys who pitched as many as 186?
I think so, yes, just barely. Liriano's biggest challenger (and the man who will likely take home the award) is Justin Verlander of the Tigers. Verlander wasn't quite as dominant as Liriano, but he was still damn good: 3.63 ERA, 60:124 BB:K ratio in 186 IP. But other than those innings pitched, Verlander doesn't have any advantage over Liriano. His ERA is a run and a half higher, and his FRA (Fair Run Average) shows that this isn't a fluke. His BB:K ratio isn't bad, but it's surprisingly low for someone with stuff as good as his. Liriano actually managed 20 more strikeouts than Verlander, despite pitching 65 fewer innings. Verlander also allowed 21 homers to Liriano's 9. And all of this in a much easier park for pitchers than Liriano has in Minnesota.
I think that because Liriano was so much better than Verlander, he should get the award, 65 innings be damned.
But it should be noted that there's another starting pitcher with a claim similar to Liriano's. Jered Weaver didn't get started until the season was almost half over, but in his 123 IP, he put up numbers similar to Liriano's. Weaver's ERA was 2.56 and his BB:K ratio was 33:105. Not quite as brilliant as Liriano, but impressive nonetheless. But it isn't just this that causes me to rank Weaver below Liriano and even Verlander; the main thing is his BABIP.
In short, BABIP is Batting Average on Balls in Play. According to sabermetric wisdom first coined by Voros McCracken, a pitcher has almost no control on whether balls in play become outs. Put simply, other than walks, strikeouts, and home runs, it's almost completely out of the pitcher's hands. BABIP measures all of those balls that the pitcher had no control over. BABIP shows almost no correlation from year to year; a pitcher doesn't have the ability towards a low or high BABIP; it's almost entirely luck. But all these balls in play do affect a pitcher's ERA. So a pitcher with a high BABIP has given up more hits than usual on balls in play. This may be due to poor defense, or simply to bad luck; the hitters were "hittin' them where they ain't."
Having said that, you can look at the pitchers with extreme BABIPs and come to certain conclusions. A BABIP between .290-.300 is about normal. Pitchers with numbers higher than this have been unlucky; thus, they should return to average next year (affecting their number of hits allowed, and thus, their ERA). Pitchers with a low BABIP have been lucky; their success isn't just due to their pitching, but to good luck, and we would expect them to decline the following season.
All of this is a long setup to a simple fact: Jered Weaver's BABIP in 2006 was .239. Among all pitchers in baseball with at least 100 innings pitched, Weaver was the luckiest in the American League on hits in play, second only to San Diego's Chris Young (.232) in all of baseball.
What does this mean? It means that Weaver's amazing 2.56 ERA was due not just to his quality pitching, but to an enormous amount of luck; balls found gloves a lot when Weaver was pitching. In my opinion, this should affect our analysis of him. BABIP can be taken too literally; pitchers will veer back and forth from year to year due to nothing but chance. But anything this extreme must be taken into account. And it's very important when determining who was better to consider that Weaver was inordinatelly lucky, whereas Liriano (.285 BABIP) and Verlander (.297) were not. That combined with his low total of innings removes Weaver from the running.
But that deals just with the starting pitchers. Were their any good rookie relief pitchers? And how.
First off, Joel Zumaya of the Tigers. Apart from being a 100-MPH-throwing monster, Zumaya also had a dominant season, one of the best seasons by an AL reliever. This was more amazing, because Zumaya wasn't a closer. He pitched middle relief for the Tigers, but Jim Leyland actually used him in many high-leverage situations in the late innings (Zumaya finished 17th among all AL relief pitchers in "leverage," a number that measures the importance of the situations a pitcher throws in. Most of the people ahead of him were closers.). Zumaya pitched a healthy 83.1 innings, striking out 97 (!) against just 6 HR and 42 walks (he can be a little wild, which is pretty scary). The only reason Zumaya wasn't moved into the more important "closer" role is that the Tigers had already signed "veteran closer" Todd Jones for the role. Jones couldn't carry Zumaya's gym bag, but that's how much teams today are overcommitted to labels.
If Jones had been the team's closer, he might have been the best relief pitcher in the AL. As it is, he wasn't. That honor goes to Boston's rookie closer, Jonathan Papelbon. I mentioned Papelbon during the Cy Young discussion, saying that if he hadn't missed September due to injury, he could quite possibly have won the award. Which means that he would have been a shoo-in for Rookie of the Year. As it is, he still ranks very highly; just below the top rookie starters in the game. Even then, there's a possibility that Papelbon was the best rookie in the AL even though he did miss a month.
Among pitchers, honorable mention goes to Baltimore's Chris Ray (a rare bit of hope in that city) and Cleveland's Jeremy Sowers.
Were there any rookie hitters that even deserve mention alongside this dauting crop of pitchers? Not really. The best was probably Esteban German of the Royals, who surprised everyone by hitting an amazing 326/422/459. German doesn't have much power or good defense, but he made it to a team full of job openings, and showed that his minor-league OBP talent wasn't a fluke. Problem: his 279 ABs, enough for a pat on the back, but not enough to dethrone Mr. Liriano. Honorable mention goes to three rookies who did play full seasons, but were not much more than above-average: Seattle's Kenji Johjima (291/332/451, and one of the steals of the offseason free agent market), Texas' Ian Kinsler (286/347/454, and a better solution at second than Mr. Soriano) and Baltimore's Nick Markakis (291/351/448, with much more to come).

1. Francisco Liriano, Twins
2. Justin Verlander, Tigers
3. Jonothan Papelbon, Red Sox
4. Joel Zumaya, Tigers
5. Jered Weaver, Angels

NL DHL Delivery Man of the Year: Takashi Saito
Yeah, I don't like the award, but we have to show our appreciation for relief pitchers. I've already discussed Saito ad nauseum in the Cy Young and ROY discussions. I've given him the edge over Hoffman and Wagner, because I don't look to saves to guide my decisions anymore. The top four are my favorite closers. My #5 may surprise people, but he was a good setup man who threw a lot of high-leverage innings. Honorable mention goes to: Brian Fuentes, Chad Cordero, Scott Linebrink, Tom Gordon

1. Takashi Saito, Dodgers
2. Billy Wagner, Mets
3. Trevor Hoffman, Padres
4. Salomon Torres, Pirates
5. Mike Gonzalez, Pirates

AL DHL Delivery Man of the Year: Jonathan Papelbon
Again, Papelbon has already been discussed in earlier entries. The messy issue here is trying to compare middle relievers to closers. Obviously, we can't use saves to do so. We could use ERA, but then ERA is only as important as the innings you're throwing. Nor can we assume, as I've said, that a closer is ipso facto throwing more important innings; middle relief juggernaughts like Zumaya are more valuable than some closers. We could use WXRL, but that's extremely biased to opportunity, and ranking by WXRL is usually not much different than ranking by save opportunities. The best thing we can do is try to use each tool's benefits to gain a better overall understanding. There are all-in-one stats like VORP or Win Shares, but I prefer to use those as a supplement, not as a definitive guide. As such, here's what I've come up with:

1. Jonathan Papelbon, Red Sox
2. B.J. Ryan, Blue Jays
3. Joe Nathan, Twins
4. Joel Zumaya, Tigers
5. J.J. Putz, Mariners

NL Manager of the Year: Joe Girardi
This is the default answer; Girardi should win the award easily. This is a credit to Girardi not only for establishig a professional atmosphere in the Florida clubhouse, but for working a baseball team out of a bunch of kids who weren't supposed to be ready for the majors yet. It took him a bit longer in some cases than others, and I can't ignore the fact that his boss desperately wanted to fire him. But Girardi seems like the best candidate to me, mainly on the strength of his team's amazing feat of exceeding everyone's expectations by leaps and bounds.

1. Joe Girardi, Marlins
2. Willie Randolph, Mets
3. Phil Garner, Astros

AL Manager of the Year: Jim Leyland
A lot of credit has to be given to Leyland for what he did on the field and off. He took a bunch of undisciplined youngsters and marginal veterans and, while he didn't turn straw into gold, he did the next best things: he took the Tigers to the postseason.

1. Jim Leyland, Tigers
2. Ron Gardenhire, Twins
3. Ken Macha, Athletics

NL Executive of the Year: Omar Minaya
Again, I'm not exactly going crazy with these awards. But although I don't always agree with his moves, I give Minaya credit. Yes, he's spent a lot of money bringing winning baseball to New York, but he has (for the most part) spent it on the right people. The Pedro contract isn't looking too good right now, but I like Carlos Beltran for the future, as well as Billy Wagner and Carlos Delgado. He also got one of the offseason's best bargains in Jose Valentin. He's also had the good sense not to trade away his future, using guys like Jose Reyes, David Wright, Aaron Heilman, and Lastings Milledge to build a foundation for future postseasons. And although Minaya has spent a lot of money and does have the league's highest payroll, it's just $91 million. This is less than half of the Yankee payroll and only slightly larger than the Dodgers or Cubs. He also has the revenues and market size to make it work. We'll see what he does this offseason, though, before we start patting ourselves on the back.
Other than Omar, it wasn't a stellar year for NL GMs. Former stalwarts such as John Schuerholz and Walt Jocketty, and recent favorite Doug Melvin, all had off-years that were reflected in their team's performance. So we had to look beyond them for some interesting, "out-there" picks for the #2 and #3 spots.

1. Omar Minaya, Mets
2. Josh Byrnes, Diamondbacks
3. Larry Beinfest, Marlins

AL Executive of the Year: Kenny Williams
It probably sounds bizarre to give this award to someone whose team missed the postseason, but as I've said before, Kenny Williams did a marvelous job of preparing his team to defend their World Championship. The Jim Thome trade paid off in spades, and the acquisition of Jermaine Dye also came to fruition this year. Williams tried to support his tired starters by trading for Javier Vazquez, but Vazquez again had a poor year despite strong peripherals. And no one could have predicted the wholesale shutdown of the starting rotation, or Juan Uribe's descent from bad to really bad. Williams has shown a good understanding of the problems facing the club in the future: namely, getting rid of Scott Podsednik and doing something either in center field or at shortstop. His team may have missed October baseball, but Williams nonetheless did his job and did it quite well.
Some may note the absence of the GMs of feel-good teams Detroit and Minnesota. My opinion is that these teams' success was not so much due to the GM. In Minnesota, if anything the team won in spite of Terry Ryan, and his signings of Rondell White (understandable) and Tony Batista (totally not understandable) not to mention the continued employment of Juan Castro. Ryan gets a big kiss from me for his A.J. Pierzynski trade, but I don't think you can't get credit for one trade every year that it helps you, even if it's a really good trade. As for the Tigers, they, too succeeded mainly due to their young players rather than the GM's machinations. GM Dave Dombrowski deserves credit for signing Kenny Rogers, but his signing of Todd Jones was completely unnecessary, and it's just lucky for him that Jones hasn't imploded yet. Other key free agents from years past include Magglio Ordonez and Ivan Rodriguez. Both players are still strong contributors, but are so incredibly overpaid that it's hard to call them a credit to Dombrowski's record. I give Dombrowski credit for presiding over the development of Verlander, Zumaya, and Curtis Granderson, but not enough to make him this year's award winner.

1. Kenny Williams, White Sox
2. Brian Cashman, Yankees
3. Billy Beane, Athletics

RANDOM AWARDS

BEST NL OFFENSE: Los Angeles Dodgers
In the NL, the teams are pretty bunched up at the top. No one has any clear lead in more than one or two offensive categories, making it hard to find a consensus winner. The Phillies led the league in runs scored with 865, but take into account their ballpark, which is infinitely more hitter-friendly than Dodger Stadium. The Braves led the league in home runs, but even their park is slightly more homer-happy than L.A.'s. The Braves also led the league in slugging percentage, giving them the edge over any other NL team in the power department.
But L.A. gets the upper hand, in my opinion, thanks to a league-leading .276 batting average and, thanks to their 601 walks, a league-leading .348 OBP. Equivalent Average (EQA) actually has the Mets at the top, at .269; a hair above L.A.'s .268 and the .267 mark recorded by Atlanta and Philadelphia.
You could make a good case for the Mets, but my money's on Los Angeles.
2nd place: New York; 3rd place: Atlanta

BEST AL OFFENSE: New York Yankees
This was not the greatest lineup of all time. It was certainly a list of 9 great players, but two of them (Matsui and Sheffield) were severely hampered by injuries, and a third (Bobby Abreu) spent less than half the season there. Still, the Yanks were the class of the league, succeeding with the same ol' reliable approach of walks and homers. They led the league in on-base percentage, although Boston drew a few more walks (672 to New York's 649). They also led the league in runs scored, but finished second to Chicago in home runs (210 to 236). Their Equivalent Average, an all-around offensive metric, puts the Yankees at the top of the league at .279, a good bit ahead of second-place Cleveland (.273). It wasn't legendary, but it was the best in the AL.
2nd place: Cleveland; 3rd place: Chicago

BEST NL PITCHING STAFF: San Diego Padres
Yes, the Padres do play in a pitcher-friendly ballpark, but even so, their 3.87 ERA is notably lower than 2nd-place Houston's 4.08. That's the main argument; does Houston's more hitter-friendly ballpark move it past San Diego?
I don't think so. Houston isn't quite as hitter-friendly as its reputation. While the Astros did notch more strikeouts than the Padres, they also allowed more walks and more home runs. The argument could be made for Houston, and perhaps even the Mets, but I'm going with San Diego.
2nd place: Houston; 3rd place: New York

BEST AL PITCHING STAFF: Minnesota Twins
This is something of a surprise. The Twins had a fine 3.95 ERA, but the Tigers were better, leading the league at 3.84. And the Tigers had the solid rep as the best-pitching team in the league. But not only is Detroit a much friendlier place to pitch than Minnesota, the Twins' peripherals are much stronger. The Twins allowed an insanely low 356 walks while tying for the league lead in strikeouts with 1164 (with the Angels). The Tigers walked 133 more batters and managed 161 fewer strikeouts. The Twins did allow 22 more home runs, but that's almost entirely attributable to the difference in ballparks. The Tigers have ERA on their side, but the Twins simply had the better staff.
2nd place: Detroit; 3rd place: Los Angeles

OZZIE GUILLEN AWARD (NL): Jeff Francoeur
Francoeur takes the 2nd-annual award for the player with the worst plate discipline in the league. If Francoeur sticks around long enough, in fact, we could rename the award after him. Because whereas Ozzie swung at anything within arm's reach, he at least made contact and didn't strike out a whole lot. I prefer to give the award to the player with a whole lot of strikeouts and very few walks. Perhaps a better name for it would be the Joe Carter Award or the Dave Kingman Award. A guy who never walks and is easy to strike out. And who better fits that description than Francoeur.
Joe Carter is actually the best-case scenario for Francoeur's career. Carter never walked and struck out often, regularly posting OBPs below .300 (which was bad even in the 1980's), but hit enough homers and had enough athleticism to put together a solid major league career (but not a Hall-of-Fame career). This is the best-case scenario for Francoeur's career.
The worst case scenario is . . . well, more seasons like this one. Francoeur posted an OBP this year of .293. Among all major league right fielders with at least 100 PAs (plate appearances), Francoeur ranks 45th out of 51. Most of the guys below him are part-time players (for good reason); Francoeur is the only player in the bottom 10 with more than 350 PAs. He's essentially the worst full-time right fielder in all of baseball at getting on base; even Carter wasn't that bad. The next-worst is the Cardinals' Juan Encarnacion, with a .317 OBP.
Some people don't see the essential connection between OBP and hitting; and by some people, I mean the Braves' announcers. They talk about how all that OBP talk is overrated, and that Francoeur is still a great player. Well, let me rephrase the issue. Francoeur this year made 473 outs. He made more outs than any other player in baseball except two. I think that's a very basic, less arbitrary way of putting it. A player who's making more outs than every other baseball player in the MLB except for Juan Pierre and Jimmy Rollins is a bad player. Granted, the issue is a bit unfair; few players as bad as Francoeur get 651 ABs. If you're that bad, no manager is going to give you the opportunity to make that many outs. Why? Because outs are bad. And that's exactly what OBP measures: percentage of time reaching base, i.e. not making an out.
But let's ignore that for a while. Let's assume that Francoeur is a player of such historic stature that he's still valuable, despite making that many outs. He could be doing it with power; he had such great power last year, that it helped him overcome his poor plate discipline. Did he do it this year? Francoeur ranks 16th among all major league right fielders in ISO, or Isolated Power (this includes all players with at least 250 PAs). That's not too bad; Jeromy Burnitz and Jason Lane are right in front of him, and Wily Mo Pena and Corey Hart are right behind him. Unfortunately, "not too bad" isn't good enough to make up for his woeful OBP. It may be a surprise to see him so low; after all, his 29 home runs are 3rd among all big-league right fielders! But his 24 doubles are tied for 21st among the same group. He's tied with Trot Nixon and Kevin Mench, and just a hair above Reggie Sanders and Endy Chavez. Generally, in baseball, a large difference between doubles and home runs suggests that the two numbers will even out over time. So Francoeur's low doubles total indicates that he's more likely to hit fewer homers in the future. That's bad news.
Keep in mind, we're only comparing him to right fielders. Right Field is supposed to be an offense-first position. Francoeur isn't a catcher or shortstop who can make up for bad offense with stellar defense. He plays one of the least important defensive positions on the diamond. I know we're reaching for straws here, but is Francoeur at least a great right fielder?
Nope. According to Clay Davenport's Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA), Francoeur ranks 26th among 30 regular major league right fielders at -9 FRAA. (Bill James' Win Shares ranks him higher; 8th of 30). ESPN ranks the 17 major-league right fielders with enough at-bats to qualify for the batting title. Among them, Francoeur is next-to-last 16/17 in fielding percentage (.973), 11/17 in Range Factor (2.08), and 8/17 in Zone Rating, a speciailized defensive statistic which assigns "zones" to different areas of the field.
So we've gotten mixed reviews on Francoeur's defense, but the best estimate is that he's an average right fielder; Clay Davenport's FRAA, which I tend to go by, rates him as pretty well below-average.
Oh, and this year, Francoeur stole one base and was caught 6 times.
Joe Carter's legacy is not in danger.
Just to recap, here's the case for Francoeur as the 2006 Ozzie Guillen Award Winner:

• Of the 310 major league players with at least 250 ABs this year, Francoeur ranks 296th in Walk Rate.
• He ranks 299th in Unintentional Walk Rate (rate of drawing walks minus those issued intentionally).
• He ranks 304th in SO:BB ratio.

And just to complete the profile: of all major league right fielders, Francoeur ranks 49th of 64 in VORP at -1.6. This puts him right behind Adam Hyzdu and T.J. Bohn and just barely ahead of Joe Borchard, Chris Aguila, and Matt Cepicky.

Case Closed.

Honorable Mention: Ronny Cedeno, Jacque Jones, Preston Wilson, Clint Barmes, Pedro Feliz, Dan Uggla

OZZIE GUILLEN AWARD (AL): Jose Lopez & Rafael Betancourt
I decided to lump these two together, since they are the Mariners' young double-play combo. And how alike they are! Both are reputedly excellent on defense, although it doesn't show up so much in the numbers (-11 FRAA for Betancourt, -18 for Lopez). They're also great choices for this award, judging by their inability to make contact with the ball. And while Jeff Francoeur swats the occasional home run, these two hit a combined 18 homers in over 1000 at-bats. Lopez sets the tone with 26:80 BB:K ratio, while Betancourt rounds it out with his 17:54 mark. Both men notch more than 3 strikeouts per walk, which is a general sign of poor plate discipline. There may have been a better choice than these among my honorable mentions, but the convenience of both men playing as young hopefuls in the Seattle middle infield made them too good to refuse.
Honorable Mention: Craig Wilson, Rocco Baldelli, Robinson Cano, Craig Monroe, Corey Patterson, Ivan Rodriguez, Ben Broussard

HARD-LUCK PITCHER AWARD (NL): Jason Jennings & Aaron Cook
Again, two players on the same team (Colorado) afflicted with the same ailment. It's bad enough all the crap that Rockie pitchers have had to suffer through in the past. Now their teammates can't score enough runs for them? Jennings was probably the better of the two, posting a 3.78 ERA in 212 innings, notching 142 strikeouts. But groundball specialist Cook was almost as effective, managing a 4.23 ERA in 212.2 IP but with a bare 92 strikeouts.
Neither man is near the Cy Young race, but both deserve congratulations for succeeding in poor conditions. But what do they have to show for it in the W-L column?
9-13 for Jennings, 9-15 for Cook.
Damn.

HARD-LUCK PITCHER AWARD (AL): John Lackey & Kelvim Escobar
Okay, maybe it's a coincidence, but are all of these problems affecting teammates in pairs? Lackey was someone who should end up on the back end of some Cy Young ballots. He posted an excellent 3.56 ERA, going 217.2 innings with a strong 72:190 BB:K ratio. Escobar was the second-best pitcher on the Angel staff, but considering Lackey, that's no insult. His ERA was a fine 3.61, and although he only pitched 189.2 innings, he still worked a solid 50:147 BB:K ratio.
Their reward? For Lackey, 13-11. For Escobar, 11-14. It may only matter to the baseball writers, but then they are the ones with the votes.

THE JIM ROSS "HOSS" AWARD (NL): Bronson Arroyo
Having been spurned from the Red Sox, because they didn't feel he was really good enough to pitch in the AL East, Arroyo took his revenge in Cincinnati. Not only was his team in contention long after Boston was eliminated, but Boston's chief problem was a shortage of starting pitching. Arroyo will be laughing all the way to the bank, as he earned himself at least one big-time free agent deal in 2006. His 14-11 record is misleading; he and Aaron Harang were the two workhorses that the Reds hitched their wagon to. If they hadn't been working with only three wheels (trading away key players Felipe Lopez and Austin Kearns) and arguably no one driving (GM Wayne Krivsky, who made the deal), they just might have made it into October. As it was, Arroyo led the league with 240.2 IP, managing an excellent 3.29 ERA and a 61:184 BB:K ratio. This season may not be good news for Arroyo's still-young arm, but it's good enough to earn at least one or two "Oh, my Gods" from good ol' J.R.
Close 2nd place: Salomon Torres

THE JIM ROSS "HOSS" AWARD (AL): Johan Santana
I guess it's not fair to give a "specialty" award to someone who's already won a major award. But Santana earned it. He led the American League in innings pitched while earning himself the pitcher's Triple Crown: he led the league in strikeouts (245) and ERA (2.77) while tying for the league lead in wins (19, with Chien-Ming Wang). He did all of this with a team that, during the September stretch run, had nothing else but him in the starting rotation and a whole lot riding on it. Santana delivered again, not that anyone's surprised.

THE EYE-POPPER AWARD (NL): Bill Hall's 35 HR
I guess I should give this award to Ryan Howard's 58 homers, but that was at least somewhat expected. But while we all knew that Bill Hall had power, I guess we just never thought he make it this far in a full season. Hall also struck out 162 times and while he's a passable shortstop, he really shouldn't hold the role full-time. I've heard talk that they may turn him into an outfielder. If so, well, at least they've found one of the few middle infielders who hits like one.

THE EYE-POPPER AWARD (AL): Jonathan Papelbon's 0.92 ERA
Yes, Papelbon didn't pitch a full season, but his 68.1 IP are actually more than a lot of closers would call a "full season." Of AL closers that spent the whole season in the role, Papelbon outpitched three of them, and was within 5 innings of all but two. Dennis Eckersley posted a 0.61 ERA in a year where the AL ERA was 3.72, and he threw only 5 innings more than Papelbon. Papelbon's 0.92 ERA came in a league with a 4.56 ERA. That gives us some idea of what we're talking about here with young Jonathan Papelbon.

THE GREATEST SEASON NO ONE NOTICED (NL): Miguel Cabrera
I mentioned this in my MVP comments, but I'll say it again: 339/430/568 batting line in a pitcher's park, passable defense at third base, key contributor on a contending team. He's also young and has been doing this for a couple of years. Come on, give the guy some "props," (as they say on the street).
Honorable Mention: Lance Berkman, Garrett Atkins, Matt Holliday

THE GREATEST SEASON NO ONE NOTICED (AL): Manny Ramirez
I would have given this award to Carlos Guillen, but his postseason exposure has gotten him some well-deserved credit. Instead, it goes to Manny. How can anyone possibly hit 321/439/619 and not get the papers at least a little excited about him? It's because Manny's off-field personality "issues" get a lot more attention. And besides, Manny's literally been doing this for years. He's quietly had one amazing offensive season after another. If he had Derek Jeter's personality, he would have already been bronzed.
Honorable Mention: Curt Schilling, C.C. Sabathia

THE OVERRATED AWARD -- NL (the player, not the award itself): Jeff Francoeur
We've been over this already; see above.
Honorable Mention: Nomar Garciaparra, Jimmy Rollins, Juan Pierre, Jason Isringhausen, David Eckstein

THE OVERRATED AWARD -- al (the player, not the award itself): Bobby Jenks
Yes, Jenks is a fine closer, no question. But to say that he's one of the best closers in baseball? No dice -- at least not yet. Jenks this year notched 41 saves (in 45 chances) which is, of course, all anyone notices about relief pitchers. But Jenks' ERA was 4.00. Not bad, but compared to other AL closers, it actually is bad. Of all AL closers who spent the full season in the role, only Ambiorix Burgos of Kansas City posted a higher mark. So Jenks ranks 11th of 12 in that department.
Jenks doesn't give up a lot of homers (5) and does get his fair share of strikeouts (80 in 69.2 IP). But his 31 walks are rather high, nearly one walk every two innings. Among the 12 aforementioned "full-season" closers, Jenks ranks 8th in WXRL, at 3.939. This is actually worse than it appears, since Jenks, with 45 save opportunities had many more chances than most at pitching in the 9th inning, the most important one.
Bobby Jenks is not a bad closer. But think again before you start putting him on the same list as Mariano Rivera, B.J. Ryan, Billy Wagner, Trevor Hoffman, Joe Nathan, and Francisco Rodriguez.

That's all I have in terms of awards. There's still some post-season analysis I have to do before I fling myself full-fledge into the world of Trevor Hoffman, but I'll keep you updated. And hopefully, none of my entries will be quite as long as this one.

For the results of my 2005 Awards, go to this page and scroll down near the bottom.
Honorable Mention: Justin Morneau, Sean Casey, Mark Loretta, the Minnesota "Piranhas", Gary Matthews, Jr.,

2006 Awards

National League MVP: Albert Pujols

It must seem like a broken record to keep calling Albert the best player in the NL, but it's rather a fact. Before I go over Albert's record, I'll deal with his main challengers.

Unlike the AL, though, there aren't a lot of candidates. The big 3 candidates (in the eyes of most) are Albert, Ryan Howard, and Carlos Beltran.

We'll start with Howard. At first, I was dismissive of Howard, because his huge number of strikeouts (181 total) were bringing down his average (and thus his OBP). But in the late months of the season, Howard went on a tear, raising all of his numbers significantly. He finished with not only 58 homers, but a 313/425/659 batting line that's legit regardless of ballparks. The main argument on Howard's behalf is that he "carried" the Phillies back into contention, finishing a close 2nd in the Wild Card race.

If you've read my blog before, you know I'm very dismissive of the idea that one player can "carry" a team, beyond what they do on the field. It is, in my opinion, largely a psychological illusion. Players tend to play as well as their inner level of talent. They may think it's because they're being "carried," but there's no evidence that a superstar payer can help a team win games beyond what they do on the field. It wasn't because of Howard's leadership that Chase Utley is a great player; Howard's charisma didn't turn Cole Hamels from a struggling prospect into a strong, front-line starter. It may seem like it did, because these things all happened at the same time. But just because they happen together, we can't assume that one thing causes another. Trust baseball men to constantly confuse correlation with causation. These are the same people who can point to an on-field fight as the event that "turned the team around." One particularly dedicated analyst went back and documented every significant fight over the past several years, including many famous ones from years past. Teams generally don't play any better after fights than they did before them, all other things considered. See my previous entry on the 2005 NL MVP race for further explanation.

Putting all that "carrying" nonsense aside, my main argument against Howard is not his strikeouts; anyone who hits over .300 with 58 homers is more than compensating for their strikeouts, even 181 of them. It has more to do with his position. Howard is a first baseman; this makes his contribution less "valuable," in the sense that it's easier to find a first baseman who hits 58 homers than a shortstop of the same ilk. Positional adjustments are one of the cornerstones of modern analysis. They don't reflect exactly what happens on the field; obviously, 58 home runs are the same no matter who hits them. But they do reflect value, both monetary and realistic value. And since the name of the award is the Most Valuable Player, we can give extra credit to a shortstop that hits 50 homers, moreso than we would to a first baseman or a DH.

Not only is Howard a first baseman, he's a pretty bad one. The objective and subjective evidence are in agreement here; Howard sucks at first. The good news is that a bad first baseman doesn't hurt a team that much; not nearly so much as a bad shortstop does. But it still hurts. Especially when compared to Albert Pujols who, as we'll mention in a minute, is a much better defender.

If I had to guess today, I'd say that the odds are 90% that either Pujols or Howard wins the award. But there is a dark horse in the race, touted most strongly by the sabermetrics community. His name is Carlos Beltran. I don't give credit or demerit to a player based on his team's status; I don't credit Beltran for making the postseason, and neither do I give him a demerit for playing on a team whose postseason status was never in doubt. Without Howard, the Phillies would not have been contenders. With Beltran, the Mets still would have been. Some people use this as an argument, but I don't think it holds water; it's completely beyond the control of a player who his teammates are, and he doesn't always get to pick his team in the first place. (Beltran did on the free agent market, but Howard did not, getting drafted by Philadelphia). Something like that is completely beyond the control of any player, and giving them extra credit in the MVP race for it is childish and foolish; and yet most voters do it.

No, the argument for Beltran is made mainly on defense. What -- a sabermetrician arguing for defense? Yes, indeed. Beltran hit an amazing 275/388/594, all the more amazing at Shea Stadium, and more valuable since Beltran plays center field, a position where very few players hit like that. But even taking position into account, can Beltran's 275/388/594 really be more valuable than Howard's 313/425/659.

Well, no -- at least, not by itself. So I would say that Howard was the more valuable hitter of the two. But while I've already mentioned Howard's terrible defense, I haven't yet mentioned the fact that Beltran is a great defensive center fielder, rating at 15 Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA) a remarkable achievement. Beltran also stole 18 bases, getting caught just 3 times. That's not a significant number, but in a close MVP race, it's worth noting.

So is all of that enough to bridge the gap in hitting between Beltran and Howard. I think so, yes. Two different systems of measurement have Beltran well ahead of Howard. Baseball Prospectus has Beltran at 10.4 WARP1, their uber-statistic of total value. Howard rates at 8.5, which shows how large an adjustment WARP makes for position. Bill James' Win Shares stat gives Beltran 38 WS and Howard just 31. It has the two almost identical on hitting Win Shares (30 for Beltran, 29.8 for Howard), but Beltran laps the field on defense (8.3 to Howard's 1.2).

So we can basically say that Carlos Beltran was a more valuable player than Ryan Howard. I wouldn't put them quite so far apart as the WARP and Win Shares suggest, but I would still favor Beltran. Therefore, in a perfect world, Carlos Beltran would be the biggest challenger to Albert Pujols' second consecutive MVP Award.

So what did Albert do to top Carlos "Willie Mays Lite" Beltran?

He did a lot.

Albert hit 331/431/671 this year. That's better even than Howard's line of 313/425/659. Pujols led the league in OBP and slugging, even managing to hit for a .331 average at that. And while strikeouts are generally overrated, compare Pujols' 50 K's to Howard's 181. That's a big difference. Equivalent Average, a stat used to quantify a hitter's total offensive contribution (adjusted for ballpark and context), puts Albert atop the National League as well. Albert's .350 EQA is noticeably better than Howard's .340 or Beltran's .322.

I also mentioned defense before. Albert is a fine defensive first baseman (17 FRAA) while Howard is a terrible defender (-15 FRAA). The difference between them is 32 runs, or nearly 3 wins. Add that to Albert's offensive edge, and there's only one true MVP here.

Just to note, a lot has been made of the fact that Albert missed some time this summer due to injury and thus didn't get as much playing time. However, this effect has been exaggerated. Howard notched 704 PAs (Plate Appearances) this year, compared to Albert's 634. That's a not-insignificant difference, but it's still not able to bridge the gap between the two.

That said, how does Albert stack up against Beltran? We know that Beltran was better than Howard, but so was Albert, by a fair margin. Is Beltran's defense and positional advantage enough to make up for Albert's superior offense?

Ask 10 different people, and they'll probably be pretty split. I've heard both men's names put forth as viable candidates. But I just can't get past the big difference in offense: 331/431/671 for Albert; 275/388/594 for Carlos. A great center fielder is more valuable than a great first baseman, obviously. Beltran gets the edge in steals, although Albert went a decent 7-for-9 himself. I'm going with Phat Albert, and the numbers back me up: Albert's 11.8 WARP1 tops Beltran's 10.4, and his 39 Win Shares led all of baseball; Beltran was just barely behind with 38.

I can see and understand the argument for Beltran, much moreso than the Howard argument. But I'm going with Albert.

Just to note: how about a guy who hit 339/430/568 while playing a decent third base for a contending team? Sounds like someone whose name should be in the MVP picture, right? And yet almost no one mentiones Miguel Cabrera (at least no one in the mainstream), and I have no idea why. He's got the numbers, he's got the performance, and he's got the stud status on a contender that usually makes writers notice him. But unfortunately, no love for Cabrera this year. But I think he was good enough to rate #2.

As for the rest of the list, there aren't many surprises. Some might be surprised to see the pitchers break the list, but the numbers would suggest that they belong there. And as for Garrett Atkins, his amazing year (329/409/556) can't be explained away by Coors Field, which is no longer a hitter's paradise. If he were worth a damn at third base (-14 FRAA), he'd rate even higher, despite the fact that nobody's ever heard of him.

1. Albert Pujols, Cardinals
2. Miguel Cabrera, Marlins
3. Carlos Beltran, Mets
4. Ryan Howard, Phillies
5. Lance Berkman, Astros
6. David Wright, Mets
7. Chase Utley, Phillies
8. Roy Oswalt, Astros
9. Chris Carpenter, Cardinals
10. Garrett Atkins, Rockies

American League MVP: Derek Jeter
Once again I am, much to my surprise, right with the mainstream. Jeter is one of two main candidates for the AL MVP honors, along with Minnesota's Justin Morneau. This is silly; Morneau is the same story as Ryan Howard -- the whole "carrying the team" B.S. But Morneau actually had a poorer year than Howard, and wasn't even the best player on his own team.
But all that in good time. Let's start with Jeter. The most amazing thing about Jeter is that he has, for the third year in a row, provided decent defense. This is after ten years or so of dreadful defense at shortstop. It's been going on long enough and is corroborated by enough stats that we can't dismiss it as a fluke. Some have suggested it's due to better positioning; some think it's due to the presence of A-Rod to Jeter's right, since Jeter's first turnaround season was also his first with A-Rod at third. Whatever the reason, Jeter's defense is no longer a millstone around the neck of his MVP argument. He doesn't deserve any Gold Gloves, but he plays defense well enough that we can call him an asset at the position and focus on his offense.
Jeter does not hit for a lot of power. His secret to success is working some walks, making contact, and generally getting on base like a madman. Lots of people think Jeter isn't a true "leadoff man," and that the Yankees were better off with Johnny Damon in the role. I don't know what the hell about Jeter is bad for a leadoff man. He strikes out, yes (102 times this year), but he also takes some walks and generally works a pitcher, which is one duty of a leadoff man. He doesn't steal a ton of bases, but he steals enough, and very efficiently at that (34-for-39 this year). He actually stole more bases, and at a better success rate, than Johnny Damon (25-for-35) this year -- the same Damon who's supposed to be a true "leadoff man," whereas Jeter is not.
But I digress. Jeter's strength is his ability to hit for a high average (.344 this year, just missing the batting title) and throwing in enough walks for a good OBP (.417). Jeter's final hitting line is 344/417/483. That may not sound like an MVP -- and in most years it wouldn't be -- but when you consider Jeter's prime defensive position (which he plays surprisingly well) and his extra credit for stolen bases, he's a very good candidate after all.
I mentioned before that Justin Morneau was Jeter's chief rival for the award. In fact, my guess is that Morneau will win. Let's dismiss that right now, shall we?
Morneau hit 321/375/559, while playing first base (adequately) for the Twins (in the hitter-friendly MetroDome). In my opinion, he's an easy dismissal; his extra power is no match for Jeter's better on-base skills and much higher defensive value. But the argument for Morneau centers not just on the "carrying the team" silliness, but on his 34 HR and especially his 130 RBI.
If I could set fire to two baseball statistics, it would be a pitcher's Win-Loss record and the RBI. Because they still somehow have the power to fool otherwise intelligent baseball commentators into accepting the baseball equivalent of the Flat-Earth Theory. I've expounded before about the uselessness of RBIs as compared to other offensive statistics, so I won't belabor the point here. But baseball writers are just as clueless as they ever were (being perhaps the most resistant breed to change, much moreso even than General Managers), and this cluelessness will likely win Morneau an undeserved MVP, just as it did for George Bell, Juan Gonzalez, and countless others. Good as Morneau was (and don't mistake me, he was very good), he wasn't even the best player on his own team.
That was catcher Joe Mauer, and considering the otherwise great reviews he's gotten this year, it's amazing to me that no one's pushing his name ahead of Morneau's. First of all, Mauer hit 347/429/507. Again, not nearly as powerful as Morneau, but more valuable due to his OBP. Mauer also became the first catcher to win the AL batting title -- ever. This is a bit trivial, but it does illustrate a more important point: it's damn hard to find a catcher who hits this well. This, of course, increases Mauer's value exponentially. Add in that he's a very good defensive catcher, and it all comes tumbling down in his favor. Mauer was so good, in fact, that he sometimes makes me reconsider my vote for Jeter. I'm sticking with Derek, but Mauer could make me change my mind. I wouldn't be too upset if either man won.
Another Twin getting a lot of support in the MVP race is Johan Santana. I said before that it was a bit of a slow year for AL MVPs; there were a lot of great seasons, but nobody had a really great season (it happens). It's years like this when a really dominant pitcher can emerge and win the MVP. Can Johan Santana do that?
No, he can't, and I don't think he should.
Santana only won 19 games. Admittedly, writers are getting better at ignoring W-L records, but a 19-win pitcher is a tough bet for the Cy Young. Pitchers who win the MVP simply have to put up big numbers: 25+ wins, a lot of saves, or an astronomically low ERA. Santana has none of these things.
What he has done is have himself a great season, though. It's your typical Johan Santana season, which is to say that it was amazing and great. Santana is the best pitcher in baseball, and he proved it again this year: 2.77 ERA (the 2nd-best in the league was Roy Halladay's 3.19), 245 strikeouts (Jeremy Bonderman was second with 202) and a league-leading 233.2 IP. Santana is a shoo-in for the Cy Young Award (as I'll discuss later), but he's just not the MVP. But I still give him good credit.
There are also the fifty-leven DHs to consider in this race. This was a good year for DHs, with several people posting great numbers and fighting their way into the MVP race regardless of their zero defensive value.
The most popular is David Ortiz. Ortiz hit a very strong 287/413/636. He does play in Boston and contribute nothing defensively, but that's still enough to make the Top 10. Ortiz was a candidate for first-place votes, until two things happened: one, the Red Sox collapsed and fell out of the running; two, Ortiz went public in saying that an MVP shouldn't have to come from a contending team. I agree, but Ortiz was of course talking about himself, and the uncharacteristically self-centered remarks only hurt his already slim chances. The public now percieves Ortiz pretty accurately: one of the best hitters in baseball, but something less than the reincarnation of Christ.
There's also the Comeback Player of the Year winner, Jim Thome. Thome hit 288/416/598 with the White Sox, a pretty amazing feat. It's not quite as good as Ortiz, and Thome's home ballpark helps a bit more than Fenway does for Ortiz. Still, a batting line like that deserves respect.
The man who really should have been voted Comeback Player of the Year is DH Frank Thomas. Thomas hit 270/382/545 for Oakland in his first healthy season in years. But although his position as the guy who "carried" Oakland has gotten him some mild MVP support, he hasn't really earned it. Thomas is probably the 5th-best DH in the league, coming in just behind Jason Giambi, who also had a fine year.
But the best DH in the AL this year might have been the same guy who missed the last month of the season: Travis Hafner. Hafner, hitting 308/439/659, was really the best player in the league through August; better even than Jeter. He ended up leading the league in both OBP and SLG. But since his injury limited him to just 454 ABs, he fell out of the running. But it's amazing enough that he still ended up one of the 10 best players overall.
The only other player to get serious support as the MVP was Jermaine Dye of the White Sox. Dye did have a career year (315/385/622), but not only did the White Sox's collapse end his candidacy (he and Ortiz can commiserate), his candidacy doesn't really hold water. His numbers are great, but he plays in a fine hitter's park in Chicago. He's also a right fielder, which doesn't help his case against guys like Jeter and Mauer.
A quick word on the two names on my list that may be a surprise (at least as far as how high I rated them).
The first is Grady Sizemore. Sizemore is no secret; after last season, Ozzie Guillen called him the best player in the AL Central, and he was mostly correct. In short, Sizemore is Carlos Beltran with lesser defensive skills. He steals some bases (though not as well as Beltran), but hits just as well as his NL counterpart (290/375/533 this year). At age 24, Sizemore will likely grow into one of the best all-around players in baseball, period.
The one who might come as a real surprise is Carlos Guillen. Keith Law's scouting report calls Guillen "one of the best players in baseball," and I'm thrilled that he's finally getting recognition as such. For several years, Guillen has been one of the best-hitting shortstops in baseball -- and that includes Jeter, Tejada, and others. But he never stayed healthy for a full season, so we were never really sure if he was for real. I had begun thinking we would never see a full season's worth of Carlos. Well, in 2006, he obliged and proved that he was for real. He's no wizard at shortstop, but again, the fact that he can hold down the position makes his hitting that much more valuable. Said hitting amounted to an amazing 320/400/519 this year, surprising for roomy Comerica Park. Guillen's probably not really this good; his career batting line is 289/358/440, and he's 31 years old. But even so, he's one of the best shortstops out there, and his career year in 2006 was enough to get him on the Top 10 List.
And here they are:

1. Derek Jeter, Yankees
2. Joe Mauer, Twins
3. Johan Santana, Twins
4. David Ortiz, Red Sox
5. Travis Hafner, Indians
6. Grady Sizemore, Indians
7. Carlos Guillen, Tigers
8. Manny Ramirez, Red Sox
9. Jermaine Dye, White Sox
10. Roy Halladay, Blue Jays

National League Cy Young: Roy Oswalt
I mentioned in a previous column that just because there's no true candidate for an award doesn't mean they call it off. The NL Cy Young Award this year is a great example. There were several pitchers who had good seasons, and about four or five that had really good seasons. But there wasn't a great season to be found among NL pitchers this year. And so we were never sure who the favorites were, with this race literally coming down to the final weekend, with Oswalt emerging at the fore. Of all the awards, this is the most up-in-the-air.
I picked Oswalt by a paper-thin margin over Chris Carpenter and Brandon Webb. Oswalt finished the season with the best ERA, 2.98. This isn't a huge lead, though, over Carpenter (3.09) and Webb (3.10). Oswalt (166) didn't strike out as many men as Carpenter (184) or Webb (178), but his 38 walks were the fewest of the three. Oswalt allowed more homers than Webb, but less than Carpenter. He also pitched fewer innings than both men, though not by much at all.
That's a pretty damn even three-horse race. It basically comes down to my preference for ERA (and FRA*, which Oswalt leads as well) and BB:K ratio. Oswalt leads all three pitchers in VORP by a fair margin, but is tied for second in Win Shares behind Webb.
Again, this could go either way, and I don't have 100% confidence in my choice. But if I had to pick, I'd pick Oswalt.
With the dearth of starting pitching candidates, some writers have suggested that it may be the year for a relief pitcher to win the award. This has some merit; this happened in 2003, when there were no dominant starters, and Eric Gagne's terrific year as closer won him the Cy Young. So, did anyone have an Eric Gagne-esque year? A year that was so good that it puts them on the board with the starters in the Cy Young race?
Not by a mile. Trevor Hoffman led the league with 46 saves. But then he also led the league with 51 save opportunities, and you already know how I feel about using saves as a measuring stick. Hoffman's ERA was 2.14, which isn't bad at all. But it's only marginally better than Oswalt's 2.98, and you have to have a much bigger difference than that to make up for the fact that Oswalt notched 220.2 IP, while the lightweight Hoffman went 63. Some have suggested that this could be a "lifetime achievement" award for Hoffman. That idea enrages me to the point that I spit in the general direction of anyone who suggests it. These aren't the f***ing Academy Awards. This is baseball, and we should take it seriously. If you want to start a Glee Club start it somewhere else.
Another argument has been put forth for Billy Wagner, the Mets' closer. But Wagner wasn't significantly better than Hoffman (2.24 ERA, but with more innings and strikeouts). The best reliever in the NL was probably L.A.'s Takashi Saito. Saito posted a 2.07 ERA in 78.1 IP (more than Hoffman or Wagner) and allowed only 3 HR (fewer than Hoffman and Wagner) and struck out 101 (more than Hoffman and Wagner). But because Saito didn't start the season as L.A.'s closer, he only managed 24 saves (in 26 chances). Although it should be noted that WXRL, a statistic that measures how much a reliever improved his team's odds of winning (in short**), doesn't give Wagner or Hoffman a big edge over Saito. You'd think that since both Wagner and Hoffman saved 40 games, they'd had a much bigger effect on their team's odds of winning than Saito, who spent half the season in middle relief. But their edge is marginal; about 5.9 to Saito's 5.4. So the edge in saves isn't a big deal, and saves themselves aren't really a big deal, for that matter.
Relievers dismissed!

1. Roy Oswalt, Astros
2. Chris Carpenter, Cardinals
3. Brandon Webb, Diamondbacks
4. Bronson Arroyo, Reds
5. John Smoltz, Braves
6. Aaron Harang, Reds
7. Jason Schmidt, Giants
8. Carlos Zambrano, Cubs
9. Jason Jennings, Rockies
10. Derek Lowe, Dodgers

* -- FRA is "Fair Run Average." Unlike ERA, it accounts differently for runners left and runners inherited. With ERA, a starting pitcher is given full credit for any runner that scores, even after he leaves the game. Fair Run Average splits the difference; it parcels out some blame to the starting pitcher who left the runners on the mound, and some to the reliever who let them score. A runner left on first that later scores would be more the reliever's fault than the starter's; the opposite would be true for a runner left at third. This is a fairer and more accurate measure than ERA, which gives ALL the blame to the starting pitcher who leaves the runners. This doesn't usually make a big difference. But if you're a starter with a bad bullpen behind you, you're going to see your ERA go up as more of your "bequeathed" runners score. Whereas the exact same pitcher with great bullpen help would have a lower ERA, because his relievers stranded those runners on base.

** -- WXRL is Wins Expected Above Replacement Level, Lineup Adjusted. It tallies how many wins a reliever notched above what a replacement-level reliever would have totalled. The number is adjusted for the quality of hitters a pitcher faced.
The wins themselves are determined by "Win Expectancy." If you plug in the state of a baseball game into the computer, including every facet of the situation, including who is at bat, who's on deck, etc. you can find an likelihood (in percentage form) of winning the game. By taking these factors into account, we could say that the Padres, in the 7th inning of Game 4 of the NLDS, had a 23% chance of winning the game. We get that number because the computer runs the simulated game a million times, and it showed the Padres winning 23% of the time.
Every play of a game, then, changes a team's Win Expectancy. If the first Padre batter makes an out, that decreases the Win Expectancy to, say, 20% (I'm estimating, here). So we would give that hitter credit for -.03 wins (he decreased his team's chance of winning by 3%). If he homers, though, it could increase his team's win expectancy to 40%. That would credit him for +.17 wins.
Both teams start out around 50% (not exactly, because the home team has an inherent advantage) and go from there. As things move on into the later innings, each play becomes more important. This is also true in a close game. If your team is down 4-1 in the 9th with 2 out and the bases loaded, we'll guess that your Win Expectancy is 15%. If you hit a grand slam to win the game, your win expectancy is 100%. In that game alone, the batter gets credited .85 wins (along with what he did in his other at-bats). Win Expectancy is biased toward opportunity -- if you get to bat a lot in the late innings in "clutch" situations, you have an unfair advantage over someone who doesn't.
But WX is great for measuring relief pitching. It lets us know not just saves and strikeouts, but how much each one meant to the team. It lets us know if a pitcher's 40 saves were all easy saves (a 3-run, 9th-inning lead where your team already has a WX of about 95%) or tough ones (bases loaded, one out in the 8th, ahead by one run -- WX of about 52%). We can see how many wins a reliever added over replacement level, bearing in mind that opportunity is still an inherent bias (if you're a 6th-inning middle reliever, you're screwed).
Does your brain hurt yet?

American League Cy Young: Johan Santana
This one's easy! Santana will win and should win. Everything else is just academic.
I mentioned earlier Santana's dominance over the rest of the AL pitchers, so it remains only to justify any controversial picks in my Top 10. Some might be surprised to see me rank Francisco Liriano #3, considering that he pitched just 121 innings. And I did puzzle long and hard over that one. But I think (and the stats agree) that Liriano was so good in his 121 innings that he was more valuable than most of the guys who threw 200. Liriano posted a 2.16 ERA (remember, Santana's league-best total was 2.77) with a 32:144 BB:K ratio and just 9 HR allowed. VORP ranks Liriano as the third-best pitcher in the AL, and I'm not inclined to disagree.
There nothing else really surprising about this list. C.C. Sabathia had a surprisingly good year, as did Curt Schilling and John Lackey, but few people noticed. I rated Mike Mussina ahead of Chien-Ming Wang with some hesitation; but as I've said before, a pitcher that succeeds with a below-average strikeout rate is likely benefitting from luck moreso than skill.
The only reliever that cracks the list is Jon Papelbon of the Red Sox. Papelbon was so good, in fact, that he was rivalling even Santana and Halladay in the early race for the Cy Young. But a September lost to injury relegated him to the bottom of the list. Still, he managed a 0.92 ERA (with an amazing 0.81 FRA), notching 75 strikeouts in 68.1 IP against just 13 walks and 3 HR allowed. Papelbon saved 35 games in 41 chances. His WXRL was second-best among AL closers, implying that his saves weren't generally cheap ones, but ones that "made a difference" for his team.

1. Johan Santana, Twins
2. Roy Halladay, Blue Jays
3. Francisco Liriano, Twins
4. Curt Schilling, Red Sox
5. C.C. Sabathia, Indians
6. Mike Mussina, Yankees
7. Jonathan Papelbon, Red Sox
8. John Lackey, Angels
9. Barry Zito, Athletics
10. Justin Verlander, Tigers

I'll be back later to finish up the awards for this year.

Short notes

Well, so far I'm 0-for-3. I picked the Twins, Yankees, Dodgers, and Padres to win the Division Series. Well, three of those teams have already lost (two of them got swept) and the Padres are down two games to one. What happened?
Well, the A's just out-played the Twins. I knew coming in that these two teams were evenly matched; I figured that the Series would last four or five games no matter who won. So I was wrong. The A's got their offense and pitched quite well; the Twins did not and suffered for it.
The main reason for celebration is that the A's victory is the end of the Moneyball curse. The Moneyball-era A's made the playoffs in 2001, 2002, and 2003, and lost each time in the ALDS. Twice they coughed up a 2-0 series lead. Everyone, of course, blamed it on their style of play. While this had some merit (playoff games are low-scoring, and so it helps to have a good closer and power pitchers), it was mostly bogus rationalization by grumpy old-school baseball men with an agenda. The Moneyball debate has since all but died down; most teams have incorporated stats to go along with their traditional scouting, which is the ideal way to do things. But there are still those -- mostly scouts and, unfortunately, TV announcers -- who insist on debunking Billy Beane. Well, nuts to you, because the A's have finally won a playoff series -- their first win since the 1990 ALCS. Many commentators are writing that it's because the A's have changed to a "pitching and defense" team. And while this is somewhat true, it's not such an easy cause-and-effect. (Nowhere but in baseball will you find such absurd rationalizations for cause and effect. In no other field will a legitimate reporter have the audacity write that someone has improved their performance because they're not washing their socks). As Keith Law points out, the A's stole zero bases in the series and laid down zero sacrifice bunts. Compare that to the other series, where everyone thinks the "Givin' Away Outs Festival" has started. The A's are a pitching and defense team, but they're still smart -- and they're still ahead of the game. Moneyball wasn't about OBP and defense -- it was about intelligence. "When everyone else zigs, we have to zag." So says Billy Beane, who could quite possibly be hoisting a World Championship trophy in a couple weeks.
The Tigers beat the Yankees. Everyone says that good pitching beats good hitting in the postseason. Well, it did in this case. And while that sentiment is generally true, you need look no further than the Atlanta Braves to shoot that theory to hell. The next time Tim McCarver or Joe Morgan start blathering on about "pitching and smallball" winning in the postseason, show them a picture of Bobby Cox and maybe that will shut them up. Somebody has to (and props to Seth MacFarlane and Family Guy for backing me up about McCarver).
As for the Dodgers, they just got whipped. They executed poorly, Grady Little made a series of old-school blunders, and their pitchers just didn't show up.
What else is going on out there?

• The Marlins fired Joe Girardi. If Girardi wins Manager of the Year (which he will), he will join Davey Johnson as the only managers to be fired after the season that won them the award. (Bobby Cox left the Blue Jays voluntarily after 1985, as far as I know, to rejoin the Braves). I think everyone is a little hasty in automatically condemning the move. If it's simply impossible for the manager to get along with upper management, then there's no point in keeping him on; the team just can't function like that. If you've ever had a boss you despised or had an employee you thought was awful, you'll be able to relate. That said, I think we can all agree that Mr. Loria is not your average owner. While Girardi has always been respected for his class and leadership, Loria is widely considered to be scum among scum. It was Loria, not Girardi, who made an ass of himself by loudly baiting the umpires. Girardi, knowing that the umps were not above taking it out on the Marlin players, asked Loria to be quiet. It's a real stretch to call that insubordination.
  In what must be an effort by management to discredit Girardi, sources have revealed some of Girardi's suggestions from Spring Training, most of which were outlandish and silly. While Girardi may have made these questionable calls in March, he's shown no sign of that incompetence during the regular season.
  This is just another garden-variety, baseball conflict of personalities. And don't underestimate Loria's desire to ruin the Marlins and move them. Girardi was like Lou Brown in the Major League movie, shooting that theory to hell by turning the rookies and cast-offs into contenders. Loria may not look like Rachel Phelps, but I think he is, at least in secret.
• The Rangers fired Buck Showalter. Now, if tradition holds, the Rangers will win the World Series. After all, the Yankees fired Buck in 1995 and won the Series in 1996. The Diamondbacks fired him in 2000 and won it all in 2001. Unfortunately, the Rangers are about 8 good pitchers away from carrying on the tradition. This is the story of Buck's career: he's done a fine job of building teams, but usually gets the shaft before they reap the rewards. Stat-heads have always been kind to Buck, who's known to favor the numbers more than his colleagues. But he's also reputed to be a bit c0ld, and that's been the reason for his ouster most times. While I still think Showalter deserves another chance, he is going to have to stick with some team eventually, or else we'll stop giving him the benefit of the doubt.
• Other managers who have said goodbye: Washington's Frank Robinson, San Francisco's Felipe Alou, and Chicago's Dusty Baker. Baker was fired for all-too-obvious reasons I've mentioned before. It's possible that some moron will take a flier on him, but it's just as likely that Dusty will spend next year watching the MLB on TV. Robinson was forced out in a slightly gentler style, due mainly to his age and the fact that management just didn't have confidence in him. He got a pleasant send-off, and this is probably the last we'll see of him on-field. Ditto for Alou, as his departure was also due to his advancing age. The circumstances are so muddy that I don't know how much of it was Alou quitting and how much of it was him being asked to quit. Either way, he's gone, and someone else will have to take over the Giants in the off-season. And if there's a disappointing tragedy waiting to happen in 2007, the Giants are the #1 contenders, with Barry Bonds at the center of it all, as usual.
• I've never really been a fan of any of the ads that the MLB runs. But I have to admit how much I love the Tommy Lasorda commercials for the postseason. Bully for MLB, and let's hope they go back to that ad agency.
• DHL has bought another award: the "MLB Delivery Man of the Year Award." After the tremendous apathy that greeted the Hometown Heroes . . .zzzzzz . . . oh, excuse me. But DHL decided to "sponsor" an award for the "best season as a relief pitcher."
  Now, since 1976, Rolaids has sponsored the award for best relief season, the "Rolaids Relief Man Award." I don't know if, perhaps, their contract has expired, or if the majors just decided to render them obsolete with another award in the exact same category. Regardless, DHL is working hard to make it into the hearts and minds of every baseball fan so that we can . . . um . . . mail stuff. Hey, did you know that DHL once shipped a tiger? It's true! A friend of mine used to work for them. They did it just to show off to FedEx and UPS. Well, who's laughing now? No, seriously . . .
• The Trevor Hoffman Project was ill-timed. Not only are the playoffs going on, but the end of the year is traditionally my big-time stat-crunching session, as I record everything from the regular season and get ready to render my decision on MVPs and Cy Youngs. So my next entry will be the end-of-the-year awards blog. The THP will have to wait, unfortunately.
• As far as the ALCS goes . . . I ain't predicting nothing. Not until my track record improves. If the Padres can mount a big comeback and beat the Cardinals, at least I'll be 1-for-4. Until then, I'm not sticking my neck out.

And they're off . . .

Dear Alex

Alex Rodriguez
c/o New York Yankees
Yankee Stadium
161st St. and River Ave.
Bronx, NY 10451

Dear Alex,

I wanted to write and offer my congratulations on a good season. I know most people wouldn't call it a good season, least of all the New York press. But I wanted to take the opportunity to write and tell you that I feel otherwise. I don't normally write to baseball players, and some might consider me a bit old to be writing a fan letter. But you're never too old to address an injustice, and the way you're being treated is an injustice.
I know it's difficult to play baseball in New York. It's also tough to play ball in Boston, Philadelphia, and other places as well. But that doesn't give anyone a license to make someone's life a living hell. Baseball players make a lot of money; so do CEOs. But no one flashes Bill Gates' stats on the front pages, nor do they call him a "choker" for losing out to the government. There's a lot more important things going on in the world than baseball, and there's about a billion different things that should be on the front pages other than Alex Rodriguez's fielding percentage.
You're a great ballplayer, and it's a crime that everyone is making a whole lot out of nothing. Even outside of New York, other newspapers and TV shows feel like they have to talk about you just to satisfy the "demand" for A-Rod coverage. This, of course, only increases the exposure. If you're waiting for a ballplayer to make a mistake, you won't be waiting long; every ballplayer makes them. If that's what you're looking for, then you'll find it; but you'll miss the big picture.
What's the big picture? The big picture is a .290 batting average, 35 home runs, 121 RBIs, 15 steals, a .392 OBP and an all-around superb offensive game. This despite hitting in a tough ballpark for right-handed hitters and, of course, being under constant media scrutiny and having to suffer through your teammates and manager openly questioning you in Sports Illustrated.
Have you had defensive troubles this year? Well, yes, there's no denying that. But that's far outweighed by your offense. I guess you could call me a stat-head, and as such I know that offense is much more important than defense. Even with the errors, you were the best all-around third baseman in the AL this year.
But the criticism always revolves around "clutch." They say that A-Rod can't produce in the clutch. As a "stat-head," I think that's bunk. If you look at any measure of "clutch," it's never consistent from year to year. Even David Ortiz's "clutch" scores aren't that consistent.
Let's disprove the myth that you aren't clutch: you knocked in 16.1% of the runners on base when you hit. David Ortiz only knocked in 17%, and Derek Jeter just knocked in 18%,not a big improvement at all, only about 3 or 4 runs difference -- neither Jeter nor Ortiz are the "huge" clutch difference-makers that everyone thinks they are. Also, Bill James' "clutch" rating lists you at 3.2 runs above average this year -- above average! David Ortiz? He was 6.2 runs below average. So much for "clutch."
But there are still two other reasons that seem to turn people against you: one, you're the highest-paid player in baseball, and two, you're allegedly too self-obsessed.
As for the first one, that's just silly. Baseball fans will always find a reason to get mad at players, but getting mad at someone for making a lot of money is silly. Enron executives got paid a lot more than you, and their colossal failure affected the lives of thousands. No one was there booing them. I defy anyone who mocks your $26 million to say that they would turn down that kind of salary. Major league baseball players are about the top 1% (or even less) of all baseball players in the country. And you are in the top 1% of that. If you take other professions -- banking, law, real estate -- I'm sure you'd find the elite performers in those industries taking in much more than $25 million. And yet no one will listen; people don't want to listen to reason, they just want to be grumpy and blame someone else. And for grumpy, pig-headed fans, only Philadelphia rivals New York.
As to the fact that you're too self-obsessed, well I can't say. I've never met you. Maybe you are self-obsessed; maybe you're not. I don't know, and neither do 99% of the people who say that you are. But let's suppose you are as self-obsessed as everyone claims: so the hell what? Was there ever a more self-obsessed diva than Babe Ruth? What kind of a "team player" was old Ty Cobb? And did anyone ever have an ego the size of Reggie Jackson? And yet these men were all universally acknowledged as great ballplayers. Being self-obsessed is basically irrelevant to baseball; everyone wants to think that being a nice guy, saying please and thank you, and calling your manager "Mr. Torre" puts extra runs on the board. But as Sandy Koufax said, "Nice guys without talent finish last."
Having said all this, let me point out that I've never been a strong fan of yours one way or the other. I'm also not a Yankee fan; in fact, I hate the Yankees. I'm a Braves fan who had to suffer through 1996 and 1999. But much as I may want to, I don't hate the Yankee players . . . all right, I do hate Jim Leyritz, but I never hated Bernie Williams or David Cone. This isn't a letter coming from a Yankee fan; this is a letter coming from a baseball fan.
Like I said before, I've never met you. Maybe you're the jerk everyone says you are. Maybe you're completely misunderstood. My point is that it doesn't matter one bit; you're one of the best baseball players of my generation. As a baseball fan, I'm outraged that the biggest story of a very exciting postseason has also been the most irrelevant. There are so many great things going on in baseball today that should be talked about; there are also serious problems that should be talked about. But your personality and alleged "failure in the clutch" are not among them.
I wrote this letter to express this dissatisfaction, but also to say that my heart goes out to you. No one deserves to get treated like this -- not Derek Jeter, not Barry Bonds, not Ty Cobb -- most certainly not you. And for every Yankee fan that thinks you should be traded, tell them there are millions of fans in other cities who would love to have you (I'm sure we could get Chipper to move to left field for you. I don't know who really runs the Braves anymore, but maybe I should write them a letter, too). Things are bound to get better; so much of "clutch" is luck that it's bound to swing back sometime or other. I just hope people haven't already made up their minds by then.
Best of luck, A-Rod. Saint or sinner, you're one of the best things about the game today, and here's one fan hoping that things get better for you.

Sincerely,

Aaron Whitehead

Postseason Predictions

Yankees .vs. Tigers
ESPN.com polled all of its contributing columnists and analysts for their postseason predictions. Of those, 17 out of 17 picked the Yankees to beat the Tigers. No other series was a clean sweep (the Padres were 16/17 favorites to win the NLDS).
Why are the Yankees considered to be such dynamic favorites? Well, it starts with the lineup:
CF -- Johnny Damon (285/359/482)
SS -- Derek Jeter (343/417/483)
RF -- Bobby Abreu (287/424/462)
3B -- Alex Rodriguez (290/392/523)
DH -- Jason Giambi (253/413/558)
1B -- Gary Sheffield (298/355/450)
LF -- Hideki Matsui (303/393/494)
C -- Jorge Posada (278/375/494)
2B -- Robinson Cano (342/365/525)

I've heard some people claim that the Yankees have the greatest lineup in postseason history. I'm not inclined to such hyperbole, but they have an absolute dynamite batting order. They've got speed and walks at the top of the order, then a good combination of the two in Bobby Abreu. All of that sits in front of sluggers A-Rod and Giambi. Sheffield and Matsui are slugger material, but we're still not sure how they'll hold up after missing most of the season due to injury. In the 8th spot is one of baseball's best-hitting catchers, and the 9th hole goes to the player with the 3rd-best batting average in the league. The Yankee offense is a juggernaught.

On the other hand, we have the Tigers. Luckily for the Tigers, their strength is pitching and their ability to potentially stop a juggernaught. However, there are two problems. One is that the Tigers starters are mostly right-handed, whereas lefties tend to have much better success against the Yankees. The other problem is that Detroit's #1 Justin Verlander and #2 Jeremy Bonderman have both struggled down the stretch. Both pitchers are capable of handling even the Yankees at their best, but it's not clear that they will be playing at their best. Another issue is that the Tigers' lone lefty starter, Kenny Rogers, was used in relief on the last day of the season (a highly questionable decision by Jim Leyland) and so won't be able to make more than one start in the series.
In the bullpen, the Tigers dominate, perhaps moreso than any other team. Closer Todd Jones is a fossil who's just barely hanging on. The Yankees will eat him for breakfast. However, Leyland has used rookie setup man Joel Zumaya as his real secret weapon during the season; deploying him in high-leverage situations for multiple innings. Leyland's basically been using Zumaya the a team should use its closer. They let Jones come in for the 9th inning and get the saves, but Zumaya has been more valuable by far. Combine that with guys like Fernando Rodney and Jamie Walker, and the Tigers could have a secret weapon here in their bullpen.

But will the Tigers be able to match the Yankees' offensive output? Even if the Detroit pitchers manage to hold the Yanks to 2, 3 or 4 runs (a big accomplishment), will Detroit be able to capitalize?
Not likely. The Tigers don't have a very strong lineup, and unfortunately Leyland hasn't done a good job of effectively using what tools he does have. Exhibit A is the fact that Neifi Perez makes the postseason roster at all, when invaluable bench player Chris Shelton sits. In fact, Shelton should be playing first base in place of the abysmal Sean Casey, who's been an albatross since coming over from Pittsburgh in a trade. If Leyland insists on batting Casey third (because Casey, once upon a time, could hit .300 despite having little power or patience), that should be a sign of things to come.
The Tigers strength is in their power. They do not have a great deal of patience, but the Yankee pitching staff is such that they still stand a chance. Magglio Ordonez, Carlos Guillen, and Marcus Thames are three pretty reliable hitters who could sock a couple home runs and give Detroit the edge. But they're not bunched together in the lineup. Instead, Leyland has the punchless Placido Polanco (295/329/364) batting 2nd, behind the league strikeout king Curtis Granderson (260/335/438 with 174 Ks). As I said, Casey could end up batting third, and if Leyland goes completely nuts, he might actuallyput Neifi Perez (243/260/316) near the top of the lineup. Not only do the Tigers have a weaker lineup than the Yankees, but it's a lineup that's not built to face good control pitchers. It's also not been an effective use of the assets at hand.

What about that Yankee pitching? Well, the Yankee pitching is better than it's been in the past, but that ain't saying much. They do have Chien-Ming Wang (3.63 ERA, 76 K in 218 IP) slated to start Game 1. But studies at Baseballprospectus.com have shown a very high correlation between a team's strikeouts/9 innings and postseason success. So there's some reason to believe that Wang's magic may not play as well in the postseason. It will be especially fascinating if the Yanks get past a better club than Detroit.
Behind Wang is Mike Mussina, who is certainly old, but has been quite effective (3.51 ERA). There's a lot of doubt surrounding Game 3 starter Randy Johnson, who is having injury problems that could either sideline him or at least affect his performance. This is bad news, because Johnson during the regular season was no great shakes either (5.00 ERA), although as a power pitcher, he does match up well against the mistake-hitting Tigers, provided he can get his fastball up there with movement. Behind Johnson are possibilities like Jaret Wright and Cory Lidle. That's actually not as bad as it sounds, but it would certainly be better for the Yankees if the Big Unit pitched more like his old self.
The Yankee bullpen is not as strong as Detroit's. While Mariano Rivera is a far better closer than Todd Jones, Rivera has had injury problems of his own and has taken some extended rest before the Series. Joe Torre made the announcement today that Rivera will be a "one-inning pitcher" in the postseason. This is terrible news for Yankee fans, as Rivera is the only good thing they have going for them. In the past, Torre had shown the ability to alter his game plan and use Rivera in more of a "true closer" style, i.e. for multiple innings. It's one of the reasons Rivera's been so dominant in the postseason, as have the Yankees themselves. The Yanks' nominal setup man is Kyle Farnsworth, whose career has taken another zag, this time to a 4.36 ERA, albeit with 75 K in 66 IP. Scott Proctor has pitched well for the Yankees (3.52 ERA), but in true Torre fashion, the Yankee skipper has taken his most reliable middle reliever and rode him into the ground. Proctor's thrown an astonishing 102.1 IP this year, which does not bode well for his durability into October. There are some problems here, but still enough positive elements to handle Detroit.

Detroit isn't really as bad as they've looked the past few weeks, but they're certainly no kind of 100-win team. The best chance the Tigers have of getting past the Yankees is to get better work from Verlander and Bonderman than they've seen so far this fall. They can also hope that the Yankee rotation falls apart, either by Wang turning back into a pumpkin or Johnson pitching like his aunt Flossie. The Tigers do have the pitching potential to beat the Yankees, and the offense that can sock some home runs and win ballgames. But there are just too many things that HAVE to go right for Detroit to win the series to be able to predict their victory.
I'll be generous:
Yankees in Four

Twins .vs. A's
These two teams have a lot in common; fine starting pitching, an excellent bullpen, and just enough offense to get by. But there are some notable differences: the Twins have Johan Santana, who is a force to be reckoned with, and is fully capable of making any offense kneel before Zod.
Also, the Twins' offense is much better than it was last year, and also much better than Oakland's lackluster attack. The Twins have two legitimate studs in Justin Morneau and Joe Mauer to go with solid, middle-of-the-order guys like Torii Hunter and Michael Cuddyer. I don't think that the "piranhas" (Nick Punto, Jason Bartlett) are anywhere worth their reputation as being a part of the club's success, but they're actually giving the Twins better production than the A's are getting from the same positions.
That's essentially what it comes down to. These two teams are similar, except that the Twins are a little bit better in almost every regard. The A's have a good bullpen, but Joe Nathan is a star closer, whereas Huston Street is struggling. The A's have Frank Thomas, but the Twins have the fearsome foursome mentioned above, while Thomas just has Nick Swisher and a lackluster Eric Chavez and Milton Bradley to back him up.
Do the A's have any advantage over the Twins? Yes, they do, and it's a rather significant one: starting rotation depth. Now in the broad sense, rotation depth is of little importance in the playoffs; the 1-3 pitchers throw most of the innings, and your #5 starter isn't going to pitch unless it's an emergency. But the Twins' problem is that they only have one starter who is reliably above-average. The good news is that that one guy is the best pitcher in baseball, Johan Santana. The bad news is that Santana can only pitch twice in a 5-game series. And it's not unreasonable for the A's to get dominated by Santana and still win. The Yankees did it in 2003, losing Game 1 to Santana and then fighting through his start in Game 4 to win anyways. The A's have a strong front four of Danny Haren, Barry Zito, Rich Harden, and either Esteban Loaiza or Joe Blanton. The A's pitchers will give them a chance to win every game, whereas the Twins will be in a real pickle in Game 2 and Game 3 with guys like Boof Bonser and Brad Radke on the hill.
But all in all, the Twins just have too many advantage over the A's. As I said before, the A's could just minimize the Santana damage, hold down the Twinkie offense, and prevail. But that will be very tough, and for one other big reason: the Twins have home field advantage, meaning three of the games will be in the Twin-friendly TwinkieDome.
Sorry, Mr. Beane.
Twins in Four

Mets .vs. Dodgers
These two teams are actually more evenly matched than they appear. The Mets are not the dominant team they once looked like, and the Dodgers are looking better and better by the minute.
The big question for the Mets surrounds their starting pitching. Although their lineup doesn't have a lot of depth, they've got a dynamic top of the order that should score runs, even against L.A. But will it be enough, if their starting rotation is Orlando Hernandez/Tom Glavine/John Maine? Hernandez has been maddeningly inconsistent this year, and so it's hard to tell what he'll do (his ERA was a terrible 6.11 with Arizona, but a strong 4.09 in New York). Glavine is a strong guy, but no longer dominant, and the Dodger offense is a lot better than their ballpark makes it look. And after that, it gets really uneven.
What sort of hitters will the Dodgers be throwing out at the Mets? They'll start off with a red-hot, rejuvenated Rafael Furcal, then a solid #2 man with a great postseason pedigree in Kenny Lofton. The heart of the order is Nomar Garciaparra, J.D. Drew, Jeff Kent, Andre Ethier, and Russell Martin, all of whom are above-average hitters, with the potential to put up a crooked number at a moment's notice.
The Mets can match the Dodgers' star power with a lineup that includes wunderkind Jose Reyes, a better-than-usual Paul Lo Duca, MVP Carlos Beltran, and sluggers Carlos Delgado and David Wright. Unfortunately, the Met lineup is pretty bare at the bottom. Cliff Floyd is hitting more like Floyd the Barber this year (244/324/407). Jose Valentin is a quality place-filler at second base (271/330/490), but no star, although he's a power threat. And neither Shawn Green nor Lastings Milledge have added anything to the right field position.
It's a close call between the lineups; probably a wash. The Mets may have the better star power in the middle of the order, but the Dodgers have more depth and fewer automatic out-makers. This series will come down to the pitching.
We've already mentioned the Mets' pitching woes. So what about the Dodgers? Well, the Dodgers aren't going to be mistaken for the '54 Indians, but they're a stronger team than the Mets. The plan right now is for Hong-Chih Kuo to start Game 1. This is a great idea; not only has the young Kuo had a promising start to the season so far, he's a lefty, and the Mets are especially vulnerable to southpaws. Derek Lowe has had another surprisingly valuable year, and has the virtue of playing the series in two of the league's best pitchers' parks (bully for him). Brad Penny is questionable as the Dodgers' #3; he's had a fine season, but he's had some pretty serious injury trouble that could hamper him in the NLDS. But on the plus side, the Dodgers have a great depth of starters that the Mets so woefully lack. The Dodgers can send Greg Maddux out as a Game 4 starter. Maddux has taken well to Dodger Stadium, and at any rate, is a far sight better than any of the Mets' prospective #4 starters. That would leave guys like Chad Billingsley, Aaron Sele, and Mark Hendrickson in the bullpen. That gives L.A. the bullpen edge, sealing the deal with closer Takashi Saito (with all due respect to Billy Wagner).
Improbably as it may seem, the Dodgers can keep up with the Mets in the run-scoring department. And I think they have a pretty clear advantage in the pitching department. While this is a close series that could go either way, I'm putting my money on pitching: Dodger pitching.
Dodgers in Five

Padres .vs. Cardinals
My, oh my, how things change. Last year, the Cardinals were huge favorites going into their NLDS matchup against the Padres and swept them. This year, the tides have turned, with the Padres getting the nod in 16/17 ESPN expert predictions (Enrique Rojas voted for the Redbirds).
Why is this? Well, it's because the Padres have a better offense than the Cardinals and a much better pitching staff. That should be enough. In most of the above match-ups, even with the Tigers and Yankees, there was some give and take with each team holding some sort of hope or advantage over the other. But if the Cardinals have a clear advantage over San Diego, I don't see it.
What about the offense? The Cardinals have Albert Pujols and friends. Remember the Fat Albert TV show, where Fat Albert would hang out in the junk yard with all sorts of weird, kooky characters? That's the 2006 characters. There's Dizzy Jim Edmonds, still suffering from the effects of a concussion and a far cry from the man who contended for the 2004 MVP. There's Slow-Down Scott Rolen, who doesn't seem to age very well as the season progresses. There's "Nada-er" Molina, a ghost who might as well be swinging an invisible bat. There's Lazy Juan Encarnacion, one of the worst right fielders in baseball. They're a far more entertaining b bunch than Rudy and Mushmouth.
Do the Padres have the pitching to handle these misfits? Yes, absolutely. The Padres have Jake Peavy, who is still an ace, and don't let the numbers fool you (how often do I say that?). They've got "Tall n' Reliable" Chris Young (3.46 ERA, 164 K in 179.1 IP), "Believe It or Not" Clay Hensley (3.71 ERA, questionable peripherals) and Mickey Lolich, Jr., David Wells, who recently missed a start due to gout. (I'm sorry -- but wasn't gout something that drunk characters had in old silent movies so that they could be the butt of all sortsof slapstick gags? Because Wells might have a future there.) In all seriousness, if the Padres can just keep the bases clear when Albert comes up, they should be able to minimize the damage.
But maybe the Cardinal pitchers can keep the score low enough that they can still compete? I highly doubt it. Chris Carpenter is their ace, and he's a bonafide Cy Young candidate, but has struggled down the stretch and may be suffering from fatigue. That's bad news. While the Cards have gotten serviceable work from Jeff Suppan and Anthony Reyes, they're not the guys who can carry the burden if Carpenter falls short. But above all, the Cards should make sure that Jason Marquis does not appear in any of these games, except maybe as a pinch hitter. They've also got an injured closer (Isringhausen is out), and almost no one that LaRussa has confidence in anymore. Compare that to San Diego's killer combo of Cla Meredith/Alan Embree/Scott Linebrink/Trevor Hoffman, and the gap widens even more.
The Padre lineup isn't fantastic, but it can handle Cardinal pitching. The Padres are also a lefty-heavy team, but it's doubtful that the Cards will be able to exploit that. The Padres' good, patient hitters should feast on soft-tossing righties like Suppan, Marquis, and Jeff Weaver.
Maybe the mis-match isn't as much as it seems. It's possible that Carpenter could come back for two strong starts, and the Cardinals could get a game-saving homer or two from Pujols and pull of the win. But that's a lot of ifs.
Padres in Three

The Regular Season Is Over

It was one of the greatest comebacks in the history of major league baseball. On my 25th birthday, August 7th, the Detroit Tigers held a 10-game in the AL Central. With only 50 games left, the Tigers were as certain a postseason lock as you can get. How many teams have lost a 10-game lead in August (I don't know, but I'd guess not many). It would take a historic collapse reminiscent of the 1951 Dodgers or the 1964 Phillies to dethrone the Tigers.
And that's exactly what happened.
After August 7th, the Tigers went 19-31. The Twins, who were 10.5 games behind the Tigers in 3rd place (the White Sox were in 2nd) have since gone 31-20. And on the last day of the season, the Twins defeated the slumping White Sox 5-1 (the White Sox went 25-27 after the 7th to finish 90-72). The Tigers blew an 8-7 lead over the Royals in the 8th inning, and then lost the game in the 12th inning. The Twins clinched the division title in historic fashion. All the Tigers had to do was take one game from the Royals at home, but as impossible as it may sound, the Tigers got swept by the Royals to end the season. And so the Twins completed one of the greatest comebacks in baseball history.
But no one noticed. Why? Because the Twins and the White Sox were both guaranteed a playoff berth a week ago, and after that, who won the division was much less important. It was not unimportant, as the Wild Card Tigers have to face the Yankees in the first round, whereas the Twins get the Athletics. But simply because of the Wild Card, this great playoff race was rendered moot.
I've never really liked the Wild Card, but I've come to accept it as a necessary part of a game with 30 different teams. Baseball sends a little more than 25% of its teams to the postseason, which is a lot, but is nowhere near the 50%+ that basketball and hockey send. It was a competitive and financial necessity, and I've grown to accept the Wild Card (or the Water Closet, as Rob Neyer calls it) and don't think it should be abolished. I think the Wild Card and the 3-division format have done more for competitive balance than any of the revenue sharing measures baseball has introduced. But that doesn't mean I have to like the results.
I've often heard the 1993 NL West race referred to as the "last great pennant race." That's because 1993 was the last year of the 2-division format in each league. It also saw a race between two legitimately great teams, the Giants and Braves. In that season, the Braves made an improbable comeback, and the race went down to the final day of the season. The drama came from the simple fact that it was "win or go home." The Braves won on the last day of the season, and the Giants lost. The Giants' final record was 103-59, making them most likely the last 100-win team to miss the postseason. Since then, the best team to miss the postseason was the 1999 Cincinnati Reds, who finished 96-67, losing a 1-game Wild Card playoff to the Mets.

In the National League, we have a nearly identical situation in the NL West, although it wasn't nearly as interesting or dramatic, mainly because it did not involve any really good teams or any big-time comeback. The Dodgers and Padres finished the regular season tied 88-74 in the West lead. But they will not play a playoff game. Since both teams are guaranteed a playoff spot as division leader and Wild Card, the seeding will be determined by the in-season series. The Padres beat the Dodgers in their seasonal series, and so will technically be the NL West "Champions," while the Dodgers will be the Wild Card. The difference is that the Dodgers have to face the Mets (sans Pedro Martinez) and the Padres get the Cardinals.
As for those Cardinals, they managed to back into the playoffs in historic fashion. The Cardinals lost today to the Brewers, narrowing their NL Central lead to one game. If the Astros could beat the Braves, the lead would be just 1/2 game, and the Cardinals would be forced to make up a game against the Giants tomorrow afternoon. Then, if the Cards lost and the division were tied, the two teams would have a one-game playoff on Tuesday to determine who would win the Central and who would go home.
Luckily for schedule makers everywhere, the Braves were able to beat the Astros 3-1 on the strength of an excellent start by John Smoltz, who notched his 16th win and lowered his ERA to 3.49. The Astros finish the season just one game short, at 82-80. The Astros have made improbable comebacks in each of the last three years, but this year it was not to be.

That leaves the Cardinals facing the Padres in the first round of the NLDS, a rematch from last year. The tides have turned, however. Last year, the 100-win Cardinals went in as heavy favorites against the 82-80 Padres and swept them in three games. Now, the 88-74 Padres are the favorites over the dismal 83-78 Cardinals. The Cardinals have Albert Pujols, yes. They also have Scott Rolen and the unlikely Chris Duncan. But their only good pitcher, Chris Carpenter, has been showing signs of fatigue lately, and the rest of the their rotation is pretty sorry (except perhaps for Jeff Suppan). The Padres, on the other hand, have an underrated offense and a fine pitching staff. I'll be making my official postseason predictions sometime in the next day or two, but I think the Padres should have an easy time of it with St. Louis.
The Mets and Dodgers series may seem like a mis-match, but no such luck. Not only will Pedro Martinez miss the postseason, as previously reported, Martinez has a serious arm injury that will sideline him for eight months, meaning he won't be back until early June 2007, according to an espn.com report. This is bad news. This is bad news times twenty. The Mets are still a good team and are certainly still capable of winning the pennant, but we can no longer call them clear favorites to do so. The Dodgers have a strong pitching staff and a pretty good offense and are certainly capable of winning against the likes of Orlando Hernandez and Steve Trachsel.
The worst part of this is for Pedro's future. Pedro will be 35 next year, and even if he returns in June, I'm guessing that it's doubtful that he will be very effective in 2007. Considering Pedro's injury history and age, an injury of this magnitude at this point of his career could be catastrophic. I'm not saying that it will be career-ending, but I'm saying that it may be the end of PEDRO, and all we have left may be a few good innings and a couple glimpses of what used to be. This is awful for Pedro, but especially so for the Mets, who still owe him $25 million for the next two seasons, and definitely won't be getting the ace they thought they signed. This is exactly why the Red Sox balked at giving Pedro a 4th year in their contract negotiations.

Some random thoughts on the year's final standings:

• Despite their 3-game sweep of Detroit, the Royals still finished the season 62-100, making them the first team in 30 years to lose 100 games three years in a row. That previous team, the Blue Jays, was an expansion team that at least had a good excuse. The Royals have turned things around with a new GM and would be well served with a new manager, but I just don't know if this franchise can contend with David Glass as owner.
• What the Royals did manage with that 3-game winning streak was to avoid finishing with the worst record in baseball. That honor goes to the Devil Rays, who ended up at 61-101. Many people picked this year as the year the Rays would take a big step forward, thanks to their big-time young talent. Instead, it's the second-worst record in franchise history. Yay team.
• Thanks to a late surge from Toronto, the Blue Jays finished in 2nd place in the AL East, at 87-75. This isn't what the front office wanted, but it is right about where I thought the team was at the beginning of the season. On the other hand, you have the Red Sox, who finished in 3rd place at 86-76. The Red Sox have finished in 2nd place every year since 1997, when they finished 4th. I fear that there may be bloodshed in Boston in the offseason, as the Sox have to be considered one of the league's biggest disappointments.
• I predicted earlier that the AL would have a 90-win team that missed the playoffs. I was right; the White Sox went 90-72 and finished 3rd in the AL Central. It was an unfortunate downfall for the Sox, but considering the strength of their division, I don't think it's quite the catastrophe that others have made it out to be. The bad news is that the Sox don't have anything like the young talent that Cleveland, Minnesota, and Detroit have, meaning that their window of opportunity in the AL Central is narrow. But hey, at least they've got a World Series banner that will fly forever.
• The Angels finished the season 89-73. They're actually in pretty darn good shape as a team and should challenge the A's for the division title next year. The Angels got off to a terrible start, going 37-44 in their first 81 games. From then on, they went an amazing 52-29 to make the AL West a close race. They've got the pitching talent to compete with anybody, and if they can replace some of their dead weight (Darin Erstad) with their young talent, they're as good as anybody.

I'll be back later with my official playoff predictions. I'll also keep you up to date on the Trevor Hoffman Project (hereafter known as the THP).

Later.

Trevor Hoffman

Trevor Hoffman recently notched his 479th career save, breaking Lee Smith's former record of 478 to become the all-time career saves leader. So is Trevor Hoffman a Hall-of-Famer?
I don't know, and I'm going to go to great lengths to try and find out. I don't have the time to do it in one sitting, so I'll set up my research and then hit the books (or the webpages) to piece out the data myself and come up with a satisfactory answer.

But first, some background . . .

The roots of relief pitching are very modest. The earliest relief pitchers were simply backups who would come in whenever the main pitcher needed a day off, or if he got in really bad trouble and couldn't finish the game. This is back when starters completed something like 95% of their starts. Relievers were utility players, no more notable than a backup shortstop or second-string catcher.
As time wore on, the team's overall workload started to get spread out. By the turn of the century, the 3-man rotation was basically standard, and a team would also need a couple other pitchers to fill in on the still-rare occasions when a starter couldn't finish. The main pitcher had been replaced by a 3-man rotation, but the relief work was either handled by a starter who wasn't pitching that day or by a spare pitcher. These spare pitchers weren't stars at all and no more celebrated than a bench player, perhaps even less so.
The first true relief ace was a man named Firpo Marberry. Marberry came up with the Washington Senators as a starting pitcher and showed a good deal of promise. I don't know the exact circumstances, but in 1924, Marberry was used mainly as a reliever, only making 15 starts out of 50 appearances. He threw 195.1 IP with a 3.09 ERA (a great 130 ERA+, meaning 30% better than the league average). The Senators went on to win the pennant and their only World Series.
The next season, Marberry pitched exclusively in relief, which was all but unheard of at the time. No one had taken a good pitcher and had them specialize as a reliever; relievers were supposed to be fringe starters or members of the rotation getting in some innings in between starts. Although Marberry would never pitch a full season exclusively in relief, he would become the game's first true "relief pitcher," making 551 career appearances and only 187 starts. More importantly, he was a darn good pitcher, lasting 14 seasons with a career 3.63 ERA (116 ERA+).
The use of Marberry started making others in baseball sit up and take notice. Pitchers were no longer completing 95% of their games anymore, or anything even close. As a greater percentage of a team's innings were allocated to relief pitchers, it became important to have someone on your club who specialized in relief to come in and pitch well in the late innings. Managers also no doubt realized that innings become exponentially more important as the game goes on, making the 9th inning a crucial one. More managers wanted to have an ace set aside for just such late-inning crisis situations.
Relievers were much, much different than they are now. The modern closer -- the guy who only comes in to finish a ballgame, usually in the 9th -- didn't exist. As you can tell from Marberry's innings logged, he was more than a one-inning man. He could come in in the 2nd inning if the starter got bombed and go the distance. Or he could come on in a pinch to snuff out a rally in the 8th. Relievers of Marberry's era were more of this ilk; they resembled a multi-purpose modern swingman more than a closer. With few exceptions, they were not true "aces," and many were indeed failed starters, but their versatility in the middle innings won them a role on every major league club.
The next reliever to change the way we perceive the role was Hall-of-Famer Hoyt Wilhelm. Wilhelm came up in 1952 with the Giants and made an immediate impact; in his first season, he made 71 appearances, threw 159.1 IP, and posted a 2.43 ERA (152 ERA+). He finished second in the league to Brooklyn's Joe Black and amazingly managed a 4th-place finish in the MVP voting. This more than anything shows the shift in perception associated with relief pitchers; they were no longer the rubber-armed failed starters, but were perceived more and more as aces. You need look no further than 1950, when Phillies relief ace Jim Konstanty became the first relief pitcher to win the MVP Award. This was back in the days before the Cy Young, but that still represented a major shift for the game.
The biggest thing that separates Wilhelm and pitchers of his era (Lindy McDaniel, Stu Miller, Elroy Face) from modern relievers is of course the number of innings pitched. No modern pitcher throwing exclusively in relief would even come close to throwing over 150 innings, as Wilhelm did. And yet, Wilhelm threw more than 100 innings per year in relief more often than not. The same was true of Stu Miller and Lindy McDaniel, although Roy Face was closer to the modern model in specialization and the lower number of innings pitched.
As time went on, relievers started to become more and more specialized. A new term entered the baseball lexicon: "closer." This was the guy whose job was to close out ballgames. The relief ace wouldn't be making any innings-eating appearances in the 2nd inning anymore; it was the 7th inning or later. As starting rotations shifted from four to five men, teams naturally began carrying more pitchers to accomodate the innings not picked up by starters. Bullpens began to grow, lending them to specialization. Whereas Marberry was a multi-purpose Swiss-Army knife, baseball in the expansion era found a pitcher to fit every role.
It was in this context that what I call the "true" closers emerged. They were primarily concerned with the 9th inning, which is what sets them apart from their forebears. This trend started in the late 60's, with the most famous example being Mike Marshall's rubber-armed 1974 campaign with the Dodgers when he threw 208.1 IP in 106 games -- all in relief. It took Marshall a few years after that before he managed another dominant year (thus establishing the limits of a pitcher's durability), but it was the pitcher like Marshall who became the "true closers."
Other than Marshall, here is a partial list of the "true" closers from this era: Goose Gossage, Rollie Fingers, Bruce Sutter, Sparky Lyle, Dan Quisenberry, Tug McGraw, Willie Hernandez, Gene Garber, Rawly Eastwick, and others. These were the "true closers," pitchers whose role was to come in whenever the late-inning crisis hit and pitch multiple innings if necessary. Forgive me if I seem to romanticize this era, but I do so because it was about to end abruptly.
It ended because of a statistic.
Now here I am, arguing that the use of a statistic has been bad for the game. But the "save" statistic came to mean much more than a textbook definition. In the same sense that a "Win" has become a magical, individual achievement rather than an arbitrary rulebook measure, a "Save" has become the same. The best pitcher is the pitcher with the most "saves," (or so people thought). Because he "saved" the most games.
And thus the save statistic grew far out of proportion to its actual importance.
Pitchers noticed than in arbitration and on the free agent market, a lot of saves meant more money. Saves were the only stat a relief pitcher could point to to prove that they had a good season. Consequently, pitchers began to pitch more exclusively in save situations. And for some reason, traditional baseball wisdom followed down this path, thinking it the right way.
A "save" is like a win; it represents an arbitrary ruling by the MLB rules committee, not any concrete accomplishment toward a team's wins. A pitcher who "won" 24 games did no such thing in the literal sense, what he did was pitch so as to accumulate 24 games where he met the criteria for the statistic. But even moreso than starting pitching, relief pitching has become a "slave to the save," and the game has suffered for it.
The generation of relievers after the Gossage/Quisenberry era were short-timers; that is, they didn't pitch nearly as many innings as their forebears. A relief ace nowadays pitches around 70-75 innings, whereas it wasn't at all unusual for a "true" closer to go 100 innings. Relievers were less inclined to enter the game earlier than the 9th inningl; they just wanted the save, no matter how much the team might need them in the 8th.
I will admit that it's possible that pitching fewer innings is a good thing. It's possible that this lighter workload is easier on a pitcher's arm; except that there's no evidence that relief aces are getting injured any more or less frequently than they were 20 years ago. Many relievers bore the brunt of consecutive 100-inning seasons and went on to long careers. So the only way that pitching more innings could be valuable is if they're pitching more valuable innings. Sure, guys like Gossage pitched 100+ innings. But maybe Trevor Hoffman is saving all of his stuff for the 9th, which is the most important inning. He's also saving it for save situations, which are the most important for his team. Therefore, Hoffman pitches fewer innings, racks up more saves, and is more valuable than Gossage.
Except that I everything I just said is a lie.
"Saves" are not necessarily the most valuable situations in which to use a reliever. That's the basic fallacy that everyone assumes anytime they use saves as a legitimate measure of a pitcher's value; the assumption that saves are the best thing a relief pitcher can do.
The best thing a relief pitcher can do is to help his team win games. They can do that by getting the save, sure, but there are a lot of very valuable situations that do not qualify for a save. There are also a lot of less valuable situations that do. If we want saves to be the most crucial situations a team faces, then we're counting the wrong innings. Saves are not set up to value the most crucial innings a team faces; rather, they're set up in an entirely arbitrary way to reward someone who pitches the 9th inning when his team is ahead. By extension, we can say that Trevor Hoffman, and most relievers of his era, are pitching the wrong innings. If, for some reason, pitchers like Hoffman are indeed limited to 70 innings (Hoffman has only topped 75 innings twice in 14 seasons), then they're pitching the wrong innings.
Here's a situation: tied ballgame, 9th inning. Home team is batting with the bases loaded and nobody out. Their cleanup hitter is on deck. A win is almost assured. The visiting team brings on its closer, who strikes out the side.
No save.
Here's another situation: visiting team ahead by three runs in the bottom of the 9th. The visiting team's closer comes on to pitch. After getting two ground ball outs, he allows two walks, a double, and a wild pitch that brings the lead down to 1. The final hitter hits a long fly ball to the deepest part of the ballpark, where the outfielder catches it at the warning track.
Save.
Those represent the two extremes, but it also represents the fact that a save does not reward a "good" performance with much consistency. A situation where the game is tied is much, much more important than one where your team is ahead by three. You could conceivably employ a closer with an ERA of 18.00 (allows two runs per inning) and still have him accumulate 20+ saves by only using him with 3-run leads. Indeed, the list of poor pitchers who have accumulated lots of saves (and subsequently lots of money) is a long one.
So what should teams do? Teams shouldn't value a statistic over the reality. The reality is that using your closer in tied ballgames, or in games where you're one run behind, is much more important than in the 9th inning with a 3-run lead. Teams should also be willing to use their closer as early as the sixth inning, to stifle anything that looks like a crucial rally. Teams should not toss out their closer at the first sign of trouble; that would be foolish. But equally foolish is what managers currently do; bring out vastly inferior pitchers to pitch in trouble spots in the late innings, all the while saving your closer for the 9th inningemergency that may never come.
I could cite numerous studies done, both anecdotal and statistical, stating that the best model for closer usage is the Gossage/Quisenberry model. The best attempt at putting the matter to rest is in the Baseball Prospectus book Baseball Between the Numbers. Bill James also makes a reasonable and valid argument in his Historical Baseball Abstract.

So what does all of this have to do with Trevor Hoffman?
It means that we can take 479 saves and throw them out the window. Don't get me wrong, they're important. Saves aren't the best indicator of quality, but anyone who gets this many is doing something right. Just like wins and losses aren't the best way to measure a starting pitcher, but anyone with 300 wins is probably pretty darn good nonetheless.
I don't have the facilities to do a regression analysis; such a thing would give a correlation showing the relationship of a pitcher's saves from year to year. There would be a strong correlation of strikeout rate, walk rate, and home run rate, but a lower correlation in saves and wins, or winning percentage. In place of that, I will list, in order, each league's league leader in saves since 1969, the first year of the divisional era. Obviously, if saves were directly connected (or correlated) to some inner talent -- that is, if pitcher's actually had the ability to get saves, then you would see most the same pitchers on the list year-to-year. A list of home run leaders varies, yes, but is generally stable and indicative of a true inner talent. Let's take a look at saves leaders:
American League: Ron Perranoski ('69-'70), Ken Sanders ('71), Sparky Lyle ('72), John Hiller ('73), Terry Forster ('74), Goose Gossage ('75), Sparky Lyle ('76), Bill Campbell ('77), Goose Gossage ('78), Mike Marshall ('79), Gossage & Quisenberry (tied, '80), Rollie Fingers ('81), Dan Quisenberry ('82-85), Dave Righetti ('86), Tom Henke ('87), Dennis Eckersley ('88), Jeff Russell ('89), Bobby Thigpen ('90), Bryan Harvey ('91), Eckersley ('92), Jeff Montgomery & Duane Ward ('93), Lee Smith ('94), Jose Mesa ('95), John Wetteland ('96), Randy Myers ('97), Tom Gordon ('98), Mariano Rivera ('99), Derek Lowe & Todd Jones ('00), Mariano Rivera ('01), Eddie Guardado ('02), Keith Foulke ('03), Mariano Rivera ('04), Bob Wickman & F. Rodriguez ('05)
National League: Fred Gladding ('69), Wayne Granger ('70), Dave Giusti ('71), Clay Carroll ('72), Mike Marshall ('73-74), Rawly Eastwick & Al Hrabosky ('75), Eastwick ('76), Rollie Fingers ('77-78), Bruce Sutter ('79-82), Lee Smith ('83), Bruce Sutter ('84), Jeff Reardon ('85), Todd Worrell ('86), Steve Bedrosian ('87), John Franco ('88), Mark Davis ('89), John Franco ('90), Lee Smith ('91-92), Randy Myers ('93), John Franco ('94), Randy Myers ('95), Jeff Brantley & Todd Worrell (tied, '96), Jeff Shaw ('97), Trevor Hoffman ('98), Ugueth Urbina ('99), Antonio Alfonseca ('00), Robb Nen ('01), John Smoltz ('02), Eric Gagne ('03), Armando Benitez & Jason Isringhausen (tied, '04), Chad Cordero ('05)

I must admit that there is a volatility inherent in relief pitching that makes a pitcher's unpredictable and uneven in general. This partially shows up here. But I would imagine that in other measures of relief performance, core measures such as strikeout rate and home run rate, you would find a much higher consistency than the above lists. So let's compare the above list of saves to one of the "truest" skills a pitcher can have, strikeout rate. Here are the league leaders in strikeouts per 9 innings since 1969 (I'll eschew the years and give it in more of a shorthand style). Marvel at the consistency:

American League: Sam McDowell, Sam McDowell, Vida Blue, Nolan Ryan, Ryan again, Ryan again, Frank Tanana, Ryan, Ryan, Ryan, Ryan, Len Barker, Barker again, Dave Righetti, Floyd Bannister, Mark Langston, Floyd Bannister, Langston, Langston, Roger Clemens, Ryan, Ryan, Ryan, Randy Johnson, Johnson, Johnson, Johnson, Clemens, Johnson, Clemens, Pedro, Pedro, Hideo Nomo, Pedro, Pedro, Johan Santana, and Santana again.
National League: Tom Griffin, Tom Seaver, Seaver, Seaver, Seaver, Seaver, John Montefusco, Seaver, Jerry Koosman, J.R. Richard, Richard again, Mario Soto, Steve Carlton, Soto, Carlton, Dwight Gooden, Sid Fernandez, Mike Scott, Nolan Ryan, Ryan again, Mark Langston, David Cone, Cone, Cone, Jose Rijo, Andy Benes, Hideo Nomo, John Smoltz, Pedro, Kerry Wood, Randy Johnson, Johnson, Johnson, Johnson, Kerry Wood, Oliver Perez, Mark Prior.

In this case, all but 14 of these guys appear on the list more than once. This is a list that reflects a true, underlying and repeatable talent. There are some flukes (John Montefusco?), but they had less to do with luck; these pitchers had the real thing, but for some of them it didn't last long. If you're wondering, the years immediately before 1969 are dominated by "Sudden" Sam McDowell and some guy named Koufax.

On the saves list, the superstars do manage to pop up several times, but not as much as you'd think. Mariano Rivera, one of the greatest closers of all time, only led the league in saves three times. What if I told you that Babe Ruth only led the league in homers three times, or that Randy Johnson only led the league in strikeouts three times? It would be even more difficult to swallow if the Babe and the Unit had been beaten out by some of the utterly marginal players that appear on these lists. You will get your flukes on the home run list, yes, but not an Antonio Alfonseca-sized fluke.

My point (and I do have one) is that we're going to have to look elsewhere for Trevor Hoffman's Hall-of-Fame case. 479 saves isn't enough. It is a good start, just like a pitcher's win-loss record is a good start, but I simply need more information. Here's what I need to know:

1. Was Trevor Hoffman used to his full advantage as a closer? In other words, did he get a lot of cheap, 3-run lead saves (called "platter saves"), or did he pitch more often in more important roles? Was he a strictly one-inning man, like many of his brethren, or was he more versatile?
2. How does Hoffman compare to his contemporaries? If Hoffman compares very favorably to his contemporaries, then that makes the historical differences less of an issue. If Hoffman's pitched brilliantly compared to his peers, but had a manager that used him in all the wrong innings, we could perhaps forgive that. Not entirely, but somewhat. Because it doesn't just matter how good you were, it matters how much you helped your team win. And a big part of that, unfortunately, is having a manager that uses you to your full potential.
3. Is the difference between Hoffman and the "true" closers so significant? Most of what I've said so far has been in generalities, but it's possible that Hoffman is not used in accordance with his era.
4. Is Hoffman really as amazingly durable as he seems? Because that could be, in and of itself, a point in his favor. Hoffman could get extra credit for prospering for a long time in a position that sees very few consistently prosper, as the above lists show all too clearly. Few relievers dominate for any length of time. If Hoffman, used right or not, was an uncommonly durable pitcher for his position, that's a point in his favor. We would give extra credit to a catcher who managed to stay at the position for 20 years, because catcher is a position that sees a lot of attrition, and a catcher who can still catch and produce at an advanced age is valuable to his team, because it gives them uncommonly good and consistent production from a position that is short on it. The same could be said for Hoffman, putting together a consistently good career in a role that usually chews guys up and spits them out within 3-5 years.

I plan to go pretty in depth into this one and track Hoffman's career as best I can. I'll report back when I have more data.

To the hunt!